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Posted to users@spamassassin.apache.org by Jason Bertoch <ja...@electronet.net> on 2007/08/27 14:59:18 UTC

SPF-Compliant Spam

I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
to meet projections?



Jason A. Bertoch
Network Administrator
jason@electronet.net
ElectroNet Intermedia Consulting
3411 Capital Medical Blvd.
Tallahassee, FL 32308
(V) 850.222.0229 (F) 850.222.8771


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bernd Petrovitsch <be...@firmix.at>.
On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 14:58 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:
[...]
> Some of the flaws in SPF
> The flaws in SPF are numerous and severalfold.
> 
>       * SPF breaks pre-delivery forwarding. 

BTW the trivial solution to this problem is that your customers simply
add your mailservers to the SPF rercords.

>       * SPF creates new categories of third class citizenship. 
>       * SPF doesn't actually address unsolicited bulk mail at all. 

It was never designed for that. Alone this statement makes the whole
page propaganda.

> SPF hijacks existing DNS mechanisms.
> Rather than creating a new DNS resource record type for the new data

There is a already new one.
The next propaganda statement.

[...]
> Ironically, the official SPF answer to the question of what SPF data
> to publish in these circumstances is, effectively, to not adopt SPF:
> 
> > If you run a personal domain, you can either not publish SPF records
> > at all, or set up "v=spf1 +all" for your domain, and you'll be able
> > to send mail from your laptop no matter where you are. 

So what?
This merely states that mail from that domain may come from every host
in the world.
This doesn't apply to my domains and so it doesn't disturb me.

Do I filter mail from a "v=spf1 +all" domain ?
Well, perhaps, why not?
But perhaps someone with a to high number of outgoing mail servers (Does
any ISP has 1K outgoing mailservers? Probably not.) gets only points for
SA.

I purposely didn't comment on the "DNS" arguments - they apply to much
more important services as well than "SPF". And no one cares there.
So why would I care for supposedly spoofed DNS for SPF?

<sarcasm>
I also miss further reasons in the line and quality of: One could
misconfigure with typos it so it *must* be a bad thing.
</sarcasm>

It boils down to the question: Why do SPF-haters wants to support forged
emails?

	Bernd
-- 
Firmix Software GmbH                   http://www.firmix.at/
mobil: +43 664 4416156                 fax: +43 1 7890849-55
          Embedded Linux Development and Services


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Luis Hernán Otegui <lu...@gmail.com>.
2007/8/27, Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>:
>
> http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html
>
>
> SPF is harmful. Adopt it. You've come to this page because you've said
> something similar to the following:
>
>
>  SPF ("sender permitted from" a.k.a. "sender policy framework") is a scheme
> designed to prevent forgery of SMTP-based Internet mail and thus prevent
> unsolicited bulk mail ("spam"). AOL has already adopted it.
>
>  This is the Frequently Given Answer to such statements.
>
> (You can find different approaches to this answer on John Levine's web page,
> in an article by Steven M. Bellovin, and on Brad Knowles' web page. By the
> way, whilst he agrees with what is said here about DNS security, take Brad
> Knowles' DNS server comparison, that he then refers to, with a large sackful
> of salt.)
>
> SPF is harmful. The architectural ramifications of it are so extensive and
> will have such significant changes on the ways that people can access and
> can use Internet mail, that it would actually be less costly to switch to an
> entirely new architecture such as IM2000 Internet mail than it would be to
> switch to SPF and deal with all of its consequences properly.
>
> Many of those architectural ramifications have either been incompletely
> addressed or not addressed at all as yet. Moreover, SPF usurps the meaning
> of an existing and widely used DNS resource record type for its own
> purposes, and has not yet been assigned its own actual resource record type.
> Anyone adopting SPF right now (which means actually adopting it, rather than
> merely paying it lip service) is adopting a scheme that can at best be
> described as woefully incomplete.
>
> Most people who have analysed SPF in detail have come to the conclusion that
> it is a deeply flawed scheme that should be avoided outright.
>
> On the gripping hand, maybe the fact that SPF is so damaging to the
> SMTP-based Internet mail architecture is a good thing. In the battle against
> unsolicited bulk mail, we have concentrated upon the wrong problem time
> after time, with mechanisms that address the wrong thing and that don't
> address the actual "unsolicited" and "bulk" qualities of undesirable mail.
> SMTP has become less usable, more patchy, and more balkanised with each new
> bodge. Perhaps the adoption of SPF will turn out to be the straw that
> finally breaks the camel's back, and that thus finally forcibly weans us off
> this bad habit of addressing the wrong problem.
>
> So perhaps SPF is a deeply flawed scheme that should be adopted.
>
> Ironically: SPF is also a good counter to one objection to IM2000 Internet
> mail, namely that it involves changing the structure of the mail system. If
> people sending mail and mail hosting companies are clearly willing to accept
> the massive structural changes that SPF will entail, they will be willing to
> accept the smaller structural changes that IM2000 Internet mail will entail.
>  Paying SPF lip service
>
>  10,000 domains cannot be wrong! claim the SPF marketing people. (That is
> actually quite a small number, of course. To gain perspective, note that in
> 2002-12-17 there were 22,009,173 domains under com. alone.) But publishing
> SPF data (aside from further entrenching the unauthorised hijacking by SPF
> of an existing DNS resource record type) is merely the paying of lip service
> to SPF.
>
> And, ironically, research has shown that most of the domains that are
> publishing such SPF data are owned by UBM senders, proving, as if any more
> proof were needed, that we are still dancing the same old foolish dance of
> concentrating upon the wrong problem, changing something that is not
> directly related to "unsolicited" and "bulk" and seeing the unsolicited bulk
> mail change to match.
>
> To properly adopt SPF, rather than just to pay it lip service, it is also
> necessary to configure one's SMTP Relay server to look up and to process the
> SPF data for all mail received.
>
> The adoption rate of those who are actually adopting SPF properly, and not
> just paying it lip service, is rather more difficult to measure. The UBM
> senders publishing SPF data probably haven't adopted SPF fully, of course.
> Interestingly, though, many proponents of SPF have fallen silent when asked
> whether, in addition to paying lip service to SPF, they have also configured
> their SMTP Relay servers to check SPF data, leading to the conclusion that
> it is quite probable that many of the SPF proponents in those 10,000 domains
> are paying mere lip service to SPF too.
>  Some of the flaws in SPF
>
>  The flaws in SPF are numerous and severalfold.
>
>  SPF breaks pre-delivery forwarding.
>  SPF hijacks existing DNS mechanisms.
>  SPF gives ISPs a "lock-in" weapon against their customers.
>  SPF is useless for several entire classes of people.
>  SPF relies upon DNS for security, but DNS isn't a security service.
>  SPF is vulnerable to race conditions during database changes.
>  SPF creates new categories of third class citizenship.
>  SPF doesn't actually address unsolicited bulk mail at all.
>  SPF hands Verisign its next unwelcome "innovation" on a platter.
>  SPF breaks pre-delivery forwarding.
>
>  SMTP-based Internet mail is, by design, a "store and forward" architecture.
> Mail is transported from machine to machine, stored and then forwarded on,
> until it finally reaches its destination.
>
> SPF runs fundamentally counter to this architecture. The primary design of
> SPF is that the owner of a domain name publishes a list of SMTP Relay client
> machines associated with that domain, and that SMTP Relay servers reject
> mail with any such envelope sender mailbox names that does not come from an
> SMTP Relay client that is on that list. The architecture that SPF thus
> actually mandates is one where mail is delivered directly from originator to
> recipient, with no "store and forward" hops in between.
>
> This is directly at loggerheads with the "store and forward" nature of
> SMTP-based Internet mail.
> SPF is at loggerheads with RFC 1123
>
>  RFC 1123 describes simple mail exploders, aliases where the mail system
> replaces a particular envelope recipient with zero or more other envelope
> recipients and then forwards the message on to those new recipients. Many
> MTSes have such features. (For examples: This is the operation of forwarding
> instructions in .qmail files and of /etc/aliases in Sendmail.) Many people
> employ such features, moreover. (For examples: Companies will have
> "system-wide" alias mailboxes such as all-sales-representatives. Users will
> choose to forward all mail from one of their mailboxes to another.)
>
> SPF breaks this. Simple mail exploders don't change the envelope sender.
> (Indeed, in the case of system-wide aliases, there's no user account under
> whose aegis the forwarding can be said to have occurred, and so no
> reasonable value to change the envelope sender to.) By declaring that mail
> with a particular envelope sender can only legitimately come from SMTP Relay
> clients that the domain name owner designates, SPF prevents the recipients
> of mail message from forwarding them on to further mailboxes, in the very
> "store and forward" manner that the SMTP-based Internet mail system is
> designed to do.
>
> In essence, SPF allows domain name owners to impose an unwaranted degree of
> control over what recipients can do with their own mail, eliminating
> outright a common mechanism that recipients have heretofore had and have
> widely employed.
>
> SPF is purported to come with a scheme called "SRS" that supposedly fixes
> this problem. But it doesn't. SRS is not even fully thought through, yet. It
> has massive problems of its own:
>
>
>
>  SRS is in conflict with existing systems that store information in the
> envelope sender mailbox name, such as VERPs.
>
>
>  SRS is a system that, after even just two levels of forwarding, causes
> envelope sender mailboxes to become so long that they run the risk of
> hitting mailbox name length limits in mail softwares.
>
>
>  Example: The SRS1 template for envelope sender mailboxes is
> SRS1=hash1=first-hop-domain-part==hash2=timestamp=orig-domain-part=orig-local-part@second-hop-domain-part.
> Plugging a real-world mailbox name and two SPF supporters into that
> template, and using conservative lengths for the hashes and timestamp (Note
> that the timestamps already in use elsewhere in electronic mail, such as
> those in Message IDs, are usually longer than this.), yields
> SRS1=123456=brightmail.com==654321=abcd=tesco.net=J.deBoynePollard@earthlink.net.
> That's 66 characters, 2 characters more than the 64 character length limit
> on mailbox name local parts in SMTP that RFC 2821 § 4.5.3.1 specifies. (And
> we didn't even choose PhilZimmermann.com.)
>
>  The section of the SRS specification entitled "A study on the 64 character
> limit" is empty. This is probably why.
>
>  Of course, SMTP already has a mechanism for incorporating intermediate hop
> information into mailbox names, the source route mechanism described in RFC
> 821 § 3.6. Converting the above mailbox name to a (hypothetical) SRS1 form
> that uses RFC 821 source routing yields
> @earthlink.net,@brightmail.com:SRS1=123456=654321=abcd==J.deBoynePollard@tesco.net,
> which at 41 characters doesn't exceed the RFC 2821 § 4.5.3.1 limit.
> Ironically, AOL, proponent of SPF, worked hard to abolish all use of this
> very mechanism with one of its previous half-baked attempts to combat UBM.
>
>
>  SRS creates the possibility of attackers forging "bounce" messages,
> reintroducing one of the very things that SPF is touted to (but, ironically,
> doesn't actually in any case) prevent.
>
>  The only way to "fix" this problem with SPF is, as some of its proponents
> have asserted, to simply outlaw pre-delivery forwarding in toto and to
> presumptively declare the fact that SPF breaks it therefore to be a
> non-problem. According to those proponents, pre-delivery forwarding is
> simply wrong in concept and all forwarding must be post-delivery, i.e.
> performed by an MUA re-injecting a delivered message into the system as a
> new message with a new envelope declaring it to be from the forwarder.
>
> The outright elimination of pre-delivery forwarding is, of course, a major
> change to the way that people use the mail system.
> SPF is at loggerheads with RFC 974 and RFC 2821
>
>  One of the aspects of the "store and forward" design of SMTP-based Internet
> mail is that of fallback mail exchangers. SPF stops fallback mail exchangers
> from working.
>
> By declaring that mail with a particular envelope sender can only
> legitimately come from SMTP Relay clients that the domain name owner
> designates, SPF prevents fallback mail exchangers from forwarding messages
> on to primary mail exchangers, because of course the domain name owners of
> all of the various envelope sender mailboxes haven't designated the SMTP
> Relay clients on the fallback mail exchanger as being legitimate sources of
> such mail.
>
> Having every domain name owner list the SMTP Relay client sides of every
> fallback mail exchanger in the world in xyr SPF data is of course a
> completely unfeasible solution to this problem, because of scalability
> problems alone.
>
> So therefore every SMTP Relay server that adopts SPF has to disable its use
> for (the SMTP Relay client sides of) every fallback mail exchanger for every
> domain that it accepts mail for. The consequences of this are at the very
> least twofold:
>
>
>
> There's a greater degree of coupling between fallback mail exchangers and
> primary mail exchangers with SPF than there is without SPF. With SPF, every
> company that provides fallback mail exchanger service has to inform its
> customers, so that they can reconfigure their exceptions to SPF, every time
> that the company moves the SMTP Relay client side of its fallback mail
> exchanger. Without SPF, companies that provide fallback mail exchanger
> service don't have to tell their customers where their SMTP Relay clients
> are.
>
>
> All fallback mail exchangers become holes in the system. Every fallback mail
> exchanger is a potential source of mail that has not passed through SPF's
> (erroneous and ill-conceived) checks on envelope sender mailbox names.
>
>  For example: If an ISP provides fallback mail exchanger service to one set
> of customers and also provides SMTP Submission service to another set of
> customers via the same system (a not uncommon state of affairs), then all
> mail submitted by any of the second set of customers via the SMTP Submission
> service can bypass all SPF checks when addressed to any of the first set of
> customers who have bought fallback mail exchanger service. To avoid this
> hole, ISPs have to run entirely separate systems for SMTP Relay and SMTP
> Submission. Again, SPF changes the current architecture of SMTP-based
> Internet mail.
>
>  The same problem applies to organisations where the SMTP Relay server seen
> by the outside world is not the final mailhost, but instead mail is relayed
> internally across the organisation's own network. Again, the use of SPF
> validation on the parts of the internal SMTP Relay servers has to be
> disabled, yielding holes in the system, and the same consequences occur.
>  SPF hijacks existing DNS mechanisms.
>
>  Rather than creating a new DNS resource record type for the new data to be
> published in the public DNS database, SPF unilaterally redefines the meaning
> of an existing DNS resource record type, TXT, for its own purposes. This
> creates a conflict between SPF and all existing uses of TXT resource
> records.
>  SPF gives ISPs a "lock-in" weapon against their customers.
>
>  In the SMTP-based Internet mail system, the nature of the system allows
> people to "roam". People may employ their own mailbox names as the envelope
> sender, whatever place they may be submitting the mail into the system at.
> For examples:
>
>
>
> A person who is a guest user on another system may employ their own mailbox
> name as the envelope sender on mail that they send from that system
> (employing the ${QMAILSHOST} mechanism in qmail, for example).
>
>
> A person may own a mailbox name, or even an entire domain, and may submit
> mail directly, connecting to Internet via various ISPs.
>
>
> A person may have bought the services of multiple ISPs, each supplying the
> user with a mailbox name, and may submit mail via any of those ISPs, or
> directly, using any of those mailbox names as the envelope sender.
>
>  SPF breaks this, providing ISPs (that provide mail hosting services to
> their customers) with a draconian lock-in weapon to wield against their
> customers. An ISP can employ SPF to prevent its customers from submitting
> mail, using those customers' own mailbox names as the envelope senders, from
> elsewhere other than the ISP itself, preventing the customer from submitting
> mail directly, via another ISP, or as a guest of another system.
>  SPF is useless for several entire classes of people.
>
>  Even leaving aside the desirability of doing so, there isn't even a way
> with SPF to publish reliable or meaningful SPF data for entire classes of
> people.
> SPF is useless for SMTP Relay clients with dynamically-assigned IP
> addresses.
>
>  Whilst it is impractical and a bad idea (because it allows mail to be
> intercepted or to be lost) for an SMTP Relay server to listen on a
> dynamically assigned IP address, there is no similar prohibition on SMTP
> Relay clients connecting from dynamically assigned IP addresses. However,
> SPF is useless for people with such SMTP Relay clients.
>
> Supposedly, the SPF "ptr" mechanism is there for dealing with publishing
> data about such SMTP Relay clients. However, this is just the flawed
> "double-reverse lookup" mechanism in a paper-thin disguise. It's a
> half-baked idea that is conceptually flawed and that doesn't actually work.
> SPF is useless for roaming SMTP Relay clients.
>
>  A person may own an entire domain and wish to submit mail, using mailbox
> names in xyr own domain as the envelope senders, directly from a system with
> a dynamically-assigned IP address (such as, for example, a portable system
> that connects via multiple ISPs).
>
> Ironically, the official SPF answer to the question of what SPF data to
> publish in these circumstances is, effectively, to not adopt SPF:
> If you run a personal domain, you can either not publish SPF records at all,
> or set up "v=spf1 +all" for your domain, and you'll be able to send mail
> from your laptop no matter where you are.
>  SPF relies upon DNS for security, but DNS isn't a security service.
>
>  SPF places far too much trust in the DNS. DNS lookups are liable to attack
> by spoofed responses. (Many people are surprised when they learn how easy
> this is.)
>
>  Moreover, even aside from the potential for spoofing, by relying upon the
> DNS for SMTP Relay client validation information SPF relies upon
> attacker-supplied data, a foolish design for any sort of validation system.
> It's trivial for malicious senders to create throwaway domain names with
> published DNS data, that they supply, declaring any SMTP Relay clients that
> they like to be (as far as SPF is concerned) "legitimate". And there's no
> shortage of such domain names to use once and then throw away.
>  SPF is vulnerable to race conditions during database changes.
>
>  DNS is a distributed database. Resource record sets are cached in proxy DNS
> servers around the world. Changing information published in the DNS database
> involves careful management, in the shape of employing the "time to die"
> features of content DNS server softwares, if one is to avoid the case where
> some proxy DNS servers will have old information and others will have new
> information. Some content DNS server softwares simply do not have such
> features, and the case is thus unavoidable.
>
> This means that there is a race condition whenever the (SPF-defined)
> "legitimacy" of an SMTP Relay client is revoked by changing the published
> DNS data. During the TTL period of the old TXT resource record set, some
> areas of the world will still consider that SMTP Relay client to be (what
> SPF defines to be) "legitimate".
>  SPF creates new categories of third class citizenship.
>
>  It's ironic, given its prior history of bodges to SMTP that AOL is
> presented as the champion of SPF.
>
> AOL is already famous for dividing the Internet up into three classes of
> citizens, placing the customers of all other ISPs into the third class and
> refusing to have any dealings with them for mail service. SPF is just more
> of the same sort of discrimination. With SPF, the third class of citizens
> with whom AOL will refuse to have dealings is, of course, those who aren't
> locked into their ISPs for mail service.
>  SPF doesn't actually address unsolicited bulk mail at all.
>
>  "Sent by an SMTP Relay client that one doesn't expect" is not the same as
> "unsolicited bulk". Blocking mail with the former quality won't block mail
> with the latter.
>
> Moreover: Consider the case of the unsolicited bulk mail generated by
> Microsoft Worms, for example. Microsoft Worms run on infected machines, and
> using the same mail submission tools that the machine's owner uses to submit
> normal mail, they mail themselves to other people. SPF does not and cannot
> distinguish such mail traffic generated by Microsoft Worms from normal mail
> traffic sent by the machine's owner. It's submitted to the same submission
> service, using the same user credentials, and travels along the same route,
> as all other mail.
>  SPF marketing
>
>  But SPF isn't an anti-UBM tool and was never portayed as such! goes the
> cry.
>
> Someone appears to have forgotten to tell the SPF webmaster and Meng Weng
> Wong himself that, then.
>
>
>
>  SPF reduces inbound spam. -- SPF web site "executive summary"
>
>
>  If the message fails SPF tests, it's a forgery. That's how you can tell
> it's probably a spammer. -- SPF web site FAQ answers (That first sentence is
> untrue, of course.)
>
>
>  Eventually, as SMTP improves its immunity to spam, we hope spammers will
> get discouraged. -- SPF web site FAQ answers
>
>
>  'Why should SPF succeed when similar proposals have failed in the past?'
> The spam problem was never as bad in the past as it is now. -- SPF web site
> FAQ answers
>
>
>  SPF is ushering in a new set of anti-spam systems, [...] -- SPF web site
>
>
>  Saving the world from spam is an expensive duty. -- SPF web site requesting
> your money
>
>
>  I really believe if SPF sees fast widespread adoption we can stop spam
> sooner than you think. -- Meng Weng Wong
>  SPF hands Verisign its next unwelcome "innovation" on a platter.
>
>  We have already witnessed that Verisign is prepared to put into action
> schemes to make itself more money at the expense of other Internet entities.
> It has already once made a land grab claiming all previously unowned *.com.
> and *.net. subdomains as its own, in order to sell advertising rights on web
> pages that it had set up associated with all of those domains, at the
> expense of many other Internet users using many other features of Internet.
>
> SPF hands Verisign another nice little money spinner, in the form of
> enabling it to specify what SPF data are published for unowned domains by
> simply adding TXT resource record sets to its wildcards, and to sell the
> rights to have their SMTP Relay clients properly validated by SPF, for huge
> numbers of previously unowned domain names, to the highest bidding UBM
> sender.
>
> Some ISPs already have "pink contracts" with UBM senders, essentially
> providing them with services in exchange for a cut of the take. And Verisign
> is already attempting to bring its *.com. and *.net. wildcards back into
> service so that vast numbers of people are directed to its web servers with
> the advertising space once again. It seems likely, therefore, that Verisign
> would find this additional money spinner very difficult to resist.
>
So what? A few months ago we got in this very list a post about some
nut-minded article on how some "new" technology was beating most anti
spam solutions. Its name? Challenge-Response Authentication... It
violates RFCs and, as was said, it's wrong. But you yet deffend it, if
I don't recall badly.
If I had to make an argumentatory page about each thing I find useless
(in my own world), my servers would be full with crap...

Please, when argumenting in favor or against some practice, do it with
more than rumors about fraudulent bussiness practices.

Peace,

Luis

-- 
-------------------------------------------------
GNU-GPL: "May The Source Be With You...
Linux Registered User #448382.
When I grow up, I wanna be like Theo...
-------------------------------------------------

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.
http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html


  SPF is harmful. Adopt it.

You've come to this page because you've said something similar to the 
following:

    SPF ("sender permitted from" a.k.a. "sender policy framework") is a
    scheme designed to prevent forgery of SMTP-based Internet mail and
    thus prevent unsolicited bulk mail ("spam"). AOL has already adopted
    it.

This is the /Frequently Given Answer/ to such statements.

(You can find different approaches to this answer on John Levine's web 
page <http://www.taugh.com./mp/lmap.html>, in an article by Steven M. 
Bellovin 
<ne...@ux13.sp.cs.cmu.edu>, 
and on Brad Knowles' web page 
<http://bradknowles.typepad.com./considered_harmful/2004/05/spf.html>. 
By the way, whilst he agrees with what is said here about DNS security, 
take Brad Knowles' DNS server comparison, that he then refers to, with a 
large sackful of salt <http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/knowles.html>.)

SPF is harmful. The architectural ramifications of it are so extensive 
and will have such significant changes on the ways that people can 
access and can use Internet mail, that it would actually be /less/ 
costly to switch to an entirely new architecture such as IM2000 Internet 
mail <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/Proposals/IM2000/> 
than it would be to switch to SPF and deal with all of its consequences 
properly.

Many of those architectural ramifications have either been incompletely 
addressed or not addressed at all as yet. Moreover, SPF usurps the 
meaning of an existing and widely used DNS resource record type for its 
own purposes, and has not yet been assigned its own actual resource 
record type. Anyone adopting SPF right now (which means /actually/ 
adopting it, rather than merely paying it lip service 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#LipService>) 
is adopting a scheme that can at best be described as woefully incomplete.

Most people who have analysed SPF in detail have come to the conclusion 
that it is a deeply flawed scheme that should be avoided outright.

On the gripping hand, maybe the fact that SPF is so damaging to the 
SMTP-based Internet mail architecture is a good thing. In the battle 
against unsolicited bulk mail, we have concentrated upon the wrong 
problem time after time 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-anti-ubm-dont-work.html>, 
with mechanisms that address the wrong thing and that don't address the 
actual "unsolicited" and "bulk" qualities of undesirable mail. SMTP has 
become less usable, more patchy, and more balkanised with each new 
bodge. Perhaps the adoption of SPF will turn out to be the straw that 
finally breaks the camel's back, and that thus finally forcibly weans us 
off this bad habit of addressing the wrong problem.

So perhaps SPF is a deeply flawed scheme that should be adopted.

Ironically: SPF is also a good counter to one objection to IM2000 
Internet mail 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/Proposals/IM2000/>, namely 
that it involves changing the structure of the mail system. If people 
sending mail and mail hosting companies are clearly willing to accept 
the massive structural changes that SPF will entail, they will be 
willing to accept the smaller structural changes that IM2000 Internet 
mail will entail.


    Paying SPF lip service

10,000 domains cannot be wrong! claim the SPF marketing people. (That is 
actually quite a small number, of course. To gain perspective, note that 
in 2002-12-17 there were 22,009,173 domains /under com. alone/.) But 
publishing SPF data (aside from further entrenching the unauthorised 
hijacking by SPF of an existing DNS resource record type 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#HijackTXTResourceRecordType>) 
is merely the paying of lip service to SPF.

And, ironically, research has shown that most of the domains that /are/ 
publishing such SPF data are owned by UBM senders, proving, as if any 
more proof were needed, that we are still dancing the same old foolish 
dance of concentrating upon the wrong problem 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-anti-ubm-dont-work.html>, 
changing something that is /not/ directly related to "unsolicited" and 
"bulk" and seeing the unsolicited bulk mail change to match.

To properly adopt SPF, rather than just to pay it lip service, it is 
also necessary to configure one's SMTP Relay server to look up and to 
process the SPF data for all mail received.

The adoption rate of those who are actually adopting SPF properly, and 
not just paying it lip service, is rather more difficult to measure. The 
UBM senders publishing SPF data probably haven't adopted SPF fully, of 
course. Interestingly, though, many proponents of SPF have fallen silent 
when asked whether, in addition to paying lip service to SPF, they have 
also configured their SMTP Relay servers to check SPF data, leading to 
the conclusion that it is quite probable that many of the SPF proponents 
in those 10,000 domains are paying mere lip service to SPF too.


    Some of the flaws in SPF

The flaws in SPF are numerous and severalfold.

    * SPF breaks pre-delivery forwarding.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#PreDeliveryForwarding>

    * SPF hijacks existing DNS mechanisms.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#HijackTXTResourceRecordType>

    * SPF gives ISPs a "lock-in" weapon against their customers.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#ISPLockIn>

    * SPF is useless for several entire classes of people.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#Uselessness>

    * SPF relies upon DNS for security, but DNS isn't a security
      service.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#DatabaseSecurity>

    * SPF is vulnerable to race conditions during database changes.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#DatabaseUpdateRace>

    * SPF creates new categories of third class citizenship.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#ThirdClassCitizens>

    * SPF doesn't actually address unsolicited bulk mail at all.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#WrongProblem>

    * SPF hands Verisign its next unwelcome "innovation" on a platter.
      <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-spf-is-harmful.html#Verisign>



      SPF breaks pre-delivery forwarding.

SMTP-based Internet mail is, by design, a "store and forward" 
architecture. Mail is transported from machine to machine, stored and 
then forwarded on, until it finally reaches its destination.

SPF runs fundamentally counter to this architecture. The primary design 
of SPF is that the owner of a domain name publishes a list of SMTP Relay 
client machines associated with that domain, and that SMTP Relay servers 
reject mail with any such envelope sender mailbox names that does not 
come from an SMTP Relay client that is on that list. The architecture 
that SPF thus actually mandates is one where mail is delivered directly 
from originator to recipient, with no "store and forward" hops in between.

This is directly at loggerheads with the "store and forward" nature of 
SMTP-based Internet mail.


        SPF is at loggerheads with RFC 1123

RFC 1123 describes simple mail exploders, aliases where the mail system 
replaces a particular envelope recipient with zero or more other 
envelope recipients and then forwards the message on to those new 
recipients. Many MTSes have such features. (For examples: This is the 
operation of forwarding instructions in .qmail files and of /etc/aliases 
in Sendmail.) Many people employ such features, moreover. (For examples: 
Companies will have "system-wide" alias mailboxes such as 
all-sales-representatives. Users will choose to forward all mail from 
one of their mailboxes to another.)

SPF breaks this. Simple mail exploders don't change the envelope sender. 
(Indeed, in the case of system-wide aliases, there's no user account 
under whose aegis the forwarding can be said to have occurred, and so no 
reasonable value to change the envelope sender to.) By declaring that 
mail with a particular envelope sender can /only/ legitimately come from 
SMTP Relay clients that the domain name owner designates, SPF prevents 
the recipients of mail message from forwarding them on to further 
mailboxes, in the very "store and forward" manner that the SMTP-based 
Internet mail system is designed to do.

In essence, SPF allows domain name owners to impose an unwaranted degree 
of control over what recipients can do /with their own mail/, 
eliminating outright a common mechanism that recipients have heretofore 
had and have widely employed.

SPF is purported to come with a scheme called "SRS" that supposedly 
fixes this problem. But it doesn't. SRS is not even fully thought 
through, yet. It has massive problems of its own:

    *

      SRS is in conflict with existing systems that store information in
      the envelope sender mailbox name, such as VERPs.

    *

      SRS is a system that, after even just two levels of forwarding,
      causes envelope sender mailboxes to become so long that they run
      the risk of hitting mailbox name length limits in mail softwares.

          Example: The SRS1 template for envelope sender mailboxes is
          SRS1=hash1=first-hop-domain-part==hash2=timestamp=orig-domain-part=orig-local-part@second-hop-domain-part.
          Plugging a real-world mailbox name and two SPF supporters into
          that template, and using conservative lengths for the hashes
          and timestamp (Note that the timestamps already in use
          elsewhere in electronic mail, such as those in Message IDs,
          are usually longer than this.), yields
          SRS1=123456=brightmail.com==654321=abcd=tesco.net=J.deBoynePollard@earthlink.net.
          That's 66 characters, 2 characters more than the 64 character
          length limit on mailbox name local parts in SMTP that RFC 2821
          § 4.5.3.1 specifies. (And we didn't even choose
          PhilZimmermann.com.)

          The section of the SRS specification entitled "A study on the
          64 character limit" is empty. This is probably why.

          Of course, SMTP already has a mechanism for incorporating
          intermediate hop information into mailbox names, the source
          route mechanism described in RFC 821 § 3.6. Converting the
          above mailbox name to a (hypothetical) SRS1 form that uses RFC
          821 source routing yields
          @earthlink.net,@brightmail.com:SRS1=123456=654321=abcd==J.deBoynePollard@tesco.net,
          which at 41 characters doesn't exceed the RFC 2821 § 4.5.3.1
          limit. Ironically, AOL, proponent of SPF, worked hard to
          /abolish/ all use of this very mechanism with one of its
          previous half-baked attempts to combat UBM
          <http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-anti-ubm-dont-work.html#SourceRouting>.


    *

      SRS creates the possibility of attackers forging "bounce"
      messages, reintroducing one of the very things that SPF is touted
      to (but, ironically, doesn't actually in any case) prevent.

The only way to "fix" this problem with SPF is, as some of its 
proponents have asserted, to simply outlaw pre-delivery forwarding /in 
toto/ and to presumptively declare the fact that SPF breaks it therefore 
to be a non-problem. According to those proponents, pre-delivery 
forwarding is simply wrong in concept and /all/ forwarding must be 
post-delivery, i.e. performed by an MUA re-injecting a delivered message 
into the system as a new message with a new envelope declaring it to be 
from the forwarder.

The outright elimination of pre-delivery forwarding is, of course, a 
major change to the way that people use the mail system.


        SPF is at loggerheads with RFC 974 and RFC 2821

One of the aspects of the "store and forward" design of SMTP-based 
Internet mail is that of fallback mail exchangers. SPF stops fallback 
mail exchangers from working.

By declaring that mail with a particular envelope sender can /only/ 
legitimately come from SMTP Relay clients that the domain name owner 
designates, SPF prevents fallback mail exchangers from forwarding 
messages on to primary mail exchangers, because of course the domain 
name owners of all of the various envelope sender mailboxes haven't 
designated the SMTP Relay clients on the fallback mail exchanger as 
being legitimate sources of such mail.

Having every domain name owner list the SMTP Relay client sides of every 
fallback mail exchanger in the world in xyr SPF data is of course a 
completely unfeasible solution to this problem, because of scalability 
problems alone.

So therefore every SMTP Relay server that adopts SPF has to disable its 
use for (the SMTP Relay client sides of) every fallback mail exchanger 
for every domain that it accepts mail for. The consequences of this are 
at the very least twofold:

    *

      There's a greater degree of coupling between fallback mail
      exchangers and primary mail exchangers with SPF than there is
      without SPF. With SPF, every company that provides fallback mail
      exchanger service has to inform its customers, so that they can
      reconfigure their exceptions to SPF, every time that the company
      moves the SMTP Relay client side of its fallback mail exchanger.
      Without SPF, companies that provide fallback mail exchanger
      service don't have to tell their customers where their SMTP Relay
      clients are.

    *

      All fallback mail exchangers become holes in the system. Every
      fallback mail exchanger is a potential source of mail that has not
      passed through SPF's (erroneous and ill-conceived) checks on
      envelope sender mailbox names.

      For example: If an ISP provides fallback mail exchanger service to
      one set of customers and /also/ provides SMTP Submission service
      to another set of customers via the same system (a not uncommon
      state of affairs), then all mail submitted by any of the second
      set of customers via the SMTP Submission service can bypass all
      SPF checks when addressed to any of the first set of customers who
      have bought fallback mail exchanger service. To avoid this hole,
      ISPs have to run /entirely separate/ systems for SMTP Relay and
      SMTP Submission. Again, SPF changes the current architecture of
      SMTP-based Internet mail.

The same problem applies to organisations where the SMTP Relay server 
seen by the outside world is not the final mailhost, but instead mail is 
relayed internally across the organisation's own network. Again, the use 
of SPF validation on the parts of the internal SMTP Relay servers has to 
be disabled, yielding holes in the system, and the same consequences occur.


      SPF hijacks existing DNS mechanisms.

Rather than creating a new DNS resource record type for the new data to 
be published in the public DNS database, SPF unilaterally redefines the 
meaning of an existing DNS resource record type, TXT, for its own 
purposes. This creates a conflict between SPF and all existing uses of 
TXT resource records.


      SPF gives ISPs a "lock-in" weapon against their customers.

In the SMTP-based Internet mail system, the nature of the system allows 
people to "roam". People may employ /their own/ mailbox names as the 
envelope sender, whatever place they may be submitting the mail into the 
system at. For examples:

    *

      A person who is a guest user on another system may employ their
      own mailbox name as the envelope sender on mail that they send
      from that system (employing the ${QMAILSHOST} mechanism in qmail,
      for example).

    *

      A person may own a mailbox name, or even an entire domain, and may
      submit mail directly, connecting to Internet via various ISPs.

    *

      A person may have bought the services of multiple ISPs, each
      supplying the user with a mailbox name, and may submit mail via
      any of those ISPs, or directly, using any of those mailbox names
      as the envelope sender.

SPF breaks this, providing ISPs (that provide mail hosting services to 
their customers) with a draconian lock-in weapon to wield against their 
customers. An ISP can employ SPF to prevent its customers from 
submitting mail, using /those customers' own/ mailbox names as the 
envelope senders, from elsewhere other than the ISP itself, preventing 
the customer from submitting mail directly, via another ISP, or as a 
guest of another system.


      SPF is useless for several entire classes of people.

Even leaving aside the desirability of doing so, there isn't even a way 
with SPF to publish reliable or meaningful SPF data for entire classes 
of people.


        SPF is useless for SMTP Relay clients with dynamically-assigned
        IP addresses.

Whilst it is impractical and a bad idea (because it allows mail to be 
intercepted or to be lost) for an SMTP Relay /server/ to listen on a 
dynamically assigned IP address, there is no similar prohibition on SMTP 
Relay /clients/ connecting from dynamically assigned IP addresses. 
However, SPF is useless for people with such SMTP Relay clients.

Supposedly, the SPF "ptr" mechanism is there for dealing with publishing 
data about such SMTP Relay clients. However, this is just the flawed 
"double-reverse lookup" mechanism 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/dns-avoid-double-reverse.html> 
in a paper-thin disguise. It's a half-baked idea that is conceptually 
flawed and that doesn't actually work.


        SPF is useless for roaming SMTP Relay clients.

A person may own an entire domain and wish to submit mail, using mailbox 
names in xyr own domain as the envelope senders, directly from a system 
with a dynamically-assigned IP address (such as, for example, a portable 
system that connects via multiple ISPs).

Ironically, the official SPF answer to the question of what SPF data to 
publish in these circumstances is, effectively, to /not adopt SPF/:

> If you run a personal domain, you can either not publish SPF records 
> at all, or set up |"v=spf1 +all"| for your domain, and you'll be able 
> to send mail from your laptop no matter where you are. 


      SPF relies upon DNS for security, but DNS isn't a security service.

SPF places far too much trust in the DNS. DNS lookups are liable to 
attack by spoofed responses. (Many people are surprised when they learn 
how easy this is <http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/forgery.html>.)

Moreover, even aside from the potential for spoofing, by relying upon 
the DNS for SMTP Relay client validation information SPF relies upon 
attacker-supplied data, a foolish design for any sort of validation 
system. It's trivial for malicious senders to create throwaway domain 
names with published DNS data, that they supply, declaring any SMTP 
Relay clients that they like to be (as far as SPF is concerned) 
"legitimate". And there's no shortage of such domain names to use once 
and then throw away.


      SPF is vulnerable to race conditions during database changes.

DNS is a distributed database. Resource record sets are cached in proxy 
DNS servers 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/dns-server-roles.html#Proxy> 
around the world. Changing information published in the DNS database 
involves careful management, in the shape of employing the "time to die" 
features of content DNS server softwares, if one is to avoid the case 
where some proxy DNS servers will have old information and others will 
have new information. Some content DNS server softwares simply do not 
have such features, and the case is thus unavoidable.

This means that there is a race condition whenever the (SPF-defined) 
"legitimacy" of an SMTP Relay client is revoked by changing the 
published DNS data. During the TTL period of the old TXT resource record 
set, some areas of the world will still consider that SMTP Relay client 
to be (what SPF defines to be) "legitimate".


      SPF creates new categories of third class citizenship.

It's ironic, given its prior history of bodges to SMTP 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/smtp-anti-ubm-dont-work.html#SourceRouting> 
that AOL is presented as the champion of SPF.

AOL is already famous for dividing the Internet up into three classes of 
citizens, placing the customers of all other ISPs into the third class 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/maps-dul-is-wrong.html> 
and refusing to have any dealings with them for mail service. SPF is 
just more of the same sort of discrimination. With SPF, the third class 
of citizens with whom AOL will refuse to have dealings is, of course, 
those who aren't locked into their ISPs for mail service.


      SPF doesn't actually address unsolicited bulk mail at all.

"Sent by an SMTP Relay client that one doesn't expect" is not the same 
as "unsolicited bulk". Blocking mail with the former quality won't block 
mail with the latter.

Moreover: Consider the case of the unsolicited bulk mail generated by 
Microsoft Worms, for example. Microsoft Worms run on infected machines, 
and using the /same/ mail submission tools that the machine's owner uses 
to submit normal mail, they mail themselves to other people. SPF does 
not and cannot distinguish such mail traffic generated by Microsoft 
Worms from normal mail traffic sent by the machine's owner. It's 
submitted to the same submission service, using the same user 
credentials, and travels along the same route, as all other mail.


        SPF marketing

But SPF isn't an anti-UBM tool and was never portayed as such! goes the 
cry.

Someone appears to have forgotten to tell the SPF webmaster and Meng 
Weng Wong himself that, then.

    *

      SPF reduces inbound spam. -- SPF web site "executive summary"
      <http://spf.pobox.com./execsumm.html>

    *

      If the message fails SPF tests, it's a forgery. That's how you can
      tell it's probably a spammer. -- SPF web site FAQ answers
      <http://spf.pobox.com./faq.html> (That first sentence is untrue,
      of course.)

    *

      Eventually, as SMTP improves its immunity to spam, we hope
      spammers will get discouraged. -- SPF web site FAQ answers
      <http://spf.pobox.com./faq.html>

    *

      'Why should SPF succeed when similar proposals have failed in the
      past?' The spam problem was never as bad in the past as it is now.
      -- SPF web site FAQ answers <http://spf.pobox.com./faq.html>

    *

      SPF is ushering in a new set of anti-spam systems, [...] -- SPF
      web site <http://spf.pobox.com./>

    *

      Saving the world from spam is an expensive duty. -- SPF web site
      requesting your money <http://spf.pobox.com./donations.html>

    *

      I really believe if SPF sees fast widespread adoption we can stop
      spam sooner than you think. -- Meng Weng Wong <http://mengwong.com./>


      SPF hands Verisign its next unwelcome "innovation" on a platter.

We have already witnessed that Verisign is prepared to put into action 
schemes to make itself more money at the expense of other Internet 
entities. It has already once made a land grab claiming all previously 
unowned *.com. and *.net. subdomains as its own 
<http://homepages.tesco.net/J.deBoynePollard/FGA/verisign-internet-coup.html>, 
in order to sell advertising rights on web pages that it had set up 
associated with all of those domains, at the expense of many other 
Internet users using many other features of Internet.

SPF hands Verisign another nice little money spinner, in the form of 
enabling it to specify what SPF data are published for unowned domains 
by simply adding TXT resource record sets to its wildcards, and to sell 
the rights to have their SMTP Relay clients properly validated by SPF, 
for huge numbers of previously unowned domain names, to the highest 
bidding UBM sender.

Some ISPs already have "pink contracts" with UBM senders, essentially 
providing them with services in exchange for a cut of the take. And 
Verisign is already attempting to bring its *.com. and *.net. wildcards 
back into service so that vast numbers of people are directed to its web 
servers with the advertising space once again. It seems likely, 
therefore, that Verisign would find this additional money spinner very 
difficult to resist.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Luis Hernán Otegui <lu...@gmail.com>.
2007/8/27, Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>:
>
>
>
>  Luis Hernán Otegui wrote:
>  2007/8/27, Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>:
>
>
>  Meng Weng Wong wrote:
>
>
>  On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:
>
>
>
>  Jason Bertoch wrote:
>
>
>  Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF
> has failed
> to meet projections?
>
>  It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful information:
> You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's
> domain name, and not an innocent third-party's. Blacklist it without
> hesitation!
>
>
>  Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.
>
> Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many
> interesting things.
>
> For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its nameservers.
>
> You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.
>
> The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> reputation lookup.
>
> I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS ->
> reputation lookup.
>
>
>
>  Meng - you are doing the email community a huge disservice with SPF. I
> wish you'd just end this lie because SPF is less than useless. I breaks
> existing forwarding standards and it causes false positives. SPF DOESN'T
> WORK!
>
>  If my two cents worth anything here, Marc, you're the one doing a
> major damage to the email community by trying to reduce everything to
> DNS lookups.
>
> Without going into technical arguments about your practices, you're
> treating us who don't do as you do as mere stupids. And that, IMHO, is
> a terrible simplification. If you find you're in the right path FOR
> YOUR SITUATION, that's ok with me. But you CANNOT become a fanatic and
> begin yelling to the rest of us that we're going to hell because we
> don't agree with you. Qouting Einstein, "Only a fool confuses reality
> with the model. Such a simplification leads to a narrow mind"...
>
> Now, on the technical hand, SPF is an anti-forgery tool, as was said
> earlier in this discussion. I publish my records for anyone to know if
> a message which claims to come from my servers (or at least, my
> domain) is legit or not. If you run majordomo mor mailman based lists,
> the forwarding issue goes down... Or you could just rewrite your SPF
> records to include the domains that get forwarded usually, as I do
> between the two major domains I manage...
>
> Peace,
>
> Luis
>
>
>
>  Juis - you have 2 domains. I have 1600 domains. I have no control over
> other domains that people forward to domains that I filter for. So if I used
> SPF then I would be bouncing a LOT of good emaim from domiains that I don't
> control.
No, I said I have TWO PRIMARY DOMAINS. I host/have 25 different
domains, some more active than anothers. I know 25 it's WAAAY much
less than 1600, but still I try to do things the right way. The number
should not be an excuse.
Whenever I catch someone who doesn't do things the right way (and NOT
my right way, but the one suggested by RFCs), I first point them in
the right direction, then offer advice to them, and last (but not
least) refer the complains from my (or their) users to them.
Oh, and by the way, my name is Luis.

Peace,


Luis

-- 
-------------------------------------------------
GNU-GPL: "May The Source Be With You...
Linux Registered User #448382.
When I grow up, I wanna be like Theo...
-------------------------------------------------

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Luis Hernán Otegui wrote:
> 2007/8/27, Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>:
>   
>> Meng Weng Wong wrote:
>>     
>>> On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:
>>>
>>>       
>>>> Jason Bertoch wrote:
>>>>         
>>>>> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF
>>>>> has failed
>>>>> to meet projections?
>>>>>           
>>>> It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful information:
>>>> You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's
>>>> domain name, and not an innocent third-party's.  Blacklist it without
>>>> hesitation!
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.
>>>
>>> Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many
>>> interesting things.
>>>
>>> For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its nameservers.
>>>
>>> You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.
>>>
>>> The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> reputation lookup.
>>>
>>> I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS ->
>>> reputation lookup.
>>>
>>>
>>>       
>> Meng - you are doing the email community a huge disservice with SPF. I
>> wish you'd just end this lie because SPF is less than useless. I breaks
>> existing forwarding standards and it causes false positives. SPF DOESN'T
>> WORK!
>>     
> If my two cents worth anything here, Marc, you're the one doing a
> major damage to the email community by trying to reduce everything to
> DNS lookups.
>
> Without going into technical arguments about your practices, you're
> treating us who don't do as you do as mere stupids. And that, IMHO, is
> a terrible simplification. If you find you're in the right path FOR
> YOUR SITUATION, that's ok with me. But you CANNOT become a fanatic and
> begin yelling to the rest of us that we're going to hell because we
> don't agree with you. Qouting Einstein, "Only a fool confuses reality
> with the model. Such a simplification leads to a narrow mind"...
>
> Now, on the technical hand, SPF is an anti-forgery tool, as was said
> earlier in this discussion. I publish my records for anyone to know if
> a message which claims to come from my servers (or at least, my
> domain) is legit or not. If you run majordomo mor mailman based lists,
> the forwarding issue goes down... Or you could just rewrite your SPF
> records to include the domains that get forwarded usually, as I do
> between the two major domains I manage...
>
> Peace,
>
> Luis
>
>   

Juis - you have 2 domains. I have 1600 domains. I have no control over 
other domains that people forward to domains that I filter for. So if I 
used SPF then I would be bouncing a LOT of good emaim from domiains that 
I don't control.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Luis Hernán Otegui <lu...@gmail.com>.
2007/8/27, Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>:
>
>
> Meng Weng Wong wrote:
> > On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:
> >
> >> Jason Bertoch wrote:
> >>> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF
> >>> has failed
> >>> to meet projections?
> >>
> >> It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful information:
> >> You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's
> >> domain name, and not an innocent third-party's.  Blacklist it without
> >> hesitation!
> >>
> >
> > Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.
> >
> > Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many
> > interesting things.
> >
> > For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its nameservers.
> >
> > You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.
> >
> > The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> reputation lookup.
> >
> > I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS ->
> > reputation lookup.
> >
> >
>
> Meng - you are doing the email community a huge disservice with SPF. I
> wish you'd just end this lie because SPF is less than useless. I breaks
> existing forwarding standards and it causes false positives. SPF DOESN'T
> WORK!
If my two cents worth anything here, Marc, you're the one doing a
major damage to the email community by trying to reduce everything to
DNS lookups.

Without going into technical arguments about your practices, you're
treating us who don't do as you do as mere stupids. And that, IMHO, is
a terrible simplification. If you find you're in the right path FOR
YOUR SITUATION, that's ok with me. But you CANNOT become a fanatic and
begin yelling to the rest of us that we're going to hell because we
don't agree with you. Qouting Einstein, "Only a fool confuses reality
with the model. Such a simplification leads to a narrow mind"...

Now, on the technical hand, SPF is an anti-forgery tool, as was said
earlier in this discussion. I publish my records for anyone to know if
a message which claims to come from my servers (or at least, my
domain) is legit or not. If you run majordomo mor mailman based lists,
the forwarding issue goes down... Or you could just rewrite your SPF
records to include the domains that get forwarded usually, as I do
between the two major domains I manage...

Peace,

Luis


-- 
-------------------------------------------------
GNU-GPL: "May The Source Be With You...
Linux Registered User #448382.
When I grow up, I wanna be like Theo...
-------------------------------------------------

RE: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Rick Cooper <rc...@dwford.com>.
 

 > -----Original Message-----
 > From: Marc Perkel [mailto:marc@perkel.com] 
 > Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 5:29 PM
 > To: Meng Weng Wong
 > Cc: Kelson; users@spamassassin.apache.org
 > Subject: Re: SPF-Compliant Spam
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > Meng Weng Wong wrote:
 > > On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:
 > >
 > >> Jason Bertoch wrote:
 > >>> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another 
 > case where SPF 
 > >>> has failed
 > >>> to meet projections?
 > >>
 > >> It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful 
 > information: 
 > >> You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's 
 > >> domain name, and not an innocent third-party's.  
 > Blacklist it without 
 > >> hesitation!
 > >>
 > >
 > > Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.
 > >
 > > Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many 
 > > interesting things.
 > >
 > > For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its 
 > nameservers.
 > >
 > > You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.
 > >
 > > The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> 
 > reputation lookup.
 > >
 > > I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS -> 
 > > reputation lookup.
 > >
 > >
 > 
 > Meng - you are doing the email community a huge disservice 
 > with SPF. I 
 > wish you'd just end this lie because SPF is less than 
 > useless. I breaks 
 > existing forwarding standards and it causes false positives. 
 > SPF DOESN'T 
 > WORK!
 > 
 > 

A lamp doesn't work either, until you plug it in. Use it correctly and it
works, don't and it doesn't

Rick


--
This message has been scanned for viruses and
dangerous content by MailScanner, and is
believed to be clean.



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Meng Weng Wong wrote:
> On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:
>
>> Jason Bertoch wrote:
>>> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF 
>>> has failed
>>> to meet projections?
>>
>> It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful information: 
>> You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's 
>> domain name, and not an innocent third-party's.  Blacklist it without 
>> hesitation!
>>
>
> Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.
>
> Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many 
> interesting things.
>
> For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its nameservers.
>
> You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.
>
> The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> reputation lookup.
>
> I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS -> 
> reputation lookup.
>
>

Meng - you are doing the email community a huge disservice with SPF. I 
wish you'd just end this lie because SPF is less than useless. I breaks 
existing forwarding standards and it causes false positives. SPF DOESN'T 
WORK!


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Meng Weng Wong <me...@pobox.com>.
On Aug 27, 2007, at 11:39 AM, Kelson wrote:

> Jason Bertoch wrote:
>> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where  
>> SPF has failed
>> to meet projections?
>
> It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful  
> information: You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the  
> spammer's domain name, and not an innocent third-party's.   
> Blacklist it without hesitation!
>

Yes, that usage was exactly the design intent of SPF.

Once you move from IP to domain reputation, you can do many  
interesting things.

For example, you can go from the known-bad domain to its nameservers.

You can then go from those nameservers to detect other bad domains.

The URIBL plugin associates URL -> domain -> IP -> reputation lookup.

I am writing a similar plugin that associates domain -> NS ->  
reputation lookup.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Kelson <ke...@speed.net>.
Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?

It's a case where the spammer has just handed you useful information: 
You know for sure that the domain name is, indeed, the spammer's domain 
name, and not an innocent third-party's.  Blacklist it without hesitation!

As for the IP, treat it the same way you'd treat the IP in 
non-SPF-compliant spam.  They can authorize any IP they want, whether 
it's (legitimately) under their control or not.

-- 
Kelson Vibber
SpeedGate Communications <www.speed.net>

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Edward Francis Klimowicz <ed...@voicenet.com>.
Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?

SPF is supposed to help mitigate forgeries, not spam.  It identifies servers
that are allowed to send for a domain, but does not have anything to do with
content.

You can't derive anything from such messages, except the certainty that your
spam is not forged.

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Graham Murray <gr...@gmurray.org.uk>.
"Jason Bertoch" <ja...@electronet.net> writes:

> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?

If we are receiving SPF-Compliant spam, the rather than indicating that
it is failing, this indicates that SPF is working as designed. It means
that the spammer is not forging the envelope domain, Despite common
misconceptions, SPF was never designed as a spam indicator or even an
anti-spam tool - it is an anti-forgery tool.

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by mouss <mo...@netoyen.net>.
Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?
>   

Spamers were among the first to jump into the SPF waggon.

The following is Table 3 from "Sender reputation In a Large Webmail Service"
    http://www.ceas.cc/2006/19.pdf

=== Table 3: Authentication Breakdown: Spam
Method                                             Frequency
Both SPF and DomainKeys             1.5%
SPF only                                         39%
DomainKeys only                             0.5%
Not authenticated                             59%



SPF helps detecting forgeries of honest domains that have configured 
"limited" SPF records. nothing more.



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bernd Petrovitsch <be...@firmix.at>.
On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 08:59 -0400, Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?

In that case, the "projections" were plain simply wrong: Almost everyone
was (successfully)
made to believe/expect that "SPF kills spam".
The real purpose is to detect forged/wrong/illegal senders and to - at
least - do not
backscatter/send error reports/... in that direction thus reducing the
overall mail 
amount and hassle.

	Bernd
-- 
Firmix Software GmbH                   http://www.firmix.at/
mobil: +43 664 4416156                 fax: +43 1 7890849-55
          Embedded Linux Development and Services



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Magnus Holmgren <ho...@lysator.liu.se>.
Please use a MUA that indents quotes properly.

On Tuesday 28 August 2007 00:45, Rick Cooper wrote:
> > Forwarded mail isn't send from my server. It is sent from the sender. I am
> > relaying the message and it's not up to me to mangle the from address. The
> > people who I farward to want the from address to be original.
>
> Then your server(s) should be listed in their SPF records, problem solved.
> We list every host that could possibly end up sending mail on from any of
> our systems, that includes back up relays, ect. If you are sending mail for
> them you should be listed in their SPF records, easy enough.

That won't work here. Marc's customers are the mail recipients. They can't get 
all Marc's servers added to all SPF records in the whole world. There are two 
possible solutions: envelope sender rewriting or adjusting the SPF policy on 
the destination (meaning: adding Marc's servers as permitted senders for all 
domains (perhaps that was what you meant) or applying the SPF check to the 
server that delivered to Marc's servers, e.g. by adding Marc's server to 
internal_networks). Stubbornly demanding that the envelope sender address be 
unmodified without adjusting the local policy is not going to work. It's the 
same thing as demanding that the envelope sender always be trusted by 
everybody, but we know that it can't be.

-- 
Magnus Holmgren        holmgren@lysator.liu.se
                       (No Cc of list mail needed, thanks)

  "Exim is better at being younger, whereas sendmail is better for 
   Scrabble (50 point bonus for clearing your rack)" -- Dave Evans

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bernd Petrovitsch <be...@firmix.at>.
On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 14:26 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:
> Bernd Petrovitsch wrote: 
> > On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 12:50 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:
[...]
> > Where is the real problem?
> > 
> > BTW I see "from mangling" as a conceptual necessary thing: Simply
> > because the forwarded mail is actually sent by your mail server.
[...]
> Forwarded mail isn't send from my server. It is sent from the sender.

It comes from the MTA on your host. So it *is* sent technically sent by
your server[0]. And how do I (or better: my MTA) tell the difference to
other spam mail?
And the time is (how long?) gone that "in dubio pro reo" can hold for
email - especially for obviously forged email.

>  I am relaying the message and it's not up to me to mangle the from

Do you have an open relay?
SCNR .....

See, open relays were quite common decades ago. They were (ab)used by
spammers. Now we have blacklist of open relays (and other similar
stuff).
It's time to fix the next hole which spammers may exploit/abuse/....

>  address. The people who I farward to want the from address to be
> original. 

Yes. And spammers wants that their mail also arrives. So what?

	Bernd

[0]: And I frankly don't care in what way your customers deliver their
     mail to you - primarily since I can't validate it anyways.
-- 
Firmix Software GmbH                   http://www.firmix.at/
mobil: +43 664 4416156                 fax: +43 1 7890849-55
          Embedded Linux Development and Services


RE: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Rick Cooper <rc...@dwford.com>.
 


  _____  

From: Marc Perkel [mailto:marc@perkel.com] 
Sent: Monday, August 27, 2007 5:26 PM
To: Bernd Petrovitsch
Cc: users@spamassassin.apache.org
Subject: Re: SPF-Compliant Spam




Bernd Petrovitsch wrote: 

On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 12:50 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:

[...]

  

I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to

us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.

    



So "not from-mangled" forwarded email cannot be (technically and quite

simply) distinguished from intended spam mail.

So the only logical useful consequence is to forbid not from-mangled

forwarding.

Where is the real problem?



BTW I see "from mangling" as a conceptual necessary thing: Simply

because the forwarded mail is actually sent by your mail server.



	Bernd

  


Forwarded mail isn't send from my server. It is sent from the sender. I am
relaying the message and it's not up to me to mangle the from address. The
people who I farward to want the from address to be original. 
[Rick Cooper] 
 
Then your server(s) should be listed in their SPF records, problem solved.
We list every host that could possibly end up sending mail on from any of
our systems, that includes back up relays, ect. If you are sending mail for
them you should be listed in their SPF records, easy enough.
 
Rick


--
This message has been scanned for viruses and
dangerous content by MailScanner, and is
believed to be clean.



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Bernd Petrovitsch wrote:
> On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 12:50 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:
> [...]
>   
>> I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to
>> us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.
>>     
>
> So "not from-mangled" forwarded email cannot be (technically and quite
> simply) distinguished from intended spam mail.
> So the only logical useful consequence is to forbid not from-mangled
> forwarding.
> Where is the real problem?
>
> BTW I see "from mangling" as a conceptual necessary thing: Simply
> because the forwarded mail is actually sent by your mail server.
>
> 	Bernd
>   

Forwarded mail isn't send from my server. It is sent from the sender. I 
am relaying the message and it's not up to me to mangle the from 
address. The people who I farward to want the from address to be original.

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bernd Petrovitsch <be...@firmix.at>.
On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 12:50 -0700, Marc Perkel wrote:
[...]
> I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to
> us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.

So "not from-mangled" forwarded email cannot be (technically and quite
simply) distinguished from intended spam mail.
So the only logical useful consequence is to forbid not from-mangled
forwarding.
Where is the real problem?

BTW I see "from mangling" as a conceptual necessary thing: Simply
because the forwarded mail is actually sent by your mail server.

	Bernd
-- 
Firmix Software GmbH                   http://www.firmix.at/
mobil: +43 664 4416156                 fax: +43 1 7890849-55
          Embedded Linux Development and Services


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by David B Funk <db...@engineering.uiowa.edu>.
On Mon, 27 Aug 2007, Marc Perkel wrote:

> Matt Kettler wrote:
> > Marc Perkel wrote:
> >
> >> Matt Kettler wrote:
> >>
> >>> Marc Perkel wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> SPF breaks email forwarding.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
> >>> little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. There's documented
> >>> ways to do this, you're just unwilling, and instead you'll continue to
> >>> repeat this partial truth. (everything you say is true, you're just
> >>> leaving out the details for your own benefit.. ever consider running for
> >>> public office?)
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >> I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to
> >> us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.
> >>
> >>
> > I don't support MAIL FROM forgery, and that's what you're doing.
> >
>
> Altering the from field is forgery.

So Marc you are saying that all these posts are forgeries?
(good mail list software changes the envelope-from).


-- 
Dave Funk                                  University of Iowa
<dbfunk (at) engineering.uiowa.edu>        College of Engineering
319/335-5751   FAX: 319/384-0549           1256 Seamans Center
Sys_admin/Postmaster/cell_admin            Iowa City, IA 52242-1527
#include <std_disclaimer.h>
Better is not better, 'standard' is better. B{

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Matt Kettler wrote:
> Marc Perkel wrote:
>   
>> Matt Kettler wrote:
>>     
>>> Marc Perkel wrote:
>>>   
>>>       
>>>> SPF breaks email forwarding.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     
>>>>         
>>> SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
>>> little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. There's documented
>>> ways to do this, you're just unwilling, and instead you'll continue to
>>> repeat this partial truth. (everything you say is true, you're just
>>> leaving out the details for your own benefit.. ever consider running for
>>> public office?)
>>>
>>>   
>>>       
>> I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to
>> us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.
>>
>>     
> I don't support MAIL FROM forgery, and that's what you're doing.
>
> There, stalemate.
>
>
>   

Altering the from field is forgery.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Matt Kettler <mk...@verizon.net>.
Marc Perkel wrote:
>
>
> Matt Kettler wrote:
>> Marc Perkel wrote:
>>   
>>> SPF breaks email forwarding.
>>>
>>>
>>>     
>> SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
>> little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. There's documented
>> ways to do this, you're just unwilling, and instead you'll continue to
>> repeat this partial truth. (everything you say is true, you're just
>> leaving out the details for your own benefit.. ever consider running for
>> public office?)
>>
>>   
>
> I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to
> us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.
>
I don't support MAIL FROM forgery, and that's what you're doing.

There, stalemate.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Matt Kettler wrote:
> Marc Perkel wrote:
>   
>> SPF breaks email forwarding.
>>
>>
>>     
> SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
> little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. There's documented
> ways to do this, you're just unwilling, and instead you'll continue to
> repeat this partial truth. (everything you say is true, you're just
> leaving out the details for your own benefit.. ever consider running for
> public office?)
>
>   

I don't support from mangling and I'm talking about email forwarded to 
us from other servers who also don't do from mangling.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by mouss <mo...@netoyen.net>.
Marc Perkel wrote:
>  
> It isn't even a forgery tool because if will return a false positive 
> of forwarded email.
>
>

If the domain owner doesn't want his domain to be used as sender address 
in email not sent by his servers, then there is no FP. It is a policy 
enforcement.

Feel free to accept such mail, but don't complain to the domain owner in 
case of abuse. your server, your rules. Their domain, their policy.

anyway, uncontrolled email forwarding create problems. so there is a 
need to "control" it. some "Best Practices" are needed here. If I setup 
a .forward on your site and forward a lot of spam, what are you gonna 
do? (there is no proof that I forward spam intentionally).



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Bill Landry wrote:
> j o a r wrote:
>   
>> On 27 aug 2007, at 21.20, Kai Schaetzl wrote:
>>
>>     
>>> That's wrong. Even if all servers in the world would check SPF you would
>>> achieve *nothing* as the big majority of mail doesn't have anything to
>>> check.
>>>       
>> Why would I, as a SPF publishing domain owner, care if they have
>> anything else to check?
>> As long as they reject messages that fail SPF checks for my domain, my
>> problem is solved.
>>
>>     
>
> I guess I don't understand where the confusion is here.  As Joar states, SPF
> allows me to protect my domains from forgery and potential backscatter, because
> anyone using SPF to validate senders can appropriately detect and handle SPF
> failures for messages claiming to come from any of my domains that are forged.
>
>   

It isn't even a forgery tool because if will return a false positive of 
forwarded email.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bill Landry <bi...@inetmsg.com>.
j o a r wrote:
> 
> On 27 aug 2007, at 21.20, Kai Schaetzl wrote:
> 
>> That's wrong. Even if all servers in the world would check SPF you would
>> achieve *nothing* as the big majority of mail doesn't have anything to
>> check.
> 
> 
> Why would I, as a SPF publishing domain owner, care if they have
> anything else to check?
> As long as they reject messages that fail SPF checks for my domain, my
> problem is solved.
> 

I guess I don't understand where the confusion is here.  As Joar states, SPF
allows me to protect my domains from forgery and potential backscatter, because
anyone using SPF to validate senders can appropriately detect and handle SPF
failures for messages claiming to come from any of my domains that are forged.

And as Graham stated, SPF is NOT a spam tool, it is an anti-forgery tool that I
can use to detect forged messages coming into my mail server from any domain
that publishes SPF records, and likewise, anyone using SPF can confirm whether
anything coming into their mail server claiming to be from one of my domains is
forged or not.

That's it, nothing more, nothing less.  Don't expect SPF to do more than it was
designed to do, detect forged senders (originally, SPF stood for "Sender
Permitted From", and was later changed to "Sender Policy Framework", even though
the original name seems more descriptive of what SPF actually does - though
that's not necessarily what the SPF FAQ claims:
http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/Sender_permitted).

Bill

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Kai Schaetzl <ma...@conactive.com>.
J o a r wrote on Mon, 27 Aug 2007 23:04:31 +0200:

> Why would I, as a SPF publishing domain owner, care if they have  
> anything else to check?
> As long as they reject messages that fail SPF checks for my domain,  
> my problem is solved.

If you see it from that perspective, yes. But the point is that server 
owners need to have an incentive to use it. If most of the domains don't 
have an SPF policy, anyway, and many of the remaining a softfail policy 
there's not much incentive for me as a server owner to check all mail. 
That's wasting a lot of dns lookups. On the other hand if a lot of domains 
use it I can reject a lot of spam from bots as a side-effect. That's a 
clear incentive to implement it.

Kai

-- 
Kai Schätzl, Berlin, Germany
Get your web at Conactive Internet Services: http://www.conactive.com




Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by j o a r <jo...@joar.com>.
On 27 aug 2007, at 21.20, Kai Schaetzl wrote:

> That's wrong. Even if all servers in the world would check SPF you  
> would
> achieve *nothing* as the big majority of mail doesn't have anything to
> check.


Why would I, as a SPF publishing domain owner, care if they have  
anything else to check?
As long as they reject messages that fail SPF checks for my domain,  
my problem is solved.

j o a r



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Kai Schaetzl <ma...@conactive.com>.
J o a r wrote on Mon, 27 Aug 2007 19:37:41 +0200:

> The number of domains publishing SPF records have nothing to do with  
> how useful it is. The number of servers checking and respecting these  
> SPF records is what matters

That's wrong. Even if all servers in the world would check SPF you would 
achieve *nothing* as the big majority of mail doesn't have anything to 
check. And "respecting" SPF is undefined, btw.

Kai

-- 
Kai Schätzl, Berlin, Germany
Get your web at Conactive Internet Services: http://www.conactive.com




Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by j o a r <jo...@joar.com>.
On 27 aug 2007, at 18.55, Per Jessen wrote:

>> From a professional standpoint, it's not (yet) particularly useful.
> Domains that publish an SPF record are still very rare (around here).


The number of domains publishing SPF records have nothing to do with  
how useful it is. The number of servers checking and respecting these  
SPF records is what matters.

The beauty of SPF is of course that it is a _sender_ policy. The  
owner of the sending domain declares how they want you to treat  
messages claiming to originate from their domain. I don't see why you  
should ever feel the need to question or disregard that declaration.

j o a r



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Per Jessen <pe...@computer.org>.
Matt Kettler wrote:

> SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
> little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. 

Forwarding services are only a minor issue.  We have the forwarding
issue every day - people forward mail from a personal domain to their
work address.  And they're typically not in a position to modify
anything on the origin mail-server. 

> Personally, I find SPF very useful.

>>From a professional standpoint, it's not (yet) particularly useful. 
Domains that publish an SPF record are still very rare (around here).


/Per Jessen, Zürich


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Matt Kettler <mk...@verizon.net>.
Marc Perkel wrote:
>
>
> SPF breaks email forwarding.
>
>
SPF breaks mail forwarding services that are unwilling to expend a
little effort to modify their MAIL FROM handling. There's documented
ways to do this, you're just unwilling, and instead you'll continue to
repeat this partial truth. (everything you say is true, you're just
leaving out the details for your own benefit.. ever consider running for
public office?)

SPF does break simple mail forwarding that chooses to re-use the MAIL
FROM parameter, and that is the method of forwarding you use. However,
rewriting the MAIL FROM isn't difficult. Mailing lists do this with
great regularity, and they're forwarding mail without being affected by
SPF. SPF doesn't break all mail forwarding, it breaks the simple
"default to most MTA's" method that you use.

Such simple forwarding is really, IMO, intended for "inside your own
network" use. I would never expect such a forwarding arrangement to be
used on email sent to me without either my prior knowledge, or the
knowledge of the owner of the sending domain. If I'm a knowing recipient
of such mail, I know that if I'm going to check SPF, I'll have to "go
back another header" and check it. This is what I have to do inside my
own LAN when my secondary MX forwards to my primary. If I'm a knowing
sender using such a relay service, I can adjust my SPF records accordingly.

> I haven't found anything I can't use it for that's useful. 
Since you run such a mail forwarding service, and aren't willing to
change your system to make SPF work for your customers, it's not
surprising you can't find anything useful about it. Instead you would
rather just complain about it (without mentioning you're doing so
because it impacts your business.)

Personally, I find SPF very useful.

whitelist_from_spf a much more reliable and sensible system than
whitelist_from_rcvd, provided the sender's domain has SPF records.
Assuming that the sender's mailserver is always going to have the same
domain-name associated with its RDNS is naive and stupid when you think
about larger organizations that have "bought out" smaller companies. The
sending servers for those buy-outs are likely to have their old company
domain name, but will be sending mail using both the old company and the
parent-company domains as senders. SPF can handle that easily.

I also find SPF failure a very good reason to greylist a message and/or
bump up the score of an email. Since I don't use any  forwarders outside
of those that I control, I know such messages are likely to be forged.

Finally, within a SpamAssassin context, your end users could fix their
SPF problems by declaring your servers to be trusted and internal,
should any of them run SA after you've already scanned the mail. SA will
automatically go back deep enough in the headers to find the host that
delivered mail to your server, and check against that.



Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Per Jessen <pe...@computer.org>.
Magnus Holmgren wrote:

> That's precisely "applying SPF without thinking". Anyone who does that
> should be fired, nuked or something worse.

The world is full of incompetent mailserver-admins. 


/Per Jessen, Zürich


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Magnus Holmgren <ho...@lysator.liu.se>.
On Monday 27 August 2007 21:54, Marc Perkel wrote:
> Magnus Holmgren wrote:
> > SPF does not in itself break email forwarding. SPF tells MTAs where mail
> > with certain senders may originate from. It's their job to know if the
> > recipient forwards mail from the connecting host. It can be tricky, but
> > it's not impossible in principle. Applying SPF without thinking is
> > incompetent and will cause false positives.
>
> Yes it does break email forwarding because if you have restrictive SPF
> and it gets forwarded then the forwarding server isn't a valid server.
> Thus if the receiving server enforces SPF rules then it bounces the
> forwared message.

That's precisely "applying SPF without thinking". Anyone who does that should 
be fired, nuked or something worse.

-- 
Magnus Holmgren        holmgren@lysator.liu.se
                       (No Cc of list mail needed, thanks)

  "Exim is better at being younger, whereas sendmail is better for 
   Scrabble (50 point bonus for clearing your rack)" -- Dave Evans

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Graham Murray <gr...@gmurray.org.uk>.
Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com> writes:

> Yes it does break email forwarding because if you have restrictive SPF and it gets forwarded then the forwarding server
> isn't a valid server. Thus if the receiving server enforces SPF rules then it bounces the forwared message.

No. Once it has been accepted by the MX MTA for the addressee domain it
has been delivered to the address "on the envelope". What the addressee,
or his organisation, does to get it into the final recipient's mailbox
should be a purely internal matter for the addressee's domain. It should
not be of any concern to the original sender who has delivered the mail
to the address 'advertised' by the recipient. It is the recipient who
wants the mail forwarded to a different mailbox, so the recipient should
take responsibility for ensuring that it is delivered, which should
include handling any delivery problems. If the sender sends a mail to
user@exaple.com who forwards it to joe@example.net and the forwarding
fails, the original sender does not want to receive an NDR from
example.net saying that joe is over quota as (s)he did not send a mail
to joe@example.net and may not be able to tell that it is the mail which
was sent to user@example.net which has not be delivered.

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Magnus Holmgren wrote:
> On Monday 27 August 2007 15:26, Marc Perkel wrote:
>   
>> Jason Bertoch wrote:
>>     
>>> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive
>>> SPF-Compliant spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly
>>> derive from such messages regarding the sending server's IP and the
>>> sending address' domain name. Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this
>>> yet another case where SPF has failed to meet projections?
>>>       
>> SPF breaks email forwarding. I haven't found anything I can't use it for
>> that's useful.
>>     
>
> SPF does not in itself break email forwarding. SPF tells MTAs where mail with 
> certain senders may originate from. It's their job to know if the recipient 
> forwards mail from the connecting host. It can be tricky, but it's not 
> impossible in principle. Applying SPF without thinking is incompetent and 
> will cause false positives.
>
>   

Yes it does break email forwarding because if you have restrictive SPF 
and it gets forwarded then the forwarding server isn't a valid server. 
Thus if the receiving server enforces SPF rules then it bounces the 
forwared message.


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Magnus Holmgren <ho...@lysator.liu.se>.
On Monday 27 August 2007 15:26, Marc Perkel wrote:
> Jason Bertoch wrote:
> > I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive
> > SPF-Compliant spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly
> > derive from such messages regarding the sending server's IP and the
> > sending address' domain name. Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this
> > yet another case where SPF has failed to meet projections?
>
> SPF breaks email forwarding. I haven't found anything I can't use it for
> that's useful.

SPF does not in itself break email forwarding. SPF tells MTAs where mail with 
certain senders may originate from. It's their job to know if the recipient 
forwards mail from the connecting host. It can be tricky, but it's not 
impossible in principle. Applying SPF without thinking is incompetent and 
will cause false positives.

-- 
Magnus Holmgren        holmgren@lysator.liu.se
                       (No Cc of list mail needed, thanks)

  "Exim is better at being younger, whereas sendmail is better for 
   Scrabble (50 point bonus for clearing your rack)" -- Dave Evans

Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Marc Perkel <ma...@perkel.com>.

Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive SPF-Compliant
> spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly derive from such
> messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending address' domain name.
> Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another case where SPF has failed
> to meet projections?
>
>   

SPF breaks email forwarding. I haven't found anything I can't use it for 
that's useful.


RE: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Bernd Petrovitsch <be...@firmix.at>.
On Mon, 2007-08-27 at 09:47 -0400, Jason Bertoch wrote:
> On Monday, August 27, 2007 9:27 AM Magnus Holmgren wrote:
> 
> > For spammers to be able to send SPF-authenticated spam using botnets,
> > they usually have to authorize ridiculously large address blocks, for
> > example with "+all" or "+a:0.0.0.0/2 +a:64.0.0.0/2 +a:128.0.0.0/2
> > +a:192.0.0.0/2", so it's possible to check for that.
> 
> Has anyone verified that spammers are actually doing this yet, and how common it
> is?  If so, it sounds like a good rule to add to the SPF protocol itself to save
> every implementation from having to check on their own.

Just give 0.1 point per SPF-allowed IP address (minus 128 or something).
There
won't be many real mail providers/ISPs left which have more outgoing IP
addresses. And
those get almost no points. Or you have to white-list them anyways (for
whatever reason,
e.g. greylisting and other quirks on their mail setup).

BTW it makes no sense to forbid the (abuse like) above since you can't
really
enforce it: On what condition do you want to say "it's illegal"?
If prefix == n is forbidden, I take n+1 as prefix and duplicate the
number of entries.

	Bernd
-- 
Firmix Software GmbH                   http://www.firmix.at/
mobil: +43 664 4416156                 fax: +43 1 7890849-55
          Embedded Linux Development and Services



RE: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Jason Bertoch <ja...@electronet.net>.
On Monday, August 27, 2007 9:27 AM Magnus Holmgren wrote:

> For spammers to be able to send SPF-authenticated spam using botnets,
> they usually have to authorize ridiculously large address blocks, for
> example with "+all" or "+a:0.0.0.0/2 +a:64.0.0.0/2 +a:128.0.0.0/2
> +a:192.0.0.0/2", so it's possible to check for that.

Has anyone verified that spammers are actually doing this yet, and how common it
is?  If so, it sounds like a good rule to add to the SPF protocol itself to save
every implementation from having to check on their own.


Jason A. Bertoch
Network Administrator
jason@electronet.net
ElectroNet Intermedia Consulting
3411 Capital Medical Blvd.
Tallahassee, FL 32308
(V) 850.222.0229 (F) 850.222.8771


Re: SPF-Compliant Spam

Posted by Magnus Holmgren <ho...@lysator.liu.se>.
On Monday 27 August 2007 14:59, Jason Bertoch wrote:
> I think it's safe to say I'm not in the minority when I receive
> SPF-Compliant spam.  I'm looking for opinions on what we can honestly
> derive from such messages regarding the sending server's IP and the sending
> address' domain name. Is it wise to blacklist both, or is this yet another
> case where SPF has failed to meet projections?

It is a fundamental property of electronic mail that new identities can be 
created almost infinitely often and no authentication scheme can do anything 
about that. The fact that the sender identity is not forged says nothing 
unless you trust that sender.

For spammers to be able to send SPF-authenticated spam using botnets, they 
usually have to authorize ridiculously large address blocks, for example 
with "+all" or "+a:0.0.0.0/2 +a:64.0.0.0/2 +a:128.0.0.0/2 +a:192.0.0.0/2", so 
it's possible to check for that. Another approach is to add a few points for 
newly-registered domains, so called "day-old bread".

-- 
Magnus Holmgren        holmgren@lysator.liu.se
                       (No Cc of list mail needed, thanks)

  "Exim is better at being younger, whereas sendmail is better for 
   Scrabble (50 point bonus for clearing your rack)" -- Dave Evans