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+The End of the Russia-China Debate Ten years ago , comparing the reform processes in China and Russia was an intellectual fashion . Was it preferable to start with economics \u2013 try and get rich , quick , but don\u2019t rock the boat politically \u2013 in the manner of the Chinese ? Or was it better to start with politics \u2013 recover liberty and prosperity may follow \u2013 which seemed to be Russia\u2019s path under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin ? Today , a new comparative debate has started . This time the subject is no longer Russia versus China , because Russia has long ceased to be a point of comparison . Instead , the new comparative debate involves Asia\u2019s two new economic , demographic , and political giants , China and India . China\u2019s annual economic growth has been roughly 8-9 % for the last 26 years ; India has recorded similar rates for the last decade . In the \u201c flat world \u201d of globalization \u2013 to borrow Thomas Friedman\u2019s powerful metaphor \u2013 it seems that Russia n
 o longer has a place . Of course , Russia is still the second-largest nuclear power in the world , and , as one of the world\u2019s leading exporters of oil and gas , it benefits from today\u2019s high energy prices . But Russia\u2019s population is disappearing before our eyes . With average male life expectancy just 57 years , the country is losing close to 800,000 people annually . Indeed , Russia is more a fragile oil-producing state than a modernizing economic giant . To put it bluntly , Russia is no longer in the same category as China . Whereas the \u201c Middle Kingdom \u201d is proudly regaining its former global status after centuries of decline , Russia is defiantly trying to resurrect its former imperial status , but in a manner that appears doomed to fail . Russia has clearly taken giant steps in the wrong direction , at a time when China has taken steps , however small , in the right direction . When you meet today\u2019s \u201c new Russian Nomenklatura , \u201d you experience a sudden feelin
 g of being 20 years younger , awash as they are in nostalgia for Cold War posturing . By contrast , seen from afar , in their new suits , you might think that Chinese economic elites are Japanese . Where Russia represents a return to the past , one sees in China an opening , however ambiguous , to the future . Of course , some bias is involved here . As a European , I and people like me almost instinctively expect more from Russia . It is , after all , a European nation in cultural , if not political terms , whereas progress in China will not be measured by the introduction of Western-style democracy , but eventually , one hopes , by Singapore-style rule of law . The diverse paths followed by Russia and China may be explained in part by how the two peoples perceive themselves . The Chinese are comforted in their self-image by the world\u2019s combination of admiration for their dynamism , greed for the market they constitute , and apprehension for the competition they represent . Russi
 ans , by contrast , seem to be animated by a dark form of narcissism . They do not find anything to be proud of in the eyes of others . They are respected for what they control \u2013 the Soviet legacy of nuclear arms and \u201c Christian energy resources , \u201d to quote Vladimir Putin\u2019s bizarre remark on his first official trip to Paris \u2013 but not for their economic performance or their essence . China and Russia tend to relate to their respective pasts and futures in very different ways \u2013 with self-confidence in China\u2019s case , with self-diffidence in the case of Russia . Chinese elites are convinced that time is working in their favor , and that it is only natural that China should regain its rank amongst the world leading powers , perhaps even emerging on top one day . Indeed , their serene patience stands in stark contrast to the anxious reticence of Russian leaders , who have yet to surmount the humiliation that Russia suffered as a result of the Soviet Union\u2019s disintegration
  at the end of the Cold War . Russia may be experiencing a global \u201c restoration \u201d phase , but in politics and economics , and also with respect to its empire , restoration is headed in the wrong direction . With Putin\u2019s current clampdown on civil society , re-nationalization of key segments of the economy , failure to develop any political approach to resolving the conflict in Chechnya , and cultivation of imperial nostalgia , Russia is killing its only chance to matter in the future . Yet there is no reason for China to declare victory . The gap between the respective qualities of China\u2019s economic and scientific elites , on the one hand , and its ruling political elites , on the other , is simply too monumental \u2013 and still growing \u2013 for stability to be taken for granted . One senses in China the birth pangs of civil society , making the introduction of the rule of law increasingly urgent . Without political reforms , China\u2019s confidence in herself will quickly turn int
 o disillusion , or even delusion . If that happens , the Russia-China debate might be revived , this time as a comparison of competitive decadence . 
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+The Making of China\u2019s Trade Deficit BEIJING \u2013 China registered a monthly trade deficit of $7.2 billion in March 2010 , its first since April 2004. And yet , at around the same time , the United States Congress issued its loudest call ever to classify China as an exchange-rate manipulator , accusing Chinese leaders of maintaining the renminbi\u2019s peg to the dollar in order to guarantee a permanent bilateral trade surplus . China\u2019s March trade deficit indicates , first of all , that it is incorrect to claim that Chinese economic growth depends mainly on exports . Exports are an important part of the Chinese economy , and any global market fluctuation or external shock will certainly have an impact on overall growth . But , like any other large economy , China\u2019s economy is driven by domestic consumption and investment . Indeed , China\u2019s exports fell by 16 % year on year in 2009 , owing to the global financial crisis and recession . Nevertheless , annual GDP grew by 8.7 % , th
 anks to 16.9 % growth in consumption ( measured by gross sale of consumer goods ) and a 33.3 % surge in fixed-investment demand . Moreover , although China\u2019s \u201c trade dependency \u201d is now reckoned to be 70 % of GDP , that figure is greatly distorted by the fact that Chinese exports require massive imports of materials and parts . The net value added of total Chinese foreign trade accounts for only about 15 % of GDP . Thus , net exports contributed 10.8 % to China\u2019s overall GDP growth rate , or only about 1.1 percentage point of 9 % growth in 2008. Compare that figure to Germany , where net exports accounted for 64 % of growth in 2008. Similarly , the figure was 33 % in Japan , 28.6 % in Korea , and 20 % in the Philippines . Clearly , China is nothing special in this regard . To be sure , China\u2019s domestic consumption is not as high as it should be , standing at 49 % of GDP in 2008 , with household consumption accounting for only 35 % . Such figures have led many observers to 
 believe that overall domestic demand must be low , leaving China dependent on external markets for growth . But domestic demand , which determines imports , consists not only of consumption , but also of fixed-asset investment . Indeed , rapid growth in investment may translate into high import growth and trade deficits . That is exactly what is happening in China now . Some people may argue that investment growth without consumption growth will result in overcapacity and eventually lead to recession . Perhaps . But we need to remind ourselves that housing investment accounts for about 30 % of China\u2019s total fixed investment , with much of the rest directed toward infrastructure \u2013 that is , long-term , durable public infrastructure investments \u2013 including subways , railways , highways , urban public facilities , and the national water system . Moreover , one can easily imagine that import demand would soar further if the US and the European Union lifted their bans on exports of
  high-tech products to China . In that case , the trade deficit recorded in March could be at least 40 % higher . The renminbi\u2019s exchange rate , then , is really a secondary factor in China\u2019s external account . Put another way , the global imbalance could be corrected more efficiently by addressing other , more fundamental factors . The fundamental factors underlying the US external imbalance are large fiscal deficits and low household savings , owing to excessive financial leverage . The fundamental factors on the Chinese side are high corporate and household savings , together with some distortion of resource/utility prices . Indeed , the current situation indicates that a significant adjustment in exchange rates may not be needed at all in order to redress global imbalances . If that is true , and China shouldn\u2019t worry about the renminbi\u2019s exchange rate , should it worry about its economy overheating ? After all , its previous trade deficits in the era of reform \u2013 such 
 as in 1992-1996 and 2003-2004 \u2013 all occurred at times of overheating . But there are differences between now and those earlier periods . For example , when rapid investment growth in 2004 led to overheating , world markets were booming . At that time , both domestic investment and exports required immediate tightening . Today , by contrast , although domestic investment is growing very strongly , external demand has not recovered to its previous levels . The result is the March trade deficit , caused mainly by exceptionally high annual import growth ( 65 % ) coupled with relatively low export growth , which reached a nominally impressive 24 % only because of the sharp decline recorded in the base period . Such a single-factor situation is easier to deal with than the double-factor situation of 2004 , and because the high investment demand has been mainly stimulus-related this time , policymakers can handle it in a more timely fashion if they perceive a problem . That said , the ra
 tio of capital formation does require careful monitoring . The last time China saw such high growth in domestic investment , the savings rate was not as high as it is now . The problem currently is that a trade deficit has emerged at a time when the national saving rate is as high as 51 % . That means that investment is extremely high \u2013 and that , despite the high share of infrastructure investment , there is an urgent need to manage the potential risks . 
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+The Return of Franco-German Leadership PARIS \u2013 Whoever wins September\u2019s parliamentary election in Germany , the time has come once again for a major Franco-German initiative . Regardless of their economic conditions or their confidence \u2013 or lack of it \u2013 in each other , France and Germany are more than ever jointly responsible for the future , if not the very survival , of the European project . Are there alternatives to Franco-German leadership of the European Union ? Joining Great Britain with them in a Club of Three would be a good idea , but it is out of the question nowadays . Britain has largely excluded itself from any leadership role in Europe . Gordon Brown is barely surviving as prime minister , and the Conservatives , whose return to power in the next year is almost certain , are as provincially euro-skeptic as ever , if not more so . Europe simply cannot count on the British , at least for a while . The idea of a Club of Six , floated by Nicolas Sarkozy early in h
 is presidency , was always abstract and is now untenable . Given Silvio Berlusconi\u2019s sexcapades , the Italy that he leads cannot be taken seriously , while Spain is out of the running for an EU leadership role , owing to its dire economic conditions . As for Poland , although the bumbling Kaczynski \u201c twins \u201d have been removed from power , the country\u2019s fixation on security in its immediate neighborhood is incompatible with true European leadership . Since the other 21 EU members never liked the idea of a Club of Six to begin with , it is just as well that such a vision has been buried , probably forever . So where but France and Germany can Europe turn for leadership ? A positive referendum result on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in October would be a necessary but insufficient condition to jump-start an institutional re-launch of the EU . Above all , the EU needs political will and direction . Only Germany and France , acting together , can convey to Europe\u2019s citizens and 
 to the world the sense that the EU is at long last waking up to today\u2019s global realities . Of course , it is impossible to underestimate the combination of suspicion , tension , and exasperation that characterizes Franco-German relations lately . To a large extent , Germany has become a \u201c second France \u201d in Europe , at a time when France is more French than ever . And they are not only putting their respective nationalisms first . They disagree on fundamentals \u2013 most of all , about how to surmount the economic crisis . But the two giants of Europe can agree to disagree about the virtues of German-style budgetary rigor or French-style fiscal stimulus as long as they don\u2019t insult each other , and , more importantly , as long as they compensate for their philosophical differences with a well publicized program of joint initiatives on key subjects . As long as each remains convinced that no alternative to cooperation exists within the EU , and that European cooperation remains
  a priority for both , it should not be overly difficult to restore their leadership . After all , France and Germany are closer to each other on many key topics than they have been for a long time . With the return of France to NATO\u2019s integrated military structure , the two countries are on the same \u201c Atlantic \u201d wavelength for the first time since 1966. Despite both sides \u2019 deep reservations about the mission in Afghanistan , they are clearly in the same boat , even if French troops , being closer to British troops in terms of combat , are more vulnerable than the Germans . And both countries would probably subscribe to the following formulation : \u201c Turkey\u2019s future is with Europe , but not necessarily in the European Union , at least in the foreseeable future . \u201d The fundamental question about how to deal with Russia remains a divisive issue , however . France and Germany have different sensitivities on the subject , which is both natural and inevitable , as these dif
 ferences reflect both geography and history . Germany is not only much closer physically to Russia ; it is also much more dependent on Russia in terms of energy security . France must not delude itself : Germany is not about to convert to nuclear energy to reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas . Yet Germany also must realize that Russia\u2019s negative evolution has consequences that Germans cannot escape . A spectacular Franco-German security initiative following the election in Germany , accompanied by a joint message to the Kremlin , would also have the benefit of sending a message to the rest of the EU , particularly to its V�clav Klauses : \u201c If you decide to paralyze the Union through stubborn ill will , you will only end up excluding yourselves , rather than dictating Europe\u2019s fate . \u201d France and Germany cannot move Europe alone , but Europe without them cannot move at all . 
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+The Transatlantic Index How should we assess the state of transatlantic relations nowadays ? With a nod to Wall Street , we can say that the Alliance is up , Europe is flat , and the United States is clearly down . The Alliance is \u201c up \u201d for one key reason : the warming of France\u2019s relations with the US following Nicolas Sarkozy\u2019s election as French president . For the first time since Charles de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic , France\u2019s priority is no longer to live in opposition to the US . The signs of this shift are profound , even spectacular . From a toughening of France\u2019s position on Iran to a real warming of relations with Israel , not to mention symbolic gestures like Sarkozy\u2019s summer vacation in America , or Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner\u2019s arrival in Baghdad , this is a New France , one seriously considering a return to NATO\u2019s integrated military structure . France\u2019s shift is the result of both political calculus and deeply felt emotion . For
  Sarkozy , the French are not anti-Americans , but simply anti-Bush . In his willingness to break with the past \u2013 in particular with Jacques Chirac\u2019s legacy \u2013 and in adding a global spin to his \u201c mandate for change , \u201d Sarkozy is paving the way for the post-Bush America that will soon be here . He knows that the \u201c return of France \u201d as an influential actor in Europe presupposes a France that is closer to America , which will automatically bring France closer to Germany and Great-Britain , not to mention Poland and Italy . Emotionally , too , \u201c Sarkozy the American , Sarkozy the doer , \u201d who wants to be judged by his actions , tends to see himself as a Gallic incarnation of the American dream . He is the son of immigrants , the outsider whose rise to the top is living proof of French openness . In the US , too , the attitude towards the alliance with Europe has changed mightily . The failure in Iraq , the risk of an \u201c Iraqization \u201d of Afghanistan , and Russia\u2019
 s newfound assertiveness have moved America from the arrogant indifference that characterized most of Bush\u2019s presidency to a rediscovery of the Alliance\u2019s value . America needs allies , and is not preoccupied by their potential independent strength . As one top American diplomat put it , \u201c The last worry I have when I wake up at three in the morning is that Europe is becoming too strong . \u201d But rapprochement between France and the US should not hide other realities . First , in Afghanistan , NATO is in danger of suffering its first military defeat . Where will the new troops that are needed come from ? And a key member of the Alliance , Turkey , may be about to embark in a dangerous military adventure in Kurdish northern Iraq . Second , one cannot speak of NATO without noting that the Alliance\u2019s twin pillars \u2013 Europe and the US \u2013 are not in great shape . If Europe is \u201c flat , \u201d one reason is Sarkozy . He may be encouraging news for the Alliance , his European polic
 y is a source of worry for Europe . While Sarkozy claims that Europe is his priority , his methods seem to contradict his intentions . The difficult personal chemistry he has with German Chancellor Angela Merkel is reinforced by his constant attacks on the European Central Bank and its president , Jean-Claude Trichet . One cannot simultaneously defend the Alliance in the name of Europe and weaken Europe with fits of populism and economic nationalism . Europe\u2019s three key new leaders \u2013 Britain\u2019s Gordon Brown , Merkel , and Sarkozy \u2013 all belong to a generation that is no longer emotionally moved by the project of European integration . Their links with Europe \u2013 if they exist at all \u2013 are at best rational , not emotional . But will cool rationality be enough to create a European security pillar within the context of the Alliance ? As for America , it is \u201c down \u201d in terms of both \u201c soft \u201d ideological power and \u201c hard \u201d military power . The US remains by far the wo
 rld\u2019s strongest country , particularly in military terms , but it is confronted with fundamental questions about the use and utility of force at a time when power is relative . Today , Americans and Europeans alike must demonstrate modesty . Unlike when the Alliance was created , a multi-polar world system has taken shape , in which the West\u2019s demographic and economic share has fallen , and in which it must now compete with successful authoritarian models such as China or even Russia . In this new context , solidarity is as crucial as ever . Opinion about the US remains largely negative in Europe , and will remain so at least until the US presidential election in 2008. Likewise , US perceptions of France and of Europe are only slowly improving . It is only by respecting our common values and not exacerbating our differences that the West will be able to reinvent itself . The Alliance may be \u201c up , \u201d but its outlook remains uncertain . 
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+Will Russia Save the West ? MOSCOW \u2013 Rapid changes in the global economy and international politics are raising , once more , an eternal issue in Russia : the country\u2019s relations with Europe , and with the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole . Of course , Russia partly belongs to this region . Yet it cannot and does not want to join the West wholeheartedly \u2013 at least not yet . Meanwhile , this choice looks very different now compared to just a few years ago . It is becoming obvious that the Euro-Atlantic world , whose economic and political model seemed so triumphant 20 years ago , is now lagging somewhat behind China and other Asian countries . So is Russia , where , despite encouraging talk about innovation-based development , the economy continues to de-modernize as corruption has been allowed to metastasize , and as the country relies increasingly on its natural-resource wealth . Indeed , it is Asia that has turned out to be the true winner of the Cold War . These rising power
 s raise problems regarding Russia\u2019s geo-strategic choices . For the first time in decades , the values gap between Russia and the EU appears to be increasing . Europe is overcoming state nationalism , while Russia is building a nation state . Broken by history and not wishing to be ravaged by war again , Europeans have embraced compromise and renounced the direct use of force in international relations . Russians , on the other hand , emphasize their \u201c hard power , \u201d including military force , because they know that they live in a dangerous world and have no one to hide behind . And , because of the country\u2019s comparative lack of \u201c soft power \u201d \u2013 social , cultural , and economic attractiveness \u2013 it stands ready to use the competitive advantages ( i. e. , its resource wealth ) available to it . Internal political developments in Russia are also pushing the country in a different direction from the West . Quite simply , Russia is moving away from democracy . This emergi
 ng values gap is not an insurmountable obstacle to geostrategic rapprochement . But , coupled with mutual irritation , which is particularly strong in Russia , closing the gap is becoming much harder . For , while Russia \u2019 s elite never considered itself defeated in the Cold War , the West essentially treated Russia as a defeated country \u2013 an attitude symbolized by NATO\u2019s eastward expansion , which laid a deep foundation for ongoing tension . It was only after the West encountered an armed rebuff in South Ossetia that NATO expansion was stopped in its tracks . Yet NATO has not given up on further enlargement . NATO expansion is nothing more than the extension of its zone of influence \u2013 and in the most sensitive , military-political sphere . And yet the West\u2019s unwillingness to abandon that effort is coupled with a repeated refusal to recognize Russia\u2019s right to have its own zone of interest . So NATO expansion has left the Cold War unfinished . The ideological and militar
 y confrontation that underlay it is gone , but the geopolitical rivalry that it entailed has returned to the fore . Thus , the old mentality survived on both sides . Energy debates are another example of this . Non-Russian Europe should thank the Almighty for the presence of energy-rich Russia at its borders , while Russia should be thankful for having such wealthy customers . But the natural differences in the interests of energy consumers and producers have been given a political/security twist \u2013 witness the discussions about an \u201c Energy NATO . \u201d F aced with the impossibility of advantageous accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions , Russia is drifting fast towards alignment with China \u2013 a \u201c younger brother , \u201d though a respected one . Russia\u2019s \u201c Asian choice \u201d of today is not the same as the Slavophile/Eurasian choice of the past . On the surface , it looks like a choice in favor of a rapidly rising civilization . But the current estrangement from Europe \u2013 the 
 cradle of Russian civilization and modernization \u2013 threatens Russia\u2019s identity and will increase its geostrategic risks in the future . Europe does not benefit from this estrangement either . It will continue to move towards beautiful decay \u2013 Venice writ large . The United States also loses . Without Russia , which will remain the world\u2019s third strongest power for the foreseeable future , it is impossible to solve the key problems of international security . The current Euro-Atlantic security architecture seems to suit the majority of Americans and Europeans , though it is becoming increasingly fragile and counterproductive . So Russia will struggle to create a new architecture largely on its own \u2013 whether through a new treaty on collective European security , or even through its accession to NATO . This is not only in Russian political and civilizational interest , but it also reflects our duty to the entire community of Euro-Atlantic nations , which is being weakened by 
 the \u201c unfinished Cold War . \u201d The idea of a \u201c Union of Europe \u201d between Russia and the EU should be put on the long-term agenda . That Union should be based on a common human , economic , and energy space . The combination of a new security arrangement for the Euro-Atlantic community and the establishment of the Union of Europe could arrest the decline in the international weight of the West . 
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+China and Russia in the New World Disorder Can Kosovo achieve independence without the tacit consent of Russia , and can there be a humanitarian and political solution to the tragedy in Darfur without the active goodwill of China ? The two crises have nothing in common , but their resolution will depend in large part on whether these two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council use their veto power . Comparing the respective abilities of Russia and China to block key international initiatives makes no sense in itself , but it does constitute a useful tool for understanding the transformation of the international system that is now taking place as a direct consequence of the relative decline of America\u2019s global power . From that standpoint , the deepening of chaos in the Middle East poses both opportunities and risks for Russia and China , which may force them to define the roles they want to play and the images they want to project in the world . The key question i
 s this : Is Russia taking giant steps in the \u201c wrong direction \u201d while China is taking \u201c minuscule \u201d steps in the \u201c right direction \u201d ? Superficially , Russia and China may give the impression that they are pursuing the same path when they both proclaim with pride that they are \u201c back \u201d on the world stage . But this boast means different things for each country . For China , a deeply self-confident country , to be \u201c back \u201d simply means regaining the country\u2019s historical centrality in the world after an absence of more than two centuries . After all , at the end of the eighteenth century , China became the world\u2019s first producer of manufactured goods , and it perceives itself as a center of civilization unequalled by any other in Asia , if not the world . China\u2019s renewed self-confidence is based on its remarkable economic prowess , which is derived not from natural resources , but from productivity and creativity . Whatever the huge political , social , and 
 economic tensions may exist , there is a \u201c feel good \u201d factor in China , a sense of progress , with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing figuring as the symbolic moment that will proclaim to the world the scale of the country\u2019s achievements . Above all , with the exception of the Taiwan issue , China is a satisfied status quo power when it comes to the evolution of the international system \u2013 a patient actor that finds it perfectly legitimate to behave and to be seen as the world\u2019s number two power . By contrast , the Russians remain insecure about their status in the world . Russia\u2019s explosive \u201c revisionist \u201d behavior on the eve of the recent G8 summit is an indication of the Kremlin\u2019s \u201c unsatisfied \u201d nature . Because they know they are less potent , particularly in demographic and economic terms , Russians feel they have to do \u201c more . \u201d For them , to say \u201c Russia is back \u201d means that the humiliating Yeltsin years are over , and that they now must be treated a
 s equals , particularly by the United States . Russians are nostalgic not for the Cold War as such , but for the international status they lost when it ended . Now that America is no longer a \u201c hyperpower \u201d with no strategic challengers , Russia has reasserted its status as a \u201c superpower , \u201d a claim that is not necessarily supported by reality . Unlike the Chinese , the Russians do not create economic wealth , but merely exploit their energy and mineral resources . Moreover , unlike the Chinese , they have not always been confident of their position in the world . Torn between Europe and Asia in cultural and political terms , victimized by a dark , narcissistic instinct that pervades their reading of their past and their visions of the future , it should surprise no one that Russia is now behaving like a \u201c revisionist \u201d power . Unsatisfied with their inner identity , it is only natural that Russians should demand changes that make them feel more secure and proud . Less 
 than 20 years ago , the Czech Republic and Poland were part of their sphere of influence , so Russians understandably cannot accept the US unilaterally implanting its security system there . Of course , in their respective judgments on Russia and China , the West \u2013 and Europeans in particular \u2013 may be demonstrating selective emotions . \u201c We \u201d tend to be less demanding of China than of Russia , because we tend to see Russia as \u201c European \u201d ( at least culturally ) . As a result , the culture of physical violence and verbal provocation that is gaining ground in Putin\u2019s Russia is deeply disturbing , whereas we tend to judge Chinese misdeeds with a greater sense of distance , if not indifference . But the differences between Russia and China today may prove to be less significant tomorrow if the deterioration in the Middle East imposes a sense of collective responsibility on all five permanent members of the UN Security Council . It is one thing for Russia and China to expl
 oit America\u2019s growing difficulties from Gaza to Kabul ; but it is quite another if the situation deteriorates to the point of general destabilization in the region . Indeed , the Middle East\u2019s deepening problems may impose a sense of restraint in Russia and China by forcing them to calculate not in terms of their global \u201c nuisance value \u201d vis-�-vis the West , but in terms of their ability to make a positive and stabilizing contribution to the world order . 
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+The Roots of Chinese/Japanese Rivalry BOSTON \u2013 The anti-Japan protests that continue to roil China are just another indication of the rise of a potent Chinese nationalism . After a century slowly fomenting among Chinese intellectuals , national sentiment has captured and redefined the consciousness of the Chinese people during the last two decades of China\u2019s economic boom . This mass national consciousness launched the Chinese colossus into global competition to achieve an international status commensurate with the country\u2019s vast capacities and the Chinese people\u2019s conception of their country\u2019s rightful place in the world . Rapidly , visibly , and inevitably , China has risen . Indeed , our era will likely be remembered as the time when a new global order , with China at the helm , was born . Competitive national consciousness \u2013 the consciousness that one\u2019s individual dignity is inseparably tied to the prestige of one\u2019s \u201c people \u201d \u2013 worked its way into the mind
 s of China\u2019s best and brightest between 1895 and 1905. In 1895 , China was defeated by Japan , a tiny aggressor whom the Chinese dismissively called wa ( the dwarf ) . China was already accustomed to rapacious Western powers squabbling over its riches , but had remained self-confident in the knowledge of these powers \u2019 irrelevance . However , the assault from Japan , a speck of dust in its own backyard , shattered this self-assurance and was experienced as a shocking and intolerable humiliation . Japan\u2019s triumph in 1905 over \u201c the Great White Power , \u201d Russia , repaired the damage to China\u2019s sense of dignity . From the Chinese point of view , Russia was a formidable European power , one feared by other Western powers . Its defeat , therefore , was seen as a successful Asian challenge to the West , in which China , its intellectuals felt , was represented by Japan . Japan thus became the focus of Chinese attention . Gentlemen-scholars , who would reform and staff the Chin
 ese army and civil service in the early decades of the twentieth century , went to study in Japan . The Revolution of 1911 was inspired by the example of Japan\u2019s Meiji Restoration ; and , because early-twentieth-century Japan was stridently nationalistic , the new China that emerged from its image was constructed on nationalist principles as well . Thus Japan became the significant \u201c other \u201d for China , the model that was imitated and the anti-model that was resented . Chinese nationalism borrowed from Japan its concept of the nation , including the very word by which it was expressed ( kuoming , from the Japanese kokumin ) . The Kuomintang ( the Chinese Nationalist Movement ) was explicitly inspired by Japan and fueled by repeated Japanese aggression . Paradoxically , but not unexpectedly , Mao Zedong\u2019s struggle against the Kuomintang was inspired by anti-Japanese nationalism as well . As was the case virtually everywhere else , communism in China was nationalism incarnate 
 . Mao\u2019s speech on the establishment of the People\u2019s Republic plainly expressed the nationalist agenda behind it . Calling the nation \u201c communist \u201d assured the new People\u2019s Republic of China of the Soviet Union\u2019s support , which was viewed by Mao as more reliable than that of the United States . But neither the Russian nor the Chinese Communists were ever unclear about the nationalist nature of their respective projects . The upper echelons of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia in Russia and China were self-consciously nationalist and , throughout Communist rule , shrewdly pursued the supreme nationalist goal : prestige \u2013 the power , naked and otherwise , to impose the nation\u2019s will on others . But national consciousness , particularly in China , was limited to a narrow elite , leaving the masses almost untouched . This changed dramatically with the Chinese government\u2019s restoration of a capitalist economy . Much like in Germany in the 1840\u2019s , when the appeal to p
 rivate enterprise converted the entire middle class to nationalism , the explicit definition of economic power as the central pillar of China\u2019s greatness awakened ordinary Chinese to nationalism\u2019s appeal . Hundreds of millions now see themselves as sharing in the nation\u2019s dignity , and are eager to contribute to it , as well as to defend it from insult . Competition for prestige , even when the contest is economic , is not a purely rational undertaking . So it should be no surprise that old injuries are likely to resurface . Some Chinese , especially those who are not economically successful , harp bitterly on Japan\u2019s past depredations . Despite China\u2019s embrace of capitalism and Japanese investment , Japan remains China\u2019s reviled other . Indeed , a professor in Beijing told me not long ago , \u201c Two in every ten Chinese dislike the US , but nine in every ten hate Japan . \u201d For the West , there is a silver lining in this nationalist rivalry : neither China nor Japan is 
 a rogue state , and , so long as their quarrels do not lead to the use of unconventional weapons , we may treat the friction between them as an internal Asian quarrel . Japan , moreover , is likely to let today\u2019s passions over disputed islands in the East China Sea cool down , despite the anti-Japanese outbursts in Chinese cities . But the West \u2013 and the US in particular \u2013 is new to dignity games � la Chinois . If it gets carried away and presumes to talk down to the 5,000-year-old culture of the Sages , the West could become the next object of China\u2019s nationalist resentment . 
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+China\u2019s Cyber-Warriors NEW DELHI \u2013 The world now accepts that protecting our atmosphere , hydrosphere , lithosphere , and biosphere \u2013 the \u201c global commons \u201d \u2013 is the responsibility of all countries . The same norm must apply to cyberspace , which is critical to our everyday life , economic well-being , and security . At a time when cyber attacks are increasing worldwide , US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was right to declare that an attack on one nation\u2019s computer networks \u201c can be an attack on all . \u201d Indeed , the attacks are a reminder that , as a new part of the global commons , cyberspace already has come under threat . Cyberspace must be treated , along with outer space , international waters , and international airspace , as property held in common for the good of all . And , like ocean piracy and airplane hijacking , cyber-crime cannot be allowed to go unpunished if we are to safeguard our common assets and collective interests . Naming China among a ha
 ndful of countries that have stepped up Internet censorship , Clinton warned that \u201c a new information curtain is descending across much of the world . \u201d Her statement , with its allusion to the Cold War-era Iron Curtain , amounted to an implicit admission that the central assumption guiding US policy on China since the 1990\u2019s \u2013 that assisting China\u2019s economic rise would usher in greater political openness there \u2013 has gone awry . The strategy of using market forces and the Internet to open up a closed political system simply is not working . Indeed , the more economic power China has accumulated , the more adept it has become in extending censorship to cyberspace . If anything , China has proven that a country can blend control , coercion , and patronage to stymie the Internet\u2019s politically liberalizing elements . Through discreet but tough controls , Beijing pursues a policy of wai song , nei jin \u2013 relaxed on the outside , vigilant internally . Google is now crying f
 oul over \u201c a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China . \u201d But , despite its corporate motto \u2013 \u201c Don\u2019t be evil \u201d \u2013 Google itself was instrumental in aiding online censorship in China , having custom-built a search engine that purges all references and Web sites that the Chinese government considers inappropriate . Now Google itself has become a victim of China\u2019s growing cyber prowess , in the same way that appeasement of Hitler boomeranged onto France and Britain . China deploys tens of thousands of \u201c cyber police \u201d to block Web sites , patrol cyber-cafes , monitor the use of cellular telephones , and track down Internet activists . But the threat to the new global commons comes not from what China does domestically . Rather , it comes from the way in which the know-how that China has gained in fashioning domestic cyber oversight is proving invaluable to it in its efforts to engage in cyber intrusion across it
 s frontiers . Canadian researchers have discovered a vast Chinese surveillance system called \u201c GhostNet , \u201d which can compromise computers in organizations abroad through booby-trapped e-mail messages that automatically scan and transfer documents to a digital storage facility in China . This is what happened when computers of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala , India , were attacked last year . India\u2019s national security adviser recently complained that his office was targeted yet again by hackers . \u201c People seem to be fairly sure it was the Chinese , \u201d he said . Officials in Germany , Britain , and the US have acknowledged that hackers believed to be from China also have broken into their government and military networks . The state-sponsored transnational cyber threat is at two levels . The first is national , with the hackers largely interested in two objectives . One is to steal secrets and gain an asymmetrical advantage over another country . Cyber intrusi
 on in peacetime allows the prowler to read the content and understand the relative importance of different computer networks so that it knows what to disable in a conflict situation . The other objective is commercial : to pilfer intellectual property . The second level of cyber threat is against chosen individuals . The most common type of intrusion is an attempt to hack into e-mail accounts . The targets also can face Trojan-horse attacks by e-mail intended to breach their computers and allow the infiltrators to corrupt or transfer files remotely . To be sure , if a cyber attack is camouflaged , it is not easy to identify the country from which it originated . Through the use of so-called \u201c false-flag espionage \u201d and other methods , attacks can be routed through the computers of a third country . Just as some Chinese pharmaceutical firms exported to Africa spurious medicines with \u201c Made in India \u201d labels \u2013 a fact admitted by the Chinese government \u2013 some Chinese hacker
 s are known to have routed their cyber intrusion through computers in Russia , Iran , Cuba , and other countries . But , like their comrades in the pharmaceutical industry , such hackers tend to leave telltale signs . Then there are many cases in which the attacks have originated directly from China . It seems unlikely that these hackers , especially those engaged in cyber espionage , pilferage , and intimidation , are private individuals with no links to the Chinese government . It is more likely that they are tied to the People\u2019s Liberation Army . In war , this irregular contingent of hackers would become the vanguard behind which the PLA takes on the enemy . Systematic cyber attacks constitute a new frontier of asymmetrical warfare at a time when the world already confronts other unconventional threats , including transnational terrorism . With national security and prosperity now dependent on the safekeeping of cyberspace , cybercrime must be effectively countered as an intern
 ational priority . If not , cyberspace will become the new global-commons battlefield . 
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+China\u2019s Gift to Europe Europeans are wrong to be angry with China because its currency peg to the US dollar has boosted the euro against most currencies on foreign exchange markets . On the contrary , they should view the currency peg as a valuable gift . In New York and other American cities , European shoppers are on a spree . They\u2019re enjoying first hand the euro\u2019s enhanced purchasing power abroad . The currency peg has also helped make the euro into an important reserve currency , rivaling the dollar . Investments from all over the world are flowing into Europe as a result . It was predictable that China\u2019s currency peg would have this effect . It forced China to accumulate huge amounts of dollars to stabilize its currency and gave the euro an extra boost as the dollar depreciated . To protect itself from the declining greenback , China and other countries are converting a portion of their accumulated dollar reserves into euros . The International Monetary Fund estimates t
 hat the euro\u2019s share of foreign exchange reserves rose to 26.4 percent in third quarter of 2007 from 25.5 percent in the second quarter of 2007 , and 24.4 percent in the third quarter of 2006. The euro\u2019s becoming a major reserve currency bestows important economic advantages on the euro-zone economy . Europeans should thank the Chinese currency peg for the part it is playing in this . Of course , with an augmented supply of euros , China can be expected to make substantial investments in Europe , which also is a good thing , especially since , in the United States at least , China has demonstrated a preference for investments in financial institutions rocked by the sub-prime crisis . Europe has plenty of those . So far , China\u2019s biggest European investment has been in the Belgian financial company , Fortis N. V. , where Ping An Insurance recently acquired a 4.2 % stake , making it the largest shareholder in the company . China Development Bank also made an investment in Barcla
 ys to bolster its bid for ABN AMRO which , though it failed , helped the Dutch bank get the full value for its assets . This is only a start . Merrill Lynch predicts that , as currency reserves climb in countries like China , state-run investment funds will grow to $7.9 trillion , from $1.9 trillion now . China\u2019s currency peg has also come in handy for Europe in its fight to keep inflation in check , while its monetary policy remains constrained by the sub-prime crisis . Experts estimate that , in terms of guarding against inflation , the euro\u2019s appreciation has been equivalent to about 35 basis points rise in the interest rate . The strong euro has helped insulate Europe from skyrocketing oil and commodity prices , which are priced in dollars on the world markets . The big downside of the currency peg for Europe is supposed to be exports . That\u2019s what sent French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other high-level European officials scurrying off to China last November\u2014and why m
 any ordinary Europeans continue to think of the Chinese as not playing by the rules . This is protectionist thinking par excellence . What makes exports so special ? Why are they more important than cheap imports or the bargains that European shoppers get in New York ? Should Europe give up all the advantages of the currency peg just because it makes European exports more expensive ? Of course not ! Note that it was French President Sarkozy who went to China to protest the currency peg , not German Chancellor Angela Merkel . German exports are not being substantially damaged by the strong euro\u2014indeed , German costs are so competitive that exporters are confident they can cope with the euro at 1.50 dollars and even higher . This is not true for France-- but the answer is obvious : reduce costs and France too will be able to cope with the strong euro . In the final analysis , cutting costs is all the Europeans can do if they want to preserve the competitiveness of their exports . Th
 e Chinese are not going to change their exchange rate regime , which has strategic as well as economic motivations , just because the Europeans are unhappy with the currency peg . China has given the Europeans a gift . They should be grateful , rather than foolishly insist that China take it back . 
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+China\u2019s Threat to Russia Last week , Russia and China held joint military maneuvers in the presence of both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao . But a new strategic alliance between the two countries is not likely , as it is China that poses the greatest strategic threat to Russia , although many in the Kremlin seem blind to this as they rattle sabers at America and the West . Indeed , China officially considers several regions in Russia\u2019s Far East to be only \u201c alienated \u201d from it . China\u2019s territorial claims on Russia are often noted in Chinese grade school geography textbooks , which include a number of Russian Far Eastern regions within China\u2019s borders . This is consistent with the Chinese strategic concept of \u201c vital space , \u201d which includes all spheres of a state\u2019s strategic activities , on land , at sea , under water , in the air , and in space . The dimensions of \u201c vital space \u201d are determined by a country\u2019s economic , sci
 entific , technical , social , and military capabilities \u2013 in essence , its \u201c total power . \u201d According to Chinese theorists , the \u201c vital space \u201d of great powers extends far beyond a state\u2019s borders , whereas the \u201c vital space \u201d of weak countries is limited to strategic boundaries that do not always correspond to the borders of their national territory . Today , China has territorial claims against 11 of its 24 neighbors , including India , Japan , Vietnam , and the Philippines , in addition to Russia . In China\u2019s relations with all of them , the potential use of military force was and remains an important factor . In September 2006 , China\u2019s People\u2019s Liberation Army ( PLA ) conducted an unprecedentedly large 10-day exercise , involving the Shenyang and Beijing military districts , the two most powerful of China\u2019s seven military districts . Shenyang abuts the Russian Armed Forces \u2019 Far Eastern District , and the Beijing district shares a border with Russia
 \u2019s Siberian Military District . During the exercises , Shenyang units advanced 1,000 kilometers into the Beijing district , where they engaged in joint war games . To military observers , the Beijing/Shenyang exercises seemed to be practice for a possible offensive operation against Russia , because exercises on such a scale are undertaken only at the final stage of a multi-year program to train troops to enact specific strategic and operational plans . The geography of the exercises , and the offensive nature of the tasks undertaken , leaves little doubt that Russia was cast in the role of \u201c potential adversary . \u201d Such a show of force is an ancient , traditional Chinese political technique . Paradoxically , these exercises were undertaken during a period when bilateral political and economic ties appeared on the surface to be at their highest point . Russia has an important place in Chinese geopolitical calculations , as a supplier of both modern weaponry and energy resource
 s needed to continue its modernization . Therefore , the Chinese are doing everything possible to strengthen their economic and political position in Russia , and to draw Russia into their sphere of influence . And China is succeeding , most importantly by consistently reinforcing Putin\u2019s anti-American and anti-Western agenda . While Beijing/Shenyang exercise should have indicated to Russian leaders that China\u2019s intentions toward Russia may not always be benign , Russia\u2019s political and military leadership seem not to sense any threat ; on the contrary , they continue to sell the Chinese advanced weapons . Russia\u2019s current diplomatic tilt , indeed , is clearly against its own long-term national security interests . China will never be interested in Russia\u2019s economic and political modernization , for it prefers Russia to remain a source of mineral and energy resources and a vast \u201c strategic rear \u201d in its looming challenge with the United States . Likewise , the Shanghai 
 Cooperation Organization ( SCO ) , which just concluded its annual meeting , is in China\u2019s eyes a tool of regional policy that helps strengthen China\u2019s influence and control over Central Asia\u2019s natural resources at the expense of Russia . No nation threatens China\u2019s land borders . China can solve its domestic problems , such as separatism , by itself . China is militarily self-sufficient and needs military cooperation under the SCO framework only in order to free its hands if any conflict should arise that affects its interests . In fact , conflict between Russia and China is possible precisely in Central Asia , given the clear differences in the two countries \u2019 economic and political interests in that region . Aside from control of the region\u2019s energy supplies , water has become a potential source of conflict , given China\u2019s serious shortages . Yet , while the Chinese clearly understand these contingencies and are preparing themselves to deal with them diplomatically 
 and militarily , the Kremlin remains myopically obsessed with the phantom threat of America . Thus , as the Kremlin dreams of re-establishing its domination over what Russians refer to as the \u201c near abroad \u201d ( Ukraine , Belarus , the Baltic countries , and the other post-Soviet states ) , China is increasingly looking at Russia as its own \u201c near abroad . \u201d Will the Kremlin finally wake up to this ? Thirty-six years ago , Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong turned world politics upside down , as both America and China realized that it was the Soviet Union , and not each other , that posed the greater threat . Vladimir Putin needs his own \u201c Nixon moment . \u201d Alienating the West is a foolish strategy when the greatest long term threat to Russia comes from the East . 
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+Europe\u2019s Vital French Connection PARIS \u2013 In the debates raging over the future of the European Union and the eurozone , Germany always takes center stage . It has the largest economy , accounting for 28 % of eurozone GDP and 25 % of the eurozone\u2019s population . It is running a current-account surplus that is now larger than China\u2019s \u2013 indeed , the largest in the world in absolute value . And , while weighted majorities can overrule it on some issues , everyone acknowledges that little can be done in the eurozone unless Germany agrees . But the emphasis on Germany , though justified , should not lead to an underestimation of France\u2019s critical role . France not only accounts for roughly 22 % of eurozone GDP and 20 % of its population \u2013 behind only Germany \u2013 but also has the healthiest demography in the eurozone , whereas the German population is projected to decline over the next decade . At the same time , France\u2019s critical role reflects more than its size . Indeed , 
 in terms of influencing outcomes in Europe , France is as important as Germany , for three reasons . First , France is an indispensable link between southern and northern Europe at a time of growing economic and financial division between creditors and debtors ( a fissure that has begun to assume a cultural dimension ) . An active France can play a bridging role , leveraging its strong relationship with Germany ( a friendship that is a pillar of the EU ) and its proximity and cultural affinities to the Mediterranean . France is \u201c southern \u201d in its current-account deficit , but \u201c northern \u201d in its borrowing costs ( slightly above Germany\u2019s ) , owing partly to inflows of capital fleeing the south , as well as to modest but positive economic growth . Moreover , there is no perceived \u201c re-denomination \u201d risk affecting French assets , given markets \u2019 confidence that France will retain the euro . So , while France faces huge economic challenges , its northern and southern 
 features permit it to play a proactive role in the European project\u2019s survival . French President Fran�ois Hollande has already given a rather successful preview of this role , meeting German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on his first day in office , and , a month later , participating in a high-profile meeting with the Italian and Spanish prime ministers in Rome . Indeed , he took the lead in adding a \u201c growth pact \u201d to the \u201c stability pact \u201d that had been negotiated under Merkel\u2019s leadership . Second , France , under its new center-left government , must demonstrate that the \u201c European model \u201d of a market economy coupled with strong social solidarity can be reformed and strengthened , rather than abandoned \u2013 not just in Europe\u2019s more pragmatic north , but also in its more ideological south . French Socialists will not renounce their traditional commitments ; nor should they . But they now have the opportunity to contribute to the European model\u2019s renewa
 l . Under Hollande , France\u2019s Socialists favor achieving that renewal through a process of social dialogue that convinces rather than imposes , that focuses both on revenue measures and on boosting government efficiency , and that may adopt some of northern Europe\u2019s more successful \u201c flexicurity \u201d policies , which combine greater labor-market flexibility with strong social protection . The reforms should also introduce much greater individual choice , permitting solutions to retirement , education , health , and lifestyle issues that can be more easily tailored to citizens \u2019 specific circumstances and needs . The government of Hollande and Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault has strong majorities at all executive and legislative levels , giving it a rare opportunity to act . If it can renew the European model at home , it will be able to project that success much more widely , particularly in southern Europe , in turn reinforcing confidence and belief in the EU , particularly
  among the young generation . The French center-left must lead in conceiving a vision for Europe in which solidarity and equity reinforce long-term economic strength . Finally , along with the United Kingdom among European countries , France retains more of a global role than Germany has yet acquired . While the United Nations Security Council is outdated in its structure , it still plays a crucial legitimizing role ; and France , not Germany , is a member . In many other international organizations as well , France punches above its weight . Similarly , while France exports much less than Germany outside the EU , many large French enterprises rival Germany\u2019s in global reach and technical know-how . And French is still a global language . In other words , France not only is a link between Europe\u2019s north and south , but also contributes substantially to linking Europe to the rest of the world . Europe needs a renewed vision and effective policies to realize that vision . France
 s Socialist-Green government can play a critical unifying role as Europeans confront their biggest challenge in decades . Its success will be highly consequential \u2013 not least for the political debate that will inform the outcome of Germany\u2019s elections in 2013. 
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+Exchange Rate Disorder NEW YORK \u2013 Two troubling features of the ongoing economic recovery are the depressed nature of world trade and the early revival of international global payment imbalances . Estimates by the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations indicate that the volume of international trade in 2010 will still be 7 % to 8 % below its 2008 peak , while many or most countries , including industrial nations , are seeking to boost their current accounts . Indeed , if we believe the IMF\u2019s projections , the world economy\u2019s accumulated current-account surpluses would increase by almost $1 trillion between 2009 and 2012 ! This is , of course , impossible , as surpluses and deficits must be in balance for the world economy as a whole . It simply reflects the recessionary ( or deflationary ) force of weak global demand hanging over the world economy . Under these conditions , export-led growth by major economies is a threat to the world economy . This is true for Chi
 na , Germany ( as French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde has consistently reminded her neighbor ) , Japan , and the United States . Countries running surpluses must adopt expansionary policies and appreciate their currencies . More broadly , to the extent that major emerging-market countries will continue to lead the global recovery , they should reduce their current-account surpluses or even generate deficits to help , through increased imports , spread the benefits of their growth worldwide . But , while that implies that emerging-market currencies must strengthen , disorderly appreciations would do more harm than good . To use an American saying , it might mean throwing out the baby ( economic growth ) with the bathwater ( exchange rate appreciation ) . Consider China , which accounts for the largest share by far of world trade among emerging economies . Real appreciation of the renminbi is necessary for a balanced world economic recovery . But disorderly appreciation may seri
 ously affect China\u2019s economic growth by disrupting its export industries , which would generate major adverse effects on all of East Asia . China needs a major internal restructuring from exports and investments , its two engines of growth in past decades , to personal and government consumption ( education , health , and social protection in the latter case ) . But this restructuring will tend to reduce , not increase , import demand , as exports and investment are much more import-intensive than consumption . Moreover , a sharp appreciation of the renminbi could risk domestic deflation and a financial crisis . Chinese authorities certainly seem to have that interpretation of the roots of Japan\u2019s malaise in mind as they seek to avoid rapid revaluation . The only desirable scenario , therefore , is a Chinese economy that transmits its stimulus to the rest of the world mainly through rising imports generated by rapid economic growth ( i. e. , the income effect on import demand ) 
 , rather than by exchange-rate appreciation ( the substitution effect ) . This requires maintaining rapid growth while undertaking a major but necessarily gradual domestic restructuring , for which a smooth appreciation is much better suited . Now consider other major emerging markets . Here currency appreciation is already taking place , pushed by massive capital inflows since the second quarter of 2009 , and in some cases it can already be said to be excessive ( for example , in Brazil ) . These countries can , of course , resist upward pressure on their currencies by accumulating foreign-exchange reserves , like they did before the global financial crisis . The result is , of course , paradoxical : private funds that flow into these countries are recycled into US Treasury securities via investment of accumulated reserves . Why should emerging-market countries \u2019 central banks undertake this peculiar financial intermediation , which represents a major cost , as the yield of priva
 te funds is higher than that of reserves ? The implication here is that relying on free movement of capital to achieve exchange-rate appreciation and current-account deficits may generate a myriad of problems , including slower economic growth and the threat of asset bubbles and financial crises of their own . So , a more orderly way to induce current-account deficits without risking disruption of emerging economies \u2019 growth should be considered . One solution ( already advocated by some , including me , and adopted to some extent by a few countries ) is broader use of capital-account regulations . Surprisingly , however , this issue has been entirely absent from current global debates on financial reform . Fortunately , the IMF opened the door to discussion of this issue in a recent staff position paper . Equally important , a desirable global scenario is possibly one in which most developing countries run current-account deficits . But this requires major reforms in the global f
 inancial system to reduce the vulnerabilities that such deficits generated in the past , and that were reflected in major financial crises in the developing world . These past crises gave rise to a form of \u201c self-insurance \u201d among developing countries through reserve accumulation . This helped many of them weather the recent storm , but it also contributed to global payments imbalances . Recent IMF reforms are just a step in the direction of trying to create better financial instruments to help these countries . It is essential , in particular , to create reliable large-scale financing for developing countries during crises , through a mix of counter-cyclical issuance of SDRs and emergency financing without onerous conditions . 
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+France and Germany Must Act in Iraq Next week , President Bush , President Chirac , and Chancellor Schroeder will meet on the cliffs of Normandy to mark the 60th anniversary of the D-Day invasions that led to the liberation of Europe . They should also seize the moment to liberate themselves from the bitterness that has divided the Atlantic Alliance over the Iraq War , argue Pierre Lellouche and Christoph Bertram . When the United States launched the war against Saddam Hussein 's Iraq , France and Germany rightly warned that the invasion could well end up worsening instability in the Middle East and increase the threat of radical Islamic terror . But now that America and its coalition have proven themselves to be incapable of bringing stability to Iraq on their own , the French and German governments can no longer rest and smugly say , " I told you so , " as the situation deteriorates even further . Both governments must now become seriously and fully engaged in what must now be a u
 nited Western effort . Of course , it would be best for everyone - France and Germany included - if the current US-led coalition were to succeed and Iraq could turn into a pillar of Middle East stability and modernization . Yet , however desirable this outcome , it is no longer likely ( if it ever was ) . Internal stability and economic recovery continue to be elusive , with the specter of civil war hovering ever closer . A divided Iraq at war with itself would be a disaster for the region , for America 's international credibility and authority , and for transatlantic relations . In an already fragile region , a major Arab country like Iraq would most likely prompt interventions by its nervous neighbors - of which there is no shortage - if it turns into a failed state . Instead of the rule of law , there would be the law of the mafia , of terrorist groups , and of tribal militias . Many of them are already in place . Instead of moving toward modernization and development , the regi
 on would be confirmed as a cockpit for conflict , a threat to itself and to the world beyond . Were the US forced to withdraw in failure , Islamic terrorist groups would claim a historic victory , promising more bloodshed for the West . Moreover , America might also once again retreat bitterly into isolationism , blaming her failure on the UN and on disloyal European allies . So the stakes are high in Iraq , for Europeans no less than for Americans . That is why it is time that even those who have been most skeptical about US policy in Iraq start to do something about it . Both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder have repeatedly pronounced that what happens in Iraq is a strategic challenge to their countries . Yet their actions in response to this insight have been modest . The recent turmoil in Iraq has , on the contrary , strengthened those in both capitals who argue that there is now even less reason to get involved on the ground . At the very least , France and Germany are dema
 nding that the Bush administration openly admit to its failure and the need for help . Yet not only is such a demand na�ve , with the Bush team battling for re-election , it is not at all certain that most of America 's European allies would heed a US call for solidarity if one were issued . Confronting the threat that an unsettled Iraq poses to Europe and to the transatlantic relationship implies stopping these tactical games . The passing of authority in Iraq from the US-led coalition to an Iraqi government and the need for a much stronger UN role now offers the chance and imposes the need for everyone to stop posturing and get serious . For their part , EU governments should provide the UN - on whose involvement in Iraq they have long insisted - with the protective force it needs to prepare nation-wide elections in Iraq later in the year , and ask others to join . A UN staff protected by US marines simply cannot do that job . With the consent of both the US and Iraq 's new leade
 rship , EU governments should also offer to organize an international conference uniting all those with a stake in Iraqi stability , including Iraq 's neighbors , to work out a strategy and commit resources in order to save Iraq from slipping into protracted turmoil . If Europe is to act , France and Germany must lead . Precisely because they opposed the war , they are now the only countries that can restore Europe 's unity of action in promoting stability . France professes to bearing a special responsibility for international order , but so does Germany ; only a few weeks ago , Chancellor Schroeder based his claim to a permanent German seat in the UN Security Council on Germany 's readiness to shoulder such responsibilities . Of all the crisis regions in the world today , instability in Iraq constitutes the greatest challenge to international order . But France and Germany can also block European responsibility for international order and for solidarity with a US facing possible d
 efeat in Iraq . The decision is theirs . It is time for both to realize that the consequences of inaction will be no less severe for the region than for the Atlantic relationship . 
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