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Posted to issues@drill.apache.org by "ASF GitHub Bot (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2017/10/17 23:22:01 UTC
[jira] [Commented] (DRILL-5582) [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be
spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the
attacker's target instead of Drillbit
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-5582?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16208586#comment-16208586 ]
ASF GitHub Bot commented on DRILL-5582:
---------------------------------------
GitHub user bitblender opened a pull request:
https://github.com/apache/drill/pull/997
DRILL-5582: C++ Client: [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be spoofed by …
…an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the attacker's target instead of Drillbit
You can merge this pull request into a Git repository by running:
$ git pull https://github.com/bitblender/drill KM-DRILL-5582
Alternatively you can review and apply these changes as the patch at:
https://github.com/apache/drill/pull/997.patch
To close this pull request, make a commit to your master/trunk branch
with (at least) the following in the commit message:
This closes #997
----
commit 488ebefd4a2d096c9f02cbcdfd8c6984901b3444
Author: karthik <km...@maprtech.com>
Date: 2017-10-17T23:18:45Z
DRILL-5582: C++ Client: [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the attacker's target instead of Drillbit
----
> [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the attacker's target instead of Drillbit
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: DRILL-5582
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-5582
> Project: Apache Drill
> Issue Type: Bug
> Affects Versions: 1.10.0
> Reporter: Rob Wu
> Assignee: Sorabh Hamirwasia
> Priority: Minor
> Labels: doc-impacting
> Fix For: 1.12.0
>
>
> *Consider the scenario:*
> Alice has a drillbit (my.drillbit.co) with plain and kerberos authentication enabled containing important data. Bob, the attacker, attempts to spoof the connection and redirect it to his own drillbit (fake.drillbit.co) with no authentication setup.
> When Alice is under attack and attempts to connect to her secure drillbit, she is actually authenticating against Bob's drillbit. At this point, the connection should have failed due to unmatched configuration. However, the current implementation will return SUCCESS as long as the (spoofing) drillbit has no authentication requirement set.
> Currently, the drillbit <- to -> drill client connection accepts the lowest authentication configuration set on the server. This leaves unsuspecting user vulnerable to spoofing.
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