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Posted to issues@spark.apache.org by "Weichen Xu (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2025/05/16 10:21:00 UTC
[jira] [Resolved] (SPARK-52122) Fix DefaultParamsReader RCE vulnerability
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-52122?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Weichen Xu resolved SPARK-52122.
--------------------------------
Fix Version/s: 4.1.0
4.0.0
Resolution: Fixed
Issue resolved by pull request 50914
[https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/50914]
> Fix DefaultParamsReader RCE vulnerability
> -----------------------------------------
>
> Key: SPARK-52122
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SPARK-52122
> Project: Spark
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Components: Connect, ML
> Affects Versions: 4.1.0
> Reporter: Weichen Xu
> Assignee: Weichen Xu
> Priority: Major
> Fix For: 4.1.0, 4.0.0
>
>
> Fix DefaultParamsReader RCE vulnerability:
> The metadata loading [https://github.com/apache/spark/blob/18aebd8eb86b554e7aab38baca1e5de24df19a57/mllib/src/main/scala/org/apache/spark/ml/util/ReadWrite.scala#L565] does not verify the class,
> and then the reflection invocation [https://github.com/apache/spark/blob/18aebd8eb86b554e7aab38baca1e5de24df19a57/mllib/src/main/scala/org/apache/spark/ml/util/ReadWrite.scala#L568] will trigger arbitrary code execution if malicious class name is written to a designed metadata file.
>
> This become a security vulnerability because the code is executed in Spark driver which might be run as ROOT permission.
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