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Posted to commits@uima.apache.org by re...@apache.org on 2023/02/26 20:57:44 UTC

[uima-uimaj-io-jsoncas] branch main updated: vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability (#10)

This is an automated email from the ASF dual-hosted git repository.

rec pushed a commit to branch main
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/uima-uimaj-io-jsoncas.git


The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push:
     new f7352f5  vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability (#10)
f7352f5 is described below

commit f7352f5c110718ff24b215f023dfe1d7e17eea08
Author: Jonathan Leitschuh <jo...@gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Sun Feb 26 15:57:39 2023 -0500

    vuln-fix: Zip Slip Vulnerability (#10)
    
    Issue #18: Fix Zip Slip Vulnerability in test code
    
    This change does one of two things. This change either
    
    1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip.
    OR
    2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`.
    
    For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`.
    The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory.
    It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object.
    For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`;
    however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`.
    
    Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
    Severity: High
    CVSSS: 7.4
    Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip)
    
    Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <Jo...@gmail.com>
    
    
    Bug-tracker: https://github.com/JLLeitschuh/security-research/issues/16
    
    Co-authored-by: Moderne <te...@moderne.io>
    Co-authored-by: Richard Eckart de Castilho <re...@apache.org>
---
 src/test/java/org/apache/uima/json/jsoncas2/Fixtures.java | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/test/java/org/apache/uima/json/jsoncas2/Fixtures.java b/src/test/java/org/apache/uima/json/jsoncas2/Fixtures.java
index 74f54dd..ff44a10 100644
--- a/src/test/java/org/apache/uima/json/jsoncas2/Fixtures.java
+++ b/src/test/java/org/apache/uima/json/jsoncas2/Fixtures.java
@@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ public class Fixtures
                         }
 
                         Path target = targetBase.resolve(name);
+
+                      if (!target.normalize().startsWith(targetBase.normalize())) {
+                        throw new RuntimeException("Bad zip entry");
+                      }
                         Files.createDirectories(target.getParent());
 
                         try (InputStream eis = zipFile.getInputStream(entry);