[jira] [Updated] (GUACAMOLE-990) Enforce rate limit within TOTP

["Mike Jumper (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org>]

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GUACAMOLE-990?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Mike Jumper updated GUACAMOLE-990:
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    Summary: Enforce rate limit within TOTP  (was: TOTP Rate Limit To Mitigate Brute Force Security Vulnerability?)

> Enforce rate limit within TOTP
> ------------------------------
>
>                 Key: GUACAMOLE-990
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/GUACAMOLE-990
>             Project: Guacamole
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: guacamole-auth-totp
>    Affects Versions: 1.1.0
>            Reporter: Graham
>            Priority: Major
>
> Google's [libpam module|[https://github.com/google/google-authenticator-libpam/blob/master/man/google-authenticator.1.md]] has a rate limit option to prevent brute forcing.
> Does Guacamole's TOTP have anything built-in that's introducing any sleep/delay in the code input loop?
> It _seems_ like it doesn't from my clumsy attempts at testing this by just hammering the keyboard :) 
> If that's true then it seems like this would potentially be easier to bypass than even the password itself. I might be butchering the napkin math here, but with a possible number range of 1 million (6 digits) and 30 seconds, assuming a WAN latency per attempt of 7ms, that would mean that on average, once a hacker broke a password, they could then break through the TOTP segment over a scripted 233 login attempts or so.
> If there was even a plain old unconfigurable 1 second sleep/delay (or better yet, a continually increasing delay of n*1second based on past failure count in the current cycle) built in to the code input loop between attempts without even any added guacamole.properties options being introduced, I think this would basically handle the problem by pushing the possible average breakthrough time into unreasonable timelines.
> Also, though this would be another issue, it seemed that incrementing totp-digits with v1.1.0 to 8 didn't result in 8 digits being displayed when I scanned the resulting barcode in google authenticator. The introductory user bit did specify 8 digits - just not the resulting google authenticator entry. That may just be a bug in google authenticator however - not sure as I haven't tested any other TOTP apps, but I thought I'd mention it.



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