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Posted to notifications@logging.apache.org by "Volkan Yazici (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2021/12/14 09:39:00 UTC
[jira] [Commented] (LOG4J2-3221) JNDI lookups in PatternFormatter (not message patterns) enabled in Log4j2 < 2.16.0
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3221?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=17459010#comment-17459010 ]
Volkan Yazici commented on LOG4J2-3221:
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Hello [~semiotics]! Thanks for reaching out to us! Would you mind sharing your case (preferably with a simple reproducible demo) in an email to private@logging.apache.org, please?
> JNDI lookups in PatternFormatter (not message patterns) enabled in Log4j2 < 2.16.0
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: LOG4J2-3221
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3221
> Project: Log4j 2
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Lucy Menon
> Priority: Major
>
> The mitigation advice for CVE-2021-4428 suggests that for Log4j > 2.10.0 and < 2.15.0, the vulnerability can be avoided by setting -{{{}Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true{}}} or upgrading to 2.15.0. However, many users may not be aware that even in this case, lookups used in pattern formatters to provide specific pieces of context information will still recursively resolve, possibly triggering JNDI lookups. In order to avoid attacker-controlled JNDI lookups, users must also either:
> * Ensure that no such lookups resolve to attacker-provided data
> * Ensure that the the JndiLookup class is not loaded
> * Upgrade to log4j2 2.16.0 (untested)
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