[jira] [Commented] (LOG4J2-3371) Log Injection Vulnerability exists in Log4j2 default configuration

["4ra1n (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org>]

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3371?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=17489986#comment-17489986 ] 

4ra1n commented on LOG4J2-3371:
-------------------------------

At your convenience, would you please let me know what you think of this?
Recently, I found some similar problems in auditing other projects which using log4j.
For example, in Apache Shiro, Shiro PMC suggested that I report the problem to log4j.
As a well-known java project at the same level as the spring framework, it may be a good way to refer to the solution of the spring framework.
 
I haven't received a reply for many days.
Do you think this is a low-risk security vulnerability? Or do you think it's not a security issue?
Will further actions be taken, such as patch release and CVE?

> Log Injection Vulnerability exists in Log4j2 default configuration
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: LOG4J2-3371
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3371
>             Project: Log4j 2
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Core
>    Affects Versions: 2.17.1
>            Reporter: 4ra1n
>            Assignee: Ralph Goers
>            Priority: Major
>
> For information about log injection, refer to OWASP:
> [https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Log_Injection]
>  
> Some time ago, the spring framework revealed two CVE vulnerabilities related to log injection: CVE-2021-22096 and CVE-2021-22060:
> [https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2021-22096]
> [https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2021-22060]
> Their fix is to filter the log content, such as not allowing line seprators
>  
> Some time ago, I found a log injection vulnerability in other Apache project, which use log4j2. Although the vulnerability is effective and can be triggered, they think I should report the problem to Apahce Log4j and prevent such log injection vulnerability under the default configuration
>  
> code(under the default configuration)
> {code:java}
> public static void main(String[] args) {
>    Logger logger = LogManager.getLogger(Main.class);
>    logger.info("test\n00:00:00.000 [main] ERROR com.text.Class -
> xxx\nxxx");
> } {code}
>  
> output(under the default configuration)
> {code:java}
> 09:47:34.190 [main] INFO com.example.Main - test
> 00:00:00.000 [main] ERROR com.text.Class - xxx
> xxx {code}
> On the exploitation of vulnerabilities: for example, add some confused logs, such as forged IP, forged classes, forged error reports and exceptions, which brings trouble to the operation and maintenance personnel and auditors. Further, if there is an internal log analysis platform, and the xxx is wrapped by the script tag, that is, JavaScript code, the platform reading the log may have XSS vulnerabilities.



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