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Posted to bugs@httpd.apache.org by bu...@apache.org on 2009/11/25 00:25:12 UTC

DO NOT REPLY [Bug 48277] New: TraceEnable directive not secure by default

https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48277

           Summary: TraceEnable directive not secure by default
           Product: Apache httpd-2
           Version: 2.3-HEAD
          Platform: All
        OS/Version: All
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P2
         Component: Core
        AssignedTo: bugs@httpd.apache.org
        ReportedBy: marsh@extendedsubset.com


HTTP has long defined a TRACE verb.

A well-known paper on web security from 2003
http://www.cgisecurity.com/whitehat-mirror/WH-WhitePaper_XST_ebook.pdf
clearly documents the opportunities for evil provided by TRACE.

Web security scanners warn when TRACE is enabled:
http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=single&id=11213

My recent attack on TLS/SSL
http://extendedsubset.com/Renegotiating_TLS.pdf
highlights the need to disable TRACE. Having TRACE enabled may allow an
attacker to leverage the blind plaintext injection attack into arbitrary evil
script running in the browser from the origin of the target website.

Apache provides a configuration directive to disable TRACE.
http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#traceenable
However, the default setting leaves it in the enabled, insecure configuration.

It is time to set the default to the secure configuration.

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DO NOT REPLY [Bug 48277] TraceEnable directive not secure by default

Posted by bu...@apache.org.
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48277

Will Rowe <wr...@apache.org> changed:

           What    |Removed                     |Added
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Keywords|                            |FAQ
             Status|NEW                         |RESOLVED
         Resolution|                            |INVALID

--- Comment #1 from Will Rowe <wr...@apache.org> 2009-11-28 14:35:12 UTC ---
[Tagging FAQ for clarification]

TRACE is not a vulnerability, any more than traceroute or ping would be
security
issues.  It is simply a tool, and the HTTP project will not disable such tools
by default.  The RFC spells out that servers SHOULD implement, therefore we do.

Now, there are entirely moronic clients and programmatic interfaces; old, stale
and badly designed flavors of Microsoft Internet Explorer and Adobe Flash all
spring to mind, which would present the results of a TRACE request to the user.
This is out of the server developers hands, and there are other sinister flaws
hiding in those design errors which 'TraceEnable off' has no effect on.

So marked as an FAQ for the justification why the "security communities'"
request
to address the TRACE directive is entirely invalid.  The serious DoS
consideration
would be the reflection of request bodies, which are not enabled by default,
but
only offered as an 'extended' feature for testing server or routing behavior.

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