(tooling-agents) branch main updated: ASVS audit: 6.2.9.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]

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     new 574d1c4  ASVS audit: 6.2.9.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]
574d1c4 is described below

commit 574d1c4fbac6503e14a710d548178ab59bec5973
Author: ASF Tooling Team <ro...@apache.org>
AuthorDate: Tue May 5 22:57:20 2026 +0200

    ASVS audit: 6.2.9.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]
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+# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.9
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Repository** | apache/steve/v3 |
+| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
+| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
+| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.9 |
+| **Files Analyzed** | 4 relevant / 49 total |
+| **Files Skipped** | 12 |
+
+**Requirement description:** Verify that passwords of at least 64 characters are permitted.
+
+### Findings Overview
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| 🔴 Critical | 0 |
+| 🟠 High | 0 |
+| 🟡 Medium | 0 |
+| 🟢 Low | 0 |
+
+---
+
+## ASVS-6.2.9: Passwords of at Least 64 Characters Permitted
+
+### Findings for 6.2.9
+
+No password length validation exists in the audited code because no password handling exists. The application does not define password policies, maximum lengths, or input constraints on password fields.
+
+**Conclusion:** This requirement is **not directly applicable** to the audited code scope. Password length policies would be enforced by the external ASF identity provider.
+
+### Security Controls Inventory for 6.2.9
+
+| Control | Location | Coverage |
+|---------|----------|----------|
+| No password length restrictions in code | All files | No password handling present |
+| External authentication | `asfquart.auth` | Cannot verify external provider policies |
+
+### Positive Patterns for 6.2.9
+
+- No artificial length restrictions are imposed anywhere in the application code on any user-supplied credential or secret input.
+
+---
+
+
+
+## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
+
+1. **Delegated Authentication:** The application entirely delegates authentication to the `asfquart.auth` module (ASF OAuth/CAS). This means password-specific ASVS requirements (6.2.6–6.2.9) are not directly applicable to this codebase but would need to be verified against the external identity provider.
+
+2. **Authorization Gap Pattern:** Multiple endpoints have `### check authz` placeholder comments without implementation. While authentication (authn) is enforced via decorators, authorization (authz — "is this user the owner of this election?") is not verified. This is a cross-cutting concern that affects the trust model around brute-force protections — any authenticated committer can access any election's management functions.
+
+3. **CSRF Placeholder:** The `csrf_token = 'placeholder'` pattern creates a false sense of security. Templates reference it, JavaScript sends it in headers, but no server-side validation occurs. This is a **Type B gap** (control exists but not enforced).
+
+4. **External Auth Boundary:** The security boundary between this application and `asfquart.auth` is critical. Rate limiting, brute force protection, password policies, and account management all depend on the external system's implementation, which is outside the audit scope.
+
+5. **Cryptographic Design (Positive):** The vote encryption scheme using Argon2 key derivation, per-voter salts, and Fernet encryption demonstrates strong cryptographic practices for protecting ballot secrecy. The anti-tamper mechanism (`is_tampered()`) provides integrity verification.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-cutting Recommendations
+
+### Immediate (Critical/High Priority)
+
+1. **Implement real CSRF protection** — Replace the placeholder token with a cryptographically random per-session token and validate it on all state-changing endpoints. This directly impacts ASVS 6.3.1 by preventing automated cross-site attacks.
+
+2. **Convert state-changing GET endpoints to POST** — `/do-open/<eid>` and `/do-close/<eid>` must use POST to prevent trivial automation and link-based attacks.
+
+3. **Implement authorization checks** — Replace all `### check authz` placeholders with actual ownership verification (e.g., verify `result.uid == election.owner_pid`).
+
+### Short-term (Medium Priority)
+
+4. **Add rate limiting** — Implement per-user, per-endpoint rate limiting for sensitive operations (voting, election creation/modification). This addresses ASVS 6.3.1 at the application layer.
+
+5. **Document external auth requirements** — Create security documentation specifying what brute force protections must be provided by the `asfquart.auth` system to satisfy ASVS 6.3.1.
+
+6. **Remove debug prints** — Remove `print('FORM:', form)` statements in `do_add_issue_endpoint` and `do_edit_issue_endpoint`.
+
+### Long-term (Architecture)
+
+7. **Verify external IdP compliance** — Audit the ASF identity provider against ASVS 6.2.6–6.2.9 to ensure password handling requirements are met at the authentication boundary.
+
+8. **Implement request anomaly detection** — Add logging and alerting for unusual patterns (rapid successive requests, bulk operations) to complement rate limiting.
+
+9. **Security documentation** — Create an application-level security document describing the authentication architecture, trust boundaries, and how each ASVS requirement is satisfied (either locally or by the external IdP).
+        
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