Digest auth - no nonce/replay checking

[Dirk-Willem van Gulik <di...@webweaving.org>]

Unless I missed something we nicely issue a nonce during digest auth
(based on r->request_time) - but when the reply comes in with an
(Proxy-)Authenticate header we use the nonce provided by the client; and
do not check if it was any where near reasonably likely that we issued it.

So I guess

->	The release notes and the digest docs should
	propably contain a warning that we are not
	hardnened against certain replay attacks.

->	Long term we propably want to solve this; e.g.
	by using a hash over a static secret or somethign.

Dw

Re: Digest auth - no nonce/replay checking

[Dirk-Willem van Gulik <di...@webweaving.org>]

On Wed, 17 Dec 2003, Ben Laurie wrote:

> I distinctly remember discussing this at the time - guess I didn't have
> the energy to fix it then :-)

yes :-) sometime 98 I think :-)

Dw

Re: Digest auth - no nonce/replay checking

[Ben Laurie <be...@algroup.co.uk>]

Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:

> Unless I missed something we nicely issue a nonce during digest auth
> (based on r->request_time) - but when the reply comes in with an
> (Proxy-)Authenticate header we use the nonce provided by the client; and
> do not check if it was any where near reasonably likely that we issued it.
> 
> So I guess
> 
> ->	The release notes and the digest docs should
> 	propably contain a warning that we are not
> 	hardnened against certain replay attacks.
> 
> ->	Long term we propably want to solve this; e.g.
> 	by using a hash over a static secret or somethign.

I distinctly remember discussing this at the time - guess I didn't have 
the energy to fix it then :-)

Cheers,

Ben.

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