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Posted to dev@polaris.apache.org by vemula praneeth <pr...@gmail.com> on 2026/03/05 19:19:57 UTC

[DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Hi dev,

I've submitted PR #3927 (https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927)
which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code 103).

Motivation:
Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
  - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
  - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
  - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES

It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for read-only
analyst principals.

Feedback welcome!

Regards,
Praneeth

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Dennis Huo <hu...@gmail.com>.
Thanks for sending the PR! Repeating from my PR comment for posterity: I
agree there's a balance between reducing verbosity vs more visible/explicit
test parameters at the individual test-case level. I think in this case
it's worth the extra characters in the tests both to provider an easier way
to see at a glance the stack of privileges that enables each
AuthorizableOperation as well as to help enable test-driven-development of
any additional or modified super-privileges.

On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 10:58 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Here is the PR : https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3970
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 4:40 PM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Dennis,
> >
> > > As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included
> TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally
> create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.
> >
> > I guess, the assumption is that you wouldn't intentionally or
> > accidentally do anything like that. If a new super-privilege is added
> > to SUPER_PRIVILEGES, this is a potentially VERY impactful change, and
> > I would assume that it would be reviewed thoroughly before being
> > merged. I noticed that the tests equally pass before and after the
> > super-privilege addition. But since that was the expected outcome, I
> > considered this situation as normal, and even told myself "good, the
> > test factory is working as expected" :-)
> >
> > > would that make new super-privilege additions automatically appear in
> the "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally
> cause all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to
> fail until they're updated?
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> > But anyways, the automatic super-privilege additions seem to cause
> > friction, and I apologize for that. I will prepare a PR to revert that
> > portion of the Authz tests refactoring.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Alex
> >
> > On Sat, Mar 7, 2026 at 7:16 AM Dennis Huo <dh...@apache.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > +1 to the overall idea, definitely a useful super-privilege to define
> for
> > > that persona. Responded with some comments on the PR. One thing to
> point
> > > out is regarding the statement:
> > >
> > > Motivation:
> > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an
> entire
> > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every
> table.
> > >
> > >
> > > It may not be sufficiently documented or obvious, but in general the
> scope
> > > of the securable "authz targets" applicable to a privilege do *not*
> > > restrict the scope of allowed entities on which the privilege is
> granted.
> > >
> > > This is easier to convey with concrete examples --
> TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES is
> > > a privilege for which the authz target is naturally a TableEntity.
> However,
> > > grants of TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES do *not* need to be on a table -- they
> can
> > > be granted on NamespaceEntities or CatalogEntities as well, where the
> > > *container hierarchy* (catalog, namespace, table) defines the
> > > inheritance of grants on the parent container.
> > >
> > > So, currently if someone really wants TABLE_READ_DATA across a whole
> > > catalog, it's already supported by granting TABLE_READ_DATA on the
> catalog
> > > object itself, and it's not necessary to individually grant
> TABLE_READ_DATA
> > > on every table.
> > >
> > > However, the motivation is still valid in that there is a convenient
> > > *bundle* of privileges that otherwise need to be granted individually
> at
> > > whatever level is desired -- granting TABLE_READ_DATA,
> > > VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_LIST,
> > > TABLE_LIST, etc. (Technically since _READ_PROPERTIES subsumes _LIST,
> > > actually just the _READ_PROPERTIES should be sufficient).
> > >
> > > My suggestion on the PR was that if we indeed only have NAMESPACE and
> lower
> > > level read privileges in this new bundle, we should name it as a
> > > NAMESPACE-level bundle ("NAMESPACE_READ_DATA") while still allowing it
> to
> > > be set at either Catalog or Namespace levels.
> > >
> > > The second big thing I wanted to discuss and hear thoughts from Alex
> was
> > > regarding the auto-addition of subsuming privileges in
> > > `PolarisAuthzTestsFactory` in
> > >
> https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3824/changes#diff-43fc1673a0b67957e44db18a44467065151a67e4b9068180b1750b21e9059f6d
> > > - right now the tests don't really help identify important
> considerations
> > > when adding a new super-privilege like here, so it's hard to prove to
> > > ourselves that the SUPER_PRIVILEGES were set up correctly without
> leaking
> > > write privileges. It's somewhat bad that in this new PR, the tests
> > > *technically* have code-coverage of using the new super-privilege, but
> will
> > > still pass no matter what bundle of privileges we add to the new
> privilege.
> > > As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included
> > > TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we
> accidentally
> > > create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.
> > >
> > > If we kept the auto-generation of "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets"
> but
> > > did *not* auto-generate the subsuming ones, would that make new
> > > super-privilege additions automatically appear in the
> > > "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally
> cause
> > > all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail
> > > until they're updated?
> > >
> > > What do others think about the balance here of intentionally opting for
> > > more verbosity in the Authz tests in the interest of having the Authz
> test
> > > automatically function as a safety belt when working with new privilege
> > > sets?
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 1:28 PM Yufei Gu <fl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > +1 on the idea. Left some comments on the PR.
> > > >
> > > > Yufei
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 10:57 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <
> dimas@apache.org>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi All,
> > > > >
> > > > > The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.
> > > > >
> > > > > I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.
> > > > >
> > > > > Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few
> more
> > > > > days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?
> > > > >
> > > > > Cheers,
> > > > > Dmitri.
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > Alex
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <
> travismbowen@gmail.com>
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Thanks for sending this out.
> > > > > > > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > -Travis
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > > > > > > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Hi dev,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I've submitted PR #3927 (
> > > > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927
> > > > > )
> > > > > > > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA
> (code
> > > > > 103).
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Motivation:
> > > > > > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst
> across an
> > > > > entire
> > > > > > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on
> every
> > > > > table.
> > > > > > > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that
> subsumes:
> > > > > > > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data
> access)
> > > > > > > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for
> > > > read-only
> > > > > > > > analyst principals.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Feedback welcome!
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > > Praneeth
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
>

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>.
Hi all,

Here is the PR : https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3970

Thanks,
Alex

On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 4:40 PM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Dennis,
>
> > As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.
>
> I guess, the assumption is that you wouldn't intentionally or
> accidentally do anything like that. If a new super-privilege is added
> to SUPER_PRIVILEGES, this is a potentially VERY impactful change, and
> I would assume that it would be reviewed thoroughly before being
> merged. I noticed that the tests equally pass before and after the
> super-privilege addition. But since that was the expected outcome, I
> considered this situation as normal, and even told myself "good, the
> test factory is working as expected" :-)
>
> > would that make new super-privilege additions automatically appear in the "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally cause all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail until they're updated?
>
> Yes.
>
> But anyways, the automatic super-privilege additions seem to cause
> friction, and I apologize for that. I will prepare a PR to revert that
> portion of the Authz tests refactoring.
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> On Sat, Mar 7, 2026 at 7:16 AM Dennis Huo <dh...@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> > +1 to the overall idea, definitely a useful super-privilege to define for
> > that persona. Responded with some comments on the PR. One thing to point
> > out is regarding the statement:
> >
> > Motivation:
> > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
> >
> >
> > It may not be sufficiently documented or obvious, but in general the scope
> > of the securable "authz targets" applicable to a privilege do *not*
> > restrict the scope of allowed entities on which the privilege is granted.
> >
> > This is easier to convey with concrete examples -- TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES is
> > a privilege for which the authz target is naturally a TableEntity. However,
> > grants of TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES do *not* need to be on a table -- they can
> > be granted on NamespaceEntities or CatalogEntities as well, where the
> > *container hierarchy* (catalog, namespace, table) defines the
> > inheritance of grants on the parent container.
> >
> > So, currently if someone really wants TABLE_READ_DATA across a whole
> > catalog, it's already supported by granting TABLE_READ_DATA on the catalog
> > object itself, and it's not necessary to individually grant TABLE_READ_DATA
> > on every table.
> >
> > However, the motivation is still valid in that there is a convenient
> > *bundle* of privileges that otherwise need to be granted individually at
> > whatever level is desired -- granting TABLE_READ_DATA,
> > VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_LIST,
> > TABLE_LIST, etc. (Technically since _READ_PROPERTIES subsumes _LIST,
> > actually just the _READ_PROPERTIES should be sufficient).
> >
> > My suggestion on the PR was that if we indeed only have NAMESPACE and lower
> > level read privileges in this new bundle, we should name it as a
> > NAMESPACE-level bundle ("NAMESPACE_READ_DATA") while still allowing it to
> > be set at either Catalog or Namespace levels.
> >
> > The second big thing I wanted to discuss and hear thoughts from Alex was
> > regarding the auto-addition of subsuming privileges in
> > `PolarisAuthzTestsFactory` in
> > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3824/changes#diff-43fc1673a0b67957e44db18a44467065151a67e4b9068180b1750b21e9059f6d
> > - right now the tests don't really help identify important considerations
> > when adding a new super-privilege like here, so it's hard to prove to
> > ourselves that the SUPER_PRIVILEGES were set up correctly without leaking
> > write privileges. It's somewhat bad that in this new PR, the tests
> > *technically* have code-coverage of using the new super-privilege, but will
> > still pass no matter what bundle of privileges we add to the new privilege.
> > As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included
> > TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally
> > create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.
> >
> > If we kept the auto-generation of "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" but
> > did *not* auto-generate the subsuming ones, would that make new
> > super-privilege additions automatically appear in the
> > "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally cause
> > all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail
> > until they're updated?
> >
> > What do others think about the balance here of intentionally opting for
> > more verbosity in the Authz tests in the interest of having the Authz test
> > automatically function as a safety belt when working with new privilege
> > sets?
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 1:28 PM Yufei Gu <fl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > +1 on the idea. Left some comments on the PR.
> > >
> > > Yufei
> > >
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 10:57 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <di...@apache.org>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi All,
> > > >
> > > > The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.
> > > >
> > > > I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.
> > > >
> > > > Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few more
> > > > days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?
> > > >
> > > > Cheers,
> > > > Dmitri.
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > > >
> > > > > The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > Alex
> > > > >
> > > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Thanks for sending this out.
> > > > > > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > -Travis
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > > > > > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi dev,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I've submitted PR #3927 (
> > > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927
> > > > )
> > > > > > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code
> > > > 103).
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Motivation:
> > > > > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an
> > > > entire
> > > > > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every
> > > > table.
> > > > > > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> > > > > > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > > > > > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for
> > > read-only
> > > > > > > analyst principals.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Feedback welcome!
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > > Praneeth
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>.
Hi Dennis,

> As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.

I guess, the assumption is that you wouldn't intentionally or
accidentally do anything like that. If a new super-privilege is added
to SUPER_PRIVILEGES, this is a potentially VERY impactful change, and
I would assume that it would be reviewed thoroughly before being
merged. I noticed that the tests equally pass before and after the
super-privilege addition. But since that was the expected outcome, I
considered this situation as normal, and even told myself "good, the
test factory is working as expected" :-)

> would that make new super-privilege additions automatically appear in the "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally cause all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail until they're updated?

Yes.

But anyways, the automatic super-privilege additions seem to cause
friction, and I apologize for that. I will prepare a PR to revert that
portion of the Authz tests refactoring.

Thanks,
Alex

On Sat, Mar 7, 2026 at 7:16 AM Dennis Huo <dh...@apache.org> wrote:
>
> +1 to the overall idea, definitely a useful super-privilege to define for
> that persona. Responded with some comments on the PR. One thing to point
> out is regarding the statement:
>
> Motivation:
> > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
>
>
> It may not be sufficiently documented or obvious, but in general the scope
> of the securable "authz targets" applicable to a privilege do *not*
> restrict the scope of allowed entities on which the privilege is granted.
>
> This is easier to convey with concrete examples -- TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES is
> a privilege for which the authz target is naturally a TableEntity. However,
> grants of TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES do *not* need to be on a table -- they can
> be granted on NamespaceEntities or CatalogEntities as well, where the
> *container hierarchy* (catalog, namespace, table) defines the
> inheritance of grants on the parent container.
>
> So, currently if someone really wants TABLE_READ_DATA across a whole
> catalog, it's already supported by granting TABLE_READ_DATA on the catalog
> object itself, and it's not necessary to individually grant TABLE_READ_DATA
> on every table.
>
> However, the motivation is still valid in that there is a convenient
> *bundle* of privileges that otherwise need to be granted individually at
> whatever level is desired -- granting TABLE_READ_DATA,
> VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_LIST,
> TABLE_LIST, etc. (Technically since _READ_PROPERTIES subsumes _LIST,
> actually just the _READ_PROPERTIES should be sufficient).
>
> My suggestion on the PR was that if we indeed only have NAMESPACE and lower
> level read privileges in this new bundle, we should name it as a
> NAMESPACE-level bundle ("NAMESPACE_READ_DATA") while still allowing it to
> be set at either Catalog or Namespace levels.
>
> The second big thing I wanted to discuss and hear thoughts from Alex was
> regarding the auto-addition of subsuming privileges in
> `PolarisAuthzTestsFactory` in
> https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3824/changes#diff-43fc1673a0b67957e44db18a44467065151a67e4b9068180b1750b21e9059f6d
> - right now the tests don't really help identify important considerations
> when adding a new super-privilege like here, so it's hard to prove to
> ourselves that the SUPER_PRIVILEGES were set up correctly without leaking
> write privileges. It's somewhat bad that in this new PR, the tests
> *technically* have code-coverage of using the new super-privilege, but will
> still pass no matter what bundle of privileges we add to the new privilege.
> As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included
> TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally
> create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.
>
> If we kept the auto-generation of "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" but
> did *not* auto-generate the subsuming ones, would that make new
> super-privilege additions automatically appear in the
> "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally cause
> all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail
> until they're updated?
>
> What do others think about the balance here of intentionally opting for
> more verbosity in the Authz tests in the interest of having the Authz test
> automatically function as a safety belt when working with new privilege
> sets?
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 1:28 PM Yufei Gu <fl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > +1 on the idea. Left some comments on the PR.
> >
> > Yufei
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 10:57 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <di...@apache.org>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Hi All,
> > >
> > > The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.
> > >
> > > I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.
> > >
> > > Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few more
> > > days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Dmitri.
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > >
> > > > The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Alex
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for sending this out.
> > > > > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> > > > >
> > > > > -Travis
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > > > > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Hi dev,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I've submitted PR #3927 (
> > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927
> > > )
> > > > > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code
> > > 103).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Motivation:
> > > > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an
> > > entire
> > > > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every
> > > table.
> > > > > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> > > > > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > > > > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for
> > read-only
> > > > > > analyst principals.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Feedback welcome!
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > Praneeth
> > > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Dennis Huo <dh...@apache.org>.
+1 to the overall idea, definitely a useful super-privilege to define for
that persona. Responded with some comments on the PR. One thing to point
out is regarding the statement:

Motivation:
> Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.


It may not be sufficiently documented or obvious, but in general the scope
of the securable "authz targets" applicable to a privilege do *not*
restrict the scope of allowed entities on which the privilege is granted.

This is easier to convey with concrete examples -- TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES is
a privilege for which the authz target is naturally a TableEntity. However,
grants of TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES do *not* need to be on a table -- they can
be granted on NamespaceEntities or CatalogEntities as well, where the
*container hierarchy* (catalog, namespace, table) defines the
inheritance of grants on the parent container.

So, currently if someone really wants TABLE_READ_DATA across a whole
catalog, it's already supported by granting TABLE_READ_DATA on the catalog
object itself, and it's not necessary to individually grant TABLE_READ_DATA
on every table.

However, the motivation is still valid in that there is a convenient
*bundle* of privileges that otherwise need to be granted individually at
whatever level is desired -- granting TABLE_READ_DATA,
VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES, NAMESPACE_LIST,
TABLE_LIST, etc. (Technically since _READ_PROPERTIES subsumes _LIST,
actually just the _READ_PROPERTIES should be sufficient).

My suggestion on the PR was that if we indeed only have NAMESPACE and lower
level read privileges in this new bundle, we should name it as a
NAMESPACE-level bundle ("NAMESPACE_READ_DATA") while still allowing it to
be set at either Catalog or Namespace levels.

The second big thing I wanted to discuss and hear thoughts from Alex was
regarding the auto-addition of subsuming privileges in
`PolarisAuthzTestsFactory` in
https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3824/changes#diff-43fc1673a0b67957e44db18a44467065151a67e4b9068180b1750b21e9059f6d
- right now the tests don't really help identify important considerations
when adding a new super-privilege like here, so it's hard to prove to
ourselves that the SUPER_PRIVILEGES were set up correctly without leaking
write privileges. It's somewhat bad that in this new PR, the tests
*technically* have code-coverage of using the new super-privilege, but will
still pass no matter what bundle of privileges we add to the new privilege.
As in, the tests equally pass whether or not we accidentally included
TABLE_WRITE_DATA as a subsumed privilege or whether or not we accidentally
create a backdoor in the `updateTable` method.

If we kept the auto-generation of "missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" but
did *not* auto-generate the subsuming ones, would that make new
super-privilege additions automatically appear in the
"missingInsufficientPrivilegeSets" by default and thus intentionally cause
all the test cases for operations allowed by the new privilege to fail
until they're updated?

What do others think about the balance here of intentionally opting for
more verbosity in the Authz tests in the interest of having the Authz test
automatically function as a safety belt when working with new privilege
sets?


On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 1:28 PM Yufei Gu <fl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> +1 on the idea. Left some comments on the PR.
>
> Yufei
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 10:57 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <di...@apache.org>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi All,
> >
> > The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.
> >
> > I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.
> >
> > Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few more
> > days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Dmitri.
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Praneeth,
> > >
> > > The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Alex
> > >
> > > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Praneeth,
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for sending this out.
> > > > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> > > >
> > > > -Travis
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > > > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi dev,
> > > > >
> > > > > I've submitted PR #3927 (
> https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927
> > )
> > > > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code
> > 103).
> > > > >
> > > > > Motivation:
> > > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an
> > entire
> > > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every
> > table.
> > > > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> > > > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > > >
> > > > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > > > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for
> read-only
> > > > > analyst principals.
> > > > >
> > > > > Feedback welcome!
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > Praneeth
> > > > >
> > >
> >
>

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Yufei Gu <fl...@gmail.com>.
+1 on the idea. Left some comments on the PR.

Yufei


On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 10:57 AM Dmitri Bourlatchkov <di...@apache.org>
wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.
>
> I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.
>
> Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few more
> days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?
>
> Cheers,
> Dmitri.
>
> On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi Praneeth,
> >
> > The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Alex
> >
> > On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Praneeth,
> > >
> > > Thanks for sending this out.
> > > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> > >
> > > -Travis
> > >
> > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi dev,
> > > >
> > > > I've submitted PR #3927 (https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927
> )
> > > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code
> 103).
> > > >
> > > > Motivation:
> > > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an
> entire
> > > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every
> table.
> > > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> > > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > > >
> > > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for read-only
> > > > analyst principals.
> > > >
> > > > Feedback welcome!
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Praneeth
> > > >
> >
>

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Dmitri Bourlatchkov <di...@apache.org>.
Hi All,

The proposed change LGTM too. I approved the PR in GH.

I see a positive review from Michael in GH too.

Since Michael also asked Dennis to review, I propose waiting a few more
days before merging. How about merging on Mar 10?

Cheers,
Dmitri.

On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 6:46 AM Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org> wrote:

> Hi Praneeth,
>
> The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Praneeth,
> >
> > Thanks for sending this out.
> > I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
> >
> > -Travis
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> > praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi dev,
> > >
> > > I've submitted PR #3927 (https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927)
> > > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code 103).
> > >
> > > Motivation:
> > > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> > > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
> > > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> > >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> > >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> > >
> > > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for read-only
> > > analyst principals.
> > >
> > > Feedback welcome!
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Praneeth
> > >
>

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Alexandre Dutra <ad...@apache.org>.
Hi Praneeth,

The changes make sense to me. I approved your PR.

Thanks,
Alex

On Fri, Mar 6, 2026 at 5:47 AM Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Praneeth,
>
> Thanks for sending this out.
> I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.
>
> -Travis
>
> On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
> praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi dev,
> >
> > I've submitted PR #3927 (https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927)
> > which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code 103).
> >
> > Motivation:
> > Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> > catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
> > CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
> >   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
> >   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
> >   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
> >
> > It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> > and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for read-only
> > analyst principals.
> >
> > Feedback welcome!
> >
> > Regards,
> > Praneeth
> >

Re: [DISCUSS] Add CATALOG_READ_DATA privilege

Posted by Travis Bowen <tr...@gmail.com>.
Hi Praneeth,

Thanks for sending this out.
I looked at the PR and think the motivation and PR makes sense.

-Travis

On Thu, Mar 5, 2026 at 11:20 AM vemula praneeth <
praneethsagarvemula@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi dev,
>
> I've submitted PR #3927 (https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/3927)
> which adds a new catalog-level privilege CATALOG_READ_DATA (code 103).
>
> Motivation:
> Currently, granting read-only access to a data analyst across an entire
> catalog requires individually granting TABLE_READ_DATA on every table.
> CATALOG_READ_DATA is a single catalog-level grant that subsumes:
>   - TABLE_READ_DATA, TABLE_LIST, TABLE_READ_PROPERTIES
>   - NAMESPACE_LIST, NAMESPACE_READ_PROPERTIES
>   - VIEW_LIST, VIEW_READ_PROPERTIES
>
> It fits naturally between CATALOG_MANAGE_METADATA (no data access)
> and CATALOG_MANAGE_CONTENT (full access), filling a gap for read-only
> analyst principals.
>
> Feedback welcome!
>
> Regards,
> Praneeth
>