Re: dev Digest 20 Aug 2008 06:49:31 -0000 Issue 2669

[Ian G <ia...@iang.org>]

Paul wrote:
> It is important enough, the problem is we don't want to a back port to 
> cause regression or other sidee effects, and to me that is the scariest 
> thing about the SNI patch(es).

There might be a compromise position here:  As long as the 
SNI patch causes no problem to other services, this could be 
ok.  If later on SNI users had to put up with some fast 
fixes, this wouldn't be so much of an issue.

Serious users of TLS (e.g., banks) won't be using SNI for a 
while.  It is the grass roots people, the LAMPS vhost 
people, that we want to get into TLS.  Right now they are 
not.  Getting them into TLS/SNI even with a few potential 
scary events, is still a huge win.

(Indeed, if TLS/SNI is thought to be wobbly by the 
mainstreet TLS operators for a while, that's fine.)

Normally, this aggressive approach might not be so good. 
But in the case of real live attacks, if we delay a year for 
a perfect secure implementation, then we lose a year, 
over-all, and the victims lose another billion.  Those 
numbers are much scarier than a few hiccups over SNI.

iang