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Posted to dev@drill.apache.org by "Rob Wu (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2017/06/13 06:32:00 UTC
[jira] [Created] (DRILL-5582) [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be
spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the
attacker's target instead of Drillbit
Rob Wu created DRILL-5582:
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Summary: [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to data being written to the attacker's target instead of Drillbit
Key: DRILL-5582
URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-5582
Project: Apache Drill
Issue Type: Bug
Affects Versions: 1.10.0
Reporter: Rob Wu
Priority: Minor
Consider the scenario:
Alice has a drillbit (my.drillbit.co) with plain and kerberos authentication enabled containing important data. Bob, the attacker, attempts to spoof the connection and redirect it to his own drillbit (fake.drillbit.co) with no authentication setup.
When Alice is under attack and attempts to connect to her secure drillbit, she is actually authenticating against Bob's drillbit. At this point, the connection should have failed due to unmatched configuration. However, the current implementation will return SUCCESS as long as the (spoofing) drillbit has no authentication requirement set.
Currently, the drillbit <-to-> drill client connection accepts the lowest authentication configuration set on the server. This leaves the user vulnerable to spoofing.
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