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Posted to issues@artemis.apache.org by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org> on 2026/05/26 19:54:45 UTC
[PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
jbertram opened a new pull request, #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468
I started this document using [this skill](https://gist.github.com/scovetta/2dc9a0695c7cbcc32e23799e00d2ced3) which was recommended by Apache security. I heavily modified the output to simplify and clarify the result.
This model is relatively high-level. We can add more details as necessary over time to cover any gaps. The main priority here is to cover all the bases and provide researchers (and AI tools) a reference to avoid a glut of false positives.
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "tabish121 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
tabish121 merged PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3311367817
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
Review Comment:
Clarified
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
Review Comment:
Fixed
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "tabish121 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
tabish121 commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3321204219
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
Review Comment:
It doesn't look like you changed it, are you sure its fixed ?
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "brusdev (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
brusdev commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3308527966
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
Review Comment:
The findings are rendered without new lines. Are those findings a list?
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3324395488
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
Review Comment:
I didn't push my changes. Sorry for the confusion!
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3311083755
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
Review Comment:
It's not a list. It's just a paragraph.
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3311113967
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
+. *Management Client → Broker Core:* Management operations from management clients are subject to RBAC.
+. *Broker Core → Filesystem:* Broker writes to append-only journal and paging files; integrity of persisted data depends on filesystem and OS guarantees.
+
+=== Reachability preconditions per component
+
+* *Protocol Adapters:* A finding is in-model only if reachable from network input on the corresponding protocol port without requiring authenticated management credentials.
Review Comment:
No. It's just saying that if you have authenticated management credentials you are trusted and not considered adversarial.
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "brusdev (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
brusdev commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3308525178
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
Review Comment:
Optional
```suggestion
Findings should be reported according to the link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
```
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
Review Comment:
They arendered without new lines, are those findings a list?
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
Review Comment:
Double that
```suggestion
Findings that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
```
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
Review Comment:
consume is a bit different: an authorized consumer can consume also after revoking the consume permissions: once the ServerConsumer object is created, no further authorization checks occur during message delivery and the consumer can continue consuming until it disconnects
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
+. *Management Client → Broker Core:* Management operations from management clients are subject to RBAC.
+. *Broker Core → Filesystem:* Broker writes to append-only journal and paging files; integrity of persisted data depends on filesystem and OS guarantees.
+
+=== Reachability preconditions per component
+
+* *Protocol Adapters:* A finding is in-model only if reachable from network input on the corresponding protocol port without requiring authenticated management credentials.
Review Comment:
Does this exclude findings that lead to privilege escalations?
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
+. *Management Client → Broker Core:* Management operations from management clients are subject to RBAC.
+. *Broker Core → Filesystem:* Broker writes to append-only journal and paging files; integrity of persisted data depends on filesystem and OS guarantees.
+
+=== Reachability preconditions per component
+
+* *Protocol Adapters:* A finding is in-model only if reachable from network input on the corresponding protocol port without requiring authenticated management credentials.
+* *Broker Core:* A finding is in-model if reachable from messaging client-controlled payloads, headers, or addressing metadata.
+* *Management APIs:* A finding is in-model if reachable from an authenticated management client's request.
+
+== Assumptions About the Environment
+
+=== Operating system and runtime
+
+* The broker assumes a conformant JVM (Java 17 or later).
+* The broker assumes the OS provides standard filesystem semantics (atomicity of writes < page size, durability after fsync).
+* The broker assumes the OS enforces process isolation (no untrusted local processes can ptrace or inject code).
+
+=== Concurrency
+
+* The broker is designed to be thread-safe for concurrent client connections.
+* The broker assumes the JVM correctly implements Java's multi-threading semantics (thread synchronization, memory visibility between threads, safe publication of shared data).
+A JVM with broken concurrency primitives could cause race conditions in authentication, authorization, or message routing.
+* Runtime configuration reload (`broker.xml`, `security-settings`) is safe under load.
+Configuration changes do not cause inconsistent state or authorization bypass during reload.
+
+=== Filesystem assumptions
+
+* The broker assumes it has exclusive write access to its data directory (journal, paging, bindings).
Review Comment:
Showuld we also assume a restricted access to the etc directory?
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3311366242
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
+Findings that are <<out-of-scope,out of the scope>> or involve security properties <<security-properties-not-provided,explicitly not provided>> will be closed citing this document.
+
+== Scope and Intended Use
+
+=== Versioning
+
+This threat model is versioned alongside Artemis.
+A security report against project version _N_ is triaged against the model *as it stood at _N_*.
+
+=== Primary intended use cases
+
+* Multi-protocol message broker for enterprise messaging systems
+* Pub/sub and point-to-point messaging topologies
+* Integration hub for heterogeneous client environments (Java, C++, Python, JavaScript, .NET)
+
+=== Deployment contexts
+
+* Standalone
+* Embedded broker within another Java application
+
+=== Actors
+
+==== Client actors
+
+Artemis distinguishes between two main client actors (network/API callers):
+
+* *Messaging* — send and consume messages via supported messaging protocols
+* *Management* — invoke management operations via web console, JMX, Jolokia HTTP, or management messages
+
+==== Operator actor
+
+* *Operator* — has filesystem or physical access to the broker (can edit `broker.xml`, access journal files, restart the broker process).
+This is not a "client" actor because there is no network call; the operator interacts directly with the host system.
+
+=== Component-Family Table
+
+[cols="2,4,2,1"]
+|===
+| Family | Representative API/Entry Point | Touches External Resources? | In Model?
+
+| Broker Core
+| Core protocol handler, journal, paging, routing engine
+| Yes — filesystem (journal, paging), network (bridges, federation)
+| *Yes*
+
+| Protocol Adapters
+| AMQP, MQTT, STOMP, OpenWire, Core protocol implementations
+| Yes — network
+| *Yes*
+
+| Management APIs
+| JMX MBeans, Jolokia HTTP, Management messages
+| Yes — network (JMX/HTTP), local JMX
+| *Yes*
+
+| Client Libraries
+| Core client, JMS 2.0 client, Jakarta Messaging 3.1 client
+| Yes — network (to broker)
+| *Partial*
+|===
+
+== Out of Scope
+
+=== Use cases Artemis does not support
+
+* Message broker as a cryptographic confidentiality boundary — the broker has access to plaintext message payloads; end-to-end encryption between message producers and consumers must be implemented outside the broker.
+* Defense against malicious operators with filesystem or JVM access — an operator with filesystem access can read journal files, modify configuration, or attach a debugger.
+* Real-time guarantees or bounded latency — the broker is designed for reliability, not hard real-time performance.
+* Byzantine fault tolerance in clustered deployments beyond simple fail-stop failures — the clustering model assumes cluster nodes are honest or fail-stop, not adversarial.
+
+=== Threats Artemis does not attempt to defend against
+
+* Attacks requiring local JVM access (e.g., agent attachment, debugger, `-javaagent` instrumentation).
+* Physical or hypervisor-level attacks on the host.
+* Side-channel attacks (timing, speculative execution) on message metadata or routing decisions.
+* Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion at OS level (e.g., file descriptor limits, kernel OOM) — operators must configure OS limits.
+
+=== Code that ships but is not covered by this model
+
+* Third-party dependencies (Netty, JGroups, etc.) — threat-modeled separately by their respective projects.
+
+== Trust Boundaries and Data Flow
+
+=== Primary trust boundary
+
+Data enters the broker via:
+
+. *Network messaging protocols* (AMQP/MQTT/STOMP/OpenWire/Core) from messaging clients.
+HTTP connections can upgrade to Core protocol.
+AMQP, MQTT, and STOMP support WebSocket as a transport.
+Beyond these specific upgrade/transport paths, protocol switching is not allowed.
+. *Management interfaces* (JMX, Jolokia HTTP, management messages) from management clients
+. *Filesystem reads* (configuration files, journal replay, paged messages) by operator or broker process
+
+=== Trust transitions
+
+. *Messaging Client → Broker Core:* Messages from network clients (untrusted or authenticated) are parsed by protocol adapters and routed to the broker core.
+Authentication happens at connection establishment; authorization happens per operation (send, consume, create queue, etc.).
+. *Management Client → Broker Core:* Management operations from management clients are subject to RBAC.
+. *Broker Core → Filesystem:* Broker writes to append-only journal and paging files; integrity of persisted data depends on filesystem and OS guarantees.
+
+=== Reachability preconditions per component
+
+* *Protocol Adapters:* A finding is in-model only if reachable from network input on the corresponding protocol port without requiring authenticated management credentials.
+* *Broker Core:* A finding is in-model if reachable from messaging client-controlled payloads, headers, or addressing metadata.
+* *Management APIs:* A finding is in-model if reachable from an authenticated management client's request.
+
+== Assumptions About the Environment
+
+=== Operating system and runtime
+
+* The broker assumes a conformant JVM (Java 17 or later).
+* The broker assumes the OS provides standard filesystem semantics (atomicity of writes < page size, durability after fsync).
+* The broker assumes the OS enforces process isolation (no untrusted local processes can ptrace or inject code).
+
+=== Concurrency
+
+* The broker is designed to be thread-safe for concurrent client connections.
+* The broker assumes the JVM correctly implements Java's multi-threading semantics (thread synchronization, memory visibility between threads, safe publication of shared data).
+A JVM with broken concurrency primitives could cause race conditions in authentication, authorization, or message routing.
+* Runtime configuration reload (`broker.xml`, `security-settings`) is safe under load.
+Configuration changes do not cause inconsistent state or authorization bypass during reload.
+
+=== Filesystem assumptions
+
+* The broker assumes it has exclusive write access to its data directory (journal, paging, bindings).
Review Comment:
This bit is specifically about assumptions at the filesystem level. The broker must have exclusive write access to the data directory otherwise data could get corrupted.
To clarify, I added more info in the "For operators deploying the broker" section regarding filesystem access.
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Re: [PR] ARTEMIS-6077 document threat model [artemis]
Posted by "jbertram (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
jbertram commented on code in PR #6468:
URL: https://github.com/apache/artemis/pull/6468#discussion_r3311369384
##########
docs/user-manual/threat-model.adoc:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+= Threat Model
+:idprefix:
+:idseparator: -
+:docinfo: shared
+
+This document defines the security boundaries, assumptions, and guarantees of Apache Artemis.
+It serves as the authoritative reference for triaging security reports, guiding secure deployments, and understanding which threats Artemis defends against versus which are the responsibility of operators and applications.
+
+Security researchers, operators deploying Artemis in production, and application developers integrating with the broker should consult this model to understand the security contract.
+
+Findings should be reported per link:https://artemis.apache.org/security-advisories[Artemis' security disclosure process].
+Findings that that fall under <<security-properties-provided, claimed properties>> will be accepted.
Review Comment:
Fixed
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