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Posted to dev@phoenix.apache.org by "Josh Elser (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2018/01/24 20:54:00 UTC

[jira] [Assigned] (PHOENIX-4533) Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Josh Elser reassigned PHOENIX-4533:
-----------------------------------

    Assignee: Lev Bronshtein

> Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: PHOENIX-4533
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533
>             Project: Phoenix
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: Lev Bronshtein
>            Assignee: Lev Bronshtein
>            Priority: Minor
>         Attachments: PHOENIX-4533.1.patch
>
>
> Currently the HTTP/ principal is used by various components in the HADOOP ecosystem to perform SPNEGO authentication.  Since there can only be one HTTP/ per host, even outside of the Hadoop ecosystem, the keytab containing key material for local HTTP/ principal is shared among a few applications.  With so many applications having access to the HTTP/ credentials, this increases the chances of an attack on the proxy user capabilities of Hadoop.  This JIRA proposes that two different key tabs can be used to
> 1. Authenticate kerberized web requests
> 2. Communicate with the phoenix back end



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