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Posted to dev@netbeans.apache.org by Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com> on 2020/07/06 17:13:09 UTC
Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Hi.
Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans Plugin Portal. The
usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update center
definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user downloads such module,
the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates or new
modules.
Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own update centers?
When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central repository,
I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven repository:
- identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
- it is not possible to alter once published content
- there are sources next to each published module
With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans extensions do
before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by installing their
own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime
to anyone and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
exploits that.
Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans Update center
to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven Central and NetBeans
Plugin Portal?
-jt
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by antonio <an...@vieiro.net>.
Ah, good to see this isn't about removing autoupdate APIs. Sorry for the
misunderstanding.
AFAIK the only update center plugin in the NetBeans Portal is the jVI
update center.
I've been trusting this update center for several years now, and I'll
keep trusting it for the years to come (as long as Ernie wants to keep
updating it). I'll keep trusting it even if Ernie decides to search for
my credit card numbers in my hard disk. In fact (and don't tell anyone)
all Ernie has to do to obtain my credit card number is ask me for it
:-). I can't see a problem in recommending users to use this update center.
Having said that, I understand that we may want to set up the same
policy for everybody publishing their modules in the plugin portal. If
so then I'd try fo follow to Ernie's advice/suggestions/recommendations,
as he's been doing this for years now.
Kind regards,
Antonio
El 8/7/20 a las 6:25, Jaroslav Tulach escribió:
> This discussion isn't about removing some AutoUpdate APIs (e.g.
> functionality), just about better verification of the modules that the
> Apache NetBeans project recommends the users to download (by default, after
> installing fresh copy of the IDE).
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com>.
On 7/7/2020 9:25 PM, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> Thanks Antonio.
>
> Companies aren't going to upload modules with their update centers to
> Apache NetBeans PP3, right?
>
> This discussion isn't about removing some AutoUpdate APIs (e.g.
> functionality), just about better verification of the modules that the
> Apache NetBeans project recommends
Recommends? Surely you don't mean that. Or is that part of your
proposal/discussion, only include recommended plugins in the plugin
portal catalog?
> the users to download (by default, after
> installing fresh copy of the IDE).
>
> -jt
>
>
> Dne út 7. 7. 2020 14:46 uživatel Antonio <an...@vieiro.net> napsal:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I don't see a security threat here if we warn the user about the
>> security implications of downloading stuff from a third party update
>> center.
>>
>> I can't remember if we are alerting the user properly, though. Maybe we
>> could improve the message.
>>
>> Being able to add third-party plugin centers is a useful feature, I
>> think, for both developers and for companies that have network
>> restrictions, and that may be wishing to setup a private update center
>> of their own. So I wouldn't impose using a NetBeans specific update center.
>>
>> Kind regards,
>> Antonio
>>
>> El 06/07/2020 a las 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach escribió:
>>> Hi.
>>> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal. The
>>> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update
>> center
>>> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
>> downloads such module,
>>> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates
>> or new
>>> modules.
>>>
>>> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
>> update centers?
>>
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>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
>> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
>>
>> For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
>> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NETBEANS/Mailing+lists
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>.
Thanks Antonio.
Companies aren't going to upload modules with their update centers to
Apache NetBeans PP3, right?
This discussion isn't about removing some AutoUpdate APIs (e.g.
functionality), just about better verification of the modules that the
Apache NetBeans project recommends the users to download (by default, after
installing fresh copy of the IDE).
-jt
Dne út 7. 7. 2020 14:46 uživatel Antonio <an...@vieiro.net> napsal:
> Hi,
>
> I don't see a security threat here if we warn the user about the
> security implications of downloading stuff from a third party update
> center.
>
> I can't remember if we are alerting the user properly, though. Maybe we
> could improve the message.
>
> Being able to add third-party plugin centers is a useful feature, I
> think, for both developers and for companies that have network
> restrictions, and that may be wishing to setup a private update center
> of their own. So I wouldn't impose using a NetBeans specific update center.
>
> Kind regards,
> Antonio
>
> El 06/07/2020 a las 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach escribió:
> > Hi.
> > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> Plugin Portal. The
> > usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update
> center
> > definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
> downloads such module,
> > the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates
> or new
> > modules.
> >
> > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> update centers?
>
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> To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
>
> For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NETBEANS/Mailing+lists
>
>
>
>
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Antonio <an...@vieiro.net>.
Hi,
I don't see a security threat here if we warn the user about the
security implications of downloading stuff from a third party update center.
I can't remember if we are alerting the user properly, though. Maybe we
could improve the message.
Being able to add third-party plugin centers is a useful feature, I
think, for both developers and for companies that have network
restrictions, and that may be wishing to setup a private update center
of their own. So I wouldn't impose using a NetBeans specific update center.
Kind regards,
Antonio
El 06/07/2020 a las 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach escribió:
> Hi.
> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans Plugin Portal. The
> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update center
> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user downloads such module,
> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates or new
> modules.
>
> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own update centers?
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jesse Glick <ty...@gmail.com>.
On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 5:38 PM Neil C Smith <ne...@apache.org> wrote:
> I personally prefer the idea of hashing in the plugin portal
Agreed, a cryptographic checksum in an HTTPS-retrieved catalog should
be sufficient, and is far less onerous than dealing with certificates.
The more interesting problem is not really defended against by
certificates anyway: even if a valid signature was applied to an NBM
by a real trustworthy person, if the build was done on their personal
hardware then there is no assurance of provenance—there could have
been a virus on that machine, or for that matter there might be local
uncommitted modifications! Better to have builds be done by something
like builds.apache.org or GitHub Actions, with some process verifying
the checksum of the binaries at the moment they are built from a
specific Git commit.
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Neil C Smith <ne...@apache.org>.
On Fri, 10 Jul 2020, 22:07 Tim Boudreau, <ni...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > What does this offer in practice, assuming any catalogue is downloaded
> from
> > a trusted location over https, above validating the file against the file
> > hash in the catalogue?
> >
>
> Not all that much, given that if you can compromise the download, you can
> also compromise the hash. Mostly just that the bits you downloaded were
> saved correctly by your local machine.
>
Yes, but if the catalogue can be trusted, then what it points at can be
verified. Perhaps we should concentrate on checking signing of catalogues
not plugins?
I personally prefer the idea of hashing in the plugin portal, and it would
potentially open up other download sources while guaranteeing files
downloaded are what the catalogue says they are.
> Signing really becomes useful when you are downloading from mirror B and
> want to verify the bits from trusted origin A.
>
Well, we now use hashing to do exactly that in the update centres -
validate NBMs downloaded from Apache mirrors are what we expect.
Best wishes,
Neil
>
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Tim Boudreau <ni...@gmail.com>.
>
> What does this offer in practice, assuming any catalogue is downloaded from
> a trusted location over https, above validating the file against the file
> hash in the catalogue?
>
Not all that much, given that if you can compromise the download, you can
also compromise the hash. Mostly just that the bits you downloaded were
saved correctly by your local machine.
Signing really becomes useful when you are downloading from mirror B and
want to verify the bits from trusted origin A. But in this case, that
isn't really useful - if you can fake the bits, and the bits are the only
source of information about where the "trusted" origin of the bits is, then
of course that can be faked too.
Which is the problem certificate authorities exist to solve. I'm not sure
treating Maven Central as a de-facto one is a fabulous idea though - and
certainly fails the test for non-open-source modules.
-Tim
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Neil C Smith <ne...@apache.org>.
On Fri, 10 Jul 2020, 17:56 Tim Boudreau, <ni...@gmail.com> wrote:
> That said, since we're unlikely to change the situation with regard to
> code-signing certs worldwide any time soon, Jesse's suggestion in the bug
> linked above is the more reasonable way to go: As long as signature
> information is downloaded via HTTPS from the same origin as the NBM, and
> the receiver knows how to verify the bits with it, the HTTPS connection is
> solving the "am I being man-in-the-middled" problem, and that's the only
> thing the certificate in JAR signing adds to the picture. The IDE just
> needs to enforce that the signature must by downloaded from the same domain
> using the same HTTPS cert as the NBM.
>
What does this offer in practice, assuming any catalogue is downloaded from
a trusted location over https, above validating the file against the file
hash in the catalogue?
Best wishes,
Neil
>
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Tim Boudreau <ni...@gmail.com>.
On Thu, Jul 9, 2020 at 12:00 AM Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com> wrote:
> On 7/8/2020 6:48 PM, Tim Boudreau wrote:
> > Isn’t that security threat the reason JAR signing was invented?
>
> I've heard that all, or almost all, plugin portal nbm's are self-signed.
>
> How does that affect the security implications?
>
> I've also heard that PP3 doesn't require jar signing; see
> https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NETBEANS-2331
Absolutely there are issues with the fact that code-signing certificates
are expensive. FWIW, I sign the NBMs I distribute with my timboudreau.com
certificate - which is *not* a code-signing certificate, so the build
generates a warning that the signature will only be valid for a short
time. Curiously, the IDE reports them as self-signed, which is wrong.
I think it would be great if large organizations such as the ASF could
pressure or work with the LetsEncrypt folks to offer code-signing
certificates - it is ridiculous that they cost more than an ordinary SSL
cert.
As for what security signing offers, it offers exactly the same thing as
HTTPS does: You can verify that the bits are the same bits that the author
signed, unmodified. Just as with HTTPS, that does not tell you that the
author is trustworthy - that is up to you - it just tells you that the
author is who you think it is and the bits are what you think they are.
Limiting the universe to a single plugin portal does *absolutely nothing* to
change the security situation. Whether you have one portal *full of
self-signed nbms* or 10,000 portals *full of self-signed nbms*, the
situation is exactly the same.
The *really, really right way* to solve this is to fix the situation with
code-signing certificates (and make it less of a PITA to use them - I
seriously think most tools and APIs for working with encryption are
intentionally obfuscated, and Java's support for encryption made that even
worse by inventing new abstruse and wholly unnecessary concepts to make it
even more initimidating - whether that's due to governments not wanting
people to use encryption, or because being a cryptographer is mutually
incompatible with understanding usability I leave as an exercise to the
reader).
That said, since we're unlikely to change the situation with regard to
code-signing certs worldwide any time soon, Jesse's suggestion in the bug
linked above is the more reasonable way to go: As long as signature
information is downloaded via HTTPS from the same origin as the NBM, and
the receiver knows how to verify the bits with it, the HTTPS connection is
solving the "am I being man-in-the-middled" problem, and that's the only
thing the certificate in JAR signing adds to the picture. The IDE just
needs to enforce that the signature must by downloaded from the same domain
using the same HTTPS cert as the NBM.
There's no reason to limit the places NBMs can be downloaded from to Maven
Central - just define the metadata (which could *be* the same as the gpg
signatures Maven uses) and have the code that downloads it enforce the
same-domain requirement, so that anyone running an update server can
provide signatures.
-Tim
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com>.
On 7/8/2020 6:48 PM, Tim Boudreau wrote:
> Isn’t that security threat the reason JAR signing was invented?
I've heard that all, or almost all, plugin portal nbm's are self-signed.
How does that affect the security implications?
I've also heard that PP3 doesn't require jar signing; see
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NETBEANS-2331
-ernie
>
> -Tim
>
> On Mon, Jul 6, 2020 at 1:12 PM Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi.
>> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal. The
>> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update
>> center
>> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
>> downloads such module,
>> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates
>> or new
>> modules.
>>
>> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
>> update centers?
>>
>> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
>> repository,
>> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven repository:
>>
>> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
>> - it is not possible to alter once published content
>> - there are sources next to each published module
>>
>> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
>> extensions do
>> before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by
>> installing their
>> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish
>> anything, anytime
>> to anyone and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time
>> till somebody
>> exploits that.
>>
>> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
>> Update center
>> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven Central
>> and NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal?
>>
>> -jt
>>
>> --
> http://timboudreau.com
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Tim Boudreau <ni...@gmail.com>.
Isn’t that security threat the reason JAR signing was invented?
-Tim
On Mon, Jul 6, 2020 at 1:12 PM Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Hi.
> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> Plugin Portal. The
> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update
> center
> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
> downloads such module,
> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates
> or new
> modules.
>
> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> update centers?
>
> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
> repository,
> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven repository:
>
> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> - it is not possible to alter once published content
> - there are sources next to each published module
>
> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
> extensions do
> before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by
> installing their
> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish
> anything, anytime
> to anyone and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time
> till somebody
> exploits that.
>
> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
> Update center
> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven Central
> and NetBeans
> Plugin Portal?
>
> -jt
>
> --
http://timboudreau.com
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Oliver Rettig <Ol...@orat.de>.
Hi,
I am just on the way learning to make a plugin available via maven central and our official
update center step by step and I think it is a good compromise between security and
practiability. And I like the idea that we have for all plugins the source code repository
available. I do not like come in the situation that there are lots of plugins in different plugin-
centers from people I do not know and I have to trust if I install the plugins.
I am also working for more than 10years on very big RCP applications based on the the
netbeans platform and I think for these management of my own update centers are the
better solution.
best regards
Oliver
> Hi.
> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans Plugin
> Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide
> own update center definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal.
> Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center gets
> activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
>
> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> update centers?
>
> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
> repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven
> repository:
>
> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> - it is not possible to alter once published content
> - there are sources next to each published module
>
> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
> extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin
> Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of
> such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and change that
> whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody exploits that.
>
> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
> Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via
> Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
>
> -jt
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Eric Bresie <eb...@gmail.com>.
On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 7:12 AM Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> > (2) Handle third-party provides similar to adding Mirrors
>
> I am not sure what do you mean by this? Apache NetBeans should focus on
> making
> it simple to distribute modules as part of Apache NetBeans or via approved
> PP3
> (and Maven central repository).
>
>
I was taking something similar to the way Eclipse does things where when
trying to get new plugins there are the default plugin repositories but
also has the ability to add other repositories (mirrors) as needed. So
then as long as the "proprietary/third party" repository uses the same
plugin interfaces and is compatible is still added. The trust of the site
is still up in the air but it is what it ise.
I'm thinking from a system level so hopefully I'm not saying things that
are basically there already in some form.
Eric Bresie
ebresie@gmail.com
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>.
Hello Eric.
- pátek 10. července 2020 15:11:57 CEST, Eric Bresie -
> Some additional thoughts...
>
> Regarding “third-party” warnings..this reminds me of the way Amazon’s Fire
> handles third-party’s. It has a setting to prevent third party plugins with
> a turn on/off setting which indicates the untrusted nature of allow this.
Good/better enough. Just like we currently do with 8.2 update center. User
needs to explicitly enable it in Tools/Plugins/Settings tab.
That however means that modules in PP3 catalog cannot install "enabled by
default" catalogs. E.g. jVi plugin could install its catalog, but it should be
disabled by default. Users who trust Ernie would have to go to Tools/Plugins/
Settings tab and explicitly checkbox his catalog.
> Also reminder of some of the Linux (think it’s Ubuntu that I saw this on)
> which comes default with trusted repositories. In this context that really
> adds a layer to the user reduce the default plugin from being risk but
> doesn’t prevent it.
>
> I think in the case of the Linux “apt” (and probable others), to be able to
> add a repository, the repository is added and at the same time I believe
> some form of “public security key” is included. I’m not sure it fully
> prevents anything in that context but it might at least add a layer of
> trust to the mix.
I know that when I use [PPA](https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+ppas), I am
basically on my own. Btw. It doesn't increase security that the archives are
signed, what matters is that they are permanently archived somewhere (by
Ubuntu, I assume).
> So all that said maybe
> (1) Need to add some form of “Allow Untrusted Plugin Provider” option
a) having an AU catalog preinstalled, just click the checkbox to enable it
b) manually Add a URL as a new catalog
> (2) Handle third-party provides similar to adding Mirrors
I am not sure what do you mean by this? Apache NetBeans should focus on making
it simple to distribute modules as part of Apache NetBeans or via approved PP3
(and Maven central repository).
> (3) Need to put in place some form of authentication mechanism for Plugin
> Providers when adding the provide repository. I know this may not prevent
> things but it at least adds a means of establishing some layer of “trust”
> of the provider being who they say they are and hopefully leads back to an
> authentic source in some way. (4) Maybe some form of “Netbeans Security”
> plugin (maybe in the core NetBeans plugins) is needed to provide some layer
> of addiction checks and/or security functionality. Maybe something like
> that could do things like looking for the Ant issue identified previously,
> have some means of adding security key management, etc.). This might be
> something like a code analysis plugin in some ways with new rules being
> able to be added as needed (although I suppose that adds to the risk of a
> malicious rule too :-) )
Alas, I haven't designed NetBeans with a security in mind. No SecurityManager
and permissions for modules. Now it is too late to fix it on the code level,
in my opinion.
As such I am only calling for a policy, not a tool. Best regards.
-jt
> > On July 9, 2020 at 2:48:29 AM CDT, Jaroslav Tulach
> > <ja...@gmail.com> wrote: Hello Karl, Ernie.
> > First of all thank you for your contribution to NetBeans. Maintaining jVi,
> > building commercial plugin on top of NetBeans, are both examples of a
> > great support for the project.
> >
> > > I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
> > > source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
> > > review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source
> >
> > Having sources available and reviewing them before letting a plugin in,
> > would of course be great, but I assume we don't have qualified volunteers
> > to do that. Reviewers should at least check the registrations (in layer,
> > meta-inf services) and make sure they don't do much harm.
> >
> > The "security" of Maven central consists of two components in my opinion:
> > - the content is immutable and signed with .asc files
> > - Sonatype knows who uploads the bits
> >
> > The immutability prevents anyone to destroy evidence. Should there be a
> > security breach, police can trace the identity of the attacker.
> >
> > Especially the immutability is missing in case of custom update centers. I
> > guess the>
> > example given by Karl is exactly the one I wanted to analyze:
> > > There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
> > > of commercial plugins.
> > >
> > > My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans ...
> > >
> > > Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> > > JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
> > > JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
> > > binaries to Maven Central.
> >
> > #1 - Such a plugin serves as a promotion. Users checking the content of
> > Tools/Plugins/ Available or the plugin portal are going to find your
> > functionality.
> >
> > #2 - Such a plugin makes installation of the functionality relatively easy
> > for end users.
> >
> > I don't know how to replace #1, but #2 could for example be solved by
> > associating `.nbm` files with NetBeans in the browser - clicking on the
> > .nbm in the browser would offer NetBeans as the default application and
> > NetBeans would open the Tools/Plugins. Then the 3rd party modules
> > installation might be relatively smooth.
> >
> > The major issue I am aiming at is to make sure the end users understand
> > that after installing a plugin with an update center, Apache NetBeans
> > project no longer takes responsibility and the responsibility is on Ernie
> > and Karl. As Antonio points out he is ready to trust Ernie and so will
> > many other users. I guess it is about finding a balance and making sure
> > users know what they do.
> >
> > I don't want to hurt Ernie's and Karl's business, but it should be Apache
> > NetBeans policy that plugins are distributed via Maven central. As far as
> > I understand Ernie is using update>
> > center to workaround the publishing process flaws, but as Jirka Kovalský
wrote:
> > > I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> > > Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> > > developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
> > > collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
> > > shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
> >
> > We should rather improve the process than workaround it. If Antonio wants
> > earlier updates directly from Ernie, he should opt-in (by enabling
> > Ernie's update center that'd be disabled by default?).
> >
> > > Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
> > > restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
> > > update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
> > > JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
> >
> > Interesting solution. We just need somebody to implement it ;-) Maybe,
> > rather than finding bullet proof technical solution (which is unlikely
> > anyway), we'd rather update the policy for reviewing the modules.
> >
> > -jt
> >
> > > On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> > > > Hi.
> > > > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> > > > Plugin Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension
> > > > to
> > > > provide own update center definition and register it in NetBeans
> > > > Plugin
> > > > Portal. Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center
> > > > gets activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
> > > >
> > > > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register
> > > > own
> > > > update centers?
> > > >
> > > > When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven
> > > > central
> > > > repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of
> > > > Maven repository:
> > > >
> > > > - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> > > > - it is not possible to alter once published content
> > > > - there are sources next to each published module
> > > >
> > > > With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party
> > > > NetBeans
> > > > extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our
> > > > Plugin Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control.
> > > > Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and
> > > > change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till
> > > > somebody
> > > > exploits that.
> > > >
> > > > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
> > > > NetBeans
> > > > Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions
> > > > via
> > > > Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
> > > >
> > > > -jt
> > >
> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
> > > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
> > >
> > > For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
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https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NETBEANS/Mailing+lists
Re: Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Eric Bresie <eb...@gmail.com>.
Some additional thoughts...
Regarding “third-party” warnings..this reminds me of the way Amazon’s Fire handles third-party’s. It has a setting to prevent third party plugins with a turn on/off setting which indicates the untrusted nature of allow this.
Also reminder of some of the Linux (think it’s Ubuntu that I saw this on) which comes default with trusted repositories. In this context that really adds a layer to the user reduce the default plugin from being risk but doesn’t prevent it.
I think in the case of the Linux “apt” (and probable others), to be able to add a repository, the repository is added and at the same time I believe some form of “public security key” is included. I’m not sure it fully prevents anything in that context but it might at least add a layer of trust to the mix.
Not sure on this part but how are “mirrors” handled presently? Would this be a similar use case of a mirror? Are these all trusted in some way? Would a similar process for adding mirrors be relevant here?
I’m not sure if this is worth wild as OS layers tend to provide external virus/anti-maleware type functionality, but could a “security” plugin be devised to provide some additional layer of checks (within the context of plugins)?
So all that said maybe
(1) Need to add some form of “Allow Untrusted Plugin Provider” option
(2) Handle third-party provides similar to adding Mirrors
(3) Need to put in place some form of authentication mechanism for Plugin Providers when adding the provide repository. I know this may not prevent things but it at least adds a means of establishing some layer of “trust” of the provider being who they say they are and hopefully leads back to an authentic source in some way.
(4) Maybe some form of “Netbeans Security” plugin (maybe in the core NetBeans plugins) is needed to provide some layer of addiction checks and/or security functionality. Maybe something like that could do things like looking for the Ant issue identified previously, have some means of adding security key management, etc.). This might be something like a code analysis plugin in some ways with new rules being able to be added as needed (although I suppose that adds to the risk of a malicious rule too :-) )
Eric Bresie
Ebresie@gmail.com
> On July 9, 2020 at 2:48:29 AM CDT, Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hello Karl, Ernie.
> First of all thank you for your contribution to NetBeans. Maintaining jVi, building
> commercial plugin on top of NetBeans, are both examples of a great support for the
> project.
>
> > I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
> > source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
> > review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source
>
> Having sources available and reviewing them before letting a plugin in, would of course be
> great, but I assume we don't have qualified volunteers to do that. Reviewers should at
> least check the registrations (in layer, meta-inf services) and make sure they don't do much
> harm.
>
> The "security" of Maven central consists of two components in my opinion:
> - the content is immutable and signed with .asc files
> - Sonatype knows who uploads the bits
>
> The immutability prevents anyone to destroy evidence. Should there be a security breach,
> police can trace the identity of the attacker.
>
> Especially the immutability is missing in case of custom update centers. I guess the
> example given by Karl is exactly the one I wanted to analyze:
>
> > There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
> > of commercial plugins.
> >
> > My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans ...
> >
> > Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> > JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
> > JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
> > binaries to Maven Central.
>
> #1 - Such a plugin serves as a promotion. Users checking the content of Tools/Plugins/
> Available or the plugin portal are going to find your functionality.
>
> #2 - Such a plugin makes installation of the functionality relatively easy for end users.
>
> I don't know how to replace #1, but #2 could for example be solved by associating `.nbm`
> files with NetBeans in the browser - clicking on the .nbm in the browser would offer
> NetBeans as the default application and NetBeans would open the Tools/Plugins. Then the
> 3rd party modules installation might be relatively smooth.
>
> The major issue I am aiming at is to make sure the end users understand that after
> installing a plugin with an update center, Apache NetBeans project no longer takes
> responsibility and the responsibility is on Ernie and Karl. As Antonio points out he is ready
> to trust Ernie and so will many other users. I guess it is about finding a balance and
> making sure users know what they do.
>
> I don't want to hurt Ernie's and Karl's business, but it should be Apache NetBeans policy
> that plugins are distributed via Maven central. As far as I understand Ernie is using update
> center to workaround the publishing process flaws, but as Jirka Kovalský wrote:
>
> > I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> > Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> > developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
> > collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
> > shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
>
> We should rather improve the process than workaround it. If Antonio wants earlier
> updates directly from Ernie, he should opt-in (by enabling Ernie's update center that'd be
> disabled by default?).
>
> > Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
> > restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
> > update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
> > JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
>
> Interesting solution. We just need somebody to implement it ;-) Maybe, rather than finding
> bullet proof technical solution (which is unlikely anyway), we'd rather update the policy for
> reviewing the modules.
>
> -jt
>
> > On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> > > Hi.
> > > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> > > Plugin Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to
> > > provide own update center definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin
> > > Portal. Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center
> > > gets activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
> > >
> > > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> > > update centers?
> > >
> > > When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
> > > repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of
> > > Maven repository:
> > >
> > > - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> > > - it is not possible to alter once published content
> > > - there are sources next to each published module
> > >
> > > With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
> > > extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our
> > > Plugin Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control.
> > > Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and
> > > change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
> > > exploits that.
> > >
> > > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
> > > Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via
> > > Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
> > >
> > > -jt
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
> > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
> >
> > For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jan Lahoda <la...@gmail.com>.
On Thu, Jul 9, 2020 at 11:21 AM Christian Lenz <ch...@gmx.net>
wrote:
> Hi,
>
> IMHO there is no need to restrict to only maven. I tried to move my
> Plugins one by one to the new PP3 and saw 2 or 3 tutorials that I need to
> follow which is far more work as before (Settings for sonar, account at
> sonar afaik, maven account, etc.). As Geertjan said in slack: „yes but it
> is more strict and safe“. I can fully aggree with that.
>
> So I thought about other solutions like using github for example because
> everything is still there. As far as I know Apple with iOS is one of them
> who only accept apps from there own app store. There is no alternative at
> all afaik but I’m not 100%.
>
> I can say how it works for android as some of you may know already. You
> have the google play store with official apps and restrictions how to
> upload your app to them. And there are some other called „blackmarkets“
> where you can download apps on your own risk. Or whereever your APK file is
> located (Google drive, via USB cable, etc.). Per default it is not allowed
> to install apk files from other sources than the play store, but there is a
> config where you can say: „Trust other Sources or install apks from unknown
> Sources on your own risk“. And also if you install the apk, you got a
> warning again. So I’m for this kind of solution.
>
> Also on Linux (Ubuntu and others) you can add repositories on your own too.
>
> So at the end, I’m not for restricting and disallowing other/custom plugin
> portals than the PP3. I’m more for settings to avoid it and change the
> settings (with a warning) if the user is sure about to use custom/not
> trusted sources to install plugins. And that’s it, the rest is up to the
> user.
>
Users can manually add an update center or manually install an NBM (which
may register an update center). And I don't think Jaroslav is proposing to
remove any of this.
What I think Jaroslav is proposing is to restrict or disallow modules that
register other update centers in our catalog, Plugin Portal. And I think it
makes sense to be somewhat careful about modules in the catalog we
maintain, and that are offered to the users by default.
I think the Linux repositories are a good example - users can register
another repository for themselves, but I doubt you can have a package in
the distribution's repository that adds a third-party repository and
enables it. So Jaroslav's proposal does not seem to be too far from what I
think Linux repositories do?
Jan
>
>
> Cheers
>
> Chris
>
>
> Von: Jaroslav Tulach
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 9. Juli 2020 09:48
> An: dev@netbeans.apache.org
> Betreff: Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
>
> Hello Karl, Ernie.
> First of all thank you for your contribution to NetBeans. Maintaining jVi,
> building
> commercial plugin on top of NetBeans, are both examples of a great support
> for the
> project.
>
> > I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
> > source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
> > review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source
>
> Having sources available and reviewing them before letting a plugin in,
> would of course be
> great, but I assume we don't have qualified volunteers to do that.
> Reviewers should at
> least check the registrations (in layer, meta-inf services) and make sure
> they don't do much
> harm.
>
> The "security" of Maven central consists of two components in my opinion:
> - the content is immutable and signed with .asc files
> - Sonatype knows who uploads the bits
>
> The immutability prevents anyone to destroy evidence. Should there be a
> security breach,
> police can trace the identity of the attacker.
>
> Especially the immutability is missing in case of custom update centers.
> I guess the
> example given by Karl is exactly the one I wanted to analyze:
>
> > There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
> > of commercial plugins.
> >
> > My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans ...
> >
> > Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> > JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
> > JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
> > binaries to Maven Central.
>
> #1 - Such a plugin serves as a promotion. Users checking the content of
> Tools/Plugins/
> Available or the plugin portal are going to find your functionality.
>
> #2 - Such a plugin makes installation of the functionality relatively easy
> for end users.
>
> I don't know how to replace #1, but #2 could for example be solved by
> associating `.nbm`
> files with NetBeans in the browser - clicking on the .nbm in the browser
> would offer
> NetBeans as the default application and NetBeans would open the
> Tools/Plugins. Then the
> 3rd party modules installation might be relatively smooth.
>
> The major issue I am aiming at is to make sure the end users understand
> that after
> installing a plugin with an update center, Apache NetBeans project no
> longer takes
> responsibility and the responsibility is on Ernie and Karl. As Antonio
> points out he is ready
> to trust Ernie and so will many other users. I guess it is about finding a
> balance and
> making sure users know what they do.
>
> I don't want to hurt Ernie's and Karl's business, but it should be Apache
> NetBeans policy
> that plugins are distributed via Maven central. As far as I understand
> Ernie is using update
> center to workaround the publishing process flaws, but as Jirka Kovalský
> wrote:
>
> > I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> > Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> > developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
> > collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
> > shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
>
> We should rather improve the process than workaround it. If Antonio wants
> earlier
> updates directly from Ernie, he should opt-in (by enabling Ernie's update
> center that'd be
> disabled by default?).
>
> > Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
> > restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
> > update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
> > JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
>
> Interesting solution. We just need somebody to implement it ;-) Maybe,
> rather than finding
> bullet proof technical solution (which is unlikely anyway), we'd rather
> update the policy for
> reviewing the modules.
>
> -jt
>
> > On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> > > Hi.
> > > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> > > Plugin Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension
> to
> > > provide own update center definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin
> > > Portal. Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center
> > > gets activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
> > >
> > > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register
> own
> > > update centers?
> > >
> > > When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven
> central
> > > repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of
> > > Maven repository:
> > >
> > > - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> > > - it is not possible to alter once published content
> > > - there are sources next to each published module
> > >
> > > With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party
> NetBeans
> > > extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our
> > > Plugin Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control.
> > > Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and
> > > change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till
> somebody
> > > exploits that.
> > >
> > > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
> NetBeans
> > > Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions
> via
> > > Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
> > >
> > > -jt
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
> > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
> >
> > For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
>
>
AW: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Christian Lenz <ch...@gmx.net>.
Hi,
IMHO there is no need to restrict to only maven. I tried to move my Plugins one by one to the new PP3 and saw 2 or 3 tutorials that I need to follow which is far more work as before (Settings for sonar, account at sonar afaik, maven account, etc.). As Geertjan said in slack: „yes but it is more strict and safe“. I can fully aggree with that.
So I thought about other solutions like using github for example because everything is still there. As far as I know Apple with iOS is one of them who only accept apps from there own app store. There is no alternative at all afaik but I’m not 100%.
I can say how it works for android as some of you may know already. You have the google play store with official apps and restrictions how to upload your app to them. And there are some other called „blackmarkets“ where you can download apps on your own risk. Or whereever your APK file is located (Google drive, via USB cable, etc.). Per default it is not allowed to install apk files from other sources than the play store, but there is a config where you can say: „Trust other Sources or install apks from unknown Sources on your own risk“. And also if you install the apk, you got a warning again. So I’m for this kind of solution.
Also on Linux (Ubuntu and others) you can add repositories on your own too.
So at the end, I’m not for restricting and disallowing other/custom plugin portals than the PP3. I’m more for settings to avoid it and change the settings (with a warning) if the user is sure about to use custom/not trusted sources to install plugins. And that’s it, the rest is up to the user.
Cheers
Chris
Von: Jaroslav Tulach
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 9. Juli 2020 09:48
An: dev@netbeans.apache.org
Betreff: Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Hello Karl, Ernie.
First of all thank you for your contribution to NetBeans. Maintaining jVi, building
commercial plugin on top of NetBeans, are both examples of a great support for the
project.
> I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
> source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
> review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source
Having sources available and reviewing them before letting a plugin in, would of course be
great, but I assume we don't have qualified volunteers to do that. Reviewers should at
least check the registrations (in layer, meta-inf services) and make sure they don't do much
harm.
The "security" of Maven central consists of two components in my opinion:
- the content is immutable and signed with .asc files
- Sonatype knows who uploads the bits
The immutability prevents anyone to destroy evidence. Should there be a security breach,
police can trace the identity of the attacker.
Especially the immutability is missing in case of custom update centers. I guess the
example given by Karl is exactly the one I wanted to analyze:
> There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
> of commercial plugins.
>
> My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans ...
>
> Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
> JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
> binaries to Maven Central.
#1 - Such a plugin serves as a promotion. Users checking the content of Tools/Plugins/
Available or the plugin portal are going to find your functionality.
#2 - Such a plugin makes installation of the functionality relatively easy for end users.
I don't know how to replace #1, but #2 could for example be solved by associating `.nbm`
files with NetBeans in the browser - clicking on the .nbm in the browser would offer
NetBeans as the default application and NetBeans would open the Tools/Plugins. Then the
3rd party modules installation might be relatively smooth.
The major issue I am aiming at is to make sure the end users understand that after
installing a plugin with an update center, Apache NetBeans project no longer takes
responsibility and the responsibility is on Ernie and Karl. As Antonio points out he is ready
to trust Ernie and so will many other users. I guess it is about finding a balance and
making sure users know what they do.
I don't want to hurt Ernie's and Karl's business, but it should be Apache NetBeans policy
that plugins are distributed via Maven central. As far as I understand Ernie is using update
center to workaround the publishing process flaws, but as Jirka Kovalský wrote:
> I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
> collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
> shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
We should rather improve the process than workaround it. If Antonio wants earlier
updates directly from Ernie, he should opt-in (by enabling Ernie's update center that'd be
disabled by default?).
> Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
> restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
> update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
> JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
Interesting solution. We just need somebody to implement it ;-) Maybe, rather than finding
bullet proof technical solution (which is unlikely anyway), we'd rather update the policy for
reviewing the modules.
-jt
> On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> > Hi.
> > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> > Plugin Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to
> > provide own update center definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin
> > Portal. Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center
> > gets activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
> >
> > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> > update centers?
> >
> > When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
> > repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of
> > Maven repository:
> >
> > - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> > - it is not possible to alter once published content
> > - there are sources next to each published module
> >
> > With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
> > extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our
> > Plugin Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control.
> > Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and
> > change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
> > exploits that.
> >
> > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
> > Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via
> > Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
> >
> > -jt
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@netbeans.apache.org
> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
>
> For further information about the NetBeans mailing lists, visit:
Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jaroslav Tulach <ja...@gmail.com>.
Hello Karl, Ernie.
First of all thank you for your contribution to NetBeans. Maintaining jVi, building
commercial plugin on top of NetBeans, are both examples of a great support for the
project.
> I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
> source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
> review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source
Having sources available and reviewing them before letting a plugin in, would of course be
great, but I assume we don't have qualified volunteers to do that. Reviewers should at
least check the registrations (in layer, meta-inf services) and make sure they don't do much
harm.
The "security" of Maven central consists of two components in my opinion:
- the content is immutable and signed with .asc files
- Sonatype knows who uploads the bits
The immutability prevents anyone to destroy evidence. Should there be a security breach,
police can trace the identity of the attacker.
Especially the immutability is missing in case of custom update centers. I guess the
example given by Karl is exactly the one I wanted to analyze:
> There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
> of commercial plugins.
>
> My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans ...
>
> Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
> JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
> binaries to Maven Central.
#1 - Such a plugin serves as a promotion. Users checking the content of Tools/Plugins/
Available or the plugin portal are going to find your functionality.
#2 - Such a plugin makes installation of the functionality relatively easy for end users.
I don't know how to replace #1, but #2 could for example be solved by associating `.nbm`
files with NetBeans in the browser - clicking on the .nbm in the browser would offer
NetBeans as the default application and NetBeans would open the Tools/Plugins. Then the
3rd party modules installation might be relatively smooth.
The major issue I am aiming at is to make sure the end users understand that after
installing a plugin with an update center, Apache NetBeans project no longer takes
responsibility and the responsibility is on Ernie and Karl. As Antonio points out he is ready
to trust Ernie and so will many other users. I guess it is about finding a balance and
making sure users know what they do.
I don't want to hurt Ernie's and Karl's business, but it should be Apache NetBeans policy
that plugins are distributed via Maven central. As far as I understand Ernie is using update
center to workaround the publishing process flaws, but as Jirka Kovalský wrote:
> I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
> collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
> shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
We should rather improve the process than workaround it. If Antonio wants earlier
updates directly from Ernie, he should opt-in (by enabling Ernie's update center that'd be
disabled by default?).
> Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
> restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
> update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
> JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
Interesting solution. We just need somebody to implement it ;-) Maybe, rather than finding
bullet proof technical solution (which is unlikely anyway), we'd rather update the policy for
reviewing the modules.
-jt
> On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> > Hi.
> > Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
> > Plugin Portal. The usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to
> > provide own update center definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin
> > Portal. Once a user downloads such module, the provided update center
> > gets activated and can distribute new updates or new modules.
> >
> > Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own
> > update centers?
> >
> > When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central
> > repository, I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of
> > Maven repository:
> >
> > - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> > - it is not possible to alter once published content
> > - there are sources next to each published module
> >
> > With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans
> > extensions do before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our
> > Plugin Portal by installing their own catalog, we loose any control.
> > Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime to anyone and
> > change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
> > exploits that.
> >
> > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans
> > Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via
> > Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
> >
> > -jt
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Karl Tauber <ka...@jformdesigner.com>.
Hi,
still not convinced that commercial code is allowed...
Issue https://issues.sonatype.org/browse/MVNCENTRAL-692
is about closed source libraries that are free to use.
See comment from Joel Orlina on 05/26/15
I think the main thing is that the artifacts need to be free to
distribute and use if they are to be hosted on Maven Central.
A commercial plugin is not free to use.
Karl
On 10.07.2020 17:35, Matthias Bläsing wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Am Freitag, den 10.07.2020, 16:40 +0200 schrieb Karl Tauber:
>> On 08.07.2020 22:21, Ernie Rael wrote:
>>> On 7/8/2020 8:07 AM, Karl Tauber wrote:
>>>> My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans and
>>>> for us it is no option to upload our commercial plugin to Maven Central.
>>>> Not sure whether this would be even legal. Isn't Maven Central for
>>>> open source only?
>>>
>>> I'd like to hear some clarification on this point if anyone has an
>>> answer, definitive or otherwise. I've seen some articles that say yes
>>> and some that say no.
>>
>> On Sonatype's central home page https://central.sonatype.org/:
>>
>> The Central Repository - Serving Open Source Components Since 2002
>>
>> Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/about.html:
>>
>> The Central Repository is the largest collection of Java and other
>> open source components.
>>
>> Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/producers.html:
>>
>> Whether you are an individual running a small open source project,
>> a group of developers with a few projects or a large organization
>> running your own repository manager publishing open source components
>> ...
>>
>
> the answer is wrong. Open Source is not a requirement:
>
> https://issues.sonatype.org/browse/MVNCENTRAL-692
>
> links to:
>
> https://central.sonatype.org/pages/central-repository-producer-terms.html
>
> links to:
>
> https://central.sonatype.org/pages/requirements.html
>
> And the core part:
>
> If, for some reason (for example, license issue or it's a Scala
> project), you can not provide -sources.jar or -javadoc.jar , please
> make fake -sources.jar or -javadoc.jar with simple README inside to
> pass the checking. We do not want to disable the rules because some
> people tend to skip it if they have an option and we want to keep
> the quality of the user experience as high as possible.
>
> TL;DR: Source and Javadoc are strong encouraged, but if you fail to
> provide them, it is ok.
>
> Greetings
>
> Matthias
>
>
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>
>
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Matthias Bläsing <mb...@doppel-helix.eu>.
Hi,
Am Freitag, den 10.07.2020, 16:40 +0200 schrieb Karl Tauber:
> On 08.07.2020 22:21, Ernie Rael wrote:
> > On 7/8/2020 8:07 AM, Karl Tauber wrote:
> > > My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans and
> > > for us it is no option to upload our commercial plugin to Maven Central.
> > > Not sure whether this would be even legal. Isn't Maven Central for
> > > open source only?
> >
> > I'd like to hear some clarification on this point if anyone has an
> > answer, definitive or otherwise. I've seen some articles that say yes
> > and some that say no.
>
> On Sonatype's central home page https://central.sonatype.org/:
>
> The Central Repository - Serving Open Source Components Since 2002
>
> Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/about.html:
>
> The Central Repository is the largest collection of Java and other
> open source components.
>
> Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/producers.html:
>
> Whether you are an individual running a small open source project,
> a group of developers with a few projects or a large organization
> running your own repository manager publishing open source components
> ...
>
the answer is wrong. Open Source is not a requirement:
https://issues.sonatype.org/browse/MVNCENTRAL-692
links to:
https://central.sonatype.org/pages/central-repository-producer-terms.html
links to:
https://central.sonatype.org/pages/requirements.html
And the core part:
If, for some reason (for example, license issue or it's a Scala
project), you can not provide -sources.jar or -javadoc.jar , please
make fake -sources.jar or -javadoc.jar with simple README inside to
pass the checking. We do not want to disable the rules because some
people tend to skip it if they have an option and we want to keep
the quality of the user experience as high as possible.
TL;DR: Source and Javadoc are strong encouraged, but if you fail to
provide them, it is ok.
Greetings
Matthias
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Karl Tauber <ka...@jformdesigner.com>.
On 08.07.2020 22:21, Ernie Rael wrote:
> On 7/8/2020 8:07 AM, Karl Tauber wrote:
>> My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans and
>> for us it is no option to upload our commercial plugin to Maven Central.
>> Not sure whether this would be even legal. Isn't Maven Central for
>> open source only?
>
> I'd like to hear some clarification on this point if anyone has an
> answer, definitive or otherwise. I've seen some articles that say yes
> and some that say no.
On Sonatype's central home page https://central.sonatype.org/:
The Central Repository - Serving Open Source Components Since 2002
Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/about.html:
The Central Repository is the largest collection of Java and other
open source components.
Or on https://central.sonatype.org/pages/producers.html:
Whether you are an individual running a small open source project,
a group of developers with a few projects or a large organization
running your own repository manager publishing open source components
...
Karl
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com>.
Hey,
I've seen some posts that say that maven central is safe because the
source is available. That seems a questionable claim. Is there any
review of the source or does anyone build their plugins from source? And
just because it works/behaves at first doesn't mean there isn't
something dangerous ticking that might bite you in the @ss after a
period of time.
The old plugin portal had a "user comments" section. Something like that
could help validate and increase the comfort level, maybe only allowing
registered users.
Further comments inline.
On 7/8/2020 8:07 AM, Karl Tauber wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
> > NetBeans Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new
> > versions via Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
>
> There should be at least one exception from this restriction for
> vendors of commercial plugins.
>
> My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans and
> for us it is no option to upload our commercial plugin to Maven Central.
> Not sure whether this would be even legal. Isn't Maven Central for
> open source only?
I'd like to hear some clarification on this point if anyone has an
answer, definitive or otherwise. I've seen some articles that say yes
and some that say no.
>
> Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
> JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can
> download/update JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to
> upload commercial binaries to Maven Central.
>
>
> Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility
> to restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the
> JFormDesigner update center would be only used/allowed to
> download/update JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
I had a similar thought. Incorporate a list of plugins that can be
downloaded. And there's the idea to only allow download of stuff from
maven central. Though that might not work in your case.
All these schemes rely on some faith in the publisher. Having
restrictions and procedures (hoops to jump through) helps. Code review
and auto build from source could alleviate this, but that cost seems way
too high.
Currently it's permitted to manually add an update center. Is removing
that capability part of this discussion? Manually installing the jVi UC,
if a user wanted, might be a compromise.
BTW, jVi reads an "motd" (infrequently changing) from the net and puts
that into an output window around startup (nothing happens if the
request fails). Is that considered a security violation?
-ernie
>
>
>
> Best regards,
> Karl Tauber
> --
> FormDev Software GmbH
> Aventinusweg 5, 85649 Brunnthal, Germany
> www.formdev.com, www.jformdesigner.com
> Register of companies: Amtsgericht München, HRB 164093
> Managing director: Karl Tauber
>
>
> On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
>> Hi.
>> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal. The
>> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own
>> update center
>> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
>> downloads such module,
>> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new
>> updates or new
>> modules.
>>
>> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register
>> own update centers?
>>
>> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven
>> central repository,
>> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven
>> repository:
>>
>> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
>> - it is not possible to alter once published content
>> - there are sources next to each published module
>>
>> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party
>> NetBeans extensions do
>> before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal
>> by installing their
>> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can
>> publish anything, anytime
>> to anyone and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of
>> time till somebody
>> exploits that.
>>
>> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
>> NetBeans Update center
>> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven
>> Central and NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal?
>>
>> -jt
>>
>>
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Karl Tauber <ka...@jformdesigner.com>.
Hi,
> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
> NetBeans Update center to avoid such bypassing and always release new
> versions via Maven Central and NetBeans Plugin Portal?
There should be at least one exception from this restriction for vendors
of commercial plugins.
My company offers a commercial plugin (JFormDesigner) for NetBeans and
for us it is no option to upload our commercial plugin to Maven Central.
Not sure whether this would be even legal. Isn't Maven Central for open
source only?
Our plan is to create a small (open-source) plugin that only adds the
JFormDesigner update center to NetBeans. Then users can download/update
JFormDesigner from our site and we are not required to upload commercial
binaries to Maven Central.
Another improvement for more security would be to have a possibility to
restrict update centers to specific plugins. Then e.g. the JFormDesigner
update center would be only used/allowed to download/update
JFormDesigner plugin, but not other plugins.
Best regards,
Karl Tauber
--
FormDev Software GmbH
Aventinusweg 5, 85649 Brunnthal, Germany
www.formdev.com, www.jformdesigner.com
Register of companies: Amtsgericht München, HRB 164093
Managing director: Karl Tauber
On 06.07.2020 19:13, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> Hi.
> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans Plugin Portal. The
> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update center
> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user downloads such module,
> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates or new
> modules.
>
> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own update centers?
>
> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central repository,
> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven repository:
>
> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> - it is not possible to alter once published content
> - there are sources next to each published module
>
> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans extensions do
> before we approve them.. With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by installing their
> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime
> to anyone and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
> exploits that.
>
> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans Update center
> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven Central and NetBeans
> Plugin Portal?
>
> -jt
>
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com>.
I just noticed that PP3 publishes the artifactId but not the groupId. Is
this intentionally missing?
-ernie
On 7/7/2020 2:36 AM, Jiří Kovalský wrote:
> I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
> Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
> developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's
> rather collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid
> these shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
>
> For example:
>
> * if the mandatory Quality Criteria for PPUC [1] are missing some
> security checks, then let's add them to the procedure.
>
> [1]
> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NETBEANS/Quality+criteria+for+Plugin+Portal+Update+Center
>
> * if verification of plugins is slow, let's agree on some allowed
> number of verification requests per month/plugin and reasonable
> reaction time for plugin verifiers.
>
> * if plugin verifiers are still overloaded, let's find more volunteers
> who will test plugins on a daily basis starting with the requestor
> him/herself.
>
> Hope this makes sense,
>
> -Jirka
>
> Dne 06. 07. 20 v 20:25 Ernie Rael napsal(a):
>
>> Greetings,
>>
>> If there were some guarantee or even a reasonable expectation of a
>> quick response after requesting validation then I'd be more inclined
>> to accept such a restriction. I am uncomfortable depending on the
>> portal for critical bug fixes in a timely fashion.
>>
>> Further comments inline.
>>
>> -ernie
>>
>> On 7/6/2020 10:13 AM, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
>>> Hi.
>>> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
>>> Plugin Portal. The
>>> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own
>>> update center
>>> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
>>> downloads such module,
>>> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new
>>> updates or new
>>> modules.
>>>
>>> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register
>>> own update centers?
>>>
>>> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven
>>> central repository,
>>> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven
>>> repository:
>>>
>>> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
>>> - it is not possible to alter once published content
>>> - there are sources next to each published module
>>>
>>> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party
>>> NetBeans extensions do
>>> before we approve them..
>>
>>
>> I can think of ways, easy ways, to put security violations into a
>> module on the plugin portal. Saying that installing a module, and
>> looking at it for a few minutes (if that long) mitigates security
>> threats from the module is a joke. Might the testing/validation be
>> more extensive than I suspect?
>>
>>
>>> With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by installing their
>>> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can
>>> publish anything, anytime
>>> to anyone
>>
>>
>> That's not true. Only the people who install that plugin are
>> susceptible to malfeasance.
>>
>>
>>> and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time
>>> till somebody
>>> exploits that.
>>>
>>> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
>>> NetBeans Update center
>>> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven
>>> Central and NetBeans
>>> Plugin Portal?
>>
>> How about only supporting update centers that download from maven
>> central? Since using Maven Central seems to be the primary method of
>> security, this would seem to satisfy security considerations and
>> still allow timely updates.
>>
>> And are there related RCP issues?
>>
>> -ernie
>>
>> PS.
>>
>> Speaking of PP3, it has two uses. First is building a catalog, second
>> is as a place to look for plugins and/or get information on plugin
>> before downloading them. User browsing has issues,
>> see https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/netbeans-dev/202006.mbox/*3Cc24e9f9e-da9b-e2ab-5ac3-f5fb9b4c750b*40raelity.com*3E__;JSUl!!GqivPVa7Brio!MRNaYRIr3wI3bXWvzWwvlhclhC7nTS9PHAqPwfEOoOrR5mhmzFLucmjd0PccB5LDm1M$
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> -jt
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
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>> For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@netbeans.apache.org
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Jiří Kovalský <ji...@oracle.com>.
I agree that we should only promote hosting of plugins on the official
Apache NetBeans Plugin Portal. If there are reasons why plugin
developers think of creating their own update centers, then let's rather
collect the reasons and try to resolve these in order to avoid these
shadow and potentially risky sources of NetBeans plugins.
For example:
* if the mandatory Quality Criteria for PPUC [1] are missing some
security checks, then let's add them to the procedure.
[1]
https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NETBEANS/Quality+criteria+for+Plugin+Portal+Update+Center
* if verification of plugins is slow, let's agree on some allowed number
of verification requests per month/plugin and reasonable reaction time
for plugin verifiers.
* if plugin verifiers are still overloaded, let's find more volunteers
who will test plugins on a daily basis starting with the requestor
him/herself.
Hope this makes sense,
-Jirka
Dne 06. 07. 20 v 20:25 Ernie Rael napsal(a):
> Greetings,
>
> If there were some guarantee or even a reasonable expectation of a quick
> response after requesting validation then I'd be more inclined to accept
> such a restriction. I am uncomfortable depending on the portal for
> critical bug fixes in a timely fashion.
>
> Further comments inline.
>
> -ernie
>
> On 7/6/2020 10:13 AM, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
>> Hi.
>> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal. The
>> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own
>> update center
>> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user
>> downloads such module,
>> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new
>> updates or new
>> modules.
>>
>> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register
>> own update centers?
>>
>> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven
>> central repository,
>> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven
>> repository:
>>
>> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
>> - it is not possible to alter once published content
>> - there are sources next to each published module
>>
>> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party
>> NetBeans extensions do
>> before we approve them..
>
>
> I can think of ways, easy ways, to put security violations into a module
> on the plugin portal. Saying that installing a module, and looking at it
> for a few minutes (if that long) mitigates security threats from the
> module is a joke. Might the testing/validation be more extensive than I
> suspect?
>
>
>> With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by installing their
>> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish
>> anything, anytime
>> to anyone
>
>
> That's not true. Only the people who install that plugin are susceptible
> to malfeasance.
>
>
>> and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till
>> somebody
>> exploits that.
>>
>> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default
>> NetBeans Update center
>> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven
>> Central and NetBeans
>> Plugin Portal?
>
> How about only supporting update centers that download from maven
> central? Since using Maven Central seems to be the primary method of
> security, this would seem to satisfy security considerations and still
> allow timely updates.
>
> And are there related RCP issues?
>
> -ernie
>
> PS.
>
> Speaking of PP3, it has two uses. First is building a catalog, second is
> as a place to look for plugins and/or get information on plugin before
> downloading them. User browsing has issues,
> see https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/netbeans-dev/202006.mbox/*3Cc24e9f9e-da9b-e2ab-5ac3-f5fb9b4c750b*40raelity.com*3E__;JSUl!!GqivPVa7Brio!MRNaYRIr3wI3bXWvzWwvlhclhC7nTS9PHAqPwfEOoOrR5mhmzFLucmjd0PccB5LDm1M$
>
>
>
>
>> -jt
>>
>>
>
>
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Re: Bypassing NetBeans Plugin Portal
Posted by Ernie Rael <er...@raelity.com>.
Greetings,
If there were some guarantee or even a reasonable expectation of a quick
response after requesting validation then I'd be more inclined to accept
such a restriction. I am uncomfortable depending on the portal for
critical bug fixes in a timely fashion.
Further comments inline.
-ernie
On 7/6/2020 10:13 AM, Jaroslav Tulach wrote:
> Hi.
> Recently I have noticed discussion explaining how to bypass NetBeans Plugin Portal. The
> usual way is to create a NetBeans module extension to provide own update center
> definition and register it in NetBeans Plugin Portal. Once a user downloads such module,
> the provided update center gets activated and can distribute new updates or new
> modules.
>
> Isn't this a security thread? Shouldn't we ban modules that register own update centers?
>
> When we worked on designing the new update center based on Maven central repository,
> I wanted to benefit from the organizational structure of Maven repository:
>
> - identity of people who publish there is known to some extent
> - it is not possible to alter once published content
> - there are sources next to each published module
>
> With such constraints we can more properly verify what 3rd party NetBeans extensions do
> before we approve them..
I can think of ways, easy ways, to put security violations into a module
on the plugin portal. Saying that installing a module, and looking at it
for a few minutes (if that long) mitigates security threats from the
module is a joke. Might the testing/validation be more extensive than I
suspect?
> With modules that bypass our Plugin Portal by installing their
> own catalog, we loose any control. Owners of such catalogs can publish anything, anytime
> to anyone
That's not true. Only the people who install that plugin are susceptible
to malfeasance.
> and change that whenever they want. It's just a matter of time till somebody
> exploits that.
>
> Shouldn't we require 3rd party modules available via the default NetBeans Update center
> to avoid such bypassing and always release new versions via Maven Central and NetBeans
> Plugin Portal?
How about only supporting update centers that download from maven
central? Since using Maven Central seems to be the primary method of
security, this would seem to satisfy security considerations and still
allow timely updates.
And are there related RCP issues?
-ernie
PS.
Speaking of PP3, it has two uses. First is building a catalog, second is
as a place to look for plugins and/or get information on plugin before
downloading them. User browsing has issues,
see http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/netbeans-dev/202006.mbox/%3Cc24e9f9e-da9b-e2ab-5ac3-f5fb9b4c750b%40raelity.com%3E
> -jt
>
>
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