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Posted to docs@httpd.apache.org by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org> on 2001/09/30 03:02:51 UTC
[PATCH] security_tips.html
I've cleaned up some of the HTML to make it more in line with the
recommendation in the tutorials, and enhanced the section on Server Side
Includes. If this looks okay, I will start working on some of the other
sections outlined in my earlier proposal.
Please let me know what you think.
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.23
diff -u -r1.23 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/09/24 01:36:41 1.23
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/09/30 01:03:31
@@ -1,64 +1,82 @@
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
-<HTML>
-<HEAD>
-<TITLE>Apache HTTP Server: Security Tips</TITLE>
-</HEAD>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Apache HTTP Server: Security Tips</title>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+</head>
<!-- Background white, links blue (unvisited), navy (visited), red (active) -->
-<BODY
- BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF"
- TEXT="#000000"
- LINK="#0000FF"
- VLINK="#000080"
- ALINK="#FF0000"
+<body
+ bgcolor="#FFFFFF"
+ text="#000000"
+ link="#0000FF"
+ vlink="#000080"
+ alink="#FF0000"
>
<!--#include virtual="header.html" -->
-<H1 ALIGN="CENTER">Security Tips for Server Configuration</H1>
+<h1 align="center">Security Tips for Server Configuration</h1>
-<HR>
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</a></li>
-<P>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. Some of
-the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.
+<li><a href="#ssi">Server Side Includes</a>
-<HR>
+<li><a href="#nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased CGI</a></li>
-<H2><A NAME="serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</A></H2>
-<P>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root
+<li><a href="#saliasedcgi">Script Aliased CGI</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#cgi">CGI in General</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#systemsettings">Protecting System Settings</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#protectserverfiles">Protect Server Files by Default</a></li>
+</ul>
+
+<hr>
+
+<p>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. Some of
+the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.</p>
+
+<hr>
+
+<h2><a name="serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</a></h2>
+<p>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root
user, and it switches to the user defined by the <A
-HREF="../mod/core.html#user"><STRONG>User</STRONG></A> directive to serve hits.
+href="../mod/core.html#user"><strong>User</strong></a> directive to serve hits.
As is the case with any command that root executes, you must take care
that it is protected from modification by non-root users. Not only
must the files themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the
directories, and parents of all directories. For example, if you
-choose to place ServerRoot in <CODE>/usr/local/apache</CODE> then it is
+choose to place ServerRoot in <code>/usr/local/apache</code> then it is
suggested that you create that directory as root, with commands
like these:
-<BLOCKQUOTE><PRE>
+<blockquote><PRE>
mkdir /usr/local/apache
cd /usr/local/apache
mkdir bin conf logs
chown 0 . bin conf logs
chgrp 0 . bin conf logs
chmod 755 . bin conf logs
-</PRE></BLOCKQUOTE>
+</PRE></blockquote>
It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable by root.
When you install the httpd executable, you should ensure that it is
similarly protected:
-<BLOCKQUOTE><PRE>
+<blockquote><PRE>
cp httpd /usr/local/apache/bin
chown 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
chgrp 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
chmod 511 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
-</PRE></BLOCKQUOTE>
+</PRE></blockquote>
-<P>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other
-users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't
-be creating files in there.
+<p>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other
+users -- since root never executes any files within that directort, and
+should not be creating files there.
+</p>
-<P>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either
+<p>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either
executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises.
For example, someone could replace the httpd binary so that the next
time you start it, it will execute some arbitrary code. If the logs
@@ -67,21 +85,49 @@
and then root might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the
log files themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone
may be able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.
-<P>
-<HR>
-<H2>Server Side Includes</H2>
-<P>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users can execute
-arbitrary programs on the server. That thought alone should send a shiver
-down the spine of any sys-admin.<P>
-
-One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you use the
-IncludesNOEXEC option to the <A HREF="../mod/core.html#options">Options</A>
-directive.<P>
+</p>
+<hr>
+<h2><a name="ssi">Server Side Includes</a></h2>
+<p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
+several potential security risks.</p>
+
+<p>
+The first risk is the increased load on the server. All SSI-enabled
+files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not there are any SSI
+directives included within the file. While this load increase is
+minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.</p>
+
+<p>
+SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI scripts
+in general. A user can execute any CGI script through an SSI-enabled
+file. That should definitely give server administrators pause.</p>
+
+<p>
+There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
+advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
+
+<p>
+To start, never enable SSI for all files with .html or .htm
+extensions. This is especially true in a shared, or heavily trafficked
+server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension,
+such as the conventional .shtml. Thus keeping server load to a minimum.
+</p>
+
+<p>Another solution is to disable the #exec command withing SSI. To do
+that you use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the
+<a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+
+<blockquote><code>
+<Directory /> <br>
+Options IncludesNOEXEC <br>
+</Directory> <br>
+</code></blockquote>
-<HR>
-<H2>Non Script Aliased CGI</H2>
-<P>Allowing users to execute <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> scripts in any directory
+<hr>
+
+<h2><a name="nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
+<p>Allowing users to execute <strong>CGI</strong> scripts in any directory
should only
be considered if;
<OL>
@@ -90,93 +136,94 @@
<LI>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas, as to
make one more potential hole irrelevant.
<LI>You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.
-</OL><P>
-<HR>
+</OL><p>
+<hr>
-<H2>Script Alias'ed CGI</H2>
-<P>Limiting <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> to special directories gives the admin
+<h2><a name="saliasedcgi">Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
+<p>Limiting <strong>CGI</strong> to special directories gives the admin
control over
what goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than
-non script aliased CGI, but <STRONG>only if users with write access to the
-directories are trusted</STRONG> or the admin is willing to test each new CGI
-script/program for potential security holes.<P>
-
-Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI approach.<P>
-
-<HR>
-<H2>CGI in general</H2>
-<P>Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI script/programs
+non script aliased CGI, but <strong>only if users with write access to the
+directories are trusted</strong> or the admin is willing to test each new CGI
+script/program for potential security holes.</p>
+
+<p>Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI approach.
+</p>
+
+<hr>
+<h2><a name="cgi">CGI in General</a></h2>
+<p>Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI script/programs
or your ability to spot potential security holes in CGI, whether they were
-deliberate or accidental.<P>
+deliberate or accidental.</p>
-All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential to
-conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts <EM>e.g.</EM>
+<p>All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential
+to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts <em>e.g.</em>
User A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI
database. One program which can be used to allow scripts to run
-as different users is <A HREF="../suexec.html">suEXEC</A> which is
+as different users is <a href="../suexec.html">suEXEC</a> which is
included with Apache as of 1.2 and is called from special hooks in
the Apache server code. Another popular way of doing this is with
-<A HREF="http://wwwcgi.umr.edu/~cgiwrap/">CGIWrap</A>. <P>
+<a href="http://wwwcgi.umr.edu/~cgiwrap/">CGIWrap</a>. </p>
-<HR>
+<hr>
-<H2>Stopping users overriding system wide settings...</H2>
-<P>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
-up <CODE>.htaccess</CODE> files which can override security features
-you've configured. Here's one way to do it...<P>
+<h2><a name="systemsettings">Protecting System Settings</a></h2>
+<p>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
+up <code>.htaccess</code> files which can override security features
+you've configured. Here's one way to do it...</p>
In the server configuration file, put
-<BLOCKQUOTE><CODE>
-<Directory /> <BR>
-AllowOverride None <BR>
-Options None <BR>
-Allow from all <BR>
-</Directory> <BR>
-</CODE></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
-Then setup for specific directories<P>
-
-This stops all overrides, Includes and accesses in all directories apart
-from those named.<P>
-<HR>
-<H2>
- Protect server files by default
-</H2>
-<P>
+<blockquote><code>
+<Directory /> <br>
+AllowOverride None <br>
+Options None <br>
+Allow from all <br>
+</Directory> <br>
+</code></blockquote>
+
+<p>Then setup for specific directories</p>
+
+<p> This stops all overrides, Includes and accesses in all directories apart
+from those named.</p>
+<hr>
+<h2>
+<a name="protectserverfiles">Protect Server Files by Default</a>
+</h2>
+<p>
One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the feature
of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it, if the
server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping rules, it
can serve it to clients.
-</P>
-<P>
+</p>
+<p>
For instance, consider the following example:
-</P>
+</p>
<OL>
- <LI><SAMP># cd /; ln -s / public_html</SAMP>
+ <LI><samp># cd /; ln -s / public_html</samp>
</LI>
- <LI>Accessing <SAMP>http://localhost/~root/</SAMP>
+ <LI>Accessing <samp>http://localhost/~root/</samp>
</LI>
</OL>
-<P>
+<p>
This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To work
around this, add the following block to your server's configuration:
-</P>
+</p>
<PRE>
<Directory />
Order Deny,Allow
Deny from all
</Directory>
</PRE>
-<P>
+<p>
This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add
appropriate
<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#directory"
-><SAMP><Directory></SAMP></A>
+ href="../mod/core.html#directory"
+><samp><Directory></samp></a>
blocks to allow access only
in those areas you wish. For example,
-</P>
+</p>
<PRE>
<Directory /usr/users/*/public_html>
Order Deny,Allow
@@ -187,45 +234,42 @@
Allow from all
</Directory>
</PRE>
-<P>
+<p>
Pay particular attention to the interactions of
<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#location"
-><SAMP><Location></SAMP></A>
+ href="../mod/core.html#location"
+><samp><Location></samp></a>
and
<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#directory"
-><SAMP><Directory></SAMP></A>
-directives; for instance, even if <SAMP><Directory /></SAMP>
-denies access, a <SAMP><Location /></SAMP> directive might
+ href="../mod/core.html#directory"
+><samp><Directory></samp></a>
+directives; for instance, even if <samp><Directory /></samp>
+denies access, a <samp><Location /></samp> directive might
overturn it.
-</P>
-<P>
+</p>
+<p>
Also be wary of playing games with the
-<A
- HREF="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir"
->UserDir</A>
-directive; setting it to something like <SAMP>"./"</SAMP>
+<a href="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir">UserDir</a>
+directive; setting it to something like <samp>"./"</samp>
would have the same effect, for root, as the first example above.
If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly recommend that you
include the following line in your server configuration files:
-</P>
+</p>
<DL>
- <DD><SAMP>UserDir disabled root</SAMP>
+ <DD><samp>UserDir disabled root</samp>
</DD>
</DL>
-<HR>
-<P>Please send any other useful security tips to The Apache Group
+<hr>
+<p>Please send any other useful security tips to The Apache Group
by filling out a
-<A HREF="http://bugs.apache.org/">problem report</A>.
+<a href="http://bugs.apache.org/">problem report</a>.
If you are confident you have found a security bug in the Apache
-source code itself, <A
-HREF="http://httpd.apache.org/bug_report.html">please let us
-know</A>.
+source code itself, <a href="http://httpd.apache.org/bug_report.html"
+>please let us know</a>.
-<P>
+<p>
<!--#include virtual="footer.html" -->
-</BODY>
-</HTML>
+</body>
+</html>
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Re: [PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by jo...@slive.ca.
On Sat, 29 Sep 2001, Allan Liska wrote:
>
> I've cleaned up some of the HTML to make it more in line with the
> recommendation in the tutorials, and enhanced the section on Server Side
> Includes. If this looks okay, I will start working on some of the other
> sections outlined in my earlier proposal.
>
> Please let me know what you think.
>
Unfortunately, I haven't looked at this in detail. One reason is that it
is very difficult to review patches when formatting and content changes
are included together. Could you please submit them as separate patches?
There is another issue related to this which I will bring up in a
separate message.
Joshua.
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[PATCH] security_tips.html III
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
Final patch, for now. I converted the document to standard XML using
Tidy and Rich Bowen's recommended command set: tidy -mi -asxml file.html
Please let me know if you have any questions, or if I should handle the
three patches in a different manner.
Thanks!
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.23
diff -u -r1.23 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/09/24 01:36:41 1.23
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/02 03:57:00
@@ -1,183 +1,199 @@
-<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2 Final//EN">
-<HTML>
-<HEAD>
-<TITLE>Apache HTTP Server: Security Tips</TITLE>
-</HEAD>
-
-<!-- Background white, links blue (unvisited), navy (visited), red (active) -->
-<BODY
- BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF"
- TEXT="#000000"
- LINK="#0000FF"
- VLINK="#000080"
- ALINK="#FF0000"
->
-<!--#include virtual="header.html" -->
-<H1 ALIGN="CENTER">Security Tips for Server Configuration</H1>
-
-<HR>
-
-<P>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. Some of
-the suggestions will be general, others specific to Apache.
-
-<HR>
-
-<H2><A NAME="serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</A></H2>
-<P>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root
-user, and it switches to the user defined by the <A
-HREF="../mod/core.html#user"><STRONG>User</STRONG></A> directive to serve hits.
-As is the case with any command that root executes, you must take care
-that it is protected from modification by non-root users. Not only
-must the files themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the
-directories, and parents of all directories. For example, if you
-choose to place ServerRoot in <CODE>/usr/local/apache</CODE> then it is
-suggested that you create that directory as root, with commands
-like these:
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
-<BLOCKQUOTE><PRE>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <head>
+ <meta name="generator" content="HTML Tidy, see www.w3.org" />
+ <title>Apache HTTP Server: Security Tips</title>
+ </head>
+ <!-- Background white, links blue (unvisited), navy (visited), red (active) -->
+
+ <body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" link="#0000FF"
+ vlink="#000080" alink="#FF0000">
+ <!--#include virtual="header.html" -->
+
+ <h1 align="CENTER">Security Tips for Server Configuration</h1>
+ <hr />
+
+ <p>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web
+ server. Some of the suggestions will be general, others
+ specific to Apache.</p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2><a id="serverroot" name="serverroot">Permissions on
+ ServerRoot Directories</a></h2>
+
+ <p>In typical operation, Apache is started by the root user,
+ and it switches to the user defined by the <a
+ href="../mod/core.html#user"><strong>User</strong></a>
+ directive to serve hits. As is the case with any command that
+ root executes, you must take care that it is protected from
+ modification by non-root users. Not only must the files
+ themselves be writeable only by root, but so must the
+ directories, and parents of all directories. For example, if
+ you choose to place ServerRoot in
+ <code>/usr/local/apache</code> then it is suggested that you
+ create that directory as root, with commands like these:</p>
+
+ <blockquote>
+<pre>
mkdir /usr/local/apache
cd /usr/local/apache
mkdir bin conf logs
chown 0 . bin conf logs
chgrp 0 . bin conf logs
chmod 755 . bin conf logs
-</PRE></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
-It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable by root.
-When you install the httpd executable, you should ensure that it is
-similarly protected:
+</pre>
+ </blockquote>
+ It is assumed that /, /usr, and /usr/local are only modifiable
+ by root. When you install the httpd executable, you should
+ ensure that it is similarly protected:
-<BLOCKQUOTE><PRE>
+ <blockquote>
+<pre>
cp httpd /usr/local/apache/bin
chown 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
chgrp 0 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
chmod 511 /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd
-</PRE></BLOCKQUOTE>
+</pre>
+ </blockquote>
-<P>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by other
-users -- since root never executes any files out of there, and shouldn't
-be creating files in there.
-
-<P>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root either
-executes or writes on then you open your system to root compromises.
-For example, someone could replace the httpd binary so that the next
-time you start it, it will execute some arbitrary code. If the logs
-directory is writeable (by a non-root user), someone
-could replace a log file with a symlink to some other system file,
-and then root might overwrite that file with arbitrary data. If the
-log files themselves are writeable (by a non-root user), then someone
-may be able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.
-<P>
-<HR>
-<H2>Server Side Includes</H2>
-<P>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users can execute
-arbitrary programs on the server. That thought alone should send a shiver
-down the spine of any sys-admin.<P>
-
-One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you use the
-IncludesNOEXEC option to the <A HREF="../mod/core.html#options">Options</A>
-directive.<P>
-
-<HR>
-
-<H2>Non Script Aliased CGI</H2>
-<P>Allowing users to execute <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> scripts in any directory
-should only
-be considered if;
-<OL>
- <LI>You trust your users not to write scripts which will deliberately or
-accidentally expose your system to an attack.
- <LI>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in other areas, as to
-make one more potential hole irrelevant.
- <LI>You have no users, and nobody ever visits your server.
-</OL><P>
-<HR>
-
-<H2>Script Alias'ed CGI</H2>
-<P>Limiting <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> to special directories gives the admin
-control over
-what goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than
-non script aliased CGI, but <STRONG>only if users with write access to the
-directories are trusted</STRONG> or the admin is willing to test each new CGI
-script/program for potential security holes.<P>
-
-Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI approach.<P>
-
-<HR>
-<H2>CGI in general</H2>
-<P>Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI script/programs
-or your ability to spot potential security holes in CGI, whether they were
-deliberate or accidental.<P>
-
-All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have potential to
-conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other scripts <EM>e.g.</EM>
-User A hates User B, so he writes a script to trash User B's CGI
-database. One program which can be used to allow scripts to run
-as different users is <A HREF="../suexec.html">suEXEC</A> which is
-included with Apache as of 1.2 and is called from special hooks in
-the Apache server code. Another popular way of doing this is with
-<A HREF="http://wwwcgi.umr.edu/~cgiwrap/">CGIWrap</A>. <P>
-
-<HR>
-
-
-<H2>Stopping users overriding system wide settings...</H2>
-<P>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
-up <CODE>.htaccess</CODE> files which can override security features
-you've configured. Here's one way to do it...<P>
-
-In the server configuration file, put
-<BLOCKQUOTE><CODE>
-<Directory /> <BR>
-AllowOverride None <BR>
-Options None <BR>
-Allow from all <BR>
-</Directory> <BR>
-</CODE></BLOCKQUOTE>
-
-Then setup for specific directories<P>
-
-This stops all overrides, Includes and accesses in all directories apart
-from those named.<P>
-<HR>
-<H2>
- Protect server files by default
-</H2>
-<P>
-One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the feature
-of default access. That is, unless you take steps to change it, if the
-server can find its way to a file through normal URL mapping rules, it
-can serve it to clients.
-</P>
-<P>
-For instance, consider the following example:
-</P>
-<OL>
- <LI><SAMP># cd /; ln -s / public_html</SAMP>
- </LI>
- <LI>Accessing <SAMP>http://localhost/~root/</SAMP>
- </LI>
-</OL>
-<P>
-This would allow clients to walk through the entire filesystem. To work
-around this, add the following block to your server's configuration:
-</P>
-<PRE>
+ <p>You can create an htdocs subdirectory which is modifiable by
+ other users -- since root never executes any files out of
+ there, and shouldn't be creating files in there.</p>
+
+ <p>If you allow non-root users to modify any files that root
+ either executes or writes on then you open your system to root
+ compromises. For example, someone could replace the httpd
+ binary so that the next time you start it, it will execute some
+ arbitrary code. If the logs directory is writeable (by a
+ non-root user), someone could replace a log file with a symlink
+ to some other system file, and then root might overwrite that
+ file with arbitrary data. If the log files themselves are
+ writeable (by a non-root user), then someone may be able to
+ overwrite the log itself with bogus data.</p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>Server Side Includes</h2>
+
+ <p>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users
+ can execute arbitrary programs on the server. That thought
+ alone should send a shiver down the spine of any sys-admin.</p>
+
+ <p>One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you
+ use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the <a
+ href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+
+ <p></p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>Non Script Aliased CGI</h2>
+
+ <p>Allowing users to execute <strong>CGI</strong> scripts in
+ any directory should only be considered if;</p>
+
+ <ol>
+ <li>You trust your users not to write scripts which will
+ deliberately or accidentally expose your system to an
+ attack.</li>
+
+ <li>You consider security at your site to be so feeble in
+ other areas, as to make one more potential hole
+ irrelevant.</li>
+
+ <li>You have no users, and nobody ever visits your
+ server.</li>
+ </ol>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>Script Alias'ed CGI</h2>
+
+ <p>Limiting <strong>CGI</strong> to special directories gives
+ the admin control over what goes into those directories. This
+ is inevitably more secure than non script aliased CGI, but
+ <strong>only if users with write access to the directories are
+ trusted</strong> or the admin is willing to test each new CGI
+ script/program for potential security holes.</p>
+
+ <p>Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased
+ CGI approach.</p>
+
+ <p></p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>CGI in general</h2>
+
+ <p>Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI
+ script/programs or your ability to spot potential security
+ holes in CGI, whether they were deliberate or accidental.</p>
+
+ <p>All the CGI scripts will run as the same user, so they have
+ potential to conflict (accidentally or deliberately) with other
+ scripts <em>e.g.</em> User A hates User B, so he writes a
+ script to trash User B's CGI database. One program which can be
+ used to allow scripts to run as different users is <a
+ href="../suexec.html">suEXEC</a> which is included with Apache
+ as of 1.2 and is called from special hooks in the Apache server
+ code. Another popular way of doing this is with <a
+ href="http://wwwcgi.umr.edu/~cgiwrap/">CGIWrap</a>.</p>
+
+ <p></p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>Stopping users overriding system wide settings...</h2>
+
+ <p>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from
+ setting up <code>.htaccess</code> files which can override
+ security features you've configured. Here's one way to do
+ it...</p>
+
+ <p>In the server configuration file, put</p>
+
+ <blockquote>
+ <code><Directory /><br />
+ AllowOverride None<br />
+ Options None<br />
+ Allow from all<br />
+ </Directory><br />
+ </code>
+ </blockquote>
+ Then setup for specific directories
+
+ <p>This stops all overrides, Includes and accesses in all
+ directories apart from those named.</p>
+ <hr />
+
+ <h2>Protect server files by default</h2>
+
+ <p>One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is
+ the feature of default access. That is, unless you take steps
+ to change it, if the server can find its way to a file through
+ normal URL mapping rules, it can serve it to clients.</p>
+
+ <p>For instance, consider the following example:</p>
+
+ <ol>
+ <li><samp># cd /; ln -s / public_html</samp></li>
+
+ <li>Accessing <samp>http://localhost/~root/</samp></li>
+ </ol>
+
+ <p>This would allow clients to walk through the entire
+ filesystem. To work around this, add the following block to
+ your server's configuration:</p>
+<pre>
<Directory />
Order Deny,Allow
Deny from all
</Directory>
-</PRE>
-<P>
-This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add
-appropriate
-<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#directory"
-><SAMP><Directory></SAMP></A>
-blocks to allow access only
-in those areas you wish. For example,
-</P>
-<PRE>
+</pre>
+
+ <p>This will forbid default access to filesystem locations. Add
+ appropriate <a
+ href="../mod/core.html#directory"><samp><Directory></samp></a>
+ blocks to allow access only in those areas you wish. For
+ example,</p>
+<pre>
<Directory /usr/users/*/public_html>
Order Deny,Allow
Allow from all
@@ -186,46 +202,39 @@
Order Deny,Allow
Allow from all
</Directory>
-</PRE>
-<P>
-Pay particular attention to the interactions of
-<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#location"
-><SAMP><Location></SAMP></A>
-and
-<A
- HREF="../mod/core.html#directory"
-><SAMP><Directory></SAMP></A>
-directives; for instance, even if <SAMP><Directory /></SAMP>
-denies access, a <SAMP><Location /></SAMP> directive might
-overturn it.
-</P>
-<P>
-Also be wary of playing games with the
-<A
- HREF="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir"
->UserDir</A>
-directive; setting it to something like <SAMP>"./"</SAMP>
-would have the same effect, for root, as the first example above.
-If you are using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly recommend that you
-include the following line in your server configuration files:
-</P>
-<DL>
- <DD><SAMP>UserDir disabled root</SAMP>
- </DD>
-</DL>
-
-<HR>
-<P>Please send any other useful security tips to The Apache Group
-by filling out a
-<A HREF="http://bugs.apache.org/">problem report</A>.
-If you are confident you have found a security bug in the Apache
-source code itself, <A
-HREF="http://httpd.apache.org/bug_report.html">please let us
-know</A>.
-
-<P>
-
-<!--#include virtual="footer.html" -->
-</BODY>
-</HTML>
+</pre>
+
+ <p>Pay particular attention to the interactions of <a
+ href="../mod/core.html#location"><samp><Location></samp></a>
+ and <a
+ href="../mod/core.html#directory"><samp><Directory></samp></a>
+ directives; for instance, even if <samp><Directory
+ /></samp> denies access, a <samp><Location /></samp>
+ directive might overturn it.</p>
+
+ <p>Also be wary of playing games with the <a
+ href="../mod/mod_userdir.html#userdir">UserDir</a> directive;
+ setting it to something like <samp>"./"</samp> would have the
+ same effect, for root, as the first example above. If you are
+ using Apache 1.3 or above, we strongly recommend that you
+ include the following line in your server configuration
+ files:</p>
+
+ <dl>
+ <dd><samp>UserDir disabled root</samp></dd>
+ </dl>
+ <hr />
+
+ <p>Please send any other useful security tips to The Apache
+ Group by filling out a <a
+ href="http://bugs.apache.org/">problem report</a>. If you are
+ confident you have found a security bug in the Apache source
+ code itself, <a
+ href="http://httpd.apache.org/bug_report.html">please let us
+ know</a>.</p>
+
+ <p><!--#include virtual="footer.html" -->
+ </p>
+ </body>
+</html>
+
--
Allan Liska
allan@allan.org
http://www.allan.org
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[PATCH] security_tips.html II
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
I added a navigation menu at the top of the page, to make it easier to
work your way through the document.
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.23
diff -u -r1.23 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/09/24 01:36:41 1.23
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/02 03:52:19
@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@
<!--#include virtual="header.html" -->
<H1 ALIGN="CENTER">Security Tips for Server Configuration</H1>
+
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#serverroot">Permissions on ServerRoot Directories</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#ssi">Server Side Includes</a>
+
+<li><a href="#nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased CGI</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#saliasedcgi">Script Aliased CGI</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#cgi">CGI in General</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#systemsettings">Protecting System Settings</a></li>
+
+<li><a href="#protectserverfiles">Protect Server Files by Default</a></li>
+</ul>
+
<HR>
<P>Some hints and tips on security issues in setting up a web server. Some of
@@ -69,7 +86,7 @@
may be able to overwrite the log itself with bogus data.
<P>
<HR>
-<H2>Server Side Includes</H2>
+<h2><a name="ssi">Server Side Includes</a></h2>
<P>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users can execute
arbitrary programs on the server. That thought alone should send a shiver
down the spine of any sys-admin.<P>
@@ -80,7 +97,7 @@
<HR>
-<H2>Non Script Aliased CGI</H2>
+<h2><a name="nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
<P>Allowing users to execute <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> scripts in any directory
should only
be considered if;
@@ -93,7 +110,7 @@
</OL><P>
<HR>
-<H2>Script Alias'ed CGI</H2>
+<h2><a name="saliasedcgi">Script Aliased CGI</a></h2>
<P>Limiting <STRONG>CGI</STRONG> to special directories gives the admin
control over
what goes into those directories. This is inevitably more secure than
@@ -104,7 +121,7 @@
Most sites choose this option over the non script aliased CGI approach.<P>
<HR>
-<H2>CGI in general</H2>
+<h2><a name="cgi">CGI in General</a></h2>
<P>Always remember that you must trust the writers of the CGI script/programs
or your ability to spot potential security holes in CGI, whether they were
deliberate or accidental.<P>
@@ -121,7 +138,7 @@
<HR>
-<H2>Stopping users overriding system wide settings...</H2>
+<h2><a name="systemsettings">Protecting System Settings</a></h2>
<P>To run a really tight ship, you'll want to stop users from setting
up <CODE>.htaccess</CODE> files which can override security features
you've configured. Here's one way to do it...<P>
@@ -141,7 +158,7 @@
from those named.<P>
<HR>
<H2>
- Protect server files by default
+<a name="protectserverfiles">Protect Server Files by Default</a>
</H2>
<P>
One aspect of Apache which is occasionally misunderstood is the feature
--
Allan Liska
allan@allan.org
http://www.allan.org
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RE: [PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Joshua Slive <jo...@slive.ca>.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Allan Liska [mailto:allan@allan.org]
> As Joshua suggested, I have separated the content changes from the
> formatting changes. Listed below are the proposed content changes for the
> Server Side Includes section. If they are acceptable, I will continue
> working the rest of the security tips documentation, according to the
> proposal outlined earlier.
Thanks!
> Any feedback is greatly appreciated.
>
See below.
> +<p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
> +several potential security risks.</p>
> +
> +<p>
> +The first risk is the increased load on the server. All SSI-enabled
> +files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not there are any SSI
> +directives included within the file. While this load increase is
> +minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.</p>
> +
> +<p>
> +SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI scripts
> +in general. A user can execute any CGI script through an SSI-enabled
> +file. That should definitely give server administrators pause.</p>
I would say "A user can execute any CGI script or program" (see exec cmd).
You might also want to say "under the userid of the User and Group
configured in httpd.conf" and then mention how suexec mitigates this
problem.
> +
> +<p>
> +There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
> +advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
> +
> +<p>
> +To start, never enable SSI for files with .html or .htm extension.
> +This is especially true in a shared, or heavily trafficked, server
> +environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension,
> +such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep server load at
> a minimum.
> +</p>
That is too strongly worded. Using a different extension is a good idea for
security and management reasons, but you should remove "never". If the
server is managed carefully, you can parse .html files without risk. (You
have to realize that some people take what is written in the docs VERY
literally. If you say "never" they assume the world will fall in if you try
it. Of course, other people assume "never" means "go for it" ;-)
> +
> +<p>Another solution is to disable the #exec command withing SSI. To do
> +that you use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the
> +<a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
I don't think the example directory block is necessary, but I would
explicitly state that you should use IncludesNoExec IN PLACE OF Includes.
Thanks again for being presistent about this!
Joshua.
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Re: [PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Cliff Woolley <cl...@yahoo.com>.
[Forgive me in advance for playing the comma police.]
On Thu, 4 Oct 2001, Allan Liska wrote:
> + <p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
s/(SSI), present/(SSI) present/
> + in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files can execute
> + any CGI script or program owned by the user and group Apache runs as, as
> + configured in httpd.conf. That should definitely give server
> + administrators pause.</p>
Not exactly. Using "exec cmd", SSI-enabled files can execute any program
that the Apache user has permission to run, regardless of who own it.
> + There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
> + advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
s/SSI files, while/SSI files while/
> + <p>To decrease the amount of damage a wayward SSI file can cause a
s/can cause a/can cause, a/
> + separate extension, such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep
> + server load at a minimum, and increases security.</p>
s/minimum, and/minimum and/
--Cliff
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cliff Woolley
cliffwoolley@yahoo.com
Charlottesville, VA
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RE: [PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Joshua Slive <jo...@slive.ca>.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Allan Liska [mailto:allan@allan.org]
>
> I have made the syntax corrections suggested by Chris Pepper and would
> like to see if there are any additional comments about the SSI changes?
Committed with Cliff's changes and a few of my own.
Joshua.
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[PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
I have made the syntax corrections suggested by Chris Pepper and would
like to see if there are any additional comments about the SSI changes?
Thanks!
allan
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.25
diff -u -r1.25 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/02 15:40:07 1.25
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/05 03:45:10
@@ -95,15 +95,46 @@
<h2><a id="ssi" name="ssi">Server Side Includes</a></h2>
- <p>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users
- can execute arbitrary programs on the server. That thought
- alone should send a shiver down the spine of any sys-admin.</p>
+ <p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
+ several potential security risks.</p>
+
+ <p>
+ The first risk is the increased load on the server. All SSI-enabled
+ files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not there are any SSI
+ directives included within the files. While this load increase is
+ minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.</p>
+
+ <p>
+ SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI scripts
+ in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files can execute
+ any CGI script or program owned by the user and group Apache runs as, as
+ configured in httpd.conf. That should definitely give server
+ administrators pause.</p>
- <p>One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you
- use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the <a
- href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+ <p>
+ There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
+ advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
- <p></p>
+ <p>To decrease the amount of damage a wayward SSI file can cause a
+ server administrator can enable <a href="../docs/suexec.html"
+ >suexec</a>. Suexec provides several levels of protection for a
+ server. It limits the users who can execute CGI scripts or programs
+ on the server (by restricting access only to the user and group defined
+ in httpd.conf). Suexec also checks to ensure all parsed files meet
+ its security standards prior to execution.
+
+ <p>
+ Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions is probably a bad
+ idea. This is especially true in a shared, or high
+ traffic, server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a
+ separate extension, such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep
+ server load at a minimum, and increases security.</p>
+
+
+ <p>Another solution is to disable the #exec element within SSI. To do
+ this replace Options Includes with Options IncludesNOEXEC within the
+ <a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+
<hr />
<h2><a id="nsaliasedcgi" name="nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased
--
Allan Liska
allan@allan.org
http://www.allan.org
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[PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
I have incorporated the suggestions made by Joshua, and I am resubmitting
this patch for discussion. Again, any feedback is greatly appreciated, as
it helps me get a better feel for what is expected going foward.
Thanks!
allan
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.25
diff -u -r1.25 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/02 15:40:07 1.25
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/04 03:06:02
@@ -95,15 +95,46 @@
<h2><a id="ssi" name="ssi">Server Side Includes</a></h2>
- <p>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users
- can execute arbitrary programs on the server. That thought
- alone should send a shiver down the spine of any sys-admin.</p>
+ <p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
+ several potential security risks.</p>
+
+ <p>
+ The first risk is the increased load on the server. All SSI-enabled
+ files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not there are any SSI
+ directives included within the file. While this load increase is
+ minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.</p>
+
+ <p>
+ SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI scripts
+ in general. Using the "exec cmd" element, SSI-enabled files can execute
+ any CGI script or program that is owned by same userid as the user and
+ group configured in httpd.conf. That should definitely give server
+ administrators pause.</p>
- <p>One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you
- use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the <a
- href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+ <p>
+ There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
+ advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
- <p></p>
+ <p>To decrease the amount of damage a wayword SSI file can cause a
+ server administrator can enable <a href="../docs/suexec.html"
+ >suexec</a>. Suexec provides several levels of protection for a
+ server. It limits the users who can execute CGI scripts or programs
+ on the server (by restricting access only to the user and group defined
+ in httpd.conf). Suexec also checks to ensure all parsed files meet
+ its security standards prior to execution.
+
+ <p>
+ Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions is probably a bad
+ idea. This is especially true in a shared, or heavily
+ trafficked, server environment. SSI-enabled files should have a
+ separate extension, such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep
+ server load at a minimum, and increases security.</p>
+
+
+ <p>Another solution is to disable the #exec element within SSI. To do
+ this replace Options Includes with Options IncludesNOEXEC within the
+ <a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+
<hr />
<h2><a id="nsaliasedcgi" name="nsaliasedcgi">Non Script Aliased
--
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allan@allan.org
http://www.allan.org
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Re: [PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Cliff Woolley <cl...@yahoo.com>.
On Mon, 12 Nov 2001, Allan Liska wrote:
> Corrected a bad link to the suexec page in the SSI section.
Committed, thanks.
--Cliff
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cliff Woolley
cliffwoolley@yahoo.com
Charlottesville, VA
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[PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
Corrected a bad link to the suexec page in the SSI section.
allan
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.27
diff -u -r1.27 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/08 01:26:54 1.27
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/11/12 18:48:27
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
<p>To isolate the damage a wayward SSI file can cause, a server
administrator can enable <a
- href="../docs/suexec.html">suexec</a> as described in the <a
+ href="../suexec.html">suexec</a> as described in the <a
href="#cgi">CGI in General</a> section.</p>
<p>Enabling SSI for files with .html or .htm extensions can be
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[PATCH] security_tips.html
Posted by Allan Liska <al...@allan.org>.
As Joshua suggested, I have separated the content changes from the
formatting changes. Listed below are the proposed content changes for the
Server Side Includes section. If they are acceptable, I will continue
working the rest of the security tips documentation, according to the
proposal outlined earlier.
Any feedback is greatly appreciated.
Index: httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/cvspublic/httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html,v
retrieving revision 1.23
diff -u -r1.23 security_tips.html
--- httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/09/24 01:36:41 1.23
+++ httpd-docs-1.3/htdocs/manual/misc/security_tips.html 2001/10/01 23:06:59
@@ -70,13 +70,40 @@
<P>
<HR>
<H2>Server Side Includes</H2>
-<P>Server side includes (SSI) can be configured so that users can execute
-arbitrary programs on the server. That thought alone should send a shiver
-down the spine of any sys-admin.<P>
-
-One solution is to disable that part of SSI. To do that you use the
-IncludesNOEXEC option to the <A HREF="../mod/core.html#options">Options</A>
-directive.<P>
+<p>Server Side Includes (SSI), present a server administrator with
+several potential security risks.</p>
+
+<p>
+The first risk is the increased load on the server. All SSI-enabled
+files have to be parsed by Apache, whether or not there are any SSI
+directives included within the file. While this load increase is
+minor, in a shared server environment it can become significant.</p>
+
+<p>
+SSI files also pose the same risks that are associated with CGI scripts
+in general. A user can execute any CGI script through an SSI-enabled
+file. That should definitely give server administrators pause.</p>
+
+<p>
+There are ways to enhance the security of SSI files, while still taking
+advantage of the benefits they provide.</p>
+
+<p>
+To start, never enable SSI for files with .html or .htm extension.
+This is especially true in a shared, or heavily trafficked, server
+environment. SSI-enabled files should have a separate extension,
+such as the conventional .shtml. This helps keep server load at a minimum.
+</p>
+
+<p>Another solution is to disable the #exec command withing SSI. To do
+that you use the IncludesNOEXEC option to the
+<a href="../mod/core.html#options">Options</a> directive.</p>
+
+<blockquote><code>
+<Directory /> <br>
+Options IncludesNOEXEC <br>
+</Directory> <br>
+</code></blockquote>
<HR>
--
Allan Liska
allan@allan.org
http://www.allan.org
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