[jira] [Resolved] (CAMEL-24440) camel-crypto - CryptoDataFormat validates the MAC after decrypting, reuses the cipher key for the HMAC, and has no per-message IV

["Andrea Cosentino (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org>]

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24440?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Andrea Cosentino resolved CAMEL-24440.
--------------------------------------
    Resolution: Fixed

> camel-crypto - CryptoDataFormat validates the MAC after decrypting, reuses the cipher key for the HMAC, and has no per-message IV
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: CAMEL-24440
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24440
>             Project: Camel
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components:  camel-crypto
>            Reporter: Andrea Cosentino
>            Assignee: Andrea Cosentino
>            Priority: Major
>             Fix For: 4.23.0
>
>
> Four related issues in {{CryptoDataFormat}}:
> 1. *MAC checked after decryption.* {{unmarshal()}} runs the body through {{CipherInputStream}} to completion before {{HMACAccumulator.validate()}} is called. Tampered input therefore surfaces as two distinguishable failures - {{IOException}} (bad padding, from the cipher) versus {{IllegalStateException}} (bad MAC) - rather than one uniform authentication failure.
> 2. *Key reuse.* {{HMACAccumulator}} is constructed with the HMAC key derived from the same {{key.getEncoded()}} used for the cipher. The same key material is used for both confidentiality and integrity.
> 3. *MAC values in the failure message.* {{HMACAccumulator.validate()}} builds its exception message with both the expected and the computed MAC in hex.
> 4. *No per-message IV.* {{getInitializationVector()}} returns the header value or the statically configured {{initVector}}; nothing ever generates a fresh one. {{marshal()}} even throws when {{inlineInitVector=true}} and no static IV was configured, which steers users towards a fixed IV for exactly the feature that exists to carry a per-message one. The javadoc notes the IV need not be secret but never that it must be unique.
> Proposal: derive separate cipher and MAC keys from the configured key (HKDF or equivalent); validate the MAC before releasing plaintext, or move to an AEAD mode; report a single uniform authentication failure without embedding MAC values; and generate a per-message {{SecureRandom}} IV when {{inlineInitVector}} is enabled instead of requiring a static one. Changing key derivation or IV handling breaks compatibility with data produced by earlier versions, so it needs an upgrade-guide entry and probably a version marker in the output format.



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