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Posted to notifications@teaclave.apache.org by GitBox <gi...@apache.org> on 2021/08/16 15:36:31 UTC

[GitHub] [incubator-teaclave-sgx-sdk] PiDelport commented on issue #333: Implications of Upcoming Total Memory Encryption (TME)

PiDelport commented on issue #333:
URL: https://github.com/apache/incubator-teaclave-sgx-sdk/issues/333#issuecomment-899608319


   According to <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.11/x86/sgx.html#encryption-engines>:
   
   > In CPUs prior to Ice Lake, the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is used to encrypt pages leaving the CPU caches. MEE uses a n-ary Merkle tree with root in SRAM to maintain integrity of the encrypted data. This provides integrity and anti-replay protection but does not scale to large memory sizes because the time required to update the Merkle tree grows logarithmically in relation to the memory size.
   >
   > CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, which means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated. B, it includes additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory aliases from being Created.
   
   Is this accurate?
   
   If I understand it correctly, this would compromise the security properties of SGX dramatically, and make it unsuitable for many current applications, wouldn't it?


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