You are viewing a plain text version of this content. The canonical link for it is here.
Posted to derby-dev@db.apache.org by "Kathey Marsden (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2007/07/09 19:29:04 UTC

[jira] Commented: (DERBY-2437) SYSCS_EXPORT_TABLE can be used to overwrite derby files

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2437?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#action_12511183 ] 

Kathey Marsden commented on DERBY-2437:
---------------------------------------

Mike asked me to check and see if this was a regression or not (Does export of BLOB make DERBY less secure).  I was able to totally corrupt a 10.1 database with export by exporting a text file over a binary file, so I don't think this is a regression, but it is an extremely serious bug.


> SYSCS_EXPORT_TABLE can be used to overwrite derby files
> -------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: DERBY-2437
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2437
>             Project: Derby
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Security
>    Affects Versions: 10.0.2.0, 10.0.2.1, 10.1.1.0, 10.1.2.1, 10.1.3.1, 10.2.1.6, 10.2.2.0, 10.3.0.0, 10.3.1.0, 10.3.1.1, 10.4.0.0
>            Reporter: Daniel John Debrunner
>            Priority: Critical
>
> here are no controls over which files SYSCS_EXPORT_TABLE can write, thus allowing any user that has permission to execute the procedure to try and modufy information that they have no permissions to do.
> In a similar fashion to the one described in DERBY-2436 I could overwrite derby.properties at least leaqding to a dnial of service attack on the next re-boot.
> With more time it might be possible to write out a valid properties file which would allow chaning the authentication, silentaly adding a new user etc.

-- 
This message is automatically generated by JIRA.
-
You can reply to this email to add a comment to the issue online.