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Posted to notifications@texera.apache.org by "bobbai00 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org> on 2026/06/08 04:59:04 UTC

[I] Authorize agent-service requests in the access-control-service (JWT authn + per-agent authz) [texera]

bobbai00 opened a new issue, #5561:
URL: https://github.com/apache/texera/issues/5561

   ### Feature Summary
   
   The `agent-service` currently authenticates its own requests, and the check is both weak and incomplete:
   
   - The only token handling is the **optional** `userToken` in `POST /api/agents`. `agent-service/src/api/auth-api.ts` base64-decodes the JWT payload and checks **only the `exp` claim** — the **signature is never verified** (`validateToken = !isTokenExpired`), so a forged-but-unexpired token passes.
   - Every other endpoint — `GET /api/agents`, `GET /api/agents/models`, `PATCH …/settings`, and the `/api/agents/:id/react` WebSocket that drives LLM calls (and provider spend) — performs **no auth at all**.
   - At the gateway, the ext-authz `SecurityPolicy` (`bin/k8s/templates/gateway-security-policy.yaml`) targets only the `*-dynamic-routes` HTTPRoute (wsapi / executions-stats / pve). The `*-agent-service-route` is **not** targeted, so `/api/agents` bypasses ext-authz entirely. (Single-node nginx has no ext-authz at all.)
   
   Net effect: anyone who can reach the gateway can drive the agent-service (and spend the LLM budget), and the only "JWT validation" is a non-cryptographic decode performed by the agent-service itself.
   
   Authentication and authorization for the agent-service should instead be **owned by the access-control-service**, the same way computing-unit / execution / pve requests are already authorized via Envoy ext-authz. The access-control-service should:
   
   1. **Authenticate** — verify the JWT signature (it already does this via `JwtParser.parseToken`), and
   2. **Authorize** — decide whether the user may access the **specific agent** named in the request.
   
   We do not yet persist an agent→owner mapping, but managing that access check is the access-control-service's responsibility, consistent with how it already owns dataset / computing-unit access.
   
   _(Surfaced while reviewing #5558, which moved the model list + LLM path onto the agent-service; relates to the role gate added in #5421.)_
   
   ### Proposed Solution or Design
   
   **Phase 1 — Authentication (ext-authz in front of the agent-service)**
   - Add an Envoy `SecurityPolicy` targeting the `*-agent-service-route` HTTPRoute, mirroring `gateway-security-policy.yaml`, pointing ext-auth at the access-control-service `/api/auth` and injecting `x-user-id` / `x-user-name` / `x-user-email`.
   - Add a branch to `AccessControlResource.authorize()` for `/api/agents…` that verifies the JWT (`parseToken`) and requires `REGULAR`/`ADMIN` (`SessionUser.isRoleOf`) — i.e. restore the gate the old LiteLLM proxy had — returning the trusted identity headers on success and 401/403 otherwise. Token extraction already supports header `Authorization: Bearer`, query `access-token` (for the WS), and body `token`.
   - Frontend: attach the JWT to **all** agent-service calls. Today `agentHeaders()` only sets `X-Agent-Workflow-Id`, `fetchModelTypes()` sends nothing, and the `/react` WebSocket carries no token. REST → `Authorization: Bearer`; WS → `?access-token=…` (mirror the workflow WebSocket).
   - Remove the agent-service's home-grown `decodeJWT` / `validateToken`; have it **trust the gateway-injected `x-user-*` headers**, which only exist after ext-authz passes.
   - Single-node (nginx, no Envoy): add an `auth_request` subrequest to `/api/auth`, or explicitly accept that dev single-node stays open.
   
   **Phase 2 — Authorization (per-agent access)**
   - Introduce an agent **ownership / ACL** model: associate each agent with its creating user (uid). Agents are currently in-memory only (`agentStore`), lost on restart and not tied to a user — so this needs a durable mapping.
   - The access-control-service answers "may uid X act on agent Y?". Options:
     - **(a)** access-control reads an agent→owner mapping from a shared store (DB) and decides — keeps the authz decision fully inside access-control (matches the stated goal). The agent id is available from the request path (`/api/agents/{id}/…`), which ext-auth already receives, exactly like `cuid` today.
     - **(b)** Hybrid: access-control injects the trusted uid and the agent-service enforces ownership locally. Simpler, but the authz logic lives outside access-control.
   - This also sets up future agent sharing/granting (like dataset / workflow ACLs).
   
   **Open design questions**
   - Where/how to persist agent ownership (a dedicated table vs. persisting agents themselves; agents are ephemeral today).
   - Does Phase 2 require persisting agents, or just an ownership index keyed by agent id?
   - Keep the existing `userToken` body field — it is the user's token forwarded to the dashboard-service for delegated workflow CRUD, which is separate from authenticating the caller.
   
   ### Affected Area
   - Deployment / Infrastructure (Envoy `SecurityPolicy`, nginx)
   - Workflow UI (JWT propagation for REST + WebSocket)
   - access-control-service and agent-service
   


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Re: [I] Authorize agent-service requests in the access-control-service (JWT authn + per-agent authz) [texera]

Posted by "Alwaysgaurav1 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
Alwaysgaurav1 commented on issue #5561:
URL: https://github.com/apache/texera/issues/5561#issuecomment-6284049600

   /take


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