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Posted to issues@hbase.apache.org by "Andrew Purtell (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2015/07/15 19:04:04 UTC
[jira] [Updated] (HBASE-14089) Remove unused draw of system entropy
from RecoverableZooKeeper
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-14089?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Andrew Purtell updated HBASE-14089:
-----------------------------------
Description: I had a look at instances where we use SecureRandom, which could block if insufficient entropy, in the 0.98 and master branch code. (Random in contrast is a PRNG seeded by System#nanoTime, it doesn't draw from system entropy.) Most uses are in encryption related code, our native encryption and SSL, but we do also use SecureRandom for salting znode metadata in RecoverableZooKeeper#appendMetadata, which is called whenever we do setData. Conceivably we could block unexpectedly when constructing data to write out to a znode if entropy gets too low until more is available. (was: I had a look at instances where we use SecureRandom, which could block if insufficient entropy, in the 0.98 and master branch code. (Random in contrast is a PRNG seeded by System#nanoTime, it doesn't draw from system entropy.) Most uses are in encryption related code, our native encryption and SSL, but we do also use SecureRandom for salting znode metadata in RecoverableZooKeeper#appendMetadata, which is called whenever we do setData. Conceivably we could block unexpectedly when constructing data to write out to a znode if entropy gets too low until more is available. Those salt values are never used and so appear to serve no purpose. We should remove the use of SecureRandom here and just pad with zeros for backwards compatibility.)
> Remove unused draw of system entropy from RecoverableZooKeeper
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HBASE-14089
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-14089
> Project: HBase
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Andrew Purtell
> Assignee: Andrew Purtell
> Priority: Minor
> Fix For: 2.0.0, 0.98.14, 1.2.0, 1.1.2, 1.3.0, 1.0.3
>
>
> I had a look at instances where we use SecureRandom, which could block if insufficient entropy, in the 0.98 and master branch code. (Random in contrast is a PRNG seeded by System#nanoTime, it doesn't draw from system entropy.) Most uses are in encryption related code, our native encryption and SSL, but we do also use SecureRandom for salting znode metadata in RecoverableZooKeeper#appendMetadata, which is called whenever we do setData. Conceivably we could block unexpectedly when constructing data to write out to a znode if entropy gets too low until more is available.
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