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Posted to commits@tooling.apache.org by as...@apache.org on 2026/05/05 20:56:45 UTC
(tooling-agents) branch main updated: ASVS audit: 4.4.1.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]
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new 7ba5d28 ASVS audit: 4.4.1.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]
7ba5d28 is described below
commit 7ba5d2895b4f1b5d4f70e2bd24090c52b7160a99
Author: ASF Tooling Team <ro...@apache.org>
AuthorDate: Tue May 5 22:56:30 2026 +0200
ASVS audit: 4.4.1.md (redacted) [source: apache/steve/v3 @ d0aa7e9]
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+# Security Audit Report: ASVS 4.4.1
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Repository** | apache/steve/v3 |
+| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
+| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
+| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 4.4.1 |
+| **Files Analyzed** | 3 relevant / 49 total |
+| **Files Skipped** | 12 |
+
+**Requirement description:** Verify that WebSocket over TLS (WSS) is used for all WebSocket connections.
+
+### Findings Overview
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| 🔴 Critical | 0 |
+| 🟠High | 0 |
+| 🟡 Medium | 0 |
+| 🟢 Low | 0 |
+
+---
+
+## ASVS-4.4.1: WebSocket over TLS (WSS)
+
+### Findings for 4.4.1
+
+No findings detected.
+
+The codebase does not implement any WebSocket functionality. The application uses standard HTTP request-response patterns exclusively. There are no WebSocket routes, upgrade handlers, or WebSocket-related libraries present.
+
+**Evidence of non-applicability:**
+- No `@APP.websocket(...)` decorators (Quart's WebSocket pattern) exist
+- No `websocket` imports from Quart or other WebSocket libraries
+- No WebSocket URL patterns (e.g., `ws://` or `wss://`) in any file
+- The JavaScript file (`steve.js`) uses only standard DOM manipulation and form submission — no `new WebSocket(...)` calls
+- The template `manage.ezt` uses `fetch()` for async calls, not WebSocket connections
+
+### Security Controls Inventory for 4.4.1
+
+No applicable controls in this scope. WebSocket is not implemented in this application.
+
+### Positive Patterns for 4.4.1
+
+- The application uses standard HTTPS fetch calls for asynchronous operations (e.g., date saving in `manage.ezt` lines 243-258), which inherit TLS protection from the parent page's HTTPS connection.
+
+---
+
+
+
+## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
+
+1. **Technology Stack Alignment**: The application is a traditional server-rendered web application using Quart (async Flask-like framework) with EZT templates. It does not employ GraphQL or WebSocket technologies. All six audited ASVS requirements (4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4) are **not applicable** to this codebase in its current form.
+
+2. **Communication Pattern**: The application uses:
+ - Standard HTTP GET/POST for page loads and form submissions
+ - `fetch()` with JSON payloads for AJAX-style date saving (in `manage.ezt`)
+ - No real-time bidirectional communication channels
+
+3. **Future Risk**: If the application were to add real-time features (e.g., live vote counting, live election status updates), WebSocket might be introduced. Similarly, if a mobile app or third-party integration layer were planned, GraphQL might be considered. At that point, these ASVS requirements would become applicable.
+
+4. **Out-of-Scope but Notable Observations** (not part of the audited requirements but observed during analysis):
+ - CSRF token is a placeholder (`'placeholder'` on line 83) with no server-side validation
+ - Multiple `### check authz` placeholders indicate incomplete authorization enforcement
+ - The `serve_doc()` function has a commented note about verifying `docname` propriety (potential path traversal)
+ - State-changing operations (`/do-open/<eid>`, `/do-close/<eid>`) use GET methods, which is an anti-pattern
+
+---
+
+## Cross-cutting Recommendations
+
+**Immediate** (if adding GraphQL or WebSocket in future):
+- N/A for current architecture — no GraphQL or WebSocket present
+
+**Short-term** (architecture hygiene related to audited categories):
+1. If real-time features are planned, ensure WebSocket implementation uses WSS exclusively, validates Origin headers, and ties into the existing `asfquart.session` mechanism
+2. If a GraphQL layer is planned for API consumers, implement query complexity analysis (e.g., using `graphql-cost-analysis`) and disable introspection in production from day one
+
+**Long-term** (general posture relevant to these requirement families):
+1. Document the application's communication architecture to clarify that GraphQL and WebSocket are intentionally excluded, preventing accidental introduction without security review
+2. If the `fetch()`-based AJAX pattern in `manage.ezt` expands significantly, consider whether a more structured API layer (REST or GraphQL) would benefit from centralized security controls
+3. Maintain the current standard HTTP architecture unless there is a clear requirement for real-time bidirectional communication — it provides a simpler security model
+
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