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Posted to issues@tez.apache.org by "László Bodor (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2026/07/22 12:12:00 UTC

[jira] [Resolved] (TEZ-4741) ProfileOutputServlet: require instrumentation ACL to read profiler output

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TEZ-4741?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

László Bodor resolved TEZ-4741.
-------------------------------
    Resolution: Fixed

> ProfileOutputServlet: require instrumentation ACL to read profiler output
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: TEZ-4741
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TEZ-4741
>             Project: Apache Tez
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>            Reporter: László Bodor
>            Assignee: Raghav Aggarwal
>            Priority: Major
>             Fix For: 1.0.0, 0.10.6
>
>          Time Spent: 1h 50m
>  Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> Tez exposes two profiler endpoints on the AM Web UI: /prof (triggers async-profiler and produces an output file under /tmp/prof-output) and /prof-output (serves those files). /prof correctly gated itself with HttpServer2.isInstrumentationAccessAllowed(...), Hadoop's admin ACL check. /prof-output had no auth check whatsoever. Anyone who could reach the AM web port could enumerate that directory and read every profile file — SVG flame graphs, JFR traces, stack dumps — including any generated by a legitimate admin. There was a path-normalization check to prevent reads outside /tmp/prof-output, but nothing to prevent reads within it.



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