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Posted to dev@phoenix.apache.org by "Josh Elser (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2017/02/17 19:33:41 UTC

[jira] [Created] (PHOENIX-3686) De-couple PQS's use of Kerberos to talk to HBase and client authentication

Josh Elser created PHOENIX-3686:
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             Summary: De-couple PQS's use of Kerberos to talk to HBase and client authentication
                 Key: PHOENIX-3686
                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-3686
             Project: Phoenix
          Issue Type: New Feature
            Reporter: Josh Elser
            Assignee: Josh Elser
             Fix For: 4.10.0


Was trying to help a user that was using https://bitbucket.org/lalinsky/python-phoenixdb to talk to PQS. After upgrading Phoenix (to a version that actually included client authentication), their application suddenly broke and they were upset.

Because they were running Phoenix/HBase on a cluster with Kerberos authentication enabled, they suddenly "inherited" this client authentication. AFAIK, the python-phoenixdb project doesn't presently include the ability to authenticate via SPNEGO. This means a Phoenix upgrade broke their app which stinks.

This happens because, presently, when sees that HBase is configured for Kerberos auth (via hbase-site.xml), it assumes that clients should be required to also authenticate via Kerberos to it. In certain circumstances, users might not actually want to do this.

It's a pretty trivial change I've hacked together which shows that this is possible, and I think that, with adequate disclaimer/documentation about this property, it's OK to do. As long as we are very clear about what exactly this configuration property is doing (allowing *anyone* into your HBase instance as the PQS Kerberos user), it will unblock these users while the various client drivers build proper support for authentication.



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