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Posted to commits@camel.apache.org by "oscerd (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org> on 2026/08/31 07:50:22 UTC

[PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

oscerd opened a new pull request, #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932

   Adds a `=== camel-spring-boot` section to `camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_23.adoc` covering six starter defaults that
   change in camel-spring-boot for 4.23. Docs only — no code in this repository is touched.
   
   The camel-spring-boot upgrade notes live here rather than in that repository, following the precedent of
   `=== camel-spring-boot - Duration configuration properties` in the 4.22 guide.
   
   | Note | camel-spring-boot PR | JIRA |
   |---|---|---|
   | jolokia binds to loopback; cross-origin rejected | apache/camel-spring-boot#1915 | CAMEL-24554 |
   | vault/secrets starters fail closed on early resolution | apache/camel-spring-boot#1900 | CAMEL-24508 |
   | undertow-spring-security validates issuer and audience | apache/camel-spring-boot#1910 | CAMEL-24497 |
   | platform-http enforces `fileNameExtWhitelist` | apache/camel-spring-boot#1897 | CAMEL-24496 |
   | security policy sees environment variables | apache/camel-spring-boot#1913 | CAMEL-24503 |
   | String conversions to file-backed types blocked | apache/camel-spring-boot#1912 | CAMEL-24504 |
   
   Each note says what changed, why, and how to opt back in where an opt-out exists
   (`camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host`, `camel.vault.ignore-resolution-failures`,
   `camel.security.undertow.keycloak.validate-audience`).
   
   **Timing:** those PRs are open, not yet merged. This is deliberately a companion rather than a follow-up, so
   the notes are ready to land alongside them — but it should **not** merge before they do, and if review changes
   any opt-out property name I will update this to match. Only CAMEL-24499 from that batch has merged, and it
   needs no note (a serialization filter fix with no user-facing behaviour change).
   
   Two of the six are the ones most likely to surprise an operator:
   
   - **jolokia** — a Kubernetes deployment scraping the agent over the pod network will lose it until
     `camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host` is set. The note calls that out specifically.
   - **security policy** — an application on `camel.security.policy=fail` that configures Camel through the
     environment may now fail startup on a violation that was always present but previously invisible.


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Re: [PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

Posted by "github-actions[bot] (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
github-actions[bot] commented on PR #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932#issuecomment-5476085003

   <!-- ci-tested-modules -->
   :test_tube: **CI tested the following changed modules:**
   
   - `docs`
   
   ---
   
   <details><summary>:microscope: Scalpel shadow comparison — Scalpel: 1 tested, 0 compile-only — current: 0 all tested</summary>
   
   [Maveniverse Scalpel](https://github.com/maveniverse/scalpel) detected **1 affected modules** (current approach: 0).
   
   <details><summary>:warning: Modules only in Scalpel (1)</summary>
   
   - `docs`
   
   </details>
   
   **Skip-tests mode would test 1 modules** (1 direct + 0 downstream), **skip tests for 0** (generated code, meta-modules)
   
   <details><summary>Modules Scalpel would test (1)</summary>
   
   - `docs`
   
   </details>
   
   > :information_source: Shadow mode — Scalpel observes but does not affect test execution. [Learn more](https://github.com/maveniverse/scalpel)
   
   </details>
   
   ---
   :gear: [View full build and test results](https://github.com/apache/camel/actions/runs/33373920075)


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Re: [PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

Posted by "github-actions[bot] (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
github-actions[bot] commented on PR #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932#issuecomment-5475389362

   :star2: Thank you for your contribution to the Apache Camel project! :star2:
     :robot: CI automation will test this PR automatically.
   
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Re: [PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

Posted by "oscerd (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
oscerd commented on code in PR #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932#discussion_r3894426762


##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_23.adoc:
##########
@@ -951,3 +951,96 @@ overrides it to `true`, so LRA interoperability is unchanged.
 A custom `CamelSagaService` that relies on the header to join sagas started by another participant must
 override the new method. Everything else is unaffected: the header is still set on the exchange, and
 routes reading it continue to work.
+
+=== camel-spring-boot
+
+A set of starter defaults changed in this release. Each is a deliberate change to what an application gets
+when it configures nothing, so an existing deployment that relied on the previous default has to opt back in.
+
+==== camel-jolokia-starter binds to loopback
+
+The Jolokia agent's bind address now defaults to `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0`, matching the default of the
+Jolokia JVM agent this starter is an alternative to. The starter ships no authenticator, and TLS is configured
+only when the Kubernetes service-account CA file is present, so the previous default put an unauthenticated
+management endpoint on every interface as soon as the starter was on the classpath.
+
+Deployments that reach the agent from outside the host — including Kubernetes deployments scraping it over the
+pod network — must set the bind address explicitly:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host = 0.0.0.0
+----
+
+Doing so should be paired with authentication or a network policy in front of the endpoint.
+
+`CamelRestrictor` also now rejects cross-origin browser requests, where before it inherited
+`AllowAllRestrictor`'s behaviour of accepting every origin. Requests that carry no `Origin` or `Referer`
+header are unaffected, so `curl`, Hawtio and the Jolokia CLI keep working. A browser-based client that drove
+the agent cross-origin needs a custom `camel.component.jolokia.server-config.restrictorClass`.
+
+Operations on the allowed MBean domains are still permitted: managing Camel through Jolokia is what the
+starter is for, and that capability is the reason the agent now binds to loopback.
+
+==== Vault and secrets starters fail closed on early property resolution
+
+The early-resolution parsers used by the `aws-secrets-manager`, `azure-key-vault`, `cyberark-vault`,
+`google-secret-manager`, `hashicorp-vault`, `ibm-secrets-manager` and `spring-cloud-config` starters used to
+swallow a per-property lookup failure at `DEBUG` and leave the placeholder in place. The literal
+`{{aws:...}}` text then became the effective value of whatever it configured — a password, a token, a URL —
+with nothing visible at the default log level.
+
+A placeholder that matched a vault prefix but could not be resolved now aborts startup. To restore the
+previous tolerance:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.vault.ignore-resolution-failures = true
+----
+
+The failure is then logged at `WARN` rather than `DEBUG`, so it is visible at the default log level.
+
+==== camel-undertow-spring-security-starter validates the token issuer and audience
+
+The JWT decoder was built with only a claim-set converter, so signature and timestamps were checked but the
+`iss` claim was not, and the configured `clientId` was never bound to the token. Every client of a realm
+shares the signing key, so a token minted for a different client of the same realm was accepted.
+
+The decoder now installs an issuer validator for the configured realm and requires the token to carry the
+configured `clientId` in its `aud` or `azp` claim. A deployment that presents tokens minted for a different

Review Comment:
   Confirmed and fixed. I read `JwtAudienceValidator.validate()` on camel-spring-boot: it takes `token.getAudience()` and checks `contains(clientId)`, with no reference to `azp` anywhere in the class. The note now says `aud` only.
   
   _Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_



##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_23.adoc:
##########
@@ -951,3 +951,96 @@ overrides it to `true`, so LRA interoperability is unchanged.
 A custom `CamelSagaService` that relies on the header to join sagas started by another participant must
 override the new method. Everything else is unaffected: the header is still set on the exchange, and
 routes reading it continue to work.
+
+=== camel-spring-boot
+
+A set of starter defaults changed in this release. Each is a deliberate change to what an application gets
+when it configures nothing, so an existing deployment that relied on the previous default has to opt back in.
+
+==== camel-jolokia-starter binds to loopback
+
+The Jolokia agent's bind address now defaults to `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0`, matching the default of the
+Jolokia JVM agent this starter is an alternative to. The starter ships no authenticator, and TLS is configured
+only when the Kubernetes service-account CA file is present, so the previous default put an unauthenticated
+management endpoint on every interface as soon as the starter was on the classpath.
+
+Deployments that reach the agent from outside the host — including Kubernetes deployments scraping it over the
+pod network — must set the bind address explicitly:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host = 0.0.0.0
+----
+
+Doing so should be paired with authentication or a network policy in front of the endpoint.
+
+`CamelRestrictor` also now rejects cross-origin browser requests, where before it inherited
+`AllowAllRestrictor`'s behaviour of accepting every origin. Requests that carry no `Origin` or `Referer`
+header are unaffected, so `curl`, Hawtio and the Jolokia CLI keep working. A browser-based client that drove
+the agent cross-origin needs a custom `camel.component.jolokia.server-config.restrictorClass`.
+
+Operations on the allowed MBean domains are still permitted: managing Camel through Jolokia is what the
+starter is for, and that capability is the reason the agent now binds to loopback.
+
+==== Vault and secrets starters fail closed on early property resolution
+
+The early-resolution parsers used by the `aws-secrets-manager`, `azure-key-vault`, `cyberark-vault`,
+`google-secret-manager`, `hashicorp-vault`, `ibm-secrets-manager` and `spring-cloud-config` starters used to
+swallow a per-property lookup failure at `DEBUG` and leave the placeholder in place. The literal
+`{{aws:...}}` text then became the effective value of whatever it configured — a password, a token, a URL —
+with nothing visible at the default log level.
+
+A placeholder that matched a vault prefix but could not be resolved now aborts startup. To restore the
+previous tolerance:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.vault.ignore-resolution-failures = true
+----
+
+The failure is then logged at `WARN` rather than `DEBUG`, so it is visible at the default log level.
+
+==== camel-undertow-spring-security-starter validates the token issuer and audience
+
+The JWT decoder was built with only a claim-set converter, so signature and timestamps were checked but the
+`iss` claim was not, and the configured `clientId` was never bound to the token. Every client of a realm
+shares the signing key, so a token minted for a different client of the same realm was accepted.
+
+The decoder now installs an issuer validator for the configured realm and requires the token to carry the
+configured `clientId` in its `aud` or `azp` claim. A deployment that presents tokens minted for a different
+client must either have that client added to the token's audience, or opt out:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.security.undertow.keycloak.validate-audience = false
+----
+
+==== camel-platform-http-starter enforces fileNameExtWhitelist
+
+`fileNameExtWhitelist` was evaluated against the multipart field name rather than the submitted file name, so
+it accepted uploads it was configured to reject. It now checks the submitted file name, treats a name with no
+extension as not accepted while a whitelist is configured, and matches whole comma-separated extension tokens
+instead of testing for a substring.
+
+Uploads that previously slipped through — a part whose field name carried no extension, or an extension that
+was merely a substring of an allowed one — are now rejected. This is the control behaving as documented; a
+deployment that depended on the previous behaviour should widen the whitelist explicitly.
+
+==== The security policy check sees properties set as environment variables
+
+`camel.security` evaluated only properties whose name a source reported with the `camel.` prefix, which
+excluded every option set as an environment variable, since those are reported as `CAMEL_COMPONENT_FOO_BAR`.
+Names are now canonicalized before the check.
+
+Applications running with `camel.security.policy=fail` that configure Camel through the environment may now
+see startup fail on a violation that was previously invisible. That violation was always present; only the
+reporting changed.
+
+==== String conversions to file-backed types are blocked
+
+`SpringTypeConverter` already refused to convert a `String` into an `InputStream`, because Spring's
+`ObjectToObjectConverter` finds the `FileInputStream(String)` constructor and opens the value as a path
+rather than treating it as content. `Reader`, `Writer` and `ZipFile` targets are now refused for the same

Review Comment:
   Confirmed and fixed. `isFileBackedTarget` reads:
   
   ```java
   return InputStream.class.isAssignableFrom(type)
           || FileReader.class.isAssignableFrom(type)
           || Writer.class.isAssignableFrom(type)
           || ZipFile.class.isAssignableFrom(type);
   ```
   
   so `FileReader` is the narrow one and `Writer` is genuinely broad, as the note had it. Changed `Reader` to `FileReader` and added a sentence saying that `String` to `Reader` itself, or to something like `StringReader`, still converts, since that is the part a reader of the old wording would have got wrong.
   
   _Claude Code on behalf of oscerd_



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Re: [PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

Posted by "davsclaus (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
davsclaus merged PR #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932


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Re: [PR] docs: upgrade notes for the camel-spring-boot 4.23 default changes [camel]

Posted by "gnodet (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
gnodet commented on code in PR #25932:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25932#discussion_r3893103737


##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_23.adoc:
##########
@@ -951,3 +951,96 @@ overrides it to `true`, so LRA interoperability is unchanged.
 A custom `CamelSagaService` that relies on the header to join sagas started by another participant must
 override the new method. Everything else is unaffected: the header is still set on the exchange, and
 routes reading it continue to work.
+
+=== camel-spring-boot
+
+A set of starter defaults changed in this release. Each is a deliberate change to what an application gets
+when it configures nothing, so an existing deployment that relied on the previous default has to opt back in.
+
+==== camel-jolokia-starter binds to loopback
+
+The Jolokia agent's bind address now defaults to `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0`, matching the default of the
+Jolokia JVM agent this starter is an alternative to. The starter ships no authenticator, and TLS is configured
+only when the Kubernetes service-account CA file is present, so the previous default put an unauthenticated
+management endpoint on every interface as soon as the starter was on the classpath.
+
+Deployments that reach the agent from outside the host — including Kubernetes deployments scraping it over the
+pod network — must set the bind address explicitly:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host = 0.0.0.0
+----
+
+Doing so should be paired with authentication or a network policy in front of the endpoint.
+
+`CamelRestrictor` also now rejects cross-origin browser requests, where before it inherited
+`AllowAllRestrictor`'s behaviour of accepting every origin. Requests that carry no `Origin` or `Referer`
+header are unaffected, so `curl`, Hawtio and the Jolokia CLI keep working. A browser-based client that drove
+the agent cross-origin needs a custom `camel.component.jolokia.server-config.restrictorClass`.
+
+Operations on the allowed MBean domains are still permitted: managing Camel through Jolokia is what the
+starter is for, and that capability is the reason the agent now binds to loopback.
+
+==== Vault and secrets starters fail closed on early property resolution
+
+The early-resolution parsers used by the `aws-secrets-manager`, `azure-key-vault`, `cyberark-vault`,
+`google-secret-manager`, `hashicorp-vault`, `ibm-secrets-manager` and `spring-cloud-config` starters used to
+swallow a per-property lookup failure at `DEBUG` and leave the placeholder in place. The literal
+`{{aws:...}}` text then became the effective value of whatever it configured — a password, a token, a URL —
+with nothing visible at the default log level.
+
+A placeholder that matched a vault prefix but could not be resolved now aborts startup. To restore the
+previous tolerance:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.vault.ignore-resolution-failures = true
+----
+
+The failure is then logged at `WARN` rather than `DEBUG`, so it is visible at the default log level.
+
+==== camel-undertow-spring-security-starter validates the token issuer and audience
+
+The JWT decoder was built with only a claim-set converter, so signature and timestamps were checked but the
+`iss` claim was not, and the configured `clientId` was never bound to the token. Every client of a realm
+shares the signing key, so a token minted for a different client of the same realm was accepted.
+
+The decoder now installs an issuer validator for the configured realm and requires the token to carry the
+configured `clientId` in its `aud` or `azp` claim. A deployment that presents tokens minted for a different
+client must either have that client added to the token's audience, or opt out:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.security.undertow.keycloak.validate-audience = false
+----
+
+==== camel-platform-http-starter enforces fileNameExtWhitelist
+
+`fileNameExtWhitelist` was evaluated against the multipart field name rather than the submitted file name, so
+it accepted uploads it was configured to reject. It now checks the submitted file name, treats a name with no
+extension as not accepted while a whitelist is configured, and matches whole comma-separated extension tokens
+instead of testing for a substring.
+
+Uploads that previously slipped through — a part whose field name carried no extension, or an extension that
+was merely a substring of an allowed one — are now rejected. This is the control behaving as documented; a
+deployment that depended on the previous behaviour should widen the whitelist explicitly.
+
+==== The security policy check sees properties set as environment variables
+
+`camel.security` evaluated only properties whose name a source reported with the `camel.` prefix, which
+excluded every option set as an environment variable, since those are reported as `CAMEL_COMPONENT_FOO_BAR`.
+Names are now canonicalized before the check.
+
+Applications running with `camel.security.policy=fail` that configure Camel through the environment may now
+see startup fail on a violation that was previously invisible. That violation was always present; only the
+reporting changed.
+
+==== String conversions to file-backed types are blocked
+
+`SpringTypeConverter` already refused to convert a `String` into an `InputStream`, because Spring's
+`ObjectToObjectConverter` finds the `FileInputStream(String)` constructor and opens the value as a path
+rather than treating it as content. `Reader`, `Writer` and `ZipFile` targets are now refused for the same

Review Comment:
   The `isFileBackedTarget()` method in `SpringTypeConverter` checks `FileReader.class.isAssignableFrom(type)`, not `Reader.class.isAssignableFrom(type)`. Converting a `String` to `Reader` itself (or to non-file-backed subclasses like `BufferedReader`/`StringReader`) is still permitted.
   
   Suggestion: change "`Reader`" to "`FileReader`":
   > `FileReader`, `Writer` and `ZipFile` targets are now refused for the same reason.



##########
docs/user-manual/modules/ROOT/pages/camel-4x-upgrade-guide-4_23.adoc:
##########
@@ -951,3 +951,96 @@ overrides it to `true`, so LRA interoperability is unchanged.
 A custom `CamelSagaService` that relies on the header to join sagas started by another participant must
 override the new method. Everything else is unaffected: the header is still set on the exchange, and
 routes reading it continue to work.
+
+=== camel-spring-boot
+
+A set of starter defaults changed in this release. Each is a deliberate change to what an application gets
+when it configures nothing, so an existing deployment that relied on the previous default has to opt back in.
+
+==== camel-jolokia-starter binds to loopback
+
+The Jolokia agent's bind address now defaults to `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0`, matching the default of the
+Jolokia JVM agent this starter is an alternative to. The starter ships no authenticator, and TLS is configured
+only when the Kubernetes service-account CA file is present, so the previous default put an unauthenticated
+management endpoint on every interface as soon as the starter was on the classpath.
+
+Deployments that reach the agent from outside the host — including Kubernetes deployments scraping it over the
+pod network — must set the bind address explicitly:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.component.jolokia.server-config.host = 0.0.0.0
+----
+
+Doing so should be paired with authentication or a network policy in front of the endpoint.
+
+`CamelRestrictor` also now rejects cross-origin browser requests, where before it inherited
+`AllowAllRestrictor`'s behaviour of accepting every origin. Requests that carry no `Origin` or `Referer`
+header are unaffected, so `curl`, Hawtio and the Jolokia CLI keep working. A browser-based client that drove
+the agent cross-origin needs a custom `camel.component.jolokia.server-config.restrictorClass`.
+
+Operations on the allowed MBean domains are still permitted: managing Camel through Jolokia is what the
+starter is for, and that capability is the reason the agent now binds to loopback.
+
+==== Vault and secrets starters fail closed on early property resolution
+
+The early-resolution parsers used by the `aws-secrets-manager`, `azure-key-vault`, `cyberark-vault`,
+`google-secret-manager`, `hashicorp-vault`, `ibm-secrets-manager` and `spring-cloud-config` starters used to
+swallow a per-property lookup failure at `DEBUG` and leave the placeholder in place. The literal
+`{{aws:...}}` text then became the effective value of whatever it configured — a password, a token, a URL —
+with nothing visible at the default log level.
+
+A placeholder that matched a vault prefix but could not be resolved now aborts startup. To restore the
+previous tolerance:
+
+[source,properties]
+----
+camel.vault.ignore-resolution-failures = true
+----
+
+The failure is then logged at `WARN` rather than `DEBUG`, so it is visible at the default log level.
+
+==== camel-undertow-spring-security-starter validates the token issuer and audience
+
+The JWT decoder was built with only a claim-set converter, so signature and timestamps were checked but the
+`iss` claim was not, and the configured `clientId` was never bound to the token. Every client of a realm
+shares the signing key, so a token minted for a different client of the same realm was accepted.
+
+The decoder now installs an issuer validator for the configured realm and requires the token to carry the
+configured `clientId` in its `aud` or `azp` claim. A deployment that presents tokens minted for a different

Review Comment:
   The `JwtAudienceValidator.validate()` method only checks the `aud` claim (via `token.getAudience()`). It never references the `azp` claim. The camel-spring-boot PR #1910 body explicitly states: "The azp claim identifies the requesting client and does not substitute for the resource audience."
   
   The test `rejectsMatchingAuthorizedPartyWhenAudienceTargetsAnotherService` confirms that a matching `azp` does NOT satisfy the validator when `aud` does not contain the client ID.
   
   Suggestion: remove "or `azp`" — change to:
   > requires the token to carry the configured `clientId` in its `aud` claim.



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