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Posted to notifications@shardingsphere.apache.org by "arpitjain099 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org> on 2026/05/28 03:45:01 UTC
[PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
arpitjain099 opened a new pull request, #38739:
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739
The Docker and Codecov actions in several CI workflows are currently referenced by floating tags (`@v3`, `@v6`, `@v5`). A version tag is not immutable: the upstream owner, or anyone who compromises that account, can move the tag to point at a different commit, and the next workflow run will pull whatever is there. That is exactly how the tj-actions/changed-files supply-chain attack (CVE-2025-30066) played out earlier this year, where retagged commits harvested CI secrets from a large number of downstream repositories.
This PR replaces those floating refs with the full commit SHA they currently resolve to, while keeping the tag name in a trailing `# v3` style comment so the mapping stays readable and Dependabot can still propose upgrades.
Files touched: `mcp-build.yml`, `mcp-llm-e2e.yml`, `mcp-llm-usability-e2e.yml`, `nightly-build.yml`, `schedule-report.yml`.
Only third-party actions were pinned. The `actions/*` entries maintained by GitHub were left alone. This brings the affected workflows in line with the OpenSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies expectation.
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Re: [PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
Posted by "terrymanu (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
terrymanu commented on PR #38739:
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739#issuecomment-4638003552
Thanks for the PR. I agree with the general direction of pinning third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs.
According to the ASF GitHub Actions Policy, external actions outside the `apache/*`, `github/*`, and `actions/*` namespaces must be pinned to a specific reviewed git hash:
https://infra.apache.org/github-actions-policy.html#external-actions
GitHub's own security guidance also recommends pinning actions to a full-length commit SHA because this is the immutable reference form for GitHub Actions:
https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use#using-third-party-actions
However, I do not think this PR is mergeable as-is.
The current patch only updates part of the workflows. After rebasing against the latest `master`, there are still external Docker actions referenced by floating tags in the current workflow set, for example in MCP-related workflows. If the goal is to address external action SHA pinning, this PR should cover the remaining external actions in the current workflow set as well, or clearly narrow the PR title and description to state that this is only a partial hardening change.
Please also verify the selected SHAs against the ASF Infrastructure allow list before updating the workflows:
https://github.com/apache/infrastructure-actions/blob/main/actions.yml
Some of the Docker action SHAs used in this PR are already close to their ASF allow-list expiration date, so it would be better to use currently approved non-expiring versions where possible.
One more point: the PR description says Dependabot can still propose upgrades, but I cannot find a `.github/dependabot.yml` configuration for the `github-actions` ecosystem in this repository. Please either add or point to the dependency-update setup, or remove that claim from the PR description.
So my suggestion is to keep this PR open for now, but request the above changes before considering merge.
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Re: [PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
Posted by "arpitjain099 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
arpitjain099 commented on PR #38739:
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739#issuecomment-4742659246
Going to close this one out. I'm stepping back from the CI action-pinning changes to focus on actual bug fixes instead. Appreciate the thorough review and the pointer to the ASF reviewed-hash list - thanks.
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Re: [PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
Posted by "arpitjain099 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
arpitjain099 commented on PR #38739:
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739#issuecomment-4741223092
Thanks for the detailed review @terrymanu. Both points are addressed:
- P1: repinned the Docker actions to the reviewed hashes in `apache/infrastructure-actions/actions.yml`, choosing the non-expiring entries: login `650006c6` (v4.2.0), setup-qemu `06116385` (v4.1.0), setup-buildx `d7f5e7f5` (v4.1.0), build-push `f9f3042f` (v7.2.0). codecov is allow-listed with a wildcard, so I left its pin as is.
- P2: corrected the description to the actual 3 files and removed the Dependabot line, since there is no updater config in the repo and that claim was wrong.
@linghengqian on your point: agreed the ASF audit is the primary defense here, and pinning is meant to complement it rather than replace it. The failure modes are what differ. If a tag is moved to a malicious commit (the tj-actions case), a tag ref pulls it silently, while a SHA ref keeps using the audited revision. And to your rancher example, if a repo or SHA is deleted the run fails closed instead of pulling something unexpected. Forging a specific 40-character commit hash is not practically feasible. This also matches what the ASF external-actions policy asks for, so it mainly brings these workflows in line with the reviewed-hash list.
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Re: [PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
Posted by "arpitjain099 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
arpitjain099 commented on PR #38739:
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739#issuecomment-4665778946
Rebased onto master to clear the conflicts. Two of the workflows I'd pinned (the mcp-llm-e2e ones) were removed upstream in the meantime, so those dropped out; the remaining SHA-pins are in nightly-build, release-mcp, and schedule-report (docker/* and codecov actions). Ready for another look - thanks @terrymanu!
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Re: [PR] ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs [shardingsphere]
Posted by "arpitjain099 (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
arpitjain099 closed pull request #38739: ci: pin third-party GitHub Actions to commit SHAs
URL: https://github.com/apache/shardingsphere/pull/38739
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