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Posted to issues@airavata.apache.org by "Marcus Christie (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2018/10/02 21:40:00 UTC
[jira] [Updated] (AIRAVATA-2840) Group-based authz applied to
credential store tokens (was: Secure GroupResourceProfiles from being
cloned and repurposed)
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AIRAVATA-2840?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Marcus Christie updated AIRAVATA-2840:
--------------------------------------
Description:
Email to dev list:
{quote}
Hi All,
I’m looking for some advice on how to secure GroupResourceProfiles. The problem is this: any user that has READ access to a GroupResourceProfile can effectively clone that GroupResourceProfile. This would allow the user to create a new GroupResourceProfile that uses the same login/allocation and this new GroupResourceProfile could have fewer restrictions or be shared with other users.
Here are some solutions I’m considering:
1. Create a new permission type that is less privileged than READ and that gives access to less details. There are a few details in the GroupComputeResourcePreferences that are sensitive, like loginUserName, resourceSpecificCredentialToken and allocationProjectNumber, because these fields determine what account gets charged and these could be left out.
2. Hide the sensitive fields mentioned above from users with READ access and only show them to users with WRITE access.
3. Apply group based authorization to credential tokens and require new GroupResourceProfiles to have their own credential tokens, that would only be accessible to the user that creates the GroupResourceProfile.
I’m open to other ideas. I’m leaning toward #2. The problem with #1 is it introduces another permission type (READ, WRITE and “USE”?) that will complicate the user experience. #3 also complicates what is required to create a GroupResourceProfile. One use case we have in mind is that users who create a GroupResourceProfile can leverage defaults defined in the GatewayResourceProfile and thus only need to provide an allocation project number and not need to add an SSH key to a compute resource account. Approach #3 would make that more difficult or impossible.
I hope the above makes sense. Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Marcus
{quote}
h2. Proposed API methods
* (breaking change) generateAndRegisterSSHKeys(authzToken, description)
* (breaking change) registerPwdCredential(authzToken, loginUserName, password, description)
* (new) getCredentialSummary(authzToken, tokenId)
* (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(authzToken, type)
* remove getSSHPubKey - use getCredentialSummary instead
* remove getAllGatewaySSHPubKeys - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUsersInGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllGatewayPWDCredentials - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* (modified) deleteSSHPubKey - remove gatewayId parameter
* (modified) deletePWDCredential - remove gatewayId parameter
h2. Proposed Credential Store CPI methods
* (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)
* -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
* -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUserInGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
* remove getAllSSHKeysForUser
* remove getAllSSHKeysForGateway
* -remove getAllPWDCredentialsForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
h2. Proposed data model changes
* remove CredentialOwnerType. The credential owner will be registered in the sharing registry. "GATEWAY" credentials will be those created and shared with users in the Admins group. Credentials that users create will be visible to admins as well and anyone else they want.
h2. TODO
* [x] Update migration script
* [x] Test migration script
* [x] Add {{getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)}} to credential store
* [x] Update API server methods to register credentials with sharing registry and query sharing registry for allowed credentials
* [x] Update API methods that take an object with credential tokens and verify that that user has access to those credential tokens. For example, createGroupResourceProfile takes as input a GroupResourceProfile object. This object contains GroupComputeResourcePreference objects that may specify a resourceSpecificCredentialToken. {{createGroupResourceProfile}} should validate that the user has access to every resourceSpecificCredentialToken and throw an AuthorizationException if not.
* [x] passwords UI in credential store
* [x] getCredentialSummary with just token id (backend can just figure out the type)
* [x] remove gatewayId from delete methods
* [ ] sort the ssh and password credentials by name
* [x] add sharing button to credentials UI
was:
Email to dev list:
{quote}
Hi All,
I’m looking for some advice on how to secure GroupResourceProfiles. The problem is this: any user that has READ access to a GroupResourceProfile can effectively clone that GroupResourceProfile. This would allow the user to create a new GroupResourceProfile that uses the same login/allocation and this new GroupResourceProfile could have fewer restrictions or be shared with other users.
Here are some solutions I’m considering:
1. Create a new permission type that is less privileged than READ and that gives access to less details. There are a few details in the GroupComputeResourcePreferences that are sensitive, like loginUserName, resourceSpecificCredentialToken and allocationProjectNumber, because these fields determine what account gets charged and these could be left out.
2. Hide the sensitive fields mentioned above from users with READ access and only show them to users with WRITE access.
3. Apply group based authorization to credential tokens and require new GroupResourceProfiles to have their own credential tokens, that would only be accessible to the user that creates the GroupResourceProfile.
I’m open to other ideas. I’m leaning toward #2. The problem with #1 is it introduces another permission type (READ, WRITE and “USE”?) that will complicate the user experience. #3 also complicates what is required to create a GroupResourceProfile. One use case we have in mind is that users who create a GroupResourceProfile can leverage defaults defined in the GatewayResourceProfile and thus only need to provide an allocation project number and not need to add an SSH key to a compute resource account. Approach #3 would make that more difficult or impossible.
I hope the above makes sense. Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Marcus
{quote}
h2. Proposed API methods
* (breaking change) generateAndRegisterSSHKeys(authzToken, description)
* (breaking change) registerPwdCredential(authzToken, loginUserName, password, description)
* (new) getCredentialSummary(authzToken, tokenId)
* (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(authzToken, type)
* remove getSSHPubKey - use getCredentialSummary instead
* remove getAllGatewaySSHPubKeys - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUsersInGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* remove getAllGatewayPWDCredentials - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
* (modified) deleteSSHPubKey - remove gatewayId parameter
* (modified) deletePWDCredential - remove gatewayId parameter
h2. Proposed Credential Store CPI methods
* (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)
* -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
* -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUserInGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
* remove getAllSSHKeysForUser
* remove getAllSSHKeysForGateway
* -remove getAllPWDCredentialsForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
h2. Proposed data model changes
* remove CredentialOwnerType. The credential owner will be registered in the sharing registry. "GATEWAY" credentials will be those created and shared with users in the Admins group. Credentials that users create will be visible to admins as well and anyone else they want.
h2. TODO
* [x] Update migration script
* [x] Test migration script
* [x] Add {{getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)}} to credential store
* [x] Update API server methods to register credentials with sharing registry and query sharing registry for allowed credentials
* [x] Update API methods that take an object with credential tokens and verify that that user has access to those credential tokens. For example, createGroupResourceProfile takes as input a GroupResourceProfile object. This object contains GroupComputeResourcePreference objects that may specify a resourceSpecificCredentialToken. {{createGroupResourceProfile}} should validate that the user has access to every resourceSpecificCredentialToken and throw an AuthorizationException if not.
* [ ] passwords UI in credential store
* [x] getCredentialSummary with just token id (backend can just figure out the type)
* [x] remove gatewayId from delete methods
* [ ] sort the ssh and password credentials by name
* [ ] add sharing button to credentials UI
> Group-based authz applied to credential store tokens (was: Secure GroupResourceProfiles from being cloned and repurposed)
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: AIRAVATA-2840
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AIRAVATA-2840
> Project: Airavata
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Marcus Christie
> Assignee: Marcus Christie
> Priority: Major
>
> Email to dev list:
> {quote}
> Hi All,
> I’m looking for some advice on how to secure GroupResourceProfiles. The problem is this: any user that has READ access to a GroupResourceProfile can effectively clone that GroupResourceProfile. This would allow the user to create a new GroupResourceProfile that uses the same login/allocation and this new GroupResourceProfile could have fewer restrictions or be shared with other users.
> Here are some solutions I’m considering:
> 1. Create a new permission type that is less privileged than READ and that gives access to less details. There are a few details in the GroupComputeResourcePreferences that are sensitive, like loginUserName, resourceSpecificCredentialToken and allocationProjectNumber, because these fields determine what account gets charged and these could be left out.
> 2. Hide the sensitive fields mentioned above from users with READ access and only show them to users with WRITE access.
> 3. Apply group based authorization to credential tokens and require new GroupResourceProfiles to have their own credential tokens, that would only be accessible to the user that creates the GroupResourceProfile.
> I’m open to other ideas. I’m leaning toward #2. The problem with #1 is it introduces another permission type (READ, WRITE and “USE”?) that will complicate the user experience. #3 also complicates what is required to create a GroupResourceProfile. One use case we have in mind is that users who create a GroupResourceProfile can leverage defaults defined in the GatewayResourceProfile and thus only need to provide an allocation project number and not need to add an SSH key to a compute resource account. Approach #3 would make that more difficult or impossible.
> I hope the above makes sense. Let me know if you have any questions.
> Thanks,
> Marcus
> {quote}
> h2. Proposed API methods
> * (breaking change) generateAndRegisterSSHKeys(authzToken, description)
> * (breaking change) registerPwdCredential(authzToken, loginUserName, password, description)
> * (new) getCredentialSummary(authzToken, tokenId)
> * (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(authzToken, type)
> * remove getSSHPubKey - use getCredentialSummary instead
> * remove getAllGatewaySSHPubKeys - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
> * remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
> * remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUsersInGateway - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
> * remove getAllGatewayPWDCredentials - use getAllCredentialSummaries instead
> * (modified) deleteSSHPubKey - remove gatewayId parameter
> * (modified) deletePWDCredential - remove gatewayId parameter
> h2. Proposed Credential Store CPI methods
> * (new) getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)
> * -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
> * -remove getAllCredentialSummaryForUserInGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
> * remove getAllSSHKeysForUser
> * remove getAllSSHKeysForGateway
> * -remove getAllPWDCredentialsForGateway- keeping because it is needed for migration, marking *deprecated*
> h2. Proposed data model changes
> * remove CredentialOwnerType. The credential owner will be registered in the sharing registry. "GATEWAY" credentials will be those created and shared with users in the Admins group. Credentials that users create will be visible to admins as well and anyone else they want.
> h2. TODO
> * [x] Update migration script
> * [x] Test migration script
> * [x] Add {{getAllCredentialSummaries(type, accessibleTokenIds, gatewayId)}} to credential store
> * [x] Update API server methods to register credentials with sharing registry and query sharing registry for allowed credentials
> * [x] Update API methods that take an object with credential tokens and verify that that user has access to those credential tokens. For example, createGroupResourceProfile takes as input a GroupResourceProfile object. This object contains GroupComputeResourcePreference objects that may specify a resourceSpecificCredentialToken. {{createGroupResourceProfile}} should validate that the user has access to every resourceSpecificCredentialToken and throw an AuthorizationException if not.
> * [x] passwords UI in credential store
> * [x] getCredentialSummary with just token id (backend can just figure out the type)
> * [x] remove gatewayId from delete methods
> * [ ] sort the ssh and password credentials by name
> * [x] add sharing button to credentials UI
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