(tooling-agents) branch main updated: ASVS audit: 6.4.3.md (redacted)

[as...@apache.org]

This is an automated email from the ASF dual-hosted git repository.

asf-tooling pushed a commit to branch main
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/tooling-agents.git


The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push:
     new 16052c7  ASVS audit: 6.4.3.md (redacted)
16052c7 is described below

commit 16052c730153d86020868e6918f5c8f6af4254d6
Author: ASF Tooling Team <ro...@apache.org>
AuthorDate: Tue May 5 14:08:51 2026 +0200

    ASVS audit: 6.4.3.md (redacted)
---
 ASVS/reports/steve/v3/d0aa7e9/all/6.4.3.md | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+)

diff --git a/ASVS/reports/steve/v3/d0aa7e9/all/6.4.3.md b/ASVS/reports/steve/v3/d0aa7e9/all/6.4.3.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92904bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ASVS/reports/steve/v3/d0aa7e9/all/6.4.3.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.4.3
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Repository** | apache/steve/v3 |
+| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
+| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
+| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.4.3 |
+| **Files Analyzed** | 4 relevant / 49 total |
+| **Files Skipped** | 12 |
+
+**Requirement description:** Verify that a secure process for resetting a forgotten password is implemented, that does not bypass any enabled multi-factor authentication mechanisms.
+
+### Findings Overview
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| 🔴 Critical | 0 |
+| 🟠 High | 0 |
+| 🟡 Medium | 0 |
+| 🟢 Low | 0 |
+
+---
+
+## ASVS-6.4.3: Secure Password Reset Process
+
+### Findings for 6.4.3
+
+No findings detected.
+
+This application contains no password reset functionality. Authentication is fully delegated to the external ASF identity provider. There are no:
+- "Forgot password" endpoints
+- Password reset token generation
+- Password change forms
+- Email-based reset flows
+
+The `/profile` and `/settings` endpoints are minimal:
+
+```python
+# v3/server/pages.py, line 535
+@APP.get('/profile')
+@asfquart.auth.require  # Bare decorator means just require a valid session
+@APP.use_template(TEMPLATES / 'profile.ezt')
+async def profile_page():
+    result = await basic_info()
+    result.title = 'Profile'
+    return result
+```
+
+No password modification or reset is handled within this application's scope.
+
+### Security Controls Inventory for 6.4.3
+
+| Control | Location | Coverage Status |
+|---------|----------|----------------|
+| No local password reset | Entire codebase | N/A — responsibility of external IdP |
+| Session-based auth only | `asfquart.session.read()` in `basic_info()` | APPLIED — sessions come from external auth |
+
+### Positive Patterns for 6.4.3
+
+1. **Separation of concerns**: By delegating authentication entirely to the ASF infrastructure, the application avoids implementing (and potentially mis-implementing) password reset flows.
+2. **No bypass opportunity**: Since there's no local password reset, there's no risk of it bypassing MFA that might be enforced at the IdP level.
+
+---
+
+
+
+## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
+
+1. **Complete Authentication Delegation**: This application entirely delegates authentication and credential management to the Apache Software Foundation's external identity infrastructure (accessed via `asfquart.auth` and `asfquart.session`). This is a sound architectural decision that eliminates an entire class of credential lifecycle vulnerabilities from this application's attack surface.
+
+2. **No Local Credential Storage**: The database schema (`v3/schema.sql`) deliberately contains no password hashes, secret questions, recovery codes, MFA seeds, or any other authentication factor data. The `person` table stores only identity references (`pid`, `name`, `email`).
+
+3. **ASVS 6.4.x Applicability**: All six requirements (6.4.1–6.4.6) relate to authentication factor lifecycle management. Since this application has no such lifecycle (delegating entirely to an external IdP), these requirements are architecturally addressed through delegation rather than implementation. The security posture for these requirements depends entirely on the external ASF identity provider's compliance.
+
+4. **Potential Concern — Session Lifecycle**: While not directly covered by 6.4.x, the session management (read via `asfquart.session.read()`) is the closest analog to an authentication mechanism in this application. Session token lifecycle, expiration, and rotation would be relevant concerns but fall under the responsibility of the `asfquart` framework rather than this application code.
+
+5. **Authorization Gap (Adjacent Concern)**: While not an authentication factor lifecycle issue, the numerous `### check authz` placeholder comments throughout `pages.py` indicate that authorization controls are incomplete. Any authenticated committer can potentially manage any election, which is an access control issue adjacent to authentication concerns.
+
+## Cross-cutting Recommendations
+
+### Immediate (No Action Required for 6.4.x)
+- **No immediate remediation needed** for ASVS 6.4.1–6.4.6 within this application's scope, as authentication factor management is correctly delegated to the external identity provider.
+
+### Short-term
+- **Document the security dependency**: Explicitly document that ASVS 6.4.x compliance relies on the ASF identity provider (IdP) implementing these controls. This should be noted in the application's security architecture documentation.
+- **Verify external IdP compliance**: Confirm that the ASF authentication infrastructure meets ASVS 6.4.1–6.4.6 requirements (secure initial password generation, no KBA, MFA-safe password reset, etc.).
+
+### Long-term
+- **If the application ever adds local accounts**: Implement proper password lifecycle management including secure random initial passwords, forced change on first use, short expiration for initial credentials, and MFA-aware password reset flows.
+- **Session lifecycle hardening**: Review `asfquart.session` for proper session token rotation, expiration, and invalidation — the application's closest analog to authentication factor lifecycle management.
+- **Complete authorization implementation**: Address the `### check authz` placeholders to ensure election owners are properly validated, as this is the application's primary security boundary after authentication.
+        
\ No newline at end of file


---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: commits-unsubscribe@tooling.apache.org
For additional commands, e-mail: commits-help@tooling.apache.org