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Posted to dev@couchdb.apache.org by "Klaus Trainer (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2014/02/24 16:41:20 UTC
[jira] [Created] (COUCHDB-2100) Implement TLS-SRP (RFC 5054)
Klaus Trainer created COUCHDB-2100:
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Summary: Implement TLS-SRP (RFC 5054)
Key: COUCHDB-2100
URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/COUCHDB-2100
Project: CouchDB
Issue Type: New Feature
Security Level: public (Regular issues)
Components: HTTP Interface
Reporter: Klaus Trainer
TLS-SRP, which provides a password-based mutual (i.e., for both client
and server) authentication for TLS, is supported in Erlang/OTP since
R16B01.
As implementing support for TLS-SRP in CouchDB would mean to just add
new functionality, it can likely be implemented without making CouchDB
incompatible with older Erlang/OTP releases at the same time. With
regard to the ssl application API, adding TLS-SRP-support would
concretely mean to add additional options (i.e., `srp_identity` and
`user_lookup_fun`) when calling `listen` or rather `connect` in the case
that TLS-SRP is supported in that particular version of the ssl
application.
Advantages:
* Users can use TLS without having to deal with certificate authorities.
* Password authentication is less prone than certificate authentication
to certain types of configuration mistakes, such as expired
certificates or mismatched common name fields.
* TLS-SRP is forward-secure.
Disadvantages:
* While there are several TLS-SRP implementations out there (e.g., in
GnuTLS, OpenSSL, Apache mod_gnutls, cURL, TLS Lite, and
SecureBlackbox), it is still not implemented in browsers.
* If an attacker learns a user's SRP verifier (e.g., by gaining access
to a user document), the attacker can masquerade as the real server to
that user (c.f. section 3.3 in RFC 5054).
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