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Posted to commits@tapestry.apache.org by "Mahendran (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2018/12/04 09:50:00 UTC

[jira] [Commented] (TAP5-2008) Serialized object data stored on the client should be HMAC signed and validated

    [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-2008?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16708484#comment-16708484 ] 

Mahendran commented on TAP5-2008:
---------------------------------

How to apply this changes in tapestry 4.0.2 version.

> Serialized object data stored on the client should be HMAC signed and validated
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: TAP5-2008
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-2008
>             Project: Tapestry 5
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: tapestry-core
>    Affects Versions: 5.3.5, 5.4
>            Reporter: Howard M. Lewis Ship
>            Assignee: Howard M. Lewis Ship
>            Priority: Major
>              Labels: fixed-in-5.4-js-rewrite, security
>             Fix For: 5.3.6, 5.4
>
>
> Tapestry encodes serialized objects into Base64 encoded strings that are stored on the client; primarily, this is for form submissions, to encode the set of operations needed to process the form when it is submitted.
> However, Tapestry does not use any form of validation to ensure that the encoded data has not been tampered with.  It is relatively easy to create a DOS attack by exploiting this.
> Tapestry should use some form of HMAC (hash-based message authentication) to ensure that the contents of such data are valid; the signing and validation should occur after writing GZipped content, and before GZip decoding (it is very easy to provide a small gzipped payload that expands to an enormous size, for example; this is one form of DOS).



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