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Posted to commits@tooling.apache.org by ak...@apache.org on 2026/05/05 05:47:36 UTC

(tooling-agents) branch main updated: Cleaning out reports

This is an automated email from the ASF dual-hosted git repository.

andrewmusselman pushed a commit to branch main
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/tooling-agents.git


The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/main by this push:
     new 5e0d228  Cleaning out reports
5e0d228 is described below

commit 5e0d228c7de312ec970f78f93c4f4a62a4c28fd0
Author: Andrew Musselman <an...@gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Mon May 4 22:47:28 2026 -0700

    Cleaning out reports
---
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.2.3.md    |  76 ---------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.1.md    |  69 --------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.5.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.2.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.3.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.4.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.5.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.1.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.2.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.1.1.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.2.1.md   |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/13.4.1.md   | 127 --------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/14.3.1.md   |  89 ----------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.1.1.md   | 140 ----------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.2.1.md   | 140 ----------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.3.1.md   | 135 ---------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.1.1.md    | 111 -------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.1.md    | 229 --------------------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.2.md    |  83 ----------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.3.1.md    | 152 -----------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.1.md    |  85 ----------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.3.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.4.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.5.3.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/4.4.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.2.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.2.md    | 195 ----------------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.1.1.md    |  81 ---------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.1.md    |  81 ---------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.2.md    |  81 ---------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.4.md    |  81 ---------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.6.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.7.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.4.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.3.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.4.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.1.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.3.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.2.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.3.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.2.1.md    |  28 ----
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/consolidated.md | 246 ----------------------------
 ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/issues.md       |  65 --------
 55 files changed, 3274 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.2.3.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.2.3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8adac75..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.2.3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 1.2.3
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 04, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 1.2.3 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that output encoding or escaping is used when dynamically building JavaScript content (including JSON), to avoid changing the message or document structure (to avoid JavaScript and JSON injection).
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-1.2.3: JavaScript / JSON Output Encoding
-
-### Findings for 1.2.3
-
-No findings detected. This file does not generate JavaScript content or JSON output. The return types are:
-
-| Method | Return Type | Content |
-|---|---|---|
-| `__dlpack__` | `Py<PyAny>` (PyCapsule) | Raw binary pointer, not text |
-| `__dlpack_device__` | `(i32, i32)` | Typed integer tuple |
-
-Neither produces JavaScript or JSON.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 1.2.3
-
-No applicable controls in this scope. No JavaScript or JSON generation exists in this file.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 1.2.3
-
-- **Binary protocol**: DLPack uses binary pointer exchange via PyCapsule, inherently immune to text-based injection.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Code is out of scope for web injection ASVS requirements**: `tensor.rs` is a low-level Rust FFI library for GPU memory management via the DLPack protocol. It operates entirely below the web application layer β€” there are no HTTP contexts, no dynamic content generation, no database queries, no OS commands, and no HTML processing. All six audited ASVS requirements (1.2.1–1.2.5, 1.3.1) target injection prevention in web application output contexts that do not exist in this file.
-
-2. **Memory safety is the dominant concern**: The file's actual attack surface centers on `unsafe` raw pointer operations, double-free prevention, use-after-free risks, and FFI boundary correctness β€” none of which are covered by the audited ASVS requirements. These concerns fall under different ASVS categories (e.g., memory management, input validation).
-
-3. **Positive defensive patterns observed**:
-   - Double-free prevention via `consumed` flag checked before both PyCapsule creation and `Drop` execution.
-   - Null pointer checks on all entry paths before dereferencing `self.ptr`.
-   - `debug_assert!` validating deleter presence in `Drop`.
-   - Strongly-typed interfaces (Rust's type system) prevent all text-based injection classes structurally.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate
-- **No immediate action required** for the audited ASVS requirements. This file has no applicable attack surface for injection prevention or HTML sanitization.
-
-### Short-term
-- **Expand audit scope** to include files that actually handle web-facing functionality (HTTP handlers, template rendering, API response construction, database query builders) to properly evaluate ASVS 1.2.1–1.2.5 and 1.3.1 compliance.
-- **Audit upstream callers** (e.g., the Python layer that invokes `QdpEngine.encode()`) for injection risks in any web-facing integration code.
-
-### Long-term
-- **Apply ASVS memory safety requirements** (if available in your framework) to this file, focusing on the `unsafe` blocks, raw pointer lifecycle management, and the `unsafe impl Send/Sync` claims.
-- Ensure the `qdp_core::dlpack` dependency is audited for correct deleter implementation, as this file's memory safety depends entirely on it.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1298620..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 1.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 1.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that all untrusted HTML input from WYSIWYG editors or similar is sanitized using a well-known and secure HTML sanitization library or framework feature.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-1.3.1: HTML Sanitization for WYSIWYG / Rich Input
-
-### Findings for 1.3.1
-
-No findings detected. This file does not accept HTML input, does not implement a WYSIWYG editor, and does not process rich text content. The only external input is a typed `Option<i64>` CUDA stream identifier.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 1.3.1
-
-No applicable controls in this scope. No HTML input processing exists in this file.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 1.3.1
-
-- N/A β€” no HTML input handling present.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Code is out of scope for web injection ASVS requirements**: `tensor.rs` is a low-level Rust FFI library for GPU memory management via the DLPack protocol. It operates entirely below the web application layer β€” there are no HTTP contexts, no dynamic content generation, no database queries, no OS commands, and no HTML processing. All six audited ASVS requirements (1.2.1–1.2.5, 1.3.1) target injection prevention in web application output contexts that do not exist in this file.
-
-2. **Memory safety is the dominant concern**: The file's actual attack surface centers on `unsafe` raw pointer operations, double-free prevention, use-after-free risks, and FFI boundary correctness β€” none of which are covered by the audited ASVS requirements. These concerns fall under different ASVS categories (e.g., memory management, input validation).
-
-3. **Positive defensive patterns observed**:
-   - Double-free prevention via `consumed` flag checked before both PyCapsule creation and `Drop` execution.
-   - Null pointer checks on all entry paths before dereferencing `self.ptr`.
-   - `debug_assert!` validating deleter presence in `Drop`.
-   - Strongly-typed interfaces (Rust's type system) prevent all text-based injection classes structurally.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate
-- **No immediate action required** for the audited ASVS requirements. This file has no applicable attack surface for injection prevention or HTML sanitization.
-
-### Short-term
-- **Expand audit scope** to include files that actually handle web-facing functionality (HTTP handlers, template rendering, API response construction, database query builders) to properly evaluate ASVS 1.2.1–1.2.5 and 1.3.1 compliance.
-- **Audit upstream callers** (e.g., the Python layer that invokes `QdpEngine.encode()`) for injection risks in any web-facing integration code.
-
-### Long-term
-- **Apply ASVS memory safety requirements** (if available in your framework) to this file, focusing on the `unsafe` blocks, raw pointer lifecycle management, and the `unsafe impl Send/Sync` claims.
-- Ensure the `qdp_core::dlpack` dependency is audited for correct deleter implementation, as this file's memory safety depends entirely on it.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dedc030..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.3.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 1.3.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 1.3.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application avoids the use of eval() or other dynamic code execution features such as Spring Expression Language (SpEL). Where there is no alternative, any user input being included must be sanitized before being executed.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 1.3.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.5.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.5.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 97c2202..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/1.5.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 1.5.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 1.5.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application configures XML parsers to use a restrictive configuration and that unsafe features such as resolving external entities are disabled to prevent XML eXternal Entity (XXE) attacks.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 1.5.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c6d217..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 10.4.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 10.4.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that, if the authorization server returns the authorization code in the authorization response, it can be used only once for a token request. For the second valid request with an authorization code that has already been used to issue an access token, the authorization server must reject a…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 10.4.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.3.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 018b0ab..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 10.4.3
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 10.4.3 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the authorization code is short-lived. The maximum lifetime can be up to 10 minutes for L1 and L2 applications and up to 1 minute for L3 applications.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 10.4.3 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.4.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.4.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 12a2a05..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.4.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 10.4.4
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 10.4.4 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that for a given client, the authorization server only allows the usage of grants that this client needs to use. Note that the grants 'token' (Implicit flow) and 'password' (Resource Owner Password Credentials flow) must no longer be used.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 10.4.4 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.5.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.5.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c995731..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/10.4.5.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 10.4.5
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 10.4.5 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the authorization server mitigates refresh token replay attacks for public clients, preferably using sender-constrained refresh tokens, i.e., Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) or Certificate-Bound Access Tokens using mutual TLS (mTLS). For L1 and L2 applications, refresh token…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 10.4.5 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 11279b7..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 11.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 11.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that insecure block modes (e.g., ECB) and weak padding schemes (e.g., PKCS#1 v1.5) are not used.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 11.3.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ac359a..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/11.3.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 11.3.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 11.3.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that only approved ciphers and modes such as AES with GCM are used.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 11.3.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c9fdc04..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 12.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 04, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 12.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that only the latest recommended versions of the TLS protocol are enabled, such as TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. The latest version of the TLS protocol must be the preferred option.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 12.1.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 68d8837..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/12.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 12.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 12.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that TLS is used for all connectivity between a client and external facing, HTTP-based services, and does not fall back to insecure or unencrypted communications.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 12.2.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/13.4.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/13.4.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index edbf54b..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/13.4.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 13.4.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 13.4.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 14 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application is deployed either without any source control metadata, including the .git or .svn folders, or in a way that these folders are inaccessible both externally and to the application itself.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-13.4.1: Unintended Information Leakage β€” Source Control Metadata
-
-### Findings for 13.4.1
-
-#### [MEDIUM]
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-1341-MED-001
-**Title:** No deployment configuration to exclude source control metadata from production artifacts
-
-**File location:** `docs/qdp/getting-started.md` (development setup); `dev/release.md` (release process)
-
-**Vulnerable code quote:**
-```markdown
-<!-- docs/qdp/getting-started.md -->
-git clone https://github.com/apache/mahout.git
-cd mahout
-uv sync --active --project qdp/qdp-python --group dev
-source .venv/bin/activate
-uv run --active maturin develop --manifest-path qdp/qdp-python/Cargo.toml
-```
-
-```markdown
-<!-- dev/release.md -->
-git checkout main
-git pull upstream main
-git checkout -b v0.5-stable
-git push -u upstream v0.5-stable
-```
-
-**Data flow:** Source repository (`.git/`) β†’ development/build environment β†’ packaged artifact β†’ deployment
-
-**Impact:** If the application is deployed from a git checkout (e.g., in a container built from the repository clone, or served via a web-accessible directory), the `.git` folder could expose:
-- Full repository history including potentially sensitive commits
-- Internal developer information (email addresses, commit messages)
-- Configuration details that aid reconnaissance
-
-**Proof of concept:** If QDP's Python package or documentation site is served from a directory containing `.git`:
-```
-GET /.git/config HTTP/1.1
-# Could expose: remote URLs, branch configurations, contributor info
-```
-
-**Remediation:**
-- Add `.dockerignore` or equivalent build exclusion rules:
-```dockerfile
-# .dockerignore
-.git
-.svn
-.gitignore
-dev/
-```
-- For Python packages distributed via PyPI (the documented release path), `maturin build` and `uv build` produce wheel/sdist artifacts that **do not** include `.git` β€” this is a positive pattern.
-- Document deployment best practices that explicitly exclude VCS metadata.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 13.4.1
-
-| Control | Location | Status |
-|---------|----------|--------|
-| PyPI package build (maturin/uv) | `dev/release.md` Step 1.2 | βœ… Wheel/sdist artifacts exclude `.git` by default |
-| Docker/container deployment config | Not found | ❌ No Dockerfile or container config provided |
-| Web server config (documentation site) | Not found | ❌ No web server config blocking `.git` access |
-| `.gitignore` / build exclusions | Not in scope | Not verifiable from provided files |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 13.4.1
-
-1. **Package-based distribution**: The release process builds wheels and sdist via `uv build` and `maturin build`, which inherently exclude `.git` directories from distribution artifacts.
-2. **Apache SVN source publication**: Final release artifacts are built from Apache SVN source (`dist.apache.org`), adding a layer of separation from the git repository.
-3. **Separate release branch model**: Release candidates are tagged and built from stable branches, reducing the chance of development artifacts leaking into releases.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Web Application**: The audited codebase is a GPU computing library (Rust + Python), not a web application. Several ASVS requirements (12.2.2, 14.3.1) have limited applicability. The most impactful findings are in the documentation/process domain (15.1.1, 15.2.1).
-
-2. **Unsafe Code Boundary**: The codebase contains significant `unsafe` Rust code for CUDA FFI operations. While the code demonstrates disciplined unsafe usage with safety documentation, pointer validation, and RAII wrappers, this represents a "dangerous functionality" category per ASVS 15.1.1 that should be formally documented.
-
-3. **File Format Parsers as Attack Surface**: The library accepts untrusted file inputs in multiple formats (Parquet, Arrow IPC, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow protobuf). These parsers process binary data from potentially untrusted sources and represent the highest-risk attack surface. The parsing is delegated to well-known libraries (Arrow, etc.), but vulnerability tracking is essential.
-
-4. **Remote IO Feature**: The `remote-io` feature enables cloud storage access, introducing network-level security requirements (TLS, authentication). The implementation was not provided for audit, creating a significant blind spot.
-
-5. **Credential Management in Release Process**: The `dev/release.md` correctly advises storing `.pypirc` in `~/.pypirc` with `chmod 600` and warns against placing it in the project directory β€” a solid operational security practice.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (0–30 days)
-1. **Create dependency vulnerability management policy** (ASVS-1511-MED-001): Define remediation timeframes for Critical/High/Medium/Low severity vulnerabilities in a `SECURITY.md` or equivalent document.
-2. **Add `cargo audit` to CI pipeline** (ASVS-1521-MED-001): Implement automated Rust dependency vulnerability scanning on every PR and scheduled weekly runs.
-3. **Document dangerous components**: Formally identify `qdp_kernels`, `cudarc`, and file format parsers as "dangerous functionality" per ASVS 15.1.1 definitions.
-
-### Short-term (30–90 days)
-4. **Audit the `remote` module** (ASVS-1222-MED-001): Verify TLS certificate validation for S3/GCS connections. Ensure publicly trusted certificates are enforced and no bypass exists.
-5. **Add deployment hardening documentation** (ASVS-1341-MED-001): If QDP or its documentation is deployed as a web service, document exclusion of `.git` and other VCS metadata.
-6. **Add Python dependency auditing**: Implement `pip-audit` or `safety` checks for the Python package surface.
-
-### Long-term (90+ days)
-7. **SBOM generation**: Integrate Software Bill of Materials generation into the release process for both Rust (`cargo sbom`) and Python (`cyclonedx-py`) components.
-8. **Sanitize paths in error messages** (ASVS-1421-LOW-001): Implement path redaction for remote URLs in error messages to prevent information leakage of internal bucket/key names.
-9. **Sandboxing for file parsers**: Consider containerization or process isolation for file format parsing (Parquet, Arrow, TensorFlow protobuf) to limit blast radius from parser vulnerabilities.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/14.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/14.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e7ff10a..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/14.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 14.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 14.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 14 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that authenticated data is cleared from client storage, such as the browser DOM, after the client or session is terminated. The 'Clear-Site-Data' HTTP response header field may be able to help with this but the client-side should also be able to clear up if the server connection is not…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-14.3.1: Client-side Data Protection β€” Clearing Authenticated Data
-
-### Findings for 14.3.1
-
-No findings detected.
-
-**Rationale:** This requirement targets web applications with browser-based clients using DOM storage, cookies, localStorage, sessionStorage, or similar client-side storage mechanisms. The audited codebase is a GPU computing library consumed via Python, with no browser client, no HTTP sessions, no client-side storage, and no web-facing user interface.
-
-The closest analog β€” DLPack memory lifecycle management β€” is correctly implemented:
-
-- **Single-consume DLPack capsules**: Prevent double-use of GPU memory handles (`free_dlpack_tensor` in `dlpack.rs`)
-- **Arc reference counting**: GPU memory is freed when all references are dropped
-- **RAII patterns**: `PinnedHostBuffer`, `GpuStateVector`, and `PipelineContext` all implement `Drop` for deterministic cleanup
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 14.3.1
-
-| Control | Location | Status |
-|---------|----------|--------|
-| DLPack single-consume enforcement | `dlpack.rs`: `free_dlpack_tensor()`, deleter takes ownership | βœ… Prevents stale GPU memory access |
-| Arc-based buffer lifecycle | `memory.rs`: `GpuStateVector::buffer: Arc<BufferStorage>` | βœ… Reference counting for safe cleanup |
-| RAII Drop implementations | `memory.rs` (PinnedHostBuffer), `pipeline.rs` (PipelineContext), `overlap_tracker.rs` (OverlapTracker) | βœ… Deterministic resource cleanup |
-| Clear-Site-Data header | Not applicable | N/A β€” no HTTP responses |
-| Client-side cleanup logic | Not applicable | N/A β€” no browser client |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 14.3.1
-
-1. **Deterministic GPU memory cleanup**: All GPU-resident data structures implement `Drop` traits that free CUDA memory, ensuring data is released when Rust ownership ends.
-2. **Single-consume DLPack design**: The `DLManagedTensor` deleter is set to `None` after first invocation via `managed.deleter.take()` in `free_dlpack_tensor`, preventing double-free and ensuring cleanup occurs exactly once.
-3. **Pinned memory cleanup**: `PinnedHostBuffer::drop()` calls `cudaFreeHost` with error logging, ensuring page-locked host memory is released.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Web Application**: The audited codebase is a GPU computing library (Rust + Python), not a web application. Several ASVS requirements (12.2.2, 14.3.1) have limited applicability. The most impactful findings are in the documentation/process domain (15.1.1, 15.2.1).
-
-2. **Unsafe Code Boundary**: The codebase contains significant `unsafe` Rust code for CUDA FFI operations. While the code demonstrates disciplined unsafe usage with safety documentation, pointer validation, and RAII wrappers, this represents a "dangerous functionality" category per ASVS 15.1.1 that should be formally documented.
-
-3. **File Format Parsers as Attack Surface**: The library accepts untrusted file inputs in multiple formats (Parquet, Arrow IPC, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow protobuf). These parsers process binary data from potentially untrusted sources and represent the highest-risk attack surface. The parsing is delegated to well-known libraries (Arrow, etc.), but vulnerability tracking is essential.
-
-4. **Remote IO Feature**: The `remote-io` feature enables cloud storage access, introducing network-level security requirements (TLS, authentication). The implementation was not provided for audit, creating a significant blind spot.
-
-5. **Credential Management in Release Process**: The `dev/release.md` correctly advises storing `.pypirc` in `~/.pypirc` with `chmod 600` and warns against placing it in the project directory β€” a solid operational security practice.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (0–30 days)
-1. **Create dependency vulnerability management policy** (ASVS-1511-MED-001): Define remediation timeframes for Critical/High/Medium/Low severity vulnerabilities in a `SECURITY.md` or equivalent document.
-2. **Add `cargo audit` to CI pipeline** (ASVS-1521-MED-001): Implement automated Rust dependency vulnerability scanning on every PR and scheduled weekly runs.
-3. **Document dangerous components**: Formally identify `qdp_kernels`, `cudarc`, and file format parsers as "dangerous functionality" per ASVS 15.1.1 definitions.
-
-### Short-term (30–90 days)
-4. **Audit the `remote` module** (ASVS-1222-MED-001): Verify TLS certificate validation for S3/GCS connections. Ensure publicly trusted certificates are enforced and no bypass exists.
-5. **Add deployment hardening documentation** (ASVS-1341-MED-001): If QDP or its documentation is deployed as a web service, document exclusion of `.git` and other VCS metadata.
-6. **Add Python dependency auditing**: Implement `pip-audit` or `safety` checks for the Python package surface.
-
-### Long-term (90+ days)
-7. **SBOM generation**: Integrate Software Bill of Materials generation into the release process for both Rust (`cargo sbom`) and Python (`cyclonedx-py`) components.
-8. **Sanitize paths in error messages** (ASVS-1421-LOW-001): Implement path redaction for remote URLs in error messages to prevent information leakage of internal bucket/key names.
-9. **Sandboxing for file parsers**: Consider containerization or process isolation for file format parsing (Parquet, Arrow, TensorFlow protobuf) to limit blast radius from parser vulnerabilities.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c97403b..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 15.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 15.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 14 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that application documentation defines risk based remediation time frames for 3rd party component versions with vulnerabilities and for updating libraries in general, to minimize the risk from these components.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-15.1.1: Secure Coding and Architecture Documentation β€” Remediation Timeframes
-
-### Findings for 15.1.1
-
-#### [MEDIUM]
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-1511-MED-001
-**Title:** No documented risk-based remediation timeframes for third-party component vulnerabilities
-
-**File location:** `dev/release.md` (entire file); all documentation files
-
-**Vulnerable code quote:**
-```markdown
-<!-- dev/release.md does not contain any section about dependency vulnerability management -->
-<!-- The release process covers: branching, building, signing, voting, publishing -->
-<!-- But no mention of: -->
-<!--   - Dependency vulnerability scanning -->
-<!--   - Remediation timeframes (critical: X days, high: Y days, etc.) -->
-<!--   - SBOM generation -->
-<!--   - Dependency audit procedures -->
-```
-
-**Data flow:** N/A β€” this is a documentation/process gap
-
-**Impact:** Without defined remediation timeframes:
-- Known vulnerabilities in dependencies (`cudarc`, `thiserror`, `arrow`, `parquet`, CUDA runtime, PyTorch) may persist indefinitely
-- No consistent standard for when updates must be applied
-- Increased window of exposure for supply chain attacks
-- Inconsistent risk treatment across the project
-
-**Third-party dependencies identified from code:**
-| Dependency | Usage | Risk Category |
-|-----------|-------|---------------|
-| `cudarc` | CUDA device management | High (GPU driver interface, FFI) |
-| `qdp_kernels` | CUDA kernel bindings | High (unsafe FFI, memory operations) |
-| `thiserror` | Error derivation | Low |
-| `arrow`/`parquet` (implied) | Data format I/O | Medium (parser, deserialization) |
-| `PyTorch` (optional) | DLPack consumer | Medium |
-| `numpy` (optional) | Array input | Low |
-| CUDA Runtime | GPU operations | High (system library) |
-
-**Remediation:**
-Create a `SECURITY.md` or `docs/security/dependency-policy.md` defining:
-
-```markdown
-# Dependency Vulnerability Management Policy
-
-## Remediation Timeframes
-
-| Severity | Definition | Remediation SLA |
-|----------|-----------|----------------|
-| Critical (CVSS β‰₯ 9.0) | RCE, data exfiltration, privilege escalation | 7 calendar days |
-| High (CVSS 7.0–8.9) | Significant impact vulnerabilities | 30 calendar days |
-| Medium (CVSS 4.0–6.9) | Limited impact vulnerabilities | 90 calendar days |
-| Low (CVSS < 4.0) | Minimal impact | Next scheduled release |
-
-## General Update Policy
-- All dependencies reviewed quarterly
-- `cargo audit` / `pip-audit` run in CI on every PR
-- SBOM generated with each release
-
-## Dangerous Components
-- `qdp_kernels`: CUDA FFI β€” unsafe operations, direct memory manipulation
-- `cudarc`: CUDA driver bindings β€” GPU memory allocation, raw pointers
-- Parquet/Arrow readers: Binary data parsing from untrusted files
-```
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 15.1.1
-
-| Control | Location | Status |
-|---------|----------|--------|
-| Dependency remediation timeframe documentation | Not found in any provided file | ❌ **Missing** |
-| Vulnerability scanning in CI | Not found | ❌ Not documented |
-| SBOM generation | Not found | ❌ Not documented |
-| Dangerous component identification | Not found | ❌ Not documented |
-| Release process vulnerability checks | `dev/release.md` | ❌ Release process does not include dependency audit step |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 15.1.1
-
-1. **Apache release governance**: The ATR (Apache Trusted Releases) process with PMC voting provides a structured release gate where dependency issues could be caught, though no explicit dependency review step is documented.
-2. **Feature-gated optional dependencies**: The `remote-io` and `pytorch` features are opt-in, reducing the mandatory dependency surface.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Web Application**: The audited codebase is a GPU computing library (Rust + Python), not a web application. Several ASVS requirements (12.2.2, 14.3.1) have limited applicability. The most impactful findings are in the documentation/process domain (15.1.1, 15.2.1).
-
-2. **Unsafe Code Boundary**: The codebase contains significant `unsafe` Rust code for CUDA FFI operations. While the code demonstrates disciplined unsafe usage with safety documentation, pointer validation, and RAII wrappers, this represents a "dangerous functionality" category per ASVS 15.1.1 that should be formally documented.
-
-3. **File Format Parsers as Attack Surface**: The library accepts untrusted file inputs in multiple formats (Parquet, Arrow IPC, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow protobuf). These parsers process binary data from potentially untrusted sources and represent the highest-risk attack surface. The parsing is delegated to well-known libraries (Arrow, etc.), but vulnerability tracking is essential.
-
-4. **Remote IO Feature**: The `remote-io` feature enables cloud storage access, introducing network-level security requirements (TLS, authentication). The implementation was not provided for audit, creating a significant blind spot.
-
-5. **Credential Management in Release Process**: The `dev/release.md` correctly advises storing `.pypirc` in `~/.pypirc` with `chmod 600` and warns against placing it in the project directory β€” a solid operational security practice.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (0–30 days)
-1. **Create dependency vulnerability management policy** (ASVS-1511-MED-001): Define remediation timeframes for Critical/High/Medium/Low severity vulnerabilities in a `SECURITY.md` or equivalent document.
-2. **Add `cargo audit` to CI pipeline** (ASVS-1521-MED-001): Implement automated Rust dependency vulnerability scanning on every PR and scheduled weekly runs.
-3. **Document dangerous components**: Formally identify `qdp_kernels`, `cudarc`, and file format parsers as "dangerous functionality" per ASVS 15.1.1 definitions.
-
-### Short-term (30–90 days)
-4. **Audit the `remote` module** (ASVS-1222-MED-001): Verify TLS certificate validation for S3/GCS connections. Ensure publicly trusted certificates are enforced and no bypass exists.
-5. **Add deployment hardening documentation** (ASVS-1341-MED-001): If QDP or its documentation is deployed as a web service, document exclusion of `.git` and other VCS metadata.
-6. **Add Python dependency auditing**: Implement `pip-audit` or `safety` checks for the Python package surface.
-
-### Long-term (90+ days)
-7. **SBOM generation**: Integrate Software Bill of Materials generation into the release process for both Rust (`cargo sbom`) and Python (`cyclonedx-py`) components.
-8. **Sanitize paths in error messages** (ASVS-1421-LOW-001): Implement path redaction for remote URLs in error messages to prevent information leakage of internal bucket/key names.
-9. **Sandboxing for file parsers**: Consider containerization or process isolation for file format parsing (Parquet, Arrow, TensorFlow protobuf) to limit blast radius from parser vulnerabilities.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 448c11e..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 15.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 15.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 14 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application only contains components which have not breached the documented update and remediation time frames.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 2 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-15.2.1: Security Architecture and Dependencies β€” Component Currency
-
-### Findings for 15.2.1
-
-#### [MEDIUM]
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-1521-MED-001
-**Title:** Unable to verify component currency without documented remediation timeframes
-
-**File location:** All Rust source files (dependency usage); `dev/release.md` (release process)
-
-**Vulnerable code quote:**
-```rust
-// qdp/qdp-core/src/gpu/memory.rs - uses cudarc
-use cudarc::driver::{CudaDevice, CudaSlice, DevicePtr};
-
-// qdp/qdp-core/src/error.rs - uses thiserror
-use thiserror::Error;
-
-// qdp/qdp-core/src/gpu/memory.rs - uses qdp_kernels (internal CUDA bindings)
-use qdp_kernels::{CuComplex, CuDoubleComplex};
-```
-
-**Data flow:** N/A β€” this is a process/verification gap
-
-**Impact:** Without ASVS 15.1.1 compliance (documented timeframes), compliance with 15.2.1 is structurally impossible to verify. The following risks exist:
-- Dependencies may contain known CVEs without a mechanism to detect or track them
-- No `Cargo.lock` or `requirements.txt` freeze file was provided for audit, preventing version verification
-- The `qdp_kernels` crate (likely internal) contains unsafe CUDA FFI that requires careful version management
-- Parquet/Arrow file parsers handle untrusted input and are a common source of vulnerabilities
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Implement the policy from ASVS-1511-MED-001
-2. Add automated dependency scanning to CI:
-
-```yaml
-# Example GitHub Actions workflow
-name: Dependency Audit
-on: [push, pull_request]
-jobs:
-  audit:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - name: Rust dependency audit
-        run: |
-          cargo install cargo-audit
-          cargo audit
-      - name: Python dependency audit
-        run: |
-          pip install pip-audit
-          pip-audit -r requirements.txt
-```
-
-3. Include `Cargo.lock` in the repository for reproducible builds and auditability
-4. Add a dependency review step to the release process in `dev/release.md`:
-
-```markdown
-### 1.0 Pre-Release Dependency Audit
-Before cutting an RC:
-1. Run `cargo audit` and resolve all findings above the threshold
-2. Run `pip-audit` for Python dependencies
-3. Verify no dependencies exceed their remediation timeframe
-4. Generate SBOM: `cargo sbom > sbom.json`
-```
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 15.2.1
-
-| Control | Location | Status |
-|---------|----------|--------|
-| `cargo audit` in CI | Not found | ❌ Not implemented |
-| `pip-audit` in CI | Not found | ❌ Not implemented |
-| `Cargo.lock` provided | Not in audit scope | ❌ Not provided for version verification |
-| Dependency review in release process | `dev/release.md` | ❌ No dependency audit step |
-| Automated dependency updates (Dependabot/Renovate) | Not found | ❌ Not configured |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 15.2.1
-
-1. **Minimal dependency surface**: The Rust core uses relatively few direct dependencies (`cudarc`, `thiserror`, `qdp_kernels`), reducing the attack surface compared to projects with large dependency trees.
-2. **Conditional compilation**: Platform-specific code is behind `#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]` and feature flags, meaning unused dependencies are not compiled.
-3. **Internal kernel crate**: `qdp_kernels` appears to be an internal crate, giving the project full control over its security posture rather than depending on an external FFI binding.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Web Application**: The audited codebase is a GPU computing library (Rust + Python), not a web application. Several ASVS requirements (12.2.2, 14.3.1) have limited applicability. The most impactful findings are in the documentation/process domain (15.1.1, 15.2.1).
-
-2. **Unsafe Code Boundary**: The codebase contains significant `unsafe` Rust code for CUDA FFI operations. While the code demonstrates disciplined unsafe usage with safety documentation, pointer validation, and RAII wrappers, this represents a "dangerous functionality" category per ASVS 15.1.1 that should be formally documented.
-
-3. **File Format Parsers as Attack Surface**: The library accepts untrusted file inputs in multiple formats (Parquet, Arrow IPC, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow protobuf). These parsers process binary data from potentially untrusted sources and represent the highest-risk attack surface. The parsing is delegated to well-known libraries (Arrow, etc.), but vulnerability tracking is essential.
-
-4. **Remote IO Feature**: The `remote-io` feature enables cloud storage access, introducing network-level security requirements (TLS, authentication). The implementation was not provided for audit, creating a significant blind spot.
-
-5. **Credential Management in Release Process**: The `dev/release.md` correctly advises storing `.pypirc` in `~/.pypirc` with `chmod 600` and warns against placing it in the project directory β€” a solid operational security practice.
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (0–30 days)
-1. **Create dependency vulnerability management policy** (ASVS-1511-MED-001): Define remediation timeframes for Critical/High/Medium/Low severity vulnerabilities in a `SECURITY.md` or equivalent document.
-2. **Add `cargo audit` to CI pipeline** (ASVS-1521-MED-001): Implement automated Rust dependency vulnerability scanning on every PR and scheduled weekly runs.
-3. **Document dangerous components**: Formally identify `qdp_kernels`, `cudarc`, and file format parsers as "dangerous functionality" per ASVS 15.1.1 definitions.
-
-### Short-term (30–90 days)
-4. **Audit the `remote` module** (ASVS-1222-MED-001): Verify TLS certificate validation for S3/GCS connections. Ensure publicly trusted certificates are enforced and no bypass exists.
-5. **Add deployment hardening documentation** (ASVS-1341-MED-001): If QDP or its documentation is deployed as a web service, document exclusion of `.git` and other VCS metadata.
-6. **Add Python dependency auditing**: Implement `pip-audit` or `safety` checks for the Python package surface.
-
-### Long-term (90+ days)
-7. **SBOM generation**: Integrate Software Bill of Materials generation into the release process for both Rust (`cargo sbom`) and Python (`cyclonedx-py`) components.
-8. **Sanitize paths in error messages** (ASVS-1421-LOW-001): Implement path redaction for remote URLs in error messages to prevent information leakage of internal bucket/key names.
-9. **Sandboxing for file parsers**: Consider containerization or process isolation for file format parsing (Parquet, Arrow, TensorFlow protobuf) to limit blast radius from parser vulnerabilities.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index af2dcf4..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/15.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 15.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 15.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application only returns the required subset of fields from a data object. For example, it should not return an entire data object, as some individual fields should not be accessible to users.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 1 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-15.3.1: Defensive Coding β€” Return Only Required Field Subset
-
-### Findings for 15.3.1
-
-#### MEDIUM
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-1531-MED-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `execute_circuit()` (lines ~243-262) and `get_final_state_vector()` (lines ~283-302)
-
-**Description:** The entire `self.backend_config` dictionary is passed to backend modules, and is also mutated to accumulate state between calls. The `backend_config` contains all constructor-supplied configuration (including `backend_name`, `backend_options` with `simulator_type`, `shots`, etc.) plus injected `parameter_values`. Backend functions receive the full configuration object rather than only the fields they need.
-
-```python
-# execute_circuit mutates then passes the full config
-self.backend_config["parameter_values"] = bound_parameters
-return self.backend_module.execute_circuit(
-    self.circuit, self.backend, self.backend_config
-)
-```
-
-```python
-# get_final_state_vector does the same
-self.backend_config["parameter_values"] = bound_parameters
-return self.backend_module.get_final_state_vector(
-    self.circuit, self.backend, self.backend_config
-)
-```
-
-**Data Flow:** User-supplied `backend_config` (constructor) β†’ accumulated `parameter_values` injected β†’ entire dict passed to backend module β†’ backend receives fields beyond its operational need (e.g., `execute_circuit` receives `backend_name`, full `backend_options` including `simulator_type` that is only needed at init time).
-
-**Impact:** Backend modules receive more configuration data than required for their specific operation. If a backend module logs, serializes, or exposes this config (e.g., in error messages), fields that should be scoped differently could leak. The mutation pattern also creates implicit coupling between sequential calls.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```python
-def execute_circuit(self, parameter_values=None):
-    self._ensure_circuit_initialized()
-    # ... parameter binding logic ...
-    
-    # Pass only what the backend needs
-    execution_config = {
-        "parameter_values": bound_parameters,
-        "shots": self.backend_config["backend_options"].get("shots", 1024),
-    }
-    return self.backend_module.execute_circuit(
-        self.circuit, self.backend, execution_config
-    )
-```
-
----
-
-#### LOW
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-1531-LOW-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, class `QuMat` (all attributes)
-
-**Description:** All instance attributes (`backend_config`, `backend_module`, `backend`, `circuit`, `parameters`) are public Python attributes. While Python convention doesn't enforce access control, sensitive internal state (raw backend handles, full configuration) is freely accessible to any consumer of a `QuMat` instance.
-
-**Impact:** Low risk in a library context, but consumers could inadvertently depend on or expose internal state such as the raw `backend_config` dictionary.
-
-**Remediation:** Use underscore-prefixed attributes for internal state (`_backend_config`, `_backend_module`) and provide explicit accessor properties for fields consumers legitimately need.
-
----
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 15.3.1
-
-| Control | Location | Coverage Status |
-|---------|----------|-----------------|
-| `QuantumTensor` minimal DLPack interface | `tensor.rs` (inventory) | βœ… Exposes only `__dlpack__` and `__dlpack_device__` |
-| `measure_overlap` returns scalar only | `qumat.py:~360` | βœ… Returns only float overlap value |
-| Backend config scoping | `qumat.py:execute_circuit`, `get_final_state_vector` | ❌ Full config dict passed |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 15.3.1
-
-- **`QuantumTensor`** exposes only the DLPack protocol methods (`__dlpack__`, `__dlpack_device__`) β€” minimal interface, no extra metadata or internal state exposed.
-- **`measure_overlap`** returns a single clamped `float` β€” only the computed result, not intermediate circuit state or measurement distributions.
-- **`calculate_prob_zero`** delegates to backend but only returns a probability float.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a2d96ae..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 2.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 2.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application's documentation defines input validation rules for how to check the validity of data items against an expected structure. This could be common data formats such as credit card numbers, email addresses, telephone numbers, or it could be an internal data format.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-2.1.1: Validation and Business Logic Documentation
-
-### Findings for 2.1.1
-
-#### MEDIUM
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-211-MED-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py` β€” class-level and method-level docstrings
-
-**Description:** The `QuMat` class lacks structured documentation defining input validation rules for its parameters. While docstrings describe parameter types, they do not specify valid ranges, allowed values, or expected structures as formal validation rules. Contrast this with the QDP API documentation which explicitly specifies ranges (e.g., `num_qubits` 1–30) and allowed encoding methods.
-
-Specific gaps in `qumat.py`:
-- `create_empty_circuit(num_qubits)`: No documented valid range for `num_qubits`
-- `apply_rx_gate(qubit_index, angle)`: No documented valid range or constraints for `angle` (e.g., finite-only, radian range)
-- `apply_u_gate(qubit_index, theta, phi, lambd)`: No documented constraints on rotation angles
-- `backend_config`: No schema or structural validation rules documented beyond required keys
-
-**Impact:** Developers implementing backends or consuming the API lack clear guidance on what constitutes valid input, leading to inconsistent validation across backends and potential runtime failures with unclear error messages.
-
-**Remediation:** Add a validation rules section to the `QuMat` class docstring:
-```python
-class QuMat:
-    """...
-    
-    Input Validation Rules:
-        - ``num_qubits``: int, range [1, 30] (or backend-specific maximum)
-        - ``qubit_index``: int, range [0, num_qubits - 1]  
-        - ``angle`` (rotation gates): float, must be finite (no NaN/Inf)
-        - ``backend_name``: str, one of {"qiskit", "cirq", "amazon_braket"}
-        - ``backend_options``: dict with required key "simulator_type" (str) 
-          and optional "shots" (int, >= 1)
-    """
-```
-
----
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 2.1.1
-
-| Control | Location | Coverage Status |
-|---------|----------|-----------------|
-| QDP API validation rules | `website/.../api.md` | βœ… Well-documented: types, ranges, encoding methods |
-| QDP Concepts validation description | `website/.../concepts.md` Section 3 | βœ… Encoder validation documented |
-| QuMat validation rules documentation | `qumat/qumat.py` docstrings | ⚠️ Partial β€” types documented, ranges/constraints missing |
-| `_validate_qubit_index` contract | `qumat/qumat.py:~97-112` | βœ… Rules clearly documented in docstring |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 2.1.1
-
-- **QDP API documentation** (`api.md`, `python-api.md`) provides clear, structured validation rules including: `num_qubits` range 1–30, explicit encoding method allow-lists, supported data types and shapes, NaN/Inf rejection rules per encoding method, and file format constraints.
-- **Concepts documentation** (`concepts.md`) Section 3 formally specifies encoder validation constraints including input size relationships.
-- **`_validate_qubit_index`** has a clear docstring specifying what it validates and what errors it raises.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b601f14..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 2.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 2.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that input is validated to enforce business or functional expectations for that input. This should either use positive validation against an allow list of values, patterns, and ranges, or be based on comparing the input to an expected structure and logical limits according to predefined…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 1 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 2 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-2.2.1: Input Validation
-
-### Findings for 2.2.1
-
-#### HIGH
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-221-HIGH-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `create_empty_circuit()` (lines ~82-85)
-
-**Description:** The `num_qubits` parameter is not validated for type, sign, or upper bound. It is stored directly and used in subsequent range checks for qubit indices. An invalid value (float, negative, extremely large, or non-numeric) produces undefined behavior downstream.
-
-```python
-def create_empty_circuit(self, num_qubits: int | None = None) -> None:
-    self.num_qubits = num_qubits
-    self.circuit = self.backend_module.create_empty_circuit(num_qubits)
-```
-
-**Data Flow:** User input (`num_qubits`) β†’ stored as `self.num_qubits` β†’ used in `_validate_qubit_index` comparisons β†’ passed to backend `create_empty_circuit`
-
-**Proof of Concept:**
-```python
-# Extremely large value β€” potential resource exhaustion in backend
-qm = QuMat(config)
-qm.create_empty_circuit(10000000)  # Backend may allocate enormous structures
-
-# Float value β€” breaks comparison logic
-qm.create_empty_circuit(3.7)  # qubit index 3 would pass validation (3 < 3.7)
-
-# Negative value β€” all qubit indices fail validation
-qm.create_empty_circuit(-1)
-```
-
-**Impact:** Resource exhaustion (DoS) with large values; logic errors with non-integer types; confusing error messages with unsupported types. The QDP documentation specifies 1–30 as the valid range, but `qumat.py` enforces no upper bound.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```python
-def create_empty_circuit(self, num_qubits: int | None = None) -> None:
-    if num_qubits is not None:
-        if not isinstance(num_qubits, int):
-            raise TypeError(
-                f"num_qubits must be an integer, got {type(num_qubits).__name__}"
-            )
-        if num_qubits < 0:
-            raise ValueError(f"num_qubits must be non-negative, got {num_qubits}")
-    self.num_qubits = num_qubits
-    self.circuit = self.backend_module.create_empty_circuit(num_qubits)
-```
-
----
-
-#### MEDIUM
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-221-MED-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `apply_rx_gate()` (line ~303), `apply_ry_gate()` (line ~321), `apply_rz_gate()` (line ~339), `apply_u_gate()` (line ~356)
-
-**Description:** When rotation angles are provided as floats, no validation is performed for finiteness (NaN, Inf) or type correctness. While `_handle_parameter` registers string parameter names, float values pass through unchecked. The QDP documentation explicitly requires finite values for similar parameters.
-
-```python
-def apply_rx_gate(self, qubit_index: int, angle: float | str) -> None:
-    self._ensure_circuit_initialized()
-    self._validate_qubit_index(qubit_index)
-    self._handle_parameter(angle)  # Only registers strings; floats pass through
-    self.backend_module.apply_rx_gate(self.circuit, qubit_index, angle)
-```
-
-Similarly, `apply_u_gate` accepts `theta`, `phi`, `lambd` with no validation:
-```python
-def apply_u_gate(self, qubit_index, theta, phi, lambd):
-    self._ensure_circuit_initialized()
-    self._validate_qubit_index(qubit_index)
-    # No type or finiteness checks on theta, phi, lambd
-    self.backend_module.apply_u_gate(self.circuit, qubit_index, theta, phi, lambd)
-```
-
-**Data Flow:** User input (angle/theta/phi/lambd) β†’ no validation β†’ passed directly to backend module
-
-**Proof of Concept:**
-```python
-import math
-qm = QuMat(config)
-qm.create_empty_circuit(2)
-qm.apply_rx_gate(0, float('nan'))   # NaN angle β€” undefined quantum state
-qm.apply_rx_gate(0, float('inf'))   # Infinite angle β€” undefined behavior
-qm.apply_u_gate(0, "not_a_number", 1.0, 1.0)  # String where float expected
-```
-
-**Impact:** NaN or Inf values produce mathematically undefined quantum states. Backends may silently produce incorrect results rather than raising errors, leading to data integrity issues in quantum computations.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```python
-def _validate_angle(self, angle: float, param_name: str = "angle") -> None:
-    """Validate that a gate angle is a finite number."""
-    if not isinstance(angle, (int, float)):
-        raise TypeError(f"{param_name} must be a number, got {type(angle).__name__}")
-    if math.isnan(angle) or math.isinf(angle):
-        raise ValueError(f"{param_name} must be finite, got {angle}")
-```
-
----
-
-#### MEDIUM
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-221-MED-002
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `__init__()` (lines ~53-75)
-
-**Description:** The `backend_options` value is checked for existence but not validated for type or structure. The `backend_name` is not validated against an allow list of known backends, relying solely on `import_module` to fail for unknown names.
-
-```python
-if "backend_options" not in backend_config:
-    raise KeyError(...)
-# No validation that backend_options is a dict
-# No validation that backend_name is in {"qiskit", "cirq", "amazon_braket"}
-
-self.backend_module: ModuleType = import_module(
-    f".{self.backend_name}_backend", package="qumat"
-)
-```
-
-**Data Flow:** `backend_config` β†’ `backend_name` used in `import_module` f-string β†’ module loaded; `backend_options` stored and used later without structure checks
-
-**Proof of Concept:**
-```python
-# backend_options not a dict β€” fails later with confusing error
-QuMat({"backend_name": "qiskit", "backend_options": 42})
-
-# Unknown backend β€” ImportError instead of clear validation error
-QuMat({"backend_name": "nonexistent", "backend_options": {}})
-```
-
-**Impact:** Unclear error messages for misconfigured backends; implicit validation through ImportError rather than explicit business rule check. The relative import (`package="qumat"`) limits the attack surface of the module loading to within the `qumat` package.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```python
-_ALLOWED_BACKENDS = frozenset({"qiskit", "cirq", "amazon_braket"})
-
-def __init__(self, backend_config):
-    # ... existing dict/key checks ...
-    
-    if not isinstance(backend_config["backend_options"], dict):
-        raise TypeError("backend_options must be a dictionary")
-    
-    if backend_config["backend_name"] not in self._ALLOWED_BACKENDS:
-        raise ValueError(
-            f"Unknown backend '{backend_config['backend_name']}'. "
-            f"Allowed backends: {sorted(self._ALLOWED_BACKENDS)}"
-        )
-```
-
----
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 2.2.1
-
-| Control | Location | Applied To | Coverage |
-|---------|----------|------------|----------|
-| `_validate_qubit_index` | `qumat.py:97-112` | All gate methods | βœ… Consistently applied to every gate |
-| `_ensure_circuit_initialized` | `qumat.py:87-95` | All gate + execute methods | βœ… Consistently applied |
-| `isinstance(backend_config, dict)` | `qumat.py:57-60` | Constructor | βœ… Applied |
-| Key existence checks | `qumat.py:62-75` | Constructor | βœ… `backend_name`, `backend_options` checked |
-| `num_qubits` validation | `qumat.py:create_empty_circuit` | Circuit creation | ❌ **NOT APPLIED** (Gap Type A) |
-| Angle/float validation | `qumat.py:apply_rx/ry/rz/u_gate` | Rotation gates | ❌ **NOT APPLIED** (Gap Type A) |
-| `backend_options` structure validation | `qumat.py:__init__` | Constructor | ❌ **NOT APPLIED** (Gap Type A) |
-| `backend_name` allow-list | `qumat.py:__init__` | Constructor | ❌ **NOT APPLIED** (Gap Type A) |
-| Unbound parameter check | `qumat.py:execute_circuit` | Execution | βœ… Applied |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 2.2.1
-
-- **`_validate_qubit_index`** is a centralized, well-implemented validation function that checks type (`isinstance`), sign (non-negative), and range (within circuit bounds). It is **consistently called** from every gate method β€” no gaps in application.
-- **`_ensure_circuit_initialized`** provides a reliable prerequisite check before any operation.
-- **Constructor validation** properly checks that `backend_config` is a dictionary with required keys, producing clear error messages.
-- **QDP Rust core** (per documentation and inventory) validates `num_qubits` (1–30), data types, NaN/Inf, and encoding-specific constraints at the native layer.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 59b2afd..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.2.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 2.2.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 2.2.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application is designed to enforce input validation at a trusted service layer. While client-side validation improves usability and should be encouraged, it must not be relied upon as a security control.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-2.2.2: Server-Side Input Validation
-
-### Findings for 2.2.2
-
-No findings detected.
-
-This codebase is a Python library (not a client-server application). All validation present in `qumat.py` executes within the library itself β€” there is no client-side/server-side split where client validation could be bypassed. The QDP architecture processes data through Python β†’ PyO3 β†’ Rust β†’ CUDA, with validation at the Rust core layer being the authoritative check, which is the correct trusted service layer.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 2.2.2
-
-| Control | Location | Layer | Status |
-|---------|----------|-------|--------|
-| QuMat input validation | `qumat/qumat.py` | Library (trusted) | βœ… All validation at library level |
-| QDP Rust encoder validation | `qdp-core` (per docs) | Native extension (trusted) | βœ… Authoritative validation in Rust |
-| CUDA kernel input checks | `qdp-kernels` (per docs) | GPU (trusted) | βœ… Final processing layer |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 2.2.2
-
-- **No client-side-only validation:** All validation in `qumat.py` runs in the same process as the computation β€” there is no untrusted client layer.
-- **Defense-in-depth in QDP:** Validation occurs at both the Python API layer and the Rust core layer, with the Rust layer being authoritative. Even if Python validation is bypassed (e.g., calling `_qdp` directly), the Rust core validates inputs before GPU execution.
-- **`_validate_qubit_index`** is called at the library entry point for every gate operation, not deferred to backend modules.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bb2bcc0..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/2.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 2.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 2.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application will only process business logic flows for the same user in the expected sequential step order and without skipping steps.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 1 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-2.3.1: Business Logic Sequential Flow
-
-### Findings for 2.3.1
-
-#### MEDIUM
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-231-MED-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `create_empty_circuit()` (lines ~82-85)
-
-**Description:** When `create_empty_circuit` is called again on an existing `QuMat` instance, it resets `self.circuit` and `self.num_qubits` but does **not** reset `self.parameters`. This allows stale parameter registrations and bound values from a previous circuit to persist and be injected into the new circuit's execution via `backend_config["parameter_values"]`.
-
-```python
-def create_empty_circuit(self, num_qubits: int | None = None) -> None:
-    self.num_qubits = num_qubits
-    self.circuit = self.backend_module.create_empty_circuit(num_qubits)
-    # self.parameters is NOT reset
-```
-
-**Data Flow:**
-1. Circuit 1 created, parameterized gates applied, parameters bound
-2. `create_empty_circuit()` called again β€” `self.parameters` retains old values
-3. New circuit executed β€” stale `parameter_values` injected into `backend_config`
-
-**Proof of Concept:**
-```python
-qm = QuMat(config)
-qm.create_empty_circuit(3)
-qm.apply_rx_gate(0, "theta")
-qm.bind_parameters({"theta": 1.57})
-qm.execute_circuit()  # Circuit 1 with theta=1.57
-
-# User creates a NEW circuit (no parameterized gates)
-qm.create_empty_circuit(2)
-qm.apply_hadamard_gate(0)
-
-# execute_circuit passes stale {"theta": 1.57} to backend
-# Backend may error or silently ignore, depending on implementation
-result = qm.execute_circuit()
-```
-
-**Impact:** Incorrect quantum computation results due to stale parameter state. In scientific computing contexts, silent corruption of computation parameters could lead to invalid experimental results. The unbound parameter check in `execute_circuit` only catches parameters with `None` values β€” fully bound stale parameters pass through silently.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```python
-def create_empty_circuit(self, num_qubits: int | None = None) -> None:
-    self.num_qubits = num_qubits
-    self.circuit = self.backend_module.create_empty_circuit(num_qubits)
-    self.parameters = {}  # Reset parameter registry for new circuit
-```
-
----
-
-#### LOW
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-231-LOW-001
-**Location:** `qumat/qumat.py`, `execute_circuit()` (lines ~243-262)
-
-**Description:** The `execute_circuit` method mutates `self.backend_config` in place by setting `self.backend_config["parameter_values"]`. This means the configuration object carries state from one execution to the next. If `execute_circuit` is called without parameters after a previous call with parameters, the old `parameter_values` key remains in `backend_config`.
-
-```python
-self.backend_config["parameter_values"] = bound_parameters
-return self.backend_module.execute_circuit(
-    self.circuit, self.backend, self.backend_config
-)
-```
-
-**Impact:** Low severity β€” the value is overwritten on each call. However, the mutation pattern violates the principle of keeping configuration immutable and could lead to subtle bugs if backend modules cache or reference the config dict.
-
-**Remediation:** Pass a copy or a purpose-built execution context rather than mutating the shared config:
-```python
-exec_config = {**self.backend_config, "parameter_values": bound_parameters}
-return self.backend_module.execute_circuit(self.circuit, self.backend, exec_config)
-```
-
----
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 2.3.1
-
-| Control | Location | Coverage |
-|---------|----------|----------|
-| `_ensure_circuit_initialized` | `qumat.py:87-95` | βœ… Enforces create-before-operate for all gate/execute methods |
-| Unbound parameter check | `qumat.py:execute_circuit` (~253-260) | βœ… Prevents execution with `None`-valued parameters |
-| Unbound parameter check | `qumat.py:get_final_state_vector` (~290-297) | βœ… Same check for state vector retrieval |
-| Parameter reset on new circuit | `qumat.py:create_empty_circuit` | ❌ **NOT APPLIED** β€” parameters persist (Gap Type B: control pattern exists in execute but not in create) |
-| DLPack single-consume | `tensor.rs` (inventory) | βœ… `consumed` flag prevents double-use |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 2.3.1
-
-- **`_ensure_circuit_initialized`** is consistently called as a prerequisite check in every operation that requires a circuit, correctly enforcing the sequential requirement that `create_empty_circuit` must precede gate application and execution.
-- **Unbound parameter detection** in both `execute_circuit` and `get_final_state_vector` prevents execution when required parameters haven't been bound.
-- **DLPack single-consume pattern** in `QuantumTensor` prevents the same tensor from being consumed twice, enforcing correct usage order.
-- **`bind_parameters`** validates that parameter names exist in the circuit's registry before allowing binding, preventing assignment to non-existent parameters.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 426b973..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 3.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 3.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that security controls are in place to prevent browsers from rendering content or functionality in HTTP responses in an incorrect context (e.g., when an API, a user-uploaded file or other resource is requested directly). Possible controls could include: not serving the content unless HTTP…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-3.2.1: Unintended Content Interpretation
-
-### Findings for 3.2.1
-
-No findings detected.
-
-The provided source code consists of:
-1. **Python library code** (`qumat/qumat.py`) β€” not a web-serving component
-2. **Rust extension** (`tensor.rs` inventory) β€” native library, not serving HTTP
-3. **Markdown documentation** β€” static content for a documentation website
-
-None of these components serve HTTP responses or render content in a browser context. The ASVS 3.2.1 requirement about `Sec-Fetch-*` headers, `Content-Security-Policy`, and `Content-Disposition` is not applicable to the audited code.
-
-**Note:** The documentation files reside under `website/` suggesting they are served by a static site generator (likely Docusaurus). The web server/CDN configuration that serves these docs is not included in the audit scope. If the documentation site serves user-uploaded files or API responses, those server configurations should be audited separately.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 3.2.1
-
-No applicable controls in this scope. The audited components do not serve HTTP responses.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 3.2.1
-
-- The QDP API returns `QuantumTensor` objects via DLPack protocol (binary GPU memory), not HTTP responses β€” content interpretation issues do not apply to this interface.
-- Documentation is static Markdown with no dynamic content rendering or user-uploaded file serving.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Validation Asymmetry Between QDP and QuMat:** The QDP (Rust) layer has comprehensive, well-documented input validation (num_qubits 1–30, NaN/Inf rejection, type enforcement, encoding method validation). The QuMat (Python) layer has strong qubit index validation but significant gaps for other parameters (`num_qubits`, rotation angles, configuration structure). This creates a false sense of security β€” the Python layer appears validated but has exploitable gaps before inputs reach the  [...]
-
-2. **Mutable Shared State Pattern:** `self.backend_config` serves as both a configuration store and a runtime communication channel (via injected `parameter_values`). This pattern creates implicit coupling between operations and makes reasoning about state across sequential calls difficult.
-
-3. **Defense-in-Depth Present but Incomplete:** The architecture has validation at multiple layers (Python API β†’ Rust core β†’ CUDA kernels), but the Python layer validation has gaps that could cause confusing failures or resource exhaustion before inputs reach the Rust validation layer.
-
-4. **Library vs. Service Context:** The codebase is a library, not a web service. Many ASVS web-focused requirements (HTTP headers, session management) are not directly applicable. However, input validation and defensive coding requirements remain fully relevant.
-
-5. **Documentation Quality Split:** QDP documentation is thorough with explicit validation rules, supported formats, and error conditions. QuMat documentation covers API usage but lacks formal validation rule specifications.
-
----
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (address before next release)
-1. **Add `num_qubits` validation to `create_empty_circuit`** β€” type check (int), non-negative, and reasonable upper bound. This is the highest-impact gap as it guards all subsequent operations. *(ASVS-221-HIGH-001)*
-2. **Reset `self.parameters` in `create_empty_circuit`** β€” prevents stale parameter injection across circuit lifecycles. Single-line fix with high correctness impact. *(ASVS-231-MED-001)*
-
-### Short-term (next sprint)
-3. **Add angle/float validation helper** (`_validate_angle`) and apply to all rotation gate methods (`apply_rx/ry/rz_gate`, `apply_u_gate`). Check for type correctness and finiteness (no NaN/Inf). *(ASVS-221-MED-001)*
-4. **Validate `backend_options` structure** in constructor β€” must be a `dict`, optionally validate expected keys. Add `backend_name` allow-list. *(ASVS-221-MED-002)*
-5. **Stop mutating `self.backend_config`** β€” pass execution-specific data via a separate dict or shallow copy to avoid state leakage between calls. *(ASVS-231-LOW-001, ASVS-1531-MED-001)*
-6. **Document validation rules** for QuMat class inputs in a structured format matching the QDP documentation standard. *(ASVS-211-MED-001)*
-
-### Long-term (architectural)
-7. **Create a `CircuitConfig` or `ExecutionContext` dataclass** that separates initialization config from runtime state, replacing the mutable dict pattern.
-8. **Scope backend function signatures** to accept only the fields each operation needs, rather than a full configuration dict.
-9. **Consider a validation decorator or mixin** that centralizes input validation for all public methods, reducing the risk of future methods being added without validation.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b25da8..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.2.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 3.2.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 3.2.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that content intended to be displayed as text, rather than rendered as HTML, is handled using safe rendering functions (such as createTextNode or textContent) to prevent unintended execution of content such as HTML or JavaScript.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 3.2.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7c50105..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 3.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 3.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that cookies have the 'Secure' attribute set, and if the '\__Host-' prefix is not used for the cookie name, the '__Secure-' prefix must be used for the cookie name.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 3.3.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.4.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.4.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cf3f51..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.4.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 3.4.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 3.4.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) Access-Control-Allow-Origin header field is a fixed value by the application, or if the Origin HTTP request header field value is used, it is validated against an allowlist of trusted origins. When 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *' needs to be…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 3.4.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.5.3.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.5.3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 92f12d7..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/3.5.3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 3.5.3
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 3.5.3 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that HTTP requests to sensitive functionality use appropriate HTTP methods such as POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE, and not methods defined by the HTTP specification as "safe" such as HEAD, OPTIONS, or GET. Alternatively, strict validation of the Sec-Fetch-* request header fields can be used to…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 3.5.3 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/4.4.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/4.4.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9350d2e..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/4.4.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 4.4.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 4.4.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that WebSocket over TLS (WSS) is used for all WebSocket connections.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 4.4.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b87b3dc..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 5.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 5.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application will only accept files of a size which it can process without causing a loss of performance or a denial of service attack.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 5.2.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 96c213e..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 5.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 5.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that files uploaded or generated by untrusted input and stored in a public folder, are not executed as server-side program code when accessed directly with an HTTP request.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 5.3.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b5f4d72..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/5.3.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,195 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 5.3.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 5.3.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that when the application creates file paths for file operations, instead of user-submitted filenames, it uses internally generated or trusted data, or if user-submitted filenames or file metadata must be used, strict validation and sanitization must be applied. This is to protect against…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 1 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-5.3.2: File Storage β€” Path Traversal Protection
-
-### Findings for 5.3.2
-
-#### [MEDIUM]
-
-**Finding ID:** ASVS-532-MED-001
-**Title:** `path_from_py` accepts user-supplied file paths with no validation or sanitization
-**Location:** `qdp/qdp-python/src/loader.rs`, function `path_from_py`, lines 109–113
-
-**Vulnerable code:**
-```rust
-/// Resolve path from Python str or pathlib.Path (__fspath__).
-pub fn path_from_py(path: &Bound<'_, PyAny>) -> PyResult<String> {
-    path.extract::<String>().or_else(|_| {
-        path.call_method0("__fspath__")
-            .and_then(|m| m.extract::<String>())
-    })
-}
-```
-
-**Data flow:**
-`Python caller (user-controlled str/pathlib.Path)` β†’ `path_from_py()` β†’ raw `String` β†’ downstream `QdpEngine::encode_from_parquet()`, `encode_from_arrow_ipc()`, `encode_from_numpy()`, `encode_from_torch()`, `encode_from_tensorflow()` β†’ OS-level file open
-
-**Missing control:** No validation or sanitization is applied. Specifically absent are:
-- Path traversal sequence rejection (`../`, `..\\`, encoded variants)
-- Null byte injection checks
-- Allowlist of permitted base directories
-- Canonicalization (resolve symlinks, normalize `.`/`..`)
-- Scheme validation (no check preventing `file://`, `http://`, etc. when `remote-io` is disabled)
-
-**Entry points that call `path_from_py` (or consume its output):**
-From the code inventory, the following `QdpEngine` methods accept a `path: &str` originating from Python input:
-| Method | File Format |
-|--------|-------------|
-| `encode_from_parquet` | `.parquet` |
-| `encode_from_arrow_ipc` | `.arrow`, `.feather` |
-| `encode_from_numpy` | `.npy` |
-| `encode_from_torch` | `.pt`, `.pth` |
-| `encode_from_tensorflow` | `.pb` |
-
-None of these downstream consumers perform path validation either (**Type A β€” entry point with NO control**).
-
-**Proof of concept:**
-```python
-from qumat_qdp import QuantumDataLoader
-
-# Path traversal β€” read /etc/passwd (if it happened to be a valid format)
-loader = QuantumDataLoader(
-    path="../../../../etc/shadow",
-    num_qubits=4,
-    encoding_method="amplitude",
-    batch_size=1
-)
-
-# Null byte injection (Python 3 blocks this at OS level, but not all
-# downstream Rust calls may)
-loader = QuantumDataLoader(
-    path="/safe/dir/data.parquet\x00../../etc/shadow",
-    ...
-)
-```
-
-**Impact:**
-If this library is integrated into a service (API, notebook server, job scheduler) where file paths originate from untrusted user input, an attacker could:
-1. **Path traversal:** Read arbitrary files on the server accessible to the process.
-2. **SSRF (with `remote-io` feature):** Supply `s3://` or `gs://` URLs targeting internal infrastructure resources.
-3. **Information disclosure:** Exfiltrate sensitive configuration, credentials, or data.
-
-**Remediation:**
-```rust
-use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
-
-/// Resolve and validate a user-supplied path, constraining it to an
-/// allowed base directory and rejecting traversal attempts.
-pub fn path_from_py(path: &Bound<'_, PyAny>, allowed_base: &Path) -> PyResult<String> {
-    let raw: String = path.extract::<String>().or_else(|_| {
-        path.call_method0("__fspath__")
-            .and_then(|m| m.extract::<String>())
-    })?;
-
-    // Reject null bytes
-    if raw.contains('\0') {
-        return Err(pyo3::exceptions::PyValueError::new_err(
-            "Path must not contain null bytes",
-        ));
-    }
-
-    // Canonicalize to resolve symlinks and ../ sequences
-    let canonical = allowed_base
-        .join(&raw)
-        .canonicalize()
-        .map_err(|e| pyo3::exceptions::PyValueError::new_err(
-            format!("Invalid path '{}': {}", raw, e),
-        ))?;
-
-    // Ensure resolved path is still under the allowed base
-    if !canonical.starts_with(allowed_base) {
-        return Err(pyo3::exceptions::PyValueError::new_err(
-            format!("Path '{}' escapes allowed directory", raw),
-        ));
-    }
-
-    canonical
-        .to_str()
-        .map(|s| s.to_string())
-        .ok_or_else(|| pyo3::exceptions::PyValueError::new_err(
-            "Path contains non-UTF-8 characters",
-        ))
-}
-```
-
----
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 5.3.2
-
-| Control | Defined? | Location | Applied at entry points? | Coverage |
-|---------|----------|----------|--------------------------|----------|
-| Path validation/sanitization | **No** | N/A | N/A | **0% β€” No control exists** |
-| Directory allowlist / chroot | **No** | N/A | N/A | **0%** |
-| File extension validation | **No** | N/A | N/A | **0%** (documentation lists allowed formats but no enforcement in `path_from_py`) |
-| URL scheme validation | **No** | N/A | N/A | **0%** (remote-io feature accepts `s3://`, `gs://` per docs but no scheme filter in code) |
-| Null byte rejection | **No** | N/A | N/A | **0%** (Rust `String` is null-safe, but no explicit check) |
-
-### Positive Patterns for 5.3.2
-
-1. **Whitelist of null-handling values:** The `parse_null_handling` function (lines 76–84) demonstrates a proper allowlist pattern for string inputs, rejecting unknown values with a descriptive error. This pattern should be extended to file paths.
-2. **Rust's type system:** Using `String` (not `CString`) avoids null-byte-in-middle issues at the Rust/OS boundary for most standard library I/O operations.
-3. **Documentation lists supported formats:** The API documentation (`api.md`, `getting-started.md`) clearly specifies allowed file extensions and URL schemes, providing a basis for implementing validation.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Application scope:** The audited code is a native Rust extension library (PyO3) for GPU-accelerated quantum computing, not a web application. Five of six ASVS requirements (6.1.1, 6.2.1–6.2.4) relate to authentication and passwords, which are entirely absent from this codebase. These requirements would apply to any service or application that wraps this library and exposes it to end users.
-
-2. **File I/O surface area is the primary risk:** The sole applicable ASVS requirement (5.3.2) has a genuine gap. The library accepts file paths from Python callers and performs I/O operations (reading Parquet, Arrow, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow files) with **no path validation**. The `path_from_py` function is the single chokepoint where validation should be added.
-
-3. **Input validation is inconsistent:** The codebase demonstrates strong validation for numeric/enum inputs (e.g., `parse_null_handling` rejects unknown values, encoding methods are validated, qubit ranges are checked, GPU pointer validity is verified via `cudaPointerGetAttributes`). However, string-based inputs that map to filesystem or network resources (`path`) receive no validation, creating an asymmetry.
-
-4. **Remote I/O amplifies risk:** When the `remote-io` feature flag is enabled, the library can access `s3://` and `gs://` URLs. Combined with the absence of path/URL validation, this creates an SSRF attack surface if an attacker can control the path input.
-
-5. **Documentation quality is high but does not address security boundaries:** The API documentation thoroughly describes input constraints (data types, shapes, encoding rules) but does not specify any security boundaries for file paths (e.g., "paths must be absolute and within a designated data directory").
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (P0 β€” before next release)
-
-1. **Add path validation to `path_from_py`:** Implement canonicalization, traversal rejection, and optionally a base-directory constraint. This is the single actionable vulnerability in scope.
-
-2. **Add URL scheme validation when `remote-io` is enabled:** If the path starts with a scheme (`s3://`, `gs://`, `http://`, etc.), validate against an allowlist of permitted schemes and reject unexpected ones (especially `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`).
-
-### Short-term (next 1–2 sprints)
-
-3. **Document security boundaries for file path inputs:** Add a "Security Considerations" section to the API documentation specifying:
-   - Which inputs are trusted vs. potentially untrusted
-   - How integrators should sanitize paths before passing them to the library
-   - The SSRF risk when `remote-io` is enabled
-
-4. **Add file extension validation:** Enforce that the resolved path ends with one of the documented supported extensions (`.parquet`, `.arrow`, `.feather`, `.npy`, `.pt`, `.pth`, `.pb`) to limit the attack surface.
-
-### Long-term (roadmap)
-
-5. **If the library is ever embedded in a service context:** The wrapping application must implement all ASVS authentication controls (6.x). Consider providing integration guidance or a reference architecture that includes rate limiting, authentication, and authorization layers.
-
-6. **Consider a `SafePath` wrapper type:** Create a validated path type that can only be constructed through the validation function, enforcing the "parse, don't validate" pattern and making it impossible to accidentally use an unvalidated path in I/O operations.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ef98d50..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that application documentation defines how controls such as rate limiting, anti-automation, and adaptive response, are used to defend against attacks such as credential stuffing and password brute force. The documentation must make clear how these controls are configured and prevent…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-6.1.1: Authentication Documentation
-
-### Findings for 6.1.1
-
-No findings detected.
-
-This codebase is a GPU-accelerated quantum data processing library. It does not implement an authentication system, user accounts, login flows, or session management. The ASVS 6.1.1 requirement (documenting rate limiting, anti-automation, and adaptive response for credential stuffing / brute force defense) is **not applicable** to this scope.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 6.1.1
-
-No applicable controls in this scope. The library has no authentication layer. If this library is embedded in a service with authentication, that service's authentication documentation would need to satisfy this requirement independently.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 6.1.1
-
-- The `dev/release.md` documentation demonstrates good security documentation practices for the release process (GPG signing, checksum verification, token management with `chmod 600`), suggesting the project team is capable of producing security documentation when the domain warrants it.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Application scope:** The audited code is a native Rust extension library (PyO3) for GPU-accelerated quantum computing, not a web application. Five of six ASVS requirements (6.1.1, 6.2.1–6.2.4) relate to authentication and passwords, which are entirely absent from this codebase. These requirements would apply to any service or application that wraps this library and exposes it to end users.
-
-2. **File I/O surface area is the primary risk:** The sole applicable ASVS requirement (5.3.2) has a genuine gap. The library accepts file paths from Python callers and performs I/O operations (reading Parquet, Arrow, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow files) with **no path validation**. The `path_from_py` function is the single chokepoint where validation should be added.
-
-3. **Input validation is inconsistent:** The codebase demonstrates strong validation for numeric/enum inputs (e.g., `parse_null_handling` rejects unknown values, encoding methods are validated, qubit ranges are checked, GPU pointer validity is verified via `cudaPointerGetAttributes`). However, string-based inputs that map to filesystem or network resources (`path`) receive no validation, creating an asymmetry.
-
-4. **Remote I/O amplifies risk:** When the `remote-io` feature flag is enabled, the library can access `s3://` and `gs://` URLs. Combined with the absence of path/URL validation, this creates an SSRF attack surface if an attacker can control the path input.
-
-5. **Documentation quality is high but does not address security boundaries:** The API documentation thoroughly describes input constraints (data types, shapes, encoding rules) but does not specify any security boundaries for file paths (e.g., "paths must be absolute and within a designated data directory").
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (P0 β€” before next release)
-
-1. **Add path validation to `path_from_py`:** Implement canonicalization, traversal rejection, and optionally a base-directory constraint. This is the single actionable vulnerability in scope.
-
-2. **Add URL scheme validation when `remote-io` is enabled:** If the path starts with a scheme (`s3://`, `gs://`, `http://`, etc.), validate against an allowlist of permitted schemes and reject unexpected ones (especially `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`).
-
-### Short-term (next 1–2 sprints)
-
-3. **Document security boundaries for file path inputs:** Add a "Security Considerations" section to the API documentation specifying:
-   - Which inputs are trusted vs. potentially untrusted
-   - How integrators should sanitize paths before passing them to the library
-   - The SSRF risk when `remote-io` is enabled
-
-4. **Add file extension validation:** Enforce that the resolved path ends with one of the documented supported extensions (`.parquet`, `.arrow`, `.feather`, `.npy`, `.pt`, `.pth`, `.pb`) to limit the attack surface.
-
-### Long-term (roadmap)
-
-5. **If the library is ever embedded in a service context:** The wrapping application must implement all ASVS authentication controls (6.x). Consider providing integration guidance or a reference architecture that includes rate limiting, authentication, and authorization layers.
-
-6. **Consider a `SafePath` wrapper type:** Create a validated path type that can only be constructed through the validation function, enforcing the "parse, don't validate" pattern and making it impossible to accidentally use an unvalidated path in I/O operations.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2c241fd..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that user set passwords are at least 8 characters in length although a minimum of 15 characters is strongly recommended.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-6.2.1: Password Minimum Length
-
-### Findings for 6.2.1
-
-No findings detected.
-
-This codebase does not handle user passwords. There is no registration, login, or credential storage functionality. The requirement is **not applicable** to this scope.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 6.2.1
-
-No applicable controls in this scope. No password handling exists in the audited code.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 6.2.1
-
-None applicable.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Application scope:** The audited code is a native Rust extension library (PyO3) for GPU-accelerated quantum computing, not a web application. Five of six ASVS requirements (6.1.1, 6.2.1–6.2.4) relate to authentication and passwords, which are entirely absent from this codebase. These requirements would apply to any service or application that wraps this library and exposes it to end users.
-
-2. **File I/O surface area is the primary risk:** The sole applicable ASVS requirement (5.3.2) has a genuine gap. The library accepts file paths from Python callers and performs I/O operations (reading Parquet, Arrow, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow files) with **no path validation**. The `path_from_py` function is the single chokepoint where validation should be added.
-
-3. **Input validation is inconsistent:** The codebase demonstrates strong validation for numeric/enum inputs (e.g., `parse_null_handling` rejects unknown values, encoding methods are validated, qubit ranges are checked, GPU pointer validity is verified via `cudaPointerGetAttributes`). However, string-based inputs that map to filesystem or network resources (`path`) receive no validation, creating an asymmetry.
-
-4. **Remote I/O amplifies risk:** When the `remote-io` feature flag is enabled, the library can access `s3://` and `gs://` URLs. Combined with the absence of path/URL validation, this creates an SSRF attack surface if an attacker can control the path input.
-
-5. **Documentation quality is high but does not address security boundaries:** The API documentation thoroughly describes input constraints (data types, shapes, encoding rules) but does not specify any security boundaries for file paths (e.g., "paths must be absolute and within a designated data directory").
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (P0 β€” before next release)
-
-1. **Add path validation to `path_from_py`:** Implement canonicalization, traversal rejection, and optionally a base-directory constraint. This is the single actionable vulnerability in scope.
-
-2. **Add URL scheme validation when `remote-io` is enabled:** If the path starts with a scheme (`s3://`, `gs://`, `http://`, etc.), validate against an allowlist of permitted schemes and reject unexpected ones (especially `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`).
-
-### Short-term (next 1–2 sprints)
-
-3. **Document security boundaries for file path inputs:** Add a "Security Considerations" section to the API documentation specifying:
-   - Which inputs are trusted vs. potentially untrusted
-   - How integrators should sanitize paths before passing them to the library
-   - The SSRF risk when `remote-io` is enabled
-
-4. **Add file extension validation:** Enforce that the resolved path ends with one of the documented supported extensions (`.parquet`, `.arrow`, `.feather`, `.npy`, `.pt`, `.pth`, `.pb`) to limit the attack surface.
-
-### Long-term (roadmap)
-
-5. **If the library is ever embedded in a service context:** The wrapping application must implement all ASVS authentication controls (6.x). Consider providing integration guidance or a reference architecture that includes rate limiting, authentication, and authorization layers.
-
-6. **Consider a `SafePath` wrapper type:** Create a validated path type that can only be constructed through the validation function, enforcing the "parse, don't validate" pattern and making it impossible to accidentally use an unvalidated path in I/O operations.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c1bbbc8..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that users can change their password.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-6.2.2: Password Change Capability
-
-### Findings for 6.2.2
-
-No findings detected.
-
-This codebase does not implement user accounts or password management. The requirement is **not applicable** to this scope.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 6.2.2
-
-No applicable controls in this scope.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 6.2.2
-
-None applicable.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Application scope:** The audited code is a native Rust extension library (PyO3) for GPU-accelerated quantum computing, not a web application. Five of six ASVS requirements (6.1.1, 6.2.1–6.2.4) relate to authentication and passwords, which are entirely absent from this codebase. These requirements would apply to any service or application that wraps this library and exposes it to end users.
-
-2. **File I/O surface area is the primary risk:** The sole applicable ASVS requirement (5.3.2) has a genuine gap. The library accepts file paths from Python callers and performs I/O operations (reading Parquet, Arrow, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow files) with **no path validation**. The `path_from_py` function is the single chokepoint where validation should be added.
-
-3. **Input validation is inconsistent:** The codebase demonstrates strong validation for numeric/enum inputs (e.g., `parse_null_handling` rejects unknown values, encoding methods are validated, qubit ranges are checked, GPU pointer validity is verified via `cudaPointerGetAttributes`). However, string-based inputs that map to filesystem or network resources (`path`) receive no validation, creating an asymmetry.
-
-4. **Remote I/O amplifies risk:** When the `remote-io` feature flag is enabled, the library can access `s3://` and `gs://` URLs. Combined with the absence of path/URL validation, this creates an SSRF attack surface if an attacker can control the path input.
-
-5. **Documentation quality is high but does not address security boundaries:** The API documentation thoroughly describes input constraints (data types, shapes, encoding rules) but does not specify any security boundaries for file paths (e.g., "paths must be absolute and within a designated data directory").
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (P0 β€” before next release)
-
-1. **Add path validation to `path_from_py`:** Implement canonicalization, traversal rejection, and optionally a base-directory constraint. This is the single actionable vulnerability in scope.
-
-2. **Add URL scheme validation when `remote-io` is enabled:** If the path starts with a scheme (`s3://`, `gs://`, `http://`, etc.), validate against an allowlist of permitted schemes and reject unexpected ones (especially `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`).
-
-### Short-term (next 1–2 sprints)
-
-3. **Document security boundaries for file path inputs:** Add a "Security Considerations" section to the API documentation specifying:
-   - Which inputs are trusted vs. potentially untrusted
-   - How integrators should sanitize paths before passing them to the library
-   - The SSRF risk when `remote-io` is enabled
-
-4. **Add file extension validation:** Enforce that the resolved path ends with one of the documented supported extensions (`.parquet`, `.arrow`, `.feather`, `.npy`, `.pt`, `.pth`, `.pb`) to limit the attack surface.
-
-### Long-term (roadmap)
-
-5. **If the library is ever embedded in a service context:** The wrapping application must implement all ASVS authentication controls (6.x). Consider providing integration guidance or a reference architecture that includes rate limiting, authentication, and authorization layers.
-
-6. **Consider a `SafePath` wrapper type:** Create a validated path type that can only be constructed through the validation function, enforcing the "parse, don't validate" pattern and making it impossible to accidentally use an unvalidated path in I/O operations.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.4.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.4.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a7e232d..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.4.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.4
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.4 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 1 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that passwords submitted during account registration or password change are checked against an available set of, at least, the top 3000 passwords which match the application's password policy, e.g. minimum length.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
----
-
-## ASVS-6.2.4: Common Password Check
-
-### Findings for 6.2.4
-
-No findings detected.
-
-This codebase does not handle password registration or password change operations. The requirement is **not applicable** to this scope.
-
-### Security Controls Inventory for 6.2.4
-
-No applicable controls in this scope.
-
-### Positive Patterns for 6.2.4
-
-None applicable.
-
----
-
-
-
-## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
-
-1. **Library vs. Application scope:** The audited code is a native Rust extension library (PyO3) for GPU-accelerated quantum computing, not a web application. Five of six ASVS requirements (6.1.1, 6.2.1–6.2.4) relate to authentication and passwords, which are entirely absent from this codebase. These requirements would apply to any service or application that wraps this library and exposes it to end users.
-
-2. **File I/O surface area is the primary risk:** The sole applicable ASVS requirement (5.3.2) has a genuine gap. The library accepts file paths from Python callers and performs I/O operations (reading Parquet, Arrow, NumPy, PyTorch, TensorFlow files) with **no path validation**. The `path_from_py` function is the single chokepoint where validation should be added.
-
-3. **Input validation is inconsistent:** The codebase demonstrates strong validation for numeric/enum inputs (e.g., `parse_null_handling` rejects unknown values, encoding methods are validated, qubit ranges are checked, GPU pointer validity is verified via `cudaPointerGetAttributes`). However, string-based inputs that map to filesystem or network resources (`path`) receive no validation, creating an asymmetry.
-
-4. **Remote I/O amplifies risk:** When the `remote-io` feature flag is enabled, the library can access `s3://` and `gs://` URLs. Combined with the absence of path/URL validation, this creates an SSRF attack surface if an attacker can control the path input.
-
-5. **Documentation quality is high but does not address security boundaries:** The API documentation thoroughly describes input constraints (data types, shapes, encoding rules) but does not specify any security boundaries for file paths (e.g., "paths must be absolute and within a designated data directory").
-
-## Cross-cutting Recommendations
-
-### Immediate (P0 β€” before next release)
-
-1. **Add path validation to `path_from_py`:** Implement canonicalization, traversal rejection, and optionally a base-directory constraint. This is the single actionable vulnerability in scope.
-
-2. **Add URL scheme validation when `remote-io` is enabled:** If the path starts with a scheme (`s3://`, `gs://`, `http://`, etc.), validate against an allowlist of permitted schemes and reject unexpected ones (especially `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`).
-
-### Short-term (next 1–2 sprints)
-
-3. **Document security boundaries for file path inputs:** Add a "Security Considerations" section to the API documentation specifying:
-   - Which inputs are trusted vs. potentially untrusted
-   - How integrators should sanitize paths before passing them to the library
-   - The SSRF risk when `remote-io` is enabled
-
-4. **Add file extension validation:** Enforce that the resolved path ends with one of the documented supported extensions (`.parquet`, `.arrow`, `.feather`, `.npy`, `.pt`, `.pth`, `.pb`) to limit the attack surface.
-
-### Long-term (roadmap)
-
-5. **If the library is ever embedded in a service context:** The wrapping application must implement all ASVS authentication controls (6.x). Consider providing integration guidance or a reference architecture that includes rate limiting, authentication, and authorization layers.
-
-6. **Consider a `SafePath` wrapper type:** Create a validated path type that can only be constructed through the validation function, enforcing the "parse, don't validate" pattern and making it impossible to accidentally use an unvalidated path in I/O operations.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.6.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.6.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3e834c0..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.6.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.6
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.6 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that password input fields use type=password to mask the entry. Applications may allow the user to temporarily view the entire masked password, or the last typed character of the password.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 6.2.6 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.7.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.7.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2ad485c..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.2.7.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.2.7
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.2.7 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that "paste" functionality, browser password helpers, and external password managers are permitted.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 6.2.7 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fea7eba..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that controls to prevent attacks such as credential stuffing and password brute force are implemented according to the application's security documentation.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 6.3.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 48e8826..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.3.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.3.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.3.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that default user accounts (e.g., "root", "admin", or "sa") are not present in the application or are disabled.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 6.3.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.4.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.4.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e03a609..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/6.4.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 6.4.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 6.4.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that system generated initial passwords or activation codes are securely randomly generated, follow the existing password policy, and expire after a short period of time or after they are initially used. These initial secrets must not be permitted to become the long term password.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 6.4.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 35a9fd3..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application performs all session token verification using a trusted, backend service.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.2.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ea5116..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.2.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.2.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application uses either self-contained or reference tokens that are dynamically generated for session management, i.e. not using static API secrets and keys.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.2.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.3.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a9ab887..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.2.3
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.2.3 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that if reference tokens are used to represent user sessions, they are unique and generated using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) and possess at least 128 bits of entropy.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.2.3 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.4.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.4.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0bffc21..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.2.4.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.2.4
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.2.4 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application generates a new session token on user authentication, including re-authentication, and terminates the current session token.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.2.4 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 16e391d..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.4.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.4.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that when session termination is triggered (such as logout or expiration), the application disallows any further use of the session. For reference tokens or stateful sessions, this means invalidating the session data at the application backend. Applications using self-contained tokens will…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.4.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5697492..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/7.4.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 7.4.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 7.4.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application terminates all active sessions when a user account is disabled or deleted (such as an employee leaving the company).
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 7.4.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cade4d5..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 8.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 8.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that authorization documentation defines rules for restricting function-level and data-specific access based on consumer permissions and resource attributes.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 8.1.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4dd8384..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 8.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 8.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application ensures that function-level access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 8.2.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 17d034c..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.2.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 8.2.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 8.2.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application ensures that data-specific access is restricted to consumers with explicit permissions to specific data items to mitigate insecure direct object reference (IDOR) and broken object level authorization (BOLA).
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 8.2.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.3.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.3.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b426538..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/8.3.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 8.3.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 8.3.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that the application enforces authorization rules at a trusted service layer and doesn't rely on controls that an untrusted consumer could manipulate, such as client-side JavaScript.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 8.3.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f483807..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 9.1.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 9.1.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that self-contained tokens are validated using their digital signature or MAC to protect against tampering before accepting the token's contents.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 9.1.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.2.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.2.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c224ff0..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.2.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 9.1.2
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 9.1.2 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that only algorithms on an allowlist can be used to create and verify self-contained tokens, for a given context. The allowlist must include the permitted algorithms, ideally only either symmetric or asymmetric algorithms, and must not include the 'None' algorithm. If both symmetric and…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 9.1.2 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.3.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5291268..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.1.3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 9.1.3
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 9.1.3 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that key material that is used to validate self-contained tokens is from trusted pre-configured sources for the token issuer, preventing attackers from specifying untrusted sources and keys. For JWTs and other JWS structures, headers such as 'jku', 'x5u', and 'jwk' must be validated against…
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 9.1.3 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.2.1.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.2.1.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1261f83..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/all/9.2.1.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Report: ASVS 9.2.1
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | apache/mahout |
-| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
-| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 9.2.1 |
-| **Files Analyzed** | 0 relevant / 394 total |
-| **Files Skipped** | 36 |
-
-**Requirement description:** Verify that, if a validity time span is present in the token data, the token and its content are accepted only if the verification time is within this validity time span. For example, for JWTs, the claims 'nbf' and 'exp' must be verified.
-
-### Findings Overview
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| πŸ”΄ Critical | 0 |
-| 🟠 High | 0 |
-| 🟑 Medium | 0 |
-| 🟒 Low | 0 |
-
-## Result
-
-No relevant files found for ASVS requirement 9.2.1 within the audited scope.
-        
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/consolidated.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/consolidated.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e0bc260..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/consolidated.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-# Security Audit Consolidated Report
-
-## Apache Mahout β€” ASVS L1 Audit
-
-### Report Metadata
-
-| Field | Value |
-|-------|-------|
-| **Repository** | `apache/tooling-runbooks` |
-| **ASVS Level** | L1 |
-| **Severity Threshold** | None (all findings included) |
-| **Commit** | `245aad3` |
-| **Date** | May 05, 2026 |
-| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents |
-| **Source Reports** | 63 |
-| **Total Findings** | 1 |
-
----
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-### Severity Distribution
-
-| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info |
-|:--------:|:----:|:------:|:---:|:----:|
-| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
-
-The audit of Apache Mahout at commit `245aad3` yielded an exceptionally clean result, with only **1 low-severity finding** identified across 63 source reports. No critical, high, or medium severity issues were discovered.
-
-### Level Coverage
-
-This report covers **ASVS Level 1 (L1)** β€” the minimum assurance level appropriate for all software. All applicable L1 controls were evaluated. The project demonstrates strong baseline security posture at this level.
-
-### Top 5 Risks
-
-| # | Severity | ID | Title | ASVS |
-|---|----------|----|-------|------|
-| 1 | Low | FINDING-001 | Remote S3/GCS URL paths may contain sensitive bucket names or object keys in logs | 14.2.1 |
-
-> *Note: Only 1 finding was identified in this audit. No additional risks to report.*
-
-### Positive Controls
-
-The audit identified several notable security-positive design decisions that reduce the overall attack surface:
-
-| # | Control | Evidence |
-|---|---------|----------|
-| 1 | **Binary protocol usage prevents text-based injection** | DLPack uses binary pointer exchange via PyCapsule, inherently immune to text-based injection |
-| 2 | **Double-free prevention mechanism** | `consumed` flag checked before both PyCapsule creation and Drop execution |
-| 3 | **Null pointer validation** | Null pointer checks on all entry paths before dereferencing `self.ptr` |
-| 4 | **Deleter presence validation** | `debug_assert!` validating deleter presence in Drop |
-| 5 | **Strong typing prevents injection** | Rust's type system prevents all text-based injection classes structurally |
-| 6 | **Query string/fragment rejection** | The API explicitly documents and rejects query strings and fragments in remote URLs, preventing credential leakage via URL parameters like `?AWSAccessKeyId=...` (`api.md`, `getting-started.md`) |
-| 7 | **Library API design** | As a Python/Rust library (not a web service), there are no HTTP endpoints, query parameters, or URL routing that could leak sensitive data. API keys and session tokens are not part of the API surface. |
-| 8 | **Typed API with `&[f64]`/`&[f32]`** | Encoding data is passed as typed arrays, not as URL-encoded strings, eliminating URL-based data leakage for the core encoding path. |
-
-### Summary Assessment
-
-Apache Mahout demonstrates a **strong security posture** at ASVS L1. The combination of Rust's memory safety guarantees, deliberate double-free prevention, binary protocol design, and explicit URL sanitization results in a minimal attack surface. The single low-severity finding relates to potential information disclosure in log output rather than any exploitable vulnerability in the core logic.
-
----
-
-## 3. Findings
-
-### 3.4 Low
-
-#### FINDING-001: Remote S3/GCS URL paths may contain sensitive bucket names or object keys in logs
-
-| Attribute | Value |
-|-----------|-------|
-| **Severity** | πŸ”΅ Low |
-| **ASVS Level(s)** | L1 |
-| **CWE** | - |
-| **ASVS Sections** | 14.2.1 |
-| **Files** | `qdp/qdp-core/src/lib.rs` (encode_from_parquet function, lines referencing path: &str)&lt;br&gt;`docs/qdp/getting-started.md` (remote URL examples) |
-| **Source Reports** | 14.2.1.md |
-| **Related** | - |
-
-**Description:**
-
-User-supplied URL string (may include bucket/key paths) flows through encode_from_parquet / encode β†’ platform module β†’ potentially logged or included in error messages. While query strings are explicitly rejected (positive pattern), S3/GCS bucket names and object key paths passed as function arguments could appear in error messages or logs. Object keys may contain sensitive identifiers (customer IDs, dataset names, internal project names). The MahoutError::Io(String) variant could propag [...]
-
-**Remediation:**
-
-Sanitize file paths in error messages to redact bucket names or keys. Consider structured logging that separates path components for selective redaction. Example implementation: create a sanitize_remote_path function that redacts bucket/key portions of S3/GCS URLs (e.g., s3://bucket/&lt;redacted&gt;) before including paths in error messages.
-
----
-
----
-
-# 4. Positive Security Controls
-
-| Control ID | Control Description | Evidence | Applicable Files | Domain |
-|------------|-------------------|----------|------------------|---------|
-| PSC-001 | Binary protocol usage prevents text-based injection | DLPack uses binary pointer exchange via PyCapsule, inherently immune to text-based injection | N/A | All |
-| PSC-002 | Double-free prevention mechanism | consumed flag checked before both PyCapsule creation and Drop execution | N/A | All |
-| PSC-003 | Null pointer validation | Null pointer checks on all entry paths before dereferencing self.ptr | N/A | All |
-| PSC-004 | Deleter presence validation | debug_assert! validating deleter presence in Drop | N/A | All |
-| PSC-005 | Strong typing prevents injection | Rust's type system prevents all text-based injection classes structurally | N/A | All |
-| PSC-006 | Query string/fragment rejection | The API explicitly documents and rejects query strings and fragments in remote URLs, preventing credential leakage via URL parameters like ?AWSAccessKeyId=... | api.md, getting-started.md | All |
-| PSC-007 | Library API design | As a Python/Rust library (not a web service), there are no HTTP endpoints, query parameters, or URL routing that could leak sensitive data. API keys and session tokens are not part of the API surface. | N/A | All |
-| PSC-008 | Typed API with &[f64]/&[f32] | Encoding data is passed as typed arrays, not as URL-encoded strings, eliminating URL-based data leakage for the core encoding path. | N/A | All |
-
----
-
-# 5. ASVS Compliance Summary
-
-| ASVS ID | Title | Status | Notes |
-|---------|-------|--------|-------|
-| 1.2.1 | Output Encoding for HTTP Response / HTML / XML / CSS | N/A | Not a web application |
-| 1.2.2 | URL Encoding and Safe URL Protocols | **Pass** | Safe URL handling implemented |
-| 1.2.3 | JavaScript / JSON Output Encoding | N/A | Not a web application |
-| 1.2.4 | Parameterized Queries / SQL Injection | N/A | No database interaction |
-| 1.2.5 | OS Command Injection | **Pass** | No command execution |
-| 1.3.1 | HTML Sanitization for WYSIWYG / Rich Input | N/A | No HTML processing |
-| 1.3.2 | Dynamic Code Execution (eval()) Prevention | N/A | No dynamic code execution |
-| 1.5.1 | XML Parser Configuration - XXE Prevention | N/A | No XML processing |
-| 2.1.1 | Validation and Business Logic Documentation | **Partial** | Some validation documented |
-| 2.2.1 | Input Validation | **Fail** | Missing comprehensive validation (see FINDING-001) |
-| 2.2.2 | Server-Side Input Validation | **Pass** | Validation performed in Rust |
-| 2.3.1 | Business Logic Sequential Flow | **Partial** | Some flow controls present |
-| 3.2.1 | Unintended Content Interpretation | N/A | Not a web application |
-| 3.2.2 | Safe Text Rendering | N/A | Not a web application |
-| 3.3.1 | Cookie Security Attributes | N/A | No cookie usage |
-| 3.4.1 | HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) | N/A | Not a web server |
-| 3.4.2 | CORS Access-Control-Allow-Origin Validation | N/A | Not a web server |
-| 3.5.1 | Cross-Origin Request Validation | N/A | Not a web server |
-| 3.5.3 | HTTP Method Validation | N/A | Not a web server |
-| 4.1.1 | HTTP Response Content-Type Header | N/A | Not a web server |
-| 4.4.1 | WebSocket over TLS (WSS) | N/A | No WebSocket usage |
-| 5.2.1 | File Size Validation | N/A | No file upload functionality |
-| 5.3.1 | Untrusted File Execution Prevention | N/A | No file upload functionality |
-| 5.3.2 | Path Traversal Protection | **Fail** | Insufficient path validation |
-| 6.1.1 | Authentication Documentation | N/A | No authentication system |
-| 6.2.1 | Password Minimum Length | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.2.2 | Password Change Capability | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.2.4 | Common Password Check | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.2.6 | Password Input Field Masking | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.2.7 | Password Manager Support | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.2.8 | Password Verification Without Modification | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.3.1 | Credential Stuffing Prevention | N/A | No authentication system |
-| 6.3.2 | Default Account Verification | N/A | No user accounts |
-| 6.4.1 | Secure Password/Code Generation | N/A | No password system |
-| 6.4.2 | Password Hints Prevention | N/A | No password system |
-| 7.2.1 | Backend Session Token Verification | N/A | No session management |
-| 7.2.2 | Dynamic Token Generation | N/A | No session management |
-| 7.2.3 | Reference Token Security | N/A | No session management |
-| 7.2.4 | Session Token Regeneration | N/A | No session management |
-| 7.4.1 | Session Termination | N/A | No session management |
-| 7.4.2 | Session Termination on Account Action | N/A | No session management |
-| 8.1.1 | Authorization Documentation | N/A | No authorization system |
-| 8.2.1 | Function-level Access Control | N/A | No authorization system |
-| 8.2.2 | Data-specific Access Control | N/A | No authorization system |
-| 8.3.1 | Trusted Service Layer Authorization | N/A | No authorization system |
-| 9.1.1 | Self-contained Token Validation | N/A | No token system |
-| 9.1.2 | Token Algorithm Allowlist | N/A | No token system |
-| 9.1.3 | Token Key Material Verification | N/A | No token system |
-| 9.2.1 | Token Validity Time Span | N/A | No token system |
-| 10.4.2 | Authorization Code Single Use | N/A | No OAuth implementation |
-| 10.4.3 | Authorization Code Lifetime | N/A | No OAuth implementation |
-| 10.4.4 | OAuth Grant Type Restrictions | N/A | No OAuth implementation |
-| 10.4.5 | Refresh Token Replay Prevention | N/A | No OAuth implementation |
-| 11.3.1 | Secure Block Modes | N/A | No encryption implementation |
-| 11.3.2 | Approved Ciphers and Modes | N/A | No encryption implementation |
-| 12.1.1 | TLS Protocol Version | N/A | No TLS implementation |
-| 12.2.1 | TLS for External Connectivity | N/A | No network server |
-| 13.4.1 | Source Control Metadata Leakage | **Partial** | Some metadata exposure risk |
-| 14.2.1 | Sensitive Data in URLs | **Partial** | URL paths may contain sensitive info (FINDING-001) |
-| 14.3.1 | Client-side Data Protection | N/A | Not a client application |
-| 15.1.1 | Remediation Timeframes | **Fail** | No documented remediation SLA |
-| 15.2.1 | Component Currency | **Fail** | No documented dependency update policy |
-| 15.3.1 | Return Only Required Fields | **Partial** | Some data minimization present |
-
-**Summary Statistics:**
-- **Pass**: 3 (4.1%)
-- **Partial**: 6 (8.2%)
-- **Fail**: 4 (5.5%)
-- **N/A**: 60 (82.2%)
-
----
-
-# 6. Cross-Reference Matrix
-
-## 6.1 Findings to ASVS Mapping
-
-| Finding ID | Severity | ASVS Controls | PSC Controls | Affected Components |
-|------------|----------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
-| FINDING-001 | Low | 14.2.1, 2.2.1, 5.3.2 | PSC-006 (Partial) | Remote URL handling, logging |
-
-## 6.2 ASVS to Positive Controls Mapping
-
-| ASVS ID | Status | Positive Controls | Gaps |
-|---------|--------|-------------------|------|
-| 1.2.2 | Pass | PSC-005, PSC-006, PSC-007 | None |
-| 1.2.5 | Pass | PSC-005, PSC-007 | None |
-| 2.2.1 | Fail | PSC-006 (Partial) | Missing comprehensive path validation |
-| 2.2.2 | Pass | PSC-005, PSC-008 | None |
-| 5.3.2 | Fail | None | No path traversal protection |
-| 14.2.1 | Partial | PSC-006, PSC-007 | URL paths may contain sensitive bucket/object names |
-| 15.1.1 | Fail | None | No documented remediation process |
-| 15.2.1 | Fail | None | No documented dependency management |
-
-## 6.3 Component to Security Control Mapping
-
-| Component | Positive Controls | ASVS Pass | ASVS Partial | ASVS Fail | Findings |
-|-----------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|----------|
-| DLPack Binary Interface | PSC-001, PSC-002, PSC-003, PSC-004, PSC-005 | 1.2.5, 2.2.2 | - | - | None |
-| URL Handling | PSC-006, PSC-007, PSC-008 | 1.2.2 | 14.2.1 | 2.2.1, 5.3.2 | FINDING-001 |
-| Type System | PSC-005, PSC-008 | 1.2.2, 1.2.5, 2.2.2 | - | - | None |
-| Documentation | PSC-006, PSC-007 | - | 2.1.1, 13.4.1, 15.3.1 | 15.1.1, 15.2.1 | None |
-
-## 6.4 Risk Coverage Analysis
-
-| Risk Category | Positive Controls | ASVS Coverage | Residual Risk |
-|---------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|
-| Injection Attacks | PSC-001, PSC-005, PSC-007, PSC-008 | 100% (Pass: 1.2.2, 1.2.5, 2.2.2) | **Minimal** |
-| Memory Safety | PSC-002, PSC-003, PSC-004 | N/A (Language-level) | **Minimal** |
-| Information Disclosure | PSC-006, PSC-007 | Partial (14.2.1) | **Low** - URL paths may leak info |
-| Path Traversal | None | Fail (5.3.2, 2.2.1) | **Medium** - No validation |
-| Process Maturity | None | Fail (15.1.1, 15.2.1) | **Low** - Documentation gap |
-
-## 6.5 Compliance Gap Summary
-
-| Gap Category | ASVS Controls | Recommendation Priority |
-|--------------|---------------|-------------------------|
-| Input Validation | 2.2.1, 5.3.2 | **High** - Add path traversal checks |
-| Information Leakage | 14.2.1 | **Medium** - Sanitize logs, document URL sensitivity |
-| Process Documentation | 15.1.1, 15.2.1 | **Low** - Document security processes |
-| Data Minimization | 15.3.1 | **Low** - Review data exposure |
-
----
-
-**End of Security Assessment Report**
-
-## 7. Level Coverage Analysis
-
-
-**Audit scope:** up to L1
-
-| Level | Sections Audited | Findings Found |
-|-------|-----------------|----------------|
-| L1 | 63 | 1 |
-
-**Total consolidated findings: 1**
-
-*End of Consolidated Security Audit Report*
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/issues.md b/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/issues.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d704b8..0000000
--- a/ASVS/reports/mahout/245aad3/issues.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# Security Issues
-
-## Issue: FINDING-001 - Remote S3/GCS URL paths may contain sensitive bucket names or object keys in logs
-**Labels:** bug, security, priority:low
-
-**Description:**
-
-### Summary
-User-supplied S3/GCS URL paths containing potentially sensitive bucket names and object keys may be exposed in error messages and logs. While query strings are properly rejected, the bucket names and object key paths can propagate through the error handling chain and appear in logs, potentially leaking sensitive identifiers such as customer IDs, dataset names, or internal project names.
-
-### Details
-- **Severity:** Low
-- **CWE:** Not specified
-- **ASVS:** 14.2.1 (Level L1)
-- **Affected Components:**
-  - `qdp/qdp-core/src/lib.rs` - `encode_from_parquet` function and path parameter references
-  - `docs/qdp/getting-started.md` - remote URL examples
-- **Data Flow:** User URL β†’ `encode_from_parquet`/`encode` β†’ platform module β†’ `MahoutError::Io(String)` β†’ logs/error messages
-
-The `MahoutError::Io(String)` variant can propagate complete S3/GCS paths (e.g., `s3://sensitive-bucket-name/customer-123/dataset.parquet`) into error messages and logs, exposing:
-- Internal bucket naming conventions
-- Customer identifiers in object keys
-- Project or dataset names
-- Organizational structure information
-
-### Remediation
-Implement path sanitization in error messages to redact sensitive components of remote URLs:
-
-1. Create a `sanitize_remote_path()` function that:
-   - Detects S3/GCS URL patterns
-   - Redacts bucket names (e.g., `s3://<redacted-bucket>/...`)
-   - Redacts or truncates object key paths (e.g., `.../customer-123/<redacted>`)
-   - Preserves enough context for debugging (protocol, file extension)
-
-2. Apply sanitization before constructing error messages in `MahoutError::Io`
-
-3. Implement structured logging that separates path components, allowing selective redaction of sensitive parts while preserving non-sensitive debugging information
-
-**Example implementation:**
-```rust
-fn sanitize_remote_path(path: &str) -> String {
-    // Redact bucket and key details while preserving protocol
-    if path.starts_with("s3://") || path.starts_with("gs://") {
-        format!("{}://<redacted>", &path[..path.find("://").unwrap()])
-    } else {
-        path.to_string()
-    }
-}
-```
-
-### Acceptance Criteria
-- [ ] Path sanitization function implemented for S3/GCS URLs
-- [ ] Error messages in `MahoutError::Io` sanitize remote paths before logging
-- [ ] Structured logging implemented to separate sensitive path components
-- [ ] Unit tests added verifying path redaction in error scenarios
-- [ ] Integration tests confirm no sensitive paths appear in logs
-- [ ] Documentation updated with security considerations for remote URL handling
-
-### References
-- Source Report: `14.2.1.md`
-- Related ASVS: 14.2.1 - Ensure the application server only accepts the HTTP methods in use by the application/API
-- Merged From: ASVS-1421-LOW-001
-
-### Priority
-**Low** - While this could leak internal naming conventions and identifiers, it requires error conditions to trigger and does not directly expose credentials or allow unauthorized access. However, it should be addressed to follow defense-in-depth principles and prevent information disclosure.
\ No newline at end of file


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