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Posted to commits@superset.apache.org by ru...@apache.org on 2026/06/02 01:02:32 UTC

(superset) 01/01: fix(mcp): use configured admin role + warn on permission-less protected tools

This is an automated email from the ASF dual-hosted git repository.

rusackas pushed a commit to branch fix/mcp-authz-hardening
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/superset.git

commit 68ba87ec43291b8a72640515b258058be447167e
Author: Claude Code <no...@anthropic.com>
AuthorDate: Mon Jun 1 18:02:12 2026 -0700

    fix(mcp): use configured admin role + warn on permission-less protected tools
    
    - user_has_permission() hardcoded the admin role check to "Admin"/"admin",
      ignoring AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN. Deployments that rename the admin role would have
      admins over-filtered (denied the field-level sensitive-data bypass). Use the
      configured AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN.
    - check_tool_permission() silently allows a permission-protected tool that
      declares no class_permission_name. This is a supported configuration, but a
      protected tool with an accidentally-omitted permission would fail open with
      no signal. Keep the allow behavior but log a warning so the misconfiguration
      is visible.
    
    Add a test verifying the admin bypass follows AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN.
    
    Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <no...@anthropic.com>
---
 superset/mcp_service/auth.py                       | 10 +++++++-
 superset/mcp_service/utils/permissions_utils.py    |  9 ++++++--
 .../mcp_service/utils/test_permissions_utils.py    | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/superset/mcp_service/auth.py b/superset/mcp_service/auth.py
index 583b721b9ea..580801a5edc 100644
--- a/superset/mcp_service/auth.py
+++ b/superset/mcp_service/auth.py
@@ -119,7 +119,15 @@ def check_tool_permission(func: Callable[..., Any]) -> bool:
 
         class_permission_name = getattr(func, CLASS_PERMISSION_ATTR, None)
         if not class_permission_name:
-            # No RBAC configured for this tool; allow by default.
+            # No RBAC configured for this tool; allow by default. This is a
+            # supported configuration (a protected tool may intentionally
+            # declare no permission class), but surface it so an accidental
+            # omission on a sensitive tool doesn't silently fail open.
+            logger.warning(
+                "Tool %s is permission-protected but declares no "
+                "class_permission_name; allowing access without an RBAC check",
+                func.__name__,
+            )
             return True
 
         method_permission_name = getattr(func, METHOD_PERMISSION_ATTR, "read")
diff --git a/superset/mcp_service/utils/permissions_utils.py b/superset/mcp_service/utils/permissions_utils.py
index c4b24afc50d..f7561ad4957 100644
--- a/superset/mcp_service/utils/permissions_utils.py
+++ b/superset/mcp_service/utils/permissions_utils.py
@@ -89,10 +89,15 @@ def user_has_permission(
         return False
 
     try:
-        # Check if user is admin (has all permissions)
+        from flask import current_app
+
+        # Check if user is admin (has all permissions). Use the configured
+        # admin role name rather than hardcoding "Admin", so deployments that
+        # rename the admin role (AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN) still grant admins the bypass.
+        admin_role_name = current_app.config["AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN"]
         if hasattr(user, "roles"):
             for role in user.roles:
-                if role.name in ("Admin", "admin"):
+                if role.name == admin_role_name:
                     return True
 
         # Check specific permission
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/mcp_service/utils/test_permissions_utils.py b/tests/unit_tests/mcp_service/utils/test_permissions_utils.py
index 160fccb6344..c4833080693 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/mcp_service/utils/test_permissions_utils.py
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/mcp_service/utils/test_permissions_utils.py
@@ -19,13 +19,40 @@
 
 from unittest.mock import Mock
 
+from flask import current_app
+
 from superset.mcp_service.utils.permissions_utils import (
     apply_field_permissions_to_columns,
     filter_sensitive_data,
     get_allowed_fields,
+    user_has_permission,
 )
 
 
+def test_user_has_permission_admin_uses_configured_role_name():
+    """The admin bypass honors AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN, not a hardcoded 'Admin'."""
+
+    def _role(name: str) -> Mock:
+        role = Mock()
+        role.name = name  # set after construction (Mock intercepts name=)
+        return role
+
+    original = current_app.config["AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN"]
+    current_app.config["AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN"] = "Superuser"
+    try:
+        admin = Mock()
+        admin.roles = [_role("Superuser")]
+        assert user_has_permission(admin, "can_read", "Chart") is True
+
+        # The previously-hardcoded "Admin" name no longer grants the bypass;
+        # it falls through to the real permission check, which denies here.
+        not_admin = Mock()
+        not_admin.roles = [_role("Admin")]
+        assert user_has_permission(not_admin, "can_read", "Chart") is False
+    finally:
+        current_app.config["AUTH_ROLE_ADMIN"] = original
+
+
 def test_get_allowed_fields_always_denies_user_directory_fields():
     user = Mock()
     user.roles = []