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Posted to dev@knox.apache.org by Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> on 2020/12/01 17:33:05 UTC

Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Dear experts,

We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.

In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache components like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing backend. These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for Access Control.
On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).

We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you all) if it is possible for the following scenario?
1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password, there will be a token stored in this session
3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be passed to backend API when querying data.

The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time to create a Kerberos token (for backend access).

Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES, do you think is possible with the help from Knox API? 

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Best regards
Tien Dat PHAN

Re: Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Posted by larry mccay <la...@gmail.com>.
Hi Tien Dat -

My pleasure.
Thanks for your interest in Apache Knox.

In fact, you should consider subscribing to the Knox dev@ and/or user@
mailing lists.
Since you are not subscribed, your email needs to be accepted by a
moderator and may get lost.

You can do so from the apache knox Mailing Lists page [1] from the project
home page.

thanks,

--larry

1. http://knox.apache.org/mailing-lists.html

On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 1:30 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Many thanks, Larry, for such useful information.
>
> Best regards
> Tien Dat
> On 2020/12/01 22:55:47, larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
> > ugh - forgot the references for you that time...
> >
> > 1.
> >
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#KnoxSSO+Setup+and+Configuration
> > 2.
> >
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#Pac4j+Provider+-+CAS+/+OAuth+/+SAML+/+OpenID+Connect
> >
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#For+CAS+support:
> > 3.
> >
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#SSO+Cookie+Provider
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 5:51 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Just realized that I left out your specific question about CAS.
> > > We have support for CAS authentication.
> > > For this you will want to look into using KnoxSSO [1] and replacing the
> > > default config in the knoxsso.xml topology to use Pac4j [2] with it
> > > configured for CAS.
> > > You can then proxy access to your various UIs through a topology that
> is
> > > configured with the SSOCookieProvider [3] authentication provider.
> > >
> > > When you try and access a UI through Knox, it will check for the
> knoxsso
> > > cookie "hadoop-jwt" and if not found direct you to the knoxsso
> endpoint.
> > > That endpoint will be configured for your CAS server and redirect you
> > > there to login.
> > > Once successfully logged in to CAS it will redirect back to KnoxSSO
> which
> > > will in turn redirect you back to your original URL.
> > > The cookie will be found and access to the UI granted based on your CAS
> > > authentication event.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:39 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
> > >
> > >> Hi Tien -
> > >>
> > >> Apache Knox sounds like exactly what you need here.
> > >> Let me explain a bit about how Knox fits into the Hadoop ecosystem.
> > >>
> > >> Apache Hadoop established an integration pattern that is used across
> the
> > >> ecosystem of related projects called proxyuser or Trusted Proxy [1].
> > >> This is a pattern that allows specific processes/services to make
> > >> requests on behalf of other endusers.
> > >> These trusted proxy services establish a trust relationship with the
> > >> backend services with a combination of:
> > >> * Kerberos for strong authentication for determining the identity of
> the
> > >> trusted service
> > >> * doAs/impersonation - this is typically a doAs query param sent to
> the
> > >> backend service from the trusted proxy
> > >> * configuration to dictate which hosts to expect trusted proxies to
> make
> > >> calls from, which users are allowed to be impersonated by the trusted
> > >> service
> > >>
> > >> Now, a high level view of Knox in this context - we'll use WebHDFS as
> the
> > >> backend service example:
> > >> * an enduser makes a curl call to WebHDFS through Knox: 'curl -ivku
> > >> guest:guest-password
> > >> https://localhost:8443/gateway/sandbox/webhdfs/v1/tmp?op=LISTSTATUS'
> > >> * Knox has an endpoint that is configured via a Knox Topology called
> > >> sandbox.xml and this topology is configured to support HTTP Basic Auth
> > >> * Knox authenticates the user via the ShiroProvider authentication
> > >> provider and establishes a Java Subject security context for the
> request
> > >> processing internally
> > >> * The request flows through the provider chain and enforces whatever
> > >> security policies, authorization checks, identity assertion, etc
> > >> * The last provider is the Dispatch to the backend service - this is
> > >> essentially an HTTP client that interacts with the backend service
> > >> * The webhdfs dispatch takes the authenticated username and sets that
> as
> > >> the doAs query param on the outgoing request and dispatches the
> client's
> > >> original request with that param added.
> > >> * The WebHDFS endpoint will issue a kerberos challenge to the client
> > >> which is Knox in this case and we will authenticate as the Knox
> identity
> > >> via Kerberos/SPNEGO
> > >> * WebHDFS will note that there is a doAs query param, that the Knox
> > >> identity is indeed a trusted proxy, that the request is coming from an
> > >> expected host and that the impersonation is allowed for the user being
> > >> asserted by the doAs.
> > >>
> > >> Hopefully that wasn't too much detail and that it proves helpful.
> > >>
> > >> thanks,
> > >>
> > >> --larry
> > >>
> > >> 1.
> > >>
> https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/Superusers.html
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:23 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> Dear experts,
> > >>>
> > >>> We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for
> > >>> equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.
> > >>>
> > >>> In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache
> components
> > >>> like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing
> backend.
> > >>> These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for
> Access
> > >>> Control.
> > >>> On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users
> > >>> (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).
> > >>>
> > >>> We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you
> all)
> > >>> if it is possible for the following scenario?
> > >>> 1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
> > >>> 2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password,
> there
> > >>> will be a token stored in this session
> > >>> 3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be
> > >>> passed to backend API when querying data.
> > >>>
> > >>> The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this
> > >>> scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time
> to
> > >>> create a Kerberos token (for backend access).
> > >>>
> > >>> Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES,
> do
> > >>> you think is possible with the help from Knox API?
> > >>>
> > >>> Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
> > >>>
> > >>> Best regards
> > >>> Tien Dat PHAN
> > >>>
> > >>
> >
>

Re: Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Posted by Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com>.
Many thanks, Larry, for such useful information.

Best regards
Tien Dat
On 2020/12/01 22:55:47, larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote: 
> ugh - forgot the references for you that time...
> 
> 1.
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#KnoxSSO+Setup+and+Configuration
> 2.
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#Pac4j+Provider+-+CAS+/+OAuth+/+SAML+/+OpenID+Connect
>     http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#For+CAS+support:
> 3.
> http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#SSO+Cookie+Provider
> 
> 
> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 5:51 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
> 
> > Just realized that I left out your specific question about CAS.
> > We have support for CAS authentication.
> > For this you will want to look into using KnoxSSO [1] and replacing the
> > default config in the knoxsso.xml topology to use Pac4j [2] with it
> > configured for CAS.
> > You can then proxy access to your various UIs through a topology that is
> > configured with the SSOCookieProvider [3] authentication provider.
> >
> > When you try and access a UI through Knox, it will check for the knoxsso
> > cookie "hadoop-jwt" and if not found direct you to the knoxsso endpoint.
> > That endpoint will be configured for your CAS server and redirect you
> > there to login.
> > Once successfully logged in to CAS it will redirect back to KnoxSSO which
> > will in turn redirect you back to your original URL.
> > The cookie will be found and access to the UI granted based on your CAS
> > authentication event.
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:39 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Hi Tien -
> >>
> >> Apache Knox sounds like exactly what you need here.
> >> Let me explain a bit about how Knox fits into the Hadoop ecosystem.
> >>
> >> Apache Hadoop established an integration pattern that is used across the
> >> ecosystem of related projects called proxyuser or Trusted Proxy [1].
> >> This is a pattern that allows specific processes/services to make
> >> requests on behalf of other endusers.
> >> These trusted proxy services establish a trust relationship with the
> >> backend services with a combination of:
> >> * Kerberos for strong authentication for determining the identity of the
> >> trusted service
> >> * doAs/impersonation - this is typically a doAs query param sent to the
> >> backend service from the trusted proxy
> >> * configuration to dictate which hosts to expect trusted proxies to make
> >> calls from, which users are allowed to be impersonated by the trusted
> >> service
> >>
> >> Now, a high level view of Knox in this context - we'll use WebHDFS as the
> >> backend service example:
> >> * an enduser makes a curl call to WebHDFS through Knox: 'curl -ivku
> >> guest:guest-password
> >> https://localhost:8443/gateway/sandbox/webhdfs/v1/tmp?op=LISTSTATUS'
> >> * Knox has an endpoint that is configured via a Knox Topology called
> >> sandbox.xml and this topology is configured to support HTTP Basic Auth
> >> * Knox authenticates the user via the ShiroProvider authentication
> >> provider and establishes a Java Subject security context for the request
> >> processing internally
> >> * The request flows through the provider chain and enforces whatever
> >> security policies, authorization checks, identity assertion, etc
> >> * The last provider is the Dispatch to the backend service - this is
> >> essentially an HTTP client that interacts with the backend service
> >> * The webhdfs dispatch takes the authenticated username and sets that as
> >> the doAs query param on the outgoing request and dispatches the client's
> >> original request with that param added.
> >> * The WebHDFS endpoint will issue a kerberos challenge to the client
> >> which is Knox in this case and we will authenticate as the Knox identity
> >> via Kerberos/SPNEGO
> >> * WebHDFS will note that there is a doAs query param, that the Knox
> >> identity is indeed a trusted proxy, that the request is coming from an
> >> expected host and that the impersonation is allowed for the user being
> >> asserted by the doAs.
> >>
> >> Hopefully that wasn't too much detail and that it proves helpful.
> >>
> >> thanks,
> >>
> >> --larry
> >>
> >> 1.
> >> https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/Superusers.html
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:23 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Dear experts,
> >>>
> >>> We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for
> >>> equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.
> >>>
> >>> In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache components
> >>> like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing backend.
> >>> These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for Access
> >>> Control.
> >>> On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users
> >>> (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).
> >>>
> >>> We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you all)
> >>> if it is possible for the following scenario?
> >>> 1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
> >>> 2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password, there
> >>> will be a token stored in this session
> >>> 3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be
> >>> passed to backend API when querying data.
> >>>
> >>> The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this
> >>> scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time to
> >>> create a Kerberos token (for backend access).
> >>>
> >>> Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES, do
> >>> you think is possible with the help from Knox API?
> >>>
> >>> Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
> >>>
> >>> Best regards
> >>> Tien Dat PHAN
> >>>
> >>
> 

Re: Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Posted by larry mccay <lm...@apache.org>.
ugh - forgot the references for you that time...

1.
http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#KnoxSSO+Setup+and+Configuration
2.
http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#Pac4j+Provider+-+CAS+/+OAuth+/+SAML+/+OpenID+Connect
    http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#For+CAS+support:
3.
http://knox.apache.org/books/knox-1-4-0/user-guide.html#SSO+Cookie+Provider


On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 5:51 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:

> Just realized that I left out your specific question about CAS.
> We have support for CAS authentication.
> For this you will want to look into using KnoxSSO [1] and replacing the
> default config in the knoxsso.xml topology to use Pac4j [2] with it
> configured for CAS.
> You can then proxy access to your various UIs through a topology that is
> configured with the SSOCookieProvider [3] authentication provider.
>
> When you try and access a UI through Knox, it will check for the knoxsso
> cookie "hadoop-jwt" and if not found direct you to the knoxsso endpoint.
> That endpoint will be configured for your CAS server and redirect you
> there to login.
> Once successfully logged in to CAS it will redirect back to KnoxSSO which
> will in turn redirect you back to your original URL.
> The cookie will be found and access to the UI granted based on your CAS
> authentication event.
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:39 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Tien -
>>
>> Apache Knox sounds like exactly what you need here.
>> Let me explain a bit about how Knox fits into the Hadoop ecosystem.
>>
>> Apache Hadoop established an integration pattern that is used across the
>> ecosystem of related projects called proxyuser or Trusted Proxy [1].
>> This is a pattern that allows specific processes/services to make
>> requests on behalf of other endusers.
>> These trusted proxy services establish a trust relationship with the
>> backend services with a combination of:
>> * Kerberos for strong authentication for determining the identity of the
>> trusted service
>> * doAs/impersonation - this is typically a doAs query param sent to the
>> backend service from the trusted proxy
>> * configuration to dictate which hosts to expect trusted proxies to make
>> calls from, which users are allowed to be impersonated by the trusted
>> service
>>
>> Now, a high level view of Knox in this context - we'll use WebHDFS as the
>> backend service example:
>> * an enduser makes a curl call to WebHDFS through Knox: 'curl -ivku
>> guest:guest-password
>> https://localhost:8443/gateway/sandbox/webhdfs/v1/tmp?op=LISTSTATUS'
>> * Knox has an endpoint that is configured via a Knox Topology called
>> sandbox.xml and this topology is configured to support HTTP Basic Auth
>> * Knox authenticates the user via the ShiroProvider authentication
>> provider and establishes a Java Subject security context for the request
>> processing internally
>> * The request flows through the provider chain and enforces whatever
>> security policies, authorization checks, identity assertion, etc
>> * The last provider is the Dispatch to the backend service - this is
>> essentially an HTTP client that interacts with the backend service
>> * The webhdfs dispatch takes the authenticated username and sets that as
>> the doAs query param on the outgoing request and dispatches the client's
>> original request with that param added.
>> * The WebHDFS endpoint will issue a kerberos challenge to the client
>> which is Knox in this case and we will authenticate as the Knox identity
>> via Kerberos/SPNEGO
>> * WebHDFS will note that there is a doAs query param, that the Knox
>> identity is indeed a trusted proxy, that the request is coming from an
>> expected host and that the impersonation is allowed for the user being
>> asserted by the doAs.
>>
>> Hopefully that wasn't too much detail and that it proves helpful.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> --larry
>>
>> 1.
>> https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/Superusers.html
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:23 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear experts,
>>>
>>> We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for
>>> equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.
>>>
>>> In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache components
>>> like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing backend.
>>> These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for Access
>>> Control.
>>> On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users
>>> (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).
>>>
>>> We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you all)
>>> if it is possible for the following scenario?
>>> 1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
>>> 2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password, there
>>> will be a token stored in this session
>>> 3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be
>>> passed to backend API when querying data.
>>>
>>> The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this
>>> scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time to
>>> create a Kerberos token (for backend access).
>>>
>>> Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES, do
>>> you think is possible with the help from Knox API?
>>>
>>> Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
>>>
>>> Best regards
>>> Tien Dat PHAN
>>>
>>

Re: Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Posted by larry mccay <lm...@apache.org>.
Just realized that I left out your specific question about CAS.
We have support for CAS authentication.
For this you will want to look into using KnoxSSO [1] and replacing the
default config in the knoxsso.xml topology to use Pac4j [2] with it
configured for CAS.
You can then proxy access to your various UIs through a topology that is
configured with the SSOCookieProvider [3] authentication provider.

When you try and access a UI through Knox, it will check for the knoxsso
cookie "hadoop-jwt" and if not found direct you to the knoxsso endpoint.
That endpoint will be configured for your CAS server and redirect you there
to login.
Once successfully logged in to CAS it will redirect back to KnoxSSO which
will in turn redirect you back to your original URL.
The cookie will be found and access to the UI granted based on your CAS
authentication event.


On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:39 PM larry mccay <lm...@apache.org> wrote:

> Hi Tien -
>
> Apache Knox sounds like exactly what you need here.
> Let me explain a bit about how Knox fits into the Hadoop ecosystem.
>
> Apache Hadoop established an integration pattern that is used across the
> ecosystem of related projects called proxyuser or Trusted Proxy [1].
> This is a pattern that allows specific processes/services to make requests
> on behalf of other endusers.
> These trusted proxy services establish a trust relationship with the
> backend services with a combination of:
> * Kerberos for strong authentication for determining the identity of the
> trusted service
> * doAs/impersonation - this is typically a doAs query param sent to the
> backend service from the trusted proxy
> * configuration to dictate which hosts to expect trusted proxies to make
> calls from, which users are allowed to be impersonated by the trusted
> service
>
> Now, a high level view of Knox in this context - we'll use WebHDFS as the
> backend service example:
> * an enduser makes a curl call to WebHDFS through Knox: 'curl -ivku
> guest:guest-password
> https://localhost:8443/gateway/sandbox/webhdfs/v1/tmp?op=LISTSTATUS'
> * Knox has an endpoint that is configured via a Knox Topology called
> sandbox.xml and this topology is configured to support HTTP Basic Auth
> * Knox authenticates the user via the ShiroProvider authentication
> provider and establishes a Java Subject security context for the request
> processing internally
> * The request flows through the provider chain and enforces whatever
> security policies, authorization checks, identity assertion, etc
> * The last provider is the Dispatch to the backend service - this is
> essentially an HTTP client that interacts with the backend service
> * The webhdfs dispatch takes the authenticated username and sets that as
> the doAs query param on the outgoing request and dispatches the client's
> original request with that param added.
> * The WebHDFS endpoint will issue a kerberos challenge to the client which
> is Knox in this case and we will authenticate as the Knox identity via
> Kerberos/SPNEGO
> * WebHDFS will note that there is a doAs query param, that the Knox
> identity is indeed a trusted proxy, that the request is coming from an
> expected host and that the impersonation is allowed for the user being
> asserted by the doAs.
>
> Hopefully that wasn't too much detail and that it proves helpful.
>
> thanks,
>
> --larry
>
> 1.
> https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/Superusers.html
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:23 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Dear experts,
>>
>> We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for
>> equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.
>>
>> In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache components
>> like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing backend.
>> These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for Access
>> Control.
>> On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users
>> (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).
>>
>> We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you all)
>> if it is possible for the following scenario?
>> 1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
>> 2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password, there
>> will be a token stored in this session
>> 3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be
>> passed to backend API when querying data.
>>
>> The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this
>> scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time to
>> create a Kerberos token (for backend access).
>>
>> Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES, do
>> you think is possible with the help from Knox API?
>>
>> Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
>>
>> Best regards
>> Tien Dat PHAN
>>
>

Re: Knox for combining CAS authentication for UI and Kerberos for backend

Posted by larry mccay <lm...@apache.org>.
Hi Tien -

Apache Knox sounds like exactly what you need here.
Let me explain a bit about how Knox fits into the Hadoop ecosystem.

Apache Hadoop established an integration pattern that is used across the
ecosystem of related projects called proxyuser or Trusted Proxy [1].
This is a pattern that allows specific processes/services to make requests
on behalf of other endusers.
These trusted proxy services establish a trust relationship with the
backend services with a combination of:
* Kerberos for strong authentication for determining the identity of the
trusted service
* doAs/impersonation - this is typically a doAs query param sent to the
backend service from the trusted proxy
* configuration to dictate which hosts to expect trusted proxies to make
calls from, which users are allowed to be impersonated by the trusted
service

Now, a high level view of Knox in this context - we'll use WebHDFS as the
backend service example:
* an enduser makes a curl call to WebHDFS through Knox: 'curl -ivku
guest:guest-password
https://localhost:8443/gateway/sandbox/webhdfs/v1/tmp?op=LISTSTATUS'
* Knox has an endpoint that is configured via a Knox Topology called
sandbox.xml and this topology is configured to support HTTP Basic Auth
* Knox authenticates the user via the ShiroProvider authentication provider
and establishes a Java Subject security context for the request processing
internally
* The request flows through the provider chain and enforces whatever
security policies, authorization checks, identity assertion, etc
* The last provider is the Dispatch to the backend service - this is
essentially an HTTP client that interacts with the backend service
* The webhdfs dispatch takes the authenticated username and sets that as
the doAs query param on the outgoing request and dispatches the client's
original request with that param added.
* The WebHDFS endpoint will issue a kerberos challenge to the client which
is Knox in this case and we will authenticate as the Knox identity via
Kerberos/SPNEGO
* WebHDFS will note that there is a doAs query param, that the Knox
identity is indeed a trusted proxy, that the request is coming from an
expected host and that the impersonation is allowed for the user being
asserted by the doAs.

Hopefully that wasn't too much detail and that it proves helpful.

thanks,

--larry

1.
https://hadoop.apache.org/docs/current/hadoop-project-dist/hadoop-common/Superusers.html


On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 2:23 PM Tien Dat PHAN <tp...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear experts,
>
> We are recently starting to adopt Knox as the principle component for
> equipping our data processing cluster a complete security layer.
>
> In fact, the situation is, in our cluster, there are Apache components
> like Apache HBase, HDFS which play the role as our data processing backend.
> These components work perfectly with Kerberos authentication for Access
> Control.
> On the other hand, our frontend is using CAS for authenticating users
> (when accessing the data stored in our cluster).
>
> We just wonder (sorry if this turns out to a dumb question for you all) if
> it is possible for the following scenario?
> 1) User access to our web UI, inputting the username and password
> 2) The CAS authentication certificates that username and password, there
> will be a token stored in this session
> 3) We (somehow) convert this token into Kerberos token which will be
> passed to backend API when querying data.
>
> The main concern is about the step 3). The reason we think of this
> scenario is because we don't expect the users to login one more time to
> create a Kerberos token (for backend access).
>
> Do you think this is a reasonable authentication setup? And if YES, do you
> think is possible with the help from Knox API?
>
> Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.
>
> Best regards
> Tien Dat PHAN
>