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Posted to dev@httpd.apache.org by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr> on 2009/11/10 16:37:22 UTC

TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Hi,

So when Apache is compiled with openssl 0.9.8l, TLS renegotiation will 
be fully disabled.

But the problem with that if that some comments of the discussion inside 
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243 are true, this 
change will unexpectedly break very badly a *lot* of sites.

Those comments suggest Apache currently requests TLS renegotiation in 
quite a few cases where it should not be needed, and where it won't be 
expected.

First there's the short SSLSessionCacheTimeout problem :
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c23

In my understanding, SSLSessionCacheTimeout should never cause 
renegociation. If the client tries to do a SSL session resume, and the 
server does not have the SSL info for that SSL id anymore, the result is 
a brand new SSL Session, *not* a SSL renegotiation.

If they actually are resumes caused by SSLSessionCacheTimeout, then it 
seems SSLSessionCacheTimeout times out sessions that are currently 
active at the TCP level, and where the user is just trying to send more 
data. Or there's a bug in the resume code that first says yes, then 
finds the session id should have been timed out, so forces a 
renegotiation. Anyway, this means this was already broken in some way 
before, but it used to be of little consequences and will now be a huge 
problem.

Second there's the SSLVerifyClient optional problem :
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c21

When SSLVerifyClient optional is actually used to allow various 
authentication level, it's expected that the change will break the site.

But what this comment report is that simply having SSLVerifyClient 
optional set, not having any different value anywhere, not even *using* 
client certificates, will cause renegotiation to happen and therefore 
sites to break when TLS renegotiation is disabled.
And Peter Gutmann just reported on oss-sec that they are many servers 
configured like this (see http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2009/q4/138 ) with 
their admin not even knowing that they require client certificates.

According to the following comment, it might be that a very simple patch 
would correct this problems :
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c16
(I've checked the svn code for apache 2.2.x, that piece of code is still 
exactly the same, but I don't understand enough to be sure that just 
handling the "optional" case in addition to the "none" case would really 
be enough to solve the problem)

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Torsten Foertsch wrote:
> If
> your/authentication/  is a resource that generates a directory listing
> via mod_autoindex then apache issues a subrequest for each directory
> entry.

This is not what I was testing, but you are *very right* that there is 
also that problem. I'll open a bug for it, maybe analyzes will show it's 
just a duplicate of 48215, but for now technically it might be a 
different issue.

 > Now, if only/authentication/  requires a client certificate but
 > the VHost or base server does not then each entry leads to a
 > renegotiation.
> Correct me if I am wrong but that is how I have
> explained the behavior for me.

I don't know but anyway it's still a bug.

If the resolution of the SSL vulnerability had been to remove 
renegociation altogether, it would not matter. But as renegociation will 
still be there, bugs that affect renegociation should be solved.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Torsten Foertsch <to...@gmx.net>.
On Mon 16 Nov 2009, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Here's the wireshark captured exchange between the client and server,
> note that "Hello Request" always *immediatly* follows the end of the
> renegotiation. This is with Apache 2.2.11/Openssl 0.9.8i (not a
>
> production server) :
> > 217   19:30:50.745606 client_ip       server_ip       HTTP    GET
> > /authentication/ HTTP/1.1
> > 218   19:30:50.747473 server_ip       client_ip       TLSv1   Hello
> > Request
> > 219   19:30:50.747896 client_ip       server_ip       TLSv1   Clien
> >t Hello
> > 220   19:30:50.749114 server_ip       client_ip       TLSv1   Serve
> >r Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> > 257   19:30:59.267340 client_ip       server_ip       TLSv1   Certi
> >ficate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec,
> > Finished
> > 259   19:30:59.288262 server_ip       client_ip       TLSv1   Chang
> >e Cipher Spec, Finished
> > 260   19:30:59.289066 server_ip       client_ip       TLSv1   Hello
> > Request
> > 262   19:30:59.289511 client_ip       server_ip       TLSv1   Clien
> >t Hello
...
> > 510   19:31:37.260057 server_ip       client_ip       HTTP    HTTP/
> >1.1 200 OK  (text/html)

I have noticed something similar. Don't know if it applies to you. If 
your /authentication/ is a resource that generates a directory listing 
via mod_autoindex then apache issues a subrequest for each directory 
entry. Now, if only /authentication/ requires a client certificate but 
the VHost or base server does not then each entry leads to a 
renegotiation. Correct me if I am wrong but that is how I have 
explained the behavior for me.

Torsten

-- 
Need professional mod_perl support?
Just hire me: torsten.foertsch@gmx.net

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Rainer Jung wrote:
>  In the presence of the
> session ticket extension, session IDs observed on the server are no
> longer a good measurement for session reuse.

Nice remark, except it's not that, it's really broken. With "session 
tickets off" (confirmed by the absence of the session ticket extension 
in the client hello), it's still the same behaviour. Apache 
2.2.11/openssl 0.9.8i does not have session tickets enabled in my setup.

This being said :  The idea of using non-constant SSL session ID in the 
specification of the session ticket extension was really *bad*.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Rainer Jung <ra...@kippdata.de>.
On 16.11.2009 20:21, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> An interesting point is that firefox is *not* reusing the ssl session in
> that case, for some reason it sends a SessionID of 0 after the "Hello
> Request" from the server. I'll forward that to the NSS team, because if
> that behavior continues, it will be no use to implement the IETF draft
> for secure renegociation, it will fail all the same.

Only concerning empty session id: during testing the renegotiation fix I
was also looking at session IDs and got aware, that the TLS session
ticket extension will move the session status to the client. In this
case the requests belonging to the initial connection to the server will
not carry a session id. Later connections from the same client will
provide some client generated id to the server that the server replaces
it by a new one. The session ticket extension allows the server to not
maintain the session data in its own cache. In the presence of the
session ticket extension, session IDs observed on the server are no
longer a good measurement for session reuse.

In Firefox's about:config you can filter fot "tls" and switch session
tickets off.

Regards,

Rainer

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Dr Stephen Henson <sh...@oss-institute.org>.
Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
>> Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
>>> Joe Orton wrote:
>>>> Please file a bug and attach all of:
>>>>
>>>> a) error_log output at "LogLevel debug" for that case
>>>> b) the config snipping that you're using for /authentication
>>>> c) the mod_ssl configuration
>>>
>>> This is now done in bug
>>> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48215
>>>
>>> error.log might have enough info to understand what happens, but I
>>> included everything else needed to repro from scratch.
>>
>> What happens with the latest 0.9.8-stable version of OpenSSL?
> 
> Stephen, what result do you expect from this ?
> 

Basically to rule out ticket issues other things fixed in 0.9.8-stable. A number
of session ticket fixes are in 0.9.8-stable but not in 0.9.8l.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Senior Technical/Cryptography Advisor,
Open Source Software Institute: www.oss-institute.org
OpenSSL Core team: www.openssl.org

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
> Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
>> Joe Orton wrote:
>>> Please file a bug and attach all of:
>>>
>>> a) error_log output at "LogLevel debug" for that case
>>> b) the config snipping that you're using for /authentication
>>> c) the mod_ssl configuration
>>
>> This is now done in bug
>> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48215
>>
>> error.log might have enough info to understand what happens, but I
>> included everything else needed to repro from scratch.
>
> What happens with the latest 0.9.8-stable version of OpenSSL?

Stephen, what result do you expect from this ?
Does the latest 0.9.8-stable already implement safe renegociation ? But 
I'd need a version of Firefox that implement it for testing (I'll try to 
get that from Nelson).

If renegociation is simply disabled, this case will simply fail as expected.
It's not a case of mod_ssl starting renegotiation where *none* is required.
Some comments imply that one also happens sometimes but I don't know if 
it's true as I don't know how precisely to reproduce it.
But I won't exclude it given how easy it is to fall into the problem of 
mod_ssl requiring more renegotiations than really needed.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Dr Stephen Henson <sh...@oss-institute.org>.
Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Joe Orton wrote:
>> Please file a bug and attach all of:
>>
>> a) error_log output at "LogLevel debug" for that case
>> b) the config snipping that you're using for /authentication
>> c) the mod_ssl configuration
> 
> This is now done in bug
> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48215
> 
> error.log might have enough info to understand what happens, but I
> included everything else needed to repro from scratch.
> 

What happens with the latest 0.9.8-stable version of OpenSSL?

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Senior Technical/Cryptography Advisor,
Open Source Software Institute: www.oss-institute.org
OpenSSL Core team: www.openssl.org

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Joe Orton wrote:
> Please file a bug and attach all of:
>
> a) error_log output at "LogLevel debug" for that case
> b) the config snipping that you're using for /authentication
> c) the mod_ssl configuration

This is now done in bug 
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48215

error.log might have enough info to understand what happens, but I 
included everything else needed to repro from scratch.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Joe Orton <jo...@redhat.com>.
On Mon, Nov 16, 2009 at 08:21:20PM +0100, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Ok, so in fact I have one apache instance available locally with a  
> problem of this kind. It's configured to not require client  
> authentication by defaut, but to require it on the /authentication url
>
> So what happens truly is that after firefox does a request to  
> /authentication, mod_ssl does renegociation 6 times in a row for  
> apparently no reason.

Please file a bug and attach all of:

a) error_log output at "LogLevel debug" for that case 
b) the config snipping that you're using for /authentication
c) the mod_ssl configuration

Regards, Joe

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Everyone who uses client certificate authentication knows that they are
> many apache configurations around that will force the user to repeatedly
> reauthenticate himself for apparently no good reason.
>
> It's hard to believe the explanation is only that all of the concerned
> sites forgot to activate the "session resume" option.
> SSLVerifyClient and SSLSessionCacheTimeout forcing unnecessary
> renegotiation did seem like a very plausible alternative explanation.
> [...]
>
> I'll try to find out more about this, with so many users reporting that
> problem, there should be a way to get some more detailed info about what
> causes it, if it's related with erroneous renegotiation or not.

Ok, so in fact I have one apache instance available locally with a 
problem of this kind. It's configured to not require client 
authentication by defaut, but to require it on the /authentication url

So what happens truly is that after firefox does a request to 
/authentication, mod_ssl does renegociation 6 times in a row for 
apparently no reason.

An interesting point is that firefox is *not* reusing the ssl session in 
that case, for some reason it sends a SessionID of 0 after the "Hello 
Request" from the server. I'll forward that to the NSS team, because if 
that behavior continues, it will be no use to implement the IETF draft 
for secure renegociation, it will fail all the same.

In that specific case, there's not much useful to learn, we get several 
re-authentication where only one was needed, but after that it's OK, no 
more needless renegociation requests. But I hear that in some 
configuration there's a reauthentication everytime the user requires a 
resource. I'll check if I can find more, if it's not just a case of 
SSLSessionCache not being enabled.

Here's the wireshark captured exchange between the client and server, 
note that "Hello Request" always *immediatly* follows the end of the 
renegotiation. This is with Apache 2.2.11/Openssl 0.9.8i (not a 
production server) :
> 217	19:30:50.745606	client_ip	server_ip	HTTP	GET /authentication/ HTTP/1.1
> 218	19:30:50.747473	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 219	19:30:50.747896	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 220	19:30:50.749114	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 257	19:30:59.267340	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 259	19:30:59.288262	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 260	19:30:59.289066	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 262	19:30:59.289511	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 263	19:30:59.290741	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 282	19:31:07.747697	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 284	19:31:07.768765	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 285	19:31:07.769681	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 287	19:31:07.770128	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 288	19:31:07.771261	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 309	19:31:12.237699	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 311	19:31:12.258634	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 312	19:31:12.259583	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 314	19:31:12.260044	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 315	19:31:12.261187	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 441	19:31:17.613690	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 443	19:31:17.634661	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 444	19:31:17.635574	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 446	19:31:17.636005	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 447	19:31:17.638787	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 467	19:31:21.725473	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 469	19:31:21.746555	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 470	19:31:21.747127	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Hello Request
> 472	19:31:21.747552	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Client Hello
> 473	19:31:21.748911	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Server Hello, Certificate, Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
> 507	19:31:37.237284	client_ip	server_ip	TLSv1	Certificate, Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 509	19:31:37.258081	server_ip	client_ip	TLSv1	Change Cipher Spec, Finished
> 510	19:31:37.260057	server_ip	client_ip	HTTP	HTTP/1.1 200 OK  (text/html)



Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Stefan Fritsch wrote:
> On Tuesday 10 November 2009, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
>> [ Apache + openssl 0.9.8l = TLS renegotiation fully disabled ]
>> First there's the short SSLSessionCacheTimeout problem :
>> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c23
>> [...] If they actually are renegotiation caused by SSLSessionCacheTimeout,
 >> [...], this means this was
>>   already broken in some way before, but it used to be of little
>>   consequences and will now be a huge problem.
>>
>> Second there's the SSLVerifyClient optional problem :
>> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c21
>> [...]  what this comment report is that simply having SSLVerifyClient
>>  optional set, [...], will cause renegotiation to happen
>>  and therefore sites to break when TLS renegotiation is disabled.
>
> I cannot reproduce the problems. With an openssl that rejects all
> renegotiations, both reconnections after ssl session timeout and
> connections to a host with sslverifyclient optional work fine (with
> openssl s_client).

Thank you for your interest on that problem.

One thing still : Everyone who uses client certificate authentication 
knows that they are many apache configurations around that will force 
the user to repeatedly reauthenticate himself for apparently no good reason.

It's hard to believe the explanation is only that all of the concerned 
sites forgot to activate the "session resume" option.
SSLVerifyClient and SSLSessionCacheTimeout forcing unnecessary 
renegotiation did seem like a very plausible alternative explanation.

This fact is the very reason why the vilified "remember client 
certificate" option is there in Firefox 3.5 (wasn't there in 3.0), 
there's a large number of bugs opened on the subject in their bugzilla :
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=510820
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=453802
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=428744
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=474445
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=395399
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32010

I'll try to find out more about this, with so many users reporting that 
problem, there should be a way to get some more detailed info about what 
causes it, if it's related with erroneous renegotiation or not.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Ruediger Pluem <rp...@apache.org>.

On 11/18/2009 08:32 PM, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> Stefan Fritsch wrote:
>> I cannot reproduce the problems. With an openssl that rejects all
>> renegotiations, both reconnections after ssl session timeout and
>> connections to a host with sslverifyclient optional work fine (with
>> openssl s_client).
> 
> I have now succeeded in reproducing at least partially the
> "SSLVerifyClient optional" problem, though what I'm testing in not
> exactly the same as you.
> 
> I'm testing that with a server where the vhost context has
> "SSLVerifyClient None" and a /authentication directory has
> "SSLVerifyClient optional", requests that alternate between these two
> directory will repeatedly require authentication even when you have
> already authenticated yourself inside the same SSL session.

Have you tried if this goes away when you set

OptRenegotiate for SSLOptions

http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/en/mod/mod_ssl.html#ssloptions

?

Regards

Rüdiger


Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Jean-Marc Desperrier <jm...@free.fr>.
Stefan Fritsch wrote:
> I cannot reproduce the problems. With an openssl that rejects all
> renegotiations, both reconnections after ssl session timeout and
> connections to a host with sslverifyclient optional work fine (with
> openssl s_client).

I have now succeeded in reproducing at least partially the 
"SSLVerifyClient optional" problem, though what I'm testing in not 
exactly the same as you.

I'm testing that with a server where the vhost context has 
"SSLVerifyClient None" and a /authentication directory has 
"SSLVerifyClient optional", requests that alternate between these two 
directory will repeatedly require authentication even when you have 
already authenticated yourself inside the same SSL session.

The setup is the same as in 
https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=48215 , with 
SSLVerifyDepth 0 moved to vhost context in order to work around the 
initial bug 48215 problem.

I just needs the following change in the reproduction steps to reproduce 
from firefox :
- load /
- load /authentification
- just click enter to accept authentication
- press back to return to /
- press F5 to force reload
- load /authentification
- press F5 to force reload
- authentication is requested again by a server initiated renegotiation

Doing this fast enough (less than 4 or 5 seconds between each step), 
Firefox doesn't close the TCP connexion, so it happens inside the same 
already authenticated ssl session, with no ssl session resume involved.

I think that in bug 48228, when I describe that reloading the page 
causes renegotiation, it's the same bug.

So I don't know if Joe prefers that I open another bug for this, or 
wants to handle this in bug 48228.

I have validated that the behavior is the same when the client doesn't 
provide a certificate after the renegotiation. It's not really 
surprising but it's interesting in the light of the case of people 
having set "SSLVerifyClient optional" by error, and not actually using 
client certificates.

Re: TLS renegotiation disabling : mod_ssl and OpenSSL 0.9.8l

Posted by Stefan Fritsch <sf...@sfritsch.de>.
Hi,

On Tuesday 10 November 2009, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> So when Apache is compiled with openssl 0.9.8l, TLS renegotiation
>  will be fully disabled.
> 
> But the problem with that if that some comments of the discussion
>  inside https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243
>  are true, this change will unexpectedly break very badly a *lot*
>  of sites.
> 
> Those comments suggest Apache currently requests TLS renegotiation
>  in quite a few cases where it should not be needed, and where it
>  won't be expected.
> 
> First there's the short SSLSessionCacheTimeout problem :
> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c23
> 
> In my understanding, SSLSessionCacheTimeout should never cause
> renegociation. If the client tries to do a SSL session resume, and
>  the server does not have the SSL info for that SSL id anymore, the
>  result is a brand new SSL Session, *not* a SSL renegotiation.
> 
> If they actually are resumes caused by SSLSessionCacheTimeout, then
>  it seems SSLSessionCacheTimeout times out sessions that are
>  currently active at the TCP level, and where the user is just
>  trying to send more data. Or there's a bug in the resume code that
>  first says yes, then finds the session id should have been timed
>  out, so forces a renegotiation. Anyway, this means this was
>  already broken in some way before, but it used to be of little
>  consequences and will now be a huge problem.
> 
> Second there's the SSLVerifyClient optional problem :
> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c21
> 
> When SSLVerifyClient optional is actually used to allow various
> authentication level, it's expected that the change will break the
>  site.
> 
> But what this comment report is that simply having SSLVerifyClient
> optional set, not having any different value anywhere, not even
>  *using* client certificates, will cause renegotiation to happen
>  and therefore sites to break when TLS renegotiation is disabled.
> And Peter Gutmann just reported on oss-sec that they are many
>  servers configured like this (see
>  http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2009/q4/138 ) with their admin not
>  even knowing that they require client certificates.
> 
> According to the following comment, it might be that a very simple
>  patch would correct this problems :
> https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=39243#c16
> (I've checked the svn code for apache 2.2.x, that piece of code is
>  still exactly the same, but I don't understand enough to be sure
>  that just handling the "optional" case in addition to the "none"
>  case would really be enough to solve the problem)
> 

I cannot reproduce the problems. With an openssl that rejects all 
renegotiations, both reconnections after ssl session timeout and 
connections to a host with sslverifyclient optional work fine (with 
openssl s_client).

Cheers,
Stefan