You are viewing a plain text version of this content. The canonical link for it is here.
Posted to commits@labs.apache.org by fi...@apache.org on 2007/10/09 01:19:31 UTC
svn commit: r582996 [2/2] - in /labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http:
rfc2965.html rfc2965.xml
Added: labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http/rfc2965.xml
URL: http://svn.apache.org/viewvc/labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http/rfc2965.xml?rev=582996&view=auto
==============================================================================
--- labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http/rfc2965.xml (added)
+++ labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http/rfc2965.xml Mon Oct 8 16:19:30 2007
@@ -0,0 +1,1513 @@
+<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
+<?rfc toc="yes" ?>
+<?rfc symrefs="yes" ?>
+<?rfc-ext include-references-in-index="yes" ?>
+
+<!DOCTYPE rfc [
+ <!ENTITY MAY "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>MAY</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY MUST "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>MUST</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY MUST-NOT "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>MUST NOT</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY OPTIONAL "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>OPTIONAL</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY RECOMMENDED "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY REQUIRED "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>REQUIRED</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY SHALL "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>SHALL</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY SHALL-NOT "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>SHALL NOT</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY SHOULD "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>SHOULD</bcp14>">
+ <!ENTITY SHOULD-NOT "<bcp14 xmlns='http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext'>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>">
+]>
+<rfc number="2965" obsoletes="2109" category="std" xmlns:x="http://purl.org/net/xml2rfc/ext">
+
+<front>
+ <title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
+
+ <author initials='D. M.' surname='Kristol' fullname='David M. Kristol'>
+ <organization>Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies</organization>
+ <address>
+ <postal>
+ <street>600 Mountain Ave. Room 2A-333</street>
+ <city>Murray Hill</city>
+ <region>NJ</region>
+ <code>07974</code>
+ </postal>
+ <phone>(908) 582-2250</phone>
+ <facsimile>(908) 582-1239</facsimile>
+ <email>dmk@bell-labs.com</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+
+ <author initials='L.' surname='Montulli' fullname='Lou Montulli'>
+ <organization>Epinions.com, Inc.</organization>
+ <address>
+ <postal>
+ <street>2037 Landings Dr.</street>
+ <city>Mountain View</city>
+ <region>CA</region>
+ <code>94301</code>
+ </postal>
+ <email>lou@montulli.org</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+
+ <date month='October' year='2000'></date>
+
+ <abstract>
+ <t>
+ This document specifies a way to create a stateful session with
+ Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) requests and responses. It
+ describes three new headers, Cookie, Cookie2, and Set-Cookie2, which
+ carry state information between participating origin servers and user
+ agents. The method described here differs from Netscape's Cookie
+ proposal <xref target="Netscape"/>, but it can interoperate with HTTP/1.0 user
+ agents that use Netscape's method. (See the HISTORICAL section.)
+ </t><t>
+ This document reflects implementation experience with RFC 2109 and
+ obsoletes it.
+ </t>
+ </abstract>
+</front>
+<middle>
+<section title="TERMINOLOGY">
+<t>
+ The terms user agent, client, server, proxy, origin server, and
+ http_URL have the same meaning as in the HTTP/1.1 specification
+ <xref target="RFC2616"/>. The terms abs_path and absoluteURI have the same meaning
+ as in the URI Syntax specification <xref target="RFC2396"/>.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Host name (HN) means either the host domain name (HDN) or the numeric
+ Internet Protocol (IP) address of a host. The fully qualified domain
+ name is preferred; use of numeric IP addresses is strongly
+ discouraged.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The terms request-host and request-URI refer to the values the client
+ would send to the server as, respectively, the host (but not port)
+ and abs_path portions of the absoluteURI (http_URL) of the HTTP
+ request line. Note that request-host is a HN.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The term effective host name is related to host name. If a host name
+ contains no dots, the effective host name is that name with the
+ string .local appended to it. Otherwise the effective host name is
+ the same as the host name. Note that all effective host names
+ contain at least one dot.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The term request-port refers to the port portion of the absoluteURI
+ (http_URL) of the HTTP request line. If the absoluteURI has no
+ explicit port, the request-port is the HTTP default, 80. The
+ request-port of a cookie is the request-port of the request in which
+ a Set-Cookie2 response header was returned to the user agent.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Host names can be specified either as an IP address or a HDN string.
+ Sometimes we compare one host name with another. (Such comparisons
+ &SHALL; be case-insensitive.) Host A's name domain-matches host B's if
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>their host name strings string-compare equal; or</t>
+
+ <t>A is a HDN string and has the form NB, where N is a non-empty
+ name string, B has the form .B', and B' is a HDN string. (So,
+ x.y.com domain-matches .Y.com but not Y.com.)</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ Note that domain-match is not a commutative operation: a.b.c.com
+ domain-matches .c.com, but not the reverse.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The reach R of a host name H is defined as follows:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>If
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>H is the host domain name of a host; and,</t>
+ <t>H has the form A.B; and</t>
+ <t>A has no embedded (that is, interior) dots; and</t>
+ <t>B has at least one embedded dot, or B is the string "local".
+ then the reach of H is .B.</t>
+ </list>
+ </t>
+ <t>Otherwise, the reach of H is H.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ For two strings that represent paths, P1 and P2, P1 path-matches P2
+ if P2 is a prefix of P1 (including the case where P1 and P2 string-
+ compare equal). Thus, the string /tec/waldo path-matches /tec.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Because it was used in Netscape's original implementation of state
+ management, we will use the term cookie to refer to the state
+ information that passes between an origin server and user agent, and
+ that gets stored by the user agent.
+</t>
+
+<section title="Requirements">
+<t>
+ The key words "MAY", "MUST", "MUST NOT", "OPTIONAL", "RECOMMENDED",
+ "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" in this
+ document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="STATE AND SESSIONS">
+<t>
+ This document describes a way to create stateful sessions with HTTP
+ requests and responses. Currently, HTTP servers respond to each
+ client request without relating that request to previous or
+ subsequent requests; the state management mechanism allows clients
+ and servers that wish to exchange state information to place HTTP
+ requests and responses within a larger context, which we term a
+ "session". This context might be used to create, for example, a
+ "shopping cart", in which user selections can be aggregated before
+ purchase, or a magazine browsing system, in which a user's previous
+ reading affects which offerings are presented.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Neither clients nor servers are required to support cookies. A
+ server &MAY; refuse to provide content to a client that does not return
+ the cookies it sends.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="DESCRIPTION">
+<t>
+ We describe here a way for an origin server to send state information
+ to the user agent, and for the user agent to return the state
+ information to the origin server. The goal is to have a minimal
+ impact on HTTP and user agents.
+</t>
+
+<section title="Syntax: General">
+<t>
+ The two state management headers, Set-Cookie2 and Cookie, have common
+ syntactic properties involving attribute-value pairs. The following
+ grammar uses the notation, and tokens DIGIT (decimal digits), token
+ (informally, a sequence of non-special, non-white space characters),
+ and http_URL from the HTTP/1.1 specification <xref target="RFC2616"/> to describe
+ their syntax.
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="abnf2616">
+ av-pairs = av-pair *(";" av-pair)
+ av-pair = attr ["=" value] ; optional value
+ attr = token
+ value = token | quoted-string
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Attributes (names) (attr) are case-insensitive. White space is
+ permitted between tokens. Note that while the above syntax
+ description shows value as optional, most attrs require them.
+</t>
+<t>
+ NOTE: The syntax above allows whitespace between the attribute and
+ the = sign.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Origin Server Role">
+<section title="General">
+<t>
+ The origin server initiates a session, if it so
+ desires. To do so, it returns an extra response header to the
+ client, Set-Cookie2. (The details follow later.)
+</t>
+<t>
+ A user agent returns a Cookie request header (see below) to the
+ origin server if it chooses to continue a session. The origin server
+ &MAY; ignore it or use it to determine the current state of the
+ session. It &MAY; send back to the client a Set-Cookie2 response
+ header with the same or different information, or it &MAY; send no
+ Set-Cookie2 header at all. The origin server effectively ends a
+ session by sending the client a Set-Cookie2 header with Max-Age=0.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Servers &MAY; return Set-Cookie2 response headers with any response.
+ User agents &SHOULD; send Cookie request headers, subject to other
+ rules detailed below, with every request.
+</t>
+<t>
+ An origin server &MAY; include multiple Set-Cookie2 headers in a
+ response. Note that an intervening gateway could fold multiple such
+ headers into a single header.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Set-Cookie2 Syntax">
+<iref item="Set-Cookie2 header" primary="true"/>
+<iref item="Headers" subitem="Set-Cookie2" primary="true"/>
+<t>
+ The syntax for the Set-Cookie2 response
+ header is
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="abnf2616">
+ set-cookie = "Set-Cookie2:" cookies
+ cookies = 1#cookie
+ cookie = NAME "=" VALUE *(";" set-cookie-av)
+ NAME = attr
+ VALUE = value
+ set-cookie-av = "Comment" "=" value
+ | "CommentURL" "=" <"> http_URL <">
+ | "Discard"
+ | "Domain" "=" value
+ | "Max-Age" "=" value
+ | "Path" "=" value
+ | "Port" [ "=" <"> portlist <"> ]
+ | "Secure"
+ | "Version" "=" 1*DIGIT
+ portlist = 1#portnum
+ portnum = 1*DIGIT
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Informally, the Set-Cookie2 response header comprises the token Set-Cookie2:,
+ followed by a comma-separated list of one or more cookies.
+ Each cookie begins with a NAME=VALUE pair, followed by zero or more
+ semi-colon-separated attribute-value pairs. The syntax for
+ attribute-value pairs was shown earlier. The specific attributes and
+ the semantics of their values follows. The NAME=VALUE attribute-value
+ pair &MUST; come first in each cookie. The others, if present,
+ can occur in any order. If an attribute appears more than once in a
+ cookie, the client &SHALL; use only the value associated with the first
+ appearance of the attribute; a client &MUST; ignore values after the
+ first.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The NAME of a cookie &MAY; be the same as one of the attributes in this
+ specification. However, because the cookie's NAME must come first in
+ a Set-Cookie2 response header, the NAME and its VALUE cannot be
+ confused with an attribute-value pair.
+</t>
+<t>
+ <list style="hanging">
+ <x:lt hangText="NAME=VALUE">
+ <t>
+ &REQUIRED;. The name of the state information ("cookie") is NAME,
+ and its value is VALUE. NAMEs that begin with $ are reserved and
+ &MUST-NOT; be used by applications.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The VALUE is opaque to the user agent and may be anything the
+ origin server chooses to send, possibly in a server-selected
+ printable ASCII encoding. "Opaque" implies that the content is of
+ interest and relevance only to the origin server. The content
+ may, in fact, be readable by anyone that examines the Set-Cookie2
+ header.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Comment=value">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. Because cookies can be used to derive or store private
+ information about a user, the value of the Comment attribute
+ allows an origin server to document how it intends to use the
+ cookie. The user can inspect the information to decide whether to
+ initiate or continue a session with this cookie. Characters in
+ value &MUST; be in UTF-8 encoding. <xref target="RFC2279"/>
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText='CommentURL="http_URL"'>
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. Because cookies can be used to derive or store private
+ information about a user, the CommentURL attribute allows an
+ origin server to document how it intends to use the cookie. The
+ user can inspect the information identified by the URL to decide
+ whether to initiate or continue a session with this cookie.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Discard">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The Discard attribute instructs the user agent to
+ discard the cookie unconditionally when the user agent terminates.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Domain=value">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The value of the Domain attribute specifies the domain
+ for which the cookie is valid. If an explicitly specified value
+ does not start with a dot, the user agent supplies a leading dot.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Max-Age=value">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The value of the Max-Age attribute is delta-seconds,
+ the lifetime of the cookie in seconds, a decimal non-negative
+ integer. To handle cached cookies correctly, a client &SHOULD;
+ calculate the age of the cookie according to the age calculation
+ rules in the HTTP/1.1 specification <xref target="RFC2616"/>. When the age is
+ greater than delta-seconds seconds, the client &SHOULD; discard the
+ cookie. A value of zero means the cookie &SHOULD; be discarded
+ immediately.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Path=value">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The value of the Path attribute specifies the subset of
+ URLs on the origin server to which this cookie applies.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText='Port[="portlist"]'>
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The Port attribute restricts the port to which a cookie
+ may be returned in a Cookie request header. Note that the syntax
+ REQUIREs quotes around the &OPTIONAL; portlist even if there is only
+ one portnum in portlist.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Secure">
+ <t>
+ &OPTIONAL;. The Secure attribute (with no value) directs the user
+ agent to use only (unspecified) secure means to contact the origin
+ server whenever it sends back this cookie, to protect the
+ confidentially and authenticity of the information in the cookie.
+ </t>
+ <t>
+ The user agent (possibly with user interaction) &MAY; determine what
+ level of security it considers appropriate for "secure" cookies.
+ The Secure attribute should be considered security advice from the
+ server to the user agent, indicating that it is in the session's
+ interest to protect the cookie contents. When it sends a "secure"
+ cookie back to a server, the user agent &SHOULD; use no less than
+ the same level of security as was used when it received the cookie
+ from the server.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ <x:lt hangText="Version=value">
+ <t>
+ &REQUIRED;. The value of the Version attribute, a decimal integer,
+ identifies the version of the state management specification to
+ which the cookie conforms. For this specification, Version=1
+ applies.
+ </t>
+ </x:lt>
+ </list>
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Controlling Caching">
+<t>
+ An origin server must be cognizant of the
+ effect of possible caching of both the returned resource and the
+ Set-Cookie2 header. Caching "public" documents is desirable. For
+ example, if the origin server wants to use a public document such as
+ a "front door" page as a sentinel to indicate the beginning of a
+ session for which a Set-Cookie2 response header must be generated,
+ the page &SHOULD; be stored in caches "pre-expired" so that the origin
+ server will see further requests. "Private documents", for example
+ those that contain information strictly private to a session, &SHOULD;
+ NOT be cached in shared caches.
+</t>
+<t>
+ If the cookie is intended for use by a single user, the Set-Cookie2
+ header &SHOULD-NOT; be cached. A Set-Cookie2 header that is intended
+ to be shared by multiple users &MAY; be cached.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The origin server &SHOULD; send the following additional HTTP/1.1
+ response headers, depending on circumstances:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>To suppress caching of the Set-Cookie2 header:
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: no-cache="set-cookie2"
+</artwork></figure>
+ </t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ and one of the following:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>To suppress caching of a private document in shared caches:
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: private
+</artwork></figure>
+ </t>
+ <t>To allow caching of a document and require that it be validated
+ before returning it to the client:
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-Control: must-revalidate, max-age=0
+</artwork></figure>
+ </t>
+ <t>To allow caching of a document, but to require that proxy
+ caches (not user agent caches) validate it before returning it
+ to the client:
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-Control: proxy-revalidate, max-age=0
+</artwork></figure>
+ </t>
+ <t>To allow caching of a document and request that it be validated
+ before returning it to the client (by "pre-expiring" it):
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: max-age=0
+</artwork></figure>
+ Not all caches will revalidate the document in every case.
+ </t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ HTTP/1.1 servers &MUST; send Expires: old-date (where old-date is a
+ date long in the past) on responses containing Set-Cookie2 response
+ headers unless they know for certain (by out of band means) that
+ there are no HTTP/1.0 proxies in the response chain. HTTP/1.1
+ servers &MAY; send other Cache-Control directives that permit caching
+ by HTTP/1.1 proxies in addition to the Expires: old-date directive;
+ the Cache-Control directive will override the Expires: old-date for
+ HTTP/1.1 proxies.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="User Agent Role">
+<section title="Interpreting Set-Cookie2">
+<t>
+ The user agent keeps separate track
+ of state information that arrives via Set-Cookie2 response headers
+ from each origin server (as distinguished by name or IP address and
+ port). The user agent &MUST; ignore attribute-value pairs whose
+ attribute it does not recognize. The user agent applies these
+ defaults for optional attributes that are missing:
+</t>
+<t>
+ <list style="hanging">
+ <t hangText="Discard">The default behavior is dictated by the presence or absence
+ of a Max-Age attribute.</t>
+ <t hangText="Domain">Defaults to the effective request-host. (Note that because
+ there is no dot at the beginning of effective request-host,
+ the default Domain can only domain-match itself.)</t>
+ <t hangText="Max-Age">The default behavior is to discard the cookie when the user
+ agent exits.</t>
+ <t hangText="Path">Defaults to the path of the request URL that generated the
+ Set-Cookie2 response, up to and including the right-most /.</t>
+ <t hangText="Port">The default behavior is that a cookie &MAY; be returned to any
+ request-port.</t>
+ <t hangText="Secure">If absent, the user agent &MAY; send the cookie over an
+ insecure channel.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Rejecting Cookies">
+<t>
+ To prevent possible security or privacy
+ violations, a user agent rejects a cookie according to rules below.
+ The goal of the rules is to try to limit the set of servers for which
+ a cookie is valid, based on the values of the Path, Domain, and Port
+ attributes and the request-URI, request-host and request-port.
+</t>
+<t>
+ A user agent rejects (&SHALL-NOT; store its information) if the Version
+ attribute is missing. Moreover, a user agent rejects (&SHALL-NOT;
+ store its information) if any of the following is true of the
+ attributes explicitly present in the Set-Cookie2 response header:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>The value for the Path attribute is not a prefix of the
+ request-URI.</t>
+ <t>The value for the Domain attribute contains no embedded dots,
+ and the value is not .local.</t>
+ <t>The effective host name that derives from the request-host does
+ not domain-match the Domain attribute.</t>
+ <t>The request-host is a HDN (not IP address) and has the form HD,
+ where D is the value of the Domain attribute, and H is a string
+ that contains one or more dots.</t>
+ <t>The Port attribute has a "port-list", and the request-port was
+ not in the list.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ Examples:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 from request-host y.x.foo.com for Domain=.foo.com
+ would be rejected, because H is y.x and contains a dot.</t>
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 from request-host x.foo.com for Domain=.foo.com
+ would be accepted.</t>
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 with Domain=.com or Domain=.com., will always be
+ rejected, because there is no embedded dot.</t>
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 with Domain=ajax.com will be accepted, and the
+ value for Domain will be taken to be .ajax.com, because a dot
+ gets prepended to the value.</t>
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 with Port="80,8000" will be accepted if the
+ request was made to port 80 or 8000 and will be rejected
+ otherwise.</t>
+ <t>A Set-Cookie2 from request-host example for Domain=.local will
+ be accepted, because the effective host name for the request-
+ host is example.local, and example.local domain-matches .local.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Cookie Management">
+<t>
+ If a user agent receives a Set-Cookie2
+ response header whose NAME is the same as that of a cookie it has
+ previously stored, the new cookie supersedes the old when: the old
+ and new Domain attribute values compare equal, using a case-insensitive string-compare;
+ and, the old and new Path attribute
+ values string-compare equal (case-sensitive). However, if the Set-Cookie2
+ has a value for Max-Age of zero, the (old and new) cookie is
+ discarded. Otherwise a cookie persists (resources permitting) until
+ whichever happens first, then gets discarded: its Max-Age lifetime is
+ exceeded; or, if the Discard attribute is set, the user agent
+ terminates the session.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Because user agents have finite space in which to store cookies, they
+ &MAY; also discard older cookies to make space for newer ones, using,
+ for example, a least-recently-used algorithm, along with constraints
+ on the maximum number of cookies that each origin server may set.
+</t>
+<t>
+ If a Set-Cookie2 response header includes a Comment attribute, the
+ user agent &SHOULD; store that information in a human-readable form
+ with the cookie and &SHOULD; display the comment text as part of a
+ cookie inspection user interface.
+</t>
+<t>
+ If a Set-Cookie2 response header includes a CommentURL attribute, the
+ user agent &SHOULD; store that information in a human-readable form
+ with the cookie, or, preferably, &SHOULD; allow the user to follow the
+ http_URL link as part of a cookie inspection user interface.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The cookie inspection user interface may include a facility whereby a
+ user can decide, at the time the user agent receives the Set-Cookie2
+ response header, whether or not to accept the cookie. A potentially
+ confusing situation could arise if the following sequence occurs:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>the user agent receives a cookie that contains a CommentURL
+ attribute;</t>
+ <t>the user agent's cookie inspection interface is configured so
+ that it presents a dialog to the user before the user agent
+ accepts the cookie;</t>
+ <t>the dialog allows the user to follow the CommentURL link when
+ the user agent receives the cookie; and,</t>
+ <t>when the user follows the CommentURL link, the origin server
+ (or another server, via other links in the returned content)
+ returns another cookie.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ The user agent &SHOULD-NOT; send any cookies in this context. The user
+ agent &MAY; discard any cookie it receives in this context that the
+ user has not, through some user agent mechanism, deemed acceptable.
+</t>
+<t>
+ User agents &SHOULD; allow the user to control cookie destruction, but
+ they &MUST-NOT; extend the cookie's lifetime beyond that controlled by
+ the Discard and Max-Age attributes. An infrequently-used cookie may
+ function as a "preferences file" for network applications, and a user
+ may wish to keep it even if it is the least-recently-used cookie. One
+ possible implementation would be an interface that allows the
+ permanent storage of a cookie through a checkbox (or, conversely, its
+ immediate destruction).
+</t>
+<t>
+ Privacy considerations dictate that the user have considerable
+ control over cookie management. The PRIVACY section contains more
+ information.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Sending Cookies to the Origin Server">
+<iref item="Cookie header" primary="true"/>
+<iref item="Headers" subitem="Cookie" primary="true"/>
+<t>
+ When it sends a request
+ to an origin server, the user agent includes a Cookie request header
+ if it has stored cookies that are applicable to the request, based on
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>the request-host and request-port;</t>
+ <t>the request-URI;</t>
+ <t>the cookie's age.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<figure><preamble>
+ The syntax for the header is:
+</preamble><artwork type="abnf2616">
+cookie = "Cookie:" cookie-version 1*((";" | ",") cookie-value)
+cookie-value = NAME "=" VALUE [";" path] [";" domain] [";" port]
+cookie-version = "$Version" "=" value
+NAME = attr
+VALUE = value
+path = "$Path" "=" value
+domain = "$Domain" "=" value
+port = "$Port" [ "=" <"> value <"> ]
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ The value of the cookie-version attribute &MUST; be the value from the
+ Version attribute of the corresponding Set-Cookie2 response header.
+ Otherwise the value for cookie-version is 0. The value for the path
+ attribute &MUST; be the value from the Path attribute, if one was
+ present, of the corresponding Set-Cookie2 response header. Otherwise
+ the attribute &SHOULD; be omitted from the Cookie request header. The
+ value for the domain attribute &MUST; be the value from the Domain
+ attribute, if one was present, of the corresponding Set-Cookie2
+ response header. Otherwise the attribute &SHOULD; be omitted from the
+ Cookie request header.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The port attribute of the Cookie request header &MUST; mirror the Port
+ attribute, if one was present, in the corresponding Set-Cookie2
+ response header. That is, the port attribute &MUST; be present if the
+ Port attribute was present in the Set-Cookie2 header, and it &MUST;
+ have the same value, if any. Otherwise, if the Port attribute was
+ absent from the Set-Cookie2 header, the attribute likewise &MUST; be
+ omitted from the Cookie request header.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Note that there is neither a Comment nor a CommentURL attribute in
+ the Cookie request header corresponding to the ones in the Set-Cookie2
+ response header. The user agent does not return the comment
+ information to the origin server.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The user agent applies the following rules to choose applicable
+ cookie-values to send in Cookie request headers from among all the
+ cookies it has received.
+ <list style="hanging">
+ <t hangText="Domain Selection">
+ The origin server's effective host name &MUST; domain-match the
+ Domain attribute of the cookie.
+ </t>
+ <t hangText="Port Selection">
+ There are three possible behaviors, depending on the Port
+ attribute in the Set-Cookie2 response header:
+ <list style="numbers">
+ <t>By default (no Port attribute), the cookie &MAY; be sent to any
+ port.</t>
+ <t>If the attribute is present but has no value (e.g., Port), the
+ cookie &MUST; only be sent to the request-port it was received
+ from.</t>
+ <t>If the attribute has a port-list, the cookie &MUST; only be
+ returned if the new request-port is one of those listed in
+ port-list.</t>
+ </list>
+ </t>
+ <t hangText="Path Selection">
+ The request-URI &MUST; path-match the Path attribute of the cookie.
+ </t>
+ <t hangText="Max-Age Selection">
+ Cookies that have expired should have been discarded and thus are
+ not forwarded to an origin server.
+ </t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ If multiple cookies satisfy the criteria above, they are ordered in
+ the Cookie header such that those with more specific Path attributes
+ precede those with less specific. Ordering with respect to other
+ attributes (e.g., Domain) is unspecified.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Note: For backward compatibility, the separator in the Cookie header
+ is semi-colon (;) everywhere. A server &SHOULD; also accept comma (,)
+ as the separator between cookie-values for future compatibility.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Identifying What Version is Understood: Cookie2">
+<iref item="Cookie2 header" primary="true"/>
+<iref item="Headers" subitem="Cookie2" primary="true"/>
+<t>
+ The Cookie2
+ request header facilitates interoperation between clients and servers
+ that understand different versions of the cookie specification. When
+ the client sends one or more cookies to an origin server, if at least
+ one of those cookies contains a $Version attribute whose value is
+ different from the version that the client understands, then the
+ client &MUST; also send a Cookie2 request header, the syntax for which
+ is
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="abnf2616">
+ cookie2 = "Cookie2:" cookie-version
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Here the value for cookie-version is the highest version of cookie
+ specification (currently 1) that the client understands. The client
+ needs to send at most one such request header per request.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Sending Cookies in Unverifiable Transactions">
+<t>
+ Users &MUST; have
+ control over sessions in order to ensure privacy. (See PRIVACY
+ section below.) To simplify implementation and to prevent an
+ additional layer of complexity where adequate safeguards exist,
+ however, this document distinguishes between transactions that are
+ verifiable and those that are unverifiable. A transaction is
+ verifiable if the user, or a user-designated agent, has the option to
+ review the request-URI prior to its use in the transaction. A
+ transaction is unverifiable if the user does not have that option.
+ Unverifiable transactions typically arise when a user agent
+ automatically requests inlined or embedded entities or when it
+ resolves redirection (3xx) responses from an origin server.
+ Typically the origin transaction, the transaction that the user
+ initiates, is verifiable, and that transaction may directly or
+ indirectly induce the user agent to make unverifiable transactions.
+</t>
+<t>
+ An unverifiable transaction is to a third-party host if its request-host
+ U does not domain-match the reach R of the request-host O in the
+ origin transaction.
+</t>
+<t>
+ When it makes an unverifiable transaction, a user agent &MUST; disable
+ all cookie processing (i.e., &MUST-NOT; send cookies, and &MUST-NOT;
+ accept any received cookies) if the transaction is to a third-party
+ host.
+</t>
+<t>
+ This restriction prevents a malicious service author from using
+ unverifiable transactions to induce a user agent to start or continue
+ a session with a server in a different domain. The starting or
+ continuation of such sessions could be contrary to the privacy
+ expectations of the user, and could also be a security problem.
+</t>
+<t>
+ User agents &MAY; offer configurable options that allow the user agent,
+ or any autonomous programs that the user agent executes, to ignore
+ the above rule, so long as these override options default to "off".
+</t>
+<t>
+ (N.B. Mechanisms may be proposed that will automate overriding the
+ third-party restrictions under controlled conditions.)
+</t>
+<t>
+ Many current user agents already provide a review option that would
+ render many links verifiable. For instance, some user agents display
+ the URL that would be referenced for a particular link when the mouse
+ pointer is placed over that link. The user can therefore determine
+ whether to visit that site before causing the browser to do so.
+ (Though not implemented on current user agents, a similar technique
+ could be used for a button used to submit a form -- the user agent
+ could display the action to be taken if the user were to select that
+ button.) However, even this would not make all links verifiable; for
+ example, links to automatically loaded images would not normally be
+ subject to "mouse pointer" verification.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Many user agents also provide the option for a user to view the HTML
+ source of a document, or to save the source to an external file where
+ it can be viewed by another application. While such an option does
+ provide a crude review mechanism, some users might not consider it
+ acceptable for this purpose.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="How an Origin Server Interprets the Cookie Header">
+<t>
+ A user agent returns much of the information in the Set-Cookie2
+ header to the origin server when the request-URI path-matches the
+ Path attribute of the cookie. When it receives a Cookie header, the
+ origin server &SHOULD; treat cookies with NAMEs whose prefix is $
+ specially, as an attribute for the cookie.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Caching Proxy Role">
+<t>
+ One reason for separating state information from both a URL and
+ document content is to facilitate the scaling that caching permits.
+ To support cookies, a caching proxy &MUST; obey these rules already in
+ the HTTP specification:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>Honor requests from the cache, if possible, based on cache
+ validity rules.</t>
+ <t>Pass along a Cookie request header in any request that the
+ proxy must make of another server.</t>
+ <t>Return the response to the client. Include any Set-Cookie2
+ response header.</t>
+ <t>Cache the received response subject to the control of the usual
+ headers, such as Expires,
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: no-cache
+</artwork></figure>
+ and
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: private
+</artwork></figure>
+ </t>
+ <t>Cache the Set-Cookie2 subject to the control of the usual
+ header,
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cache-control: no-cache="set-cookie2"
+</artwork></figure>
+ (The Set-Cookie2 header should usually not be cached.)</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ Proxies &MUST-NOT; introduce Set-Cookie2 (Cookie) headers of their own
+ in proxy responses (requests).
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="EXAMPLES">
+
+<section title="Example 1">
+<t>
+ Most detail of request and response headers has been omitted. Assume
+ the user agent has no stored cookies.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 1. User Agent -> Server
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="request"'>
+ POST /acme/login HTTP/1.1
+ [form data]
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ User identifies self via a form.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 2. Server -> User Agent
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="response"'>
+ HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+ Set-Cookie2: Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; Version="1"; Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Cookie reflects user's identity.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 3. User Agent -> Server
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="request"'>
+ POST /acme/pickitem HTTP/1.1
+ Cookie: $Version="1"; Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme"
+ [form data]
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ User selects an item for "shopping basket".
+</t>
+<t>
+ 4. Server -> User Agent
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="response"'>
+ HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+ Set-Cookie2: Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; Version="1";
+ Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Shopping basket contains an item.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 5. User Agent -> Server
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="request"'>
+ POST /acme/shipping HTTP/1.1
+ Cookie: $Version="1";
+ Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme";
+ Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme"
+ [form data]
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ User selects shipping method from form.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 6. Server -> User Agent
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="response"'>
+ HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+ Set-Cookie2: Shipping="FedEx"; Version="1"; Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ New cookie reflects shipping method.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 7. User Agent -> Server
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="request"'>
+ POST /acme/process HTTP/1.1
+ Cookie: $Version="1";
+ Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme";
+ Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme";
+ Shipping="FedEx"; $Path="/acme"
+ [form data]
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ User chooses to process order.
+</t>
+<t>
+ 8. Server -> User Agent
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type='message/http; msgtype="response"'>
+ HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Transaction is complete.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The user agent makes a series of requests on the origin server, after
+ each of which it receives a new cookie. All the cookies have the
+ same Path attribute and (default) domain. Because the request-URIs
+ all path-match /acme, the Path attribute of each cookie, each request
+ contains all the cookies received so far.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Example 2">
+<t>
+ This example illustrates the effect of the Path attribute. All
+ detail of request and response headers has been omitted. Assume the
+ user agent has no stored cookies.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Imagine the user agent has received, in response to earlier requests,
+ the response headers
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Set-Cookie2: Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; Version="1";
+ Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ and
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Set-Cookie2: Part_Number="Riding_Rocket_0023"; Version="1";
+ Path="/acme/ammo"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ A subsequent request by the user agent to the (same) server for URLs
+ of the form /acme/ammo/... would include the following request
+ header:
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cookie: $Version="1";
+ Part_Number="Riding_Rocket_0023"; $Path="/acme/ammo";
+ Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Note that the NAME=VALUE pair for the cookie with the more specific
+ Path attribute, /acme/ammo, comes before the one with the less
+ specific Path attribute, /acme. Further note that the same cookie
+ name appears more than once.
+</t>
+<t>
+ A subsequent request by the user agent to the (same) server for a URL
+ of the form /acme/parts/ would include the following request header:
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cookie: $Version="1"; Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001";
+ $Path="/acme"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ Here, the second cookie's Path attribute /acme/ammo is not a prefix
+ of the request URL, /acme/parts/, so the cookie does not get
+ forwarded to the server.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS">
+<t>
+ Here we provide guidance on likely or desirable details for an origin
+ server that implements state management.
+</t>
+
+<section title="Set-Cookie2 Content">
+<t>
+ An origin server's content should probably be divided into disjoint
+ application areas, some of which require the use of state
+ information. The application areas can be distinguished by their
+ request URLs. The Set-Cookie2 header can incorporate information
+ about the application areas by setting the Path attribute for each
+ one.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The session information can obviously be clear or encoded text that
+ describes state. However, if it grows too large, it can become
+ unwieldy. Therefore, an implementor might choose for the session
+ information to be a key to a server-side resource. Of course, using
+ a database creates some problems that this state management
+ specification was meant to avoid, namely:
+ <list style="numbers">
+ <t>keeping real state on the server side;</t>
+ <t>how and when to garbage-collect the database entry, in case the
+ user agent terminates the session by, for example, exiting.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Stateless Pages">
+<t>
+ Caching benefits the scalability of WWW. Therefore it is important
+ to reduce the number of documents that have state embedded in them
+ inherently. For example, if a shopping-basket-style application
+ always displays a user's current basket contents on each page, those
+ pages cannot be cached, because each user's basket's contents would
+ be different. On the other hand, if each page contains just a link
+ that allows the user to "Look at My Shopping Basket", the page can be
+ cached.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Implementation Limits">
+<t>
+ Practical user agent implementations have limits on the number and
+ size of cookies that they can store. In general, user agents' cookie
+ support should have no fixed limits. They should strive to store as
+ many frequently-used cookies as possible. Furthermore, general-use
+ user agents &SHOULD; provide each of the following minimum capabilities
+ individually, although not necessarily simultaneously:
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>at least 300 cookies</t>
+ <t>at least 4096 bytes per cookie (as measured by the characters
+ that comprise the cookie non-terminal in the syntax description
+ of the Set-Cookie2 header, and as received in the Set-Cookie2
+ header)</t>
+ <t>at least 20 cookies per unique host or domain name</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ User agents created for specific purposes or for limited-capacity
+ devices &SHOULD; provide at least 20 cookies of 4096 bytes, to ensure
+ that the user can interact with a session-based origin server.
+</t>
+<t>
+ The information in a Set-Cookie2 response header &MUST; be retained in
+ its entirety. If for some reason there is inadequate space to store
+ the cookie, it &MUST; be discarded, not truncated.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Applications should use as few and as small cookies as possible, and
+ they should cope gracefully with the loss of a cookie.
+</t>
+
+<section title="Denial of Service Attacks">
+<t>
+ User agents &MAY; choose to set an
+ upper bound on the number of cookies to be stored from a given host
+ or domain name or on the size of the cookie information. Otherwise a
+ malicious server could attempt to flood a user agent with many
+ cookies, or large cookies, on successive responses, which would force
+ out cookies the user agent had received from other servers. However,
+ the minima specified above &SHOULD; still be supported.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="PRIVACY">
+<t>
+ Informed consent should guide the design of systems that use cookies.
+ A user should be able to find out how a web site plans to use
+ information in a cookie and should be able to choose whether or not
+ those policies are acceptable. Both the user agent and the origin
+ server must assist informed consent.
+</t>
+
+<section title="User Agent Control">
+<t>
+ An origin server could create a Set-Cookie2 header to track the path
+ of a user through the server. Users may object to this behavior as
+ an intrusive accumulation of information, even if their identity is
+ not evident. (Identity might become evident, for example, if a user
+ subsequently fills out a form that contains identifying information.)
+ This state management specification therefore requires that a user
+ agent give the user control over such a possible intrusion, although
+ the interface through which the user is given this control is left
+ unspecified. However, the control mechanisms provided &SHALL; at least
+ allow the user
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>to completely disable the sending and saving of cookies.</t>
+ <t>to determine whether a stateful session is in progress.</t>
+ <t>to control the saving of a cookie on the basis of the cookie's
+ Domain attribute.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ Such control could be provided, for example, by mechanisms
+ <list style="symbols">
+ <t>to notify the user when the user agent is about to send a
+ cookie to the origin server, to offer the option not to begin a
+ session.</t>
+ <t>to display a visual indication that a stateful session is in
+ progress.</t>
+ <t>to let the user decide which cookies, if any, should be saved
+ when the user concludes a window or user agent session.</t>
+ <t>to let the user examine and delete the contents of a cookie at
+ any time.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ A user agent usually begins execution with no remembered state
+ information. It &SHOULD; be possible to configure a user agent never
+ to send Cookie headers, in which case it can never sustain state with
+ an origin server. (The user agent would then behave like one that is
+ unaware of how to handle Set-Cookie2 response headers.)
+</t>
+<t>
+ When the user agent terminates execution, it &SHOULD; let the user
+ discard all state information. Alternatively, the user agent &MAY; ask
+ the user whether state information should be retained; the default
+ should be "no". If the user chooses to retain state information, it
+ would be restored the next time the user agent runs.
+</t>
+<t>
+ NOTE: User agents should probably be cautious about using files to
+ store cookies long-term. If a user runs more than one instance of
+ the user agent, the cookies could be commingled or otherwise
+ corrupted.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Origin Server Role">
+<t>
+ An origin server &SHOULD; promote informed consent by adding CommentURL
+ or Comment information to the cookies it sends. CommentURL is
+ preferred because of the opportunity to provide richer information in
+ a multiplicity of languages.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Clear Text">
+<t>
+ The information in the Set-Cookie2 and Cookie headers is unprotected.
+ As a consequence:
+ <list style="numbers">
+ <t>Any sensitive information that is conveyed in them is exposed
+ to intruders.</t>
+ <t>A malicious intermediary could alter the headers as they travel
+ in either direction, with unpredictable results.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+<t>
+ These facts imply that information of a personal and/or financial
+ nature should only be sent over a secure channel. For less sensitive
+ information, or when the content of the header is a database key, an
+ origin server should be vigilant to prevent a bad Cookie value from
+ causing failures.
+</t>
+<t>
+ A user agent in a shared user environment poses a further risk.
+ Using a cookie inspection interface, User B could examine the
+ contents of cookies that were saved when User A used the machine.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS">
+
+<section title="Protocol Design">
+<t>
+ The restrictions on the value of the Domain attribute, and the rules
+ concerning unverifiable transactions, are meant to reduce the ways
+ that cookies can "leak" to the "wrong" site. The intent is to
+ restrict cookies to one host, or a closely related set of hosts.
+ Therefore a request-host is limited as to what values it can set for
+ Domain. We consider it acceptable for hosts host1.foo.com and
+ host2.foo.com to share cookies, but not a.com and b.com.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Similarly, a server can set a Path only for cookies that are related
+ to the request-URI.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Cookie Spoofing">
+<t>
+ Proper application design can avoid spoofing attacks from related
+ domains. Consider:
+ <list style="numbers">
+ <t>User agent makes request to victim.cracker.edu, gets back
+ cookie session_id="1234" and sets the default domain
+ victim.cracker.edu.</t>
+
+ <t>User agent makes request to spoof.cracker.edu, gets back cookie
+ session-id="1111", with Domain=".cracker.edu".</t>
+
+ <t>User agent makes request to victim.cracker.edu again, and
+ passes
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cookie: $Version="1"; session_id="1234",
+ $Version="1"; session_id="1111"; $Domain=".cracker.edu"
+</artwork></figure>
+ The server at victim.cracker.edu should detect that the second
+ cookie was not one it originated by noticing that the Domain
+ attribute is not for itself and ignore it.</t>
+ </list>
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Unexpected Cookie Sharing">
+<t>
+ A user agent &SHOULD; make every attempt to prevent the sharing of
+ session information between hosts that are in different domains.
+ Embedded or inlined objects may cause particularly severe privacy
+ problems if they can be used to share cookies between disparate
+ hosts. For example, a malicious server could embed cookie
+ information for host a.com in a URI for a CGI on host b.com. User
+ agent implementors are strongly encouraged to prevent this sort of
+ exchange whenever possible.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Cookies For Account Information">
+<t>
+ While it is common practice to use them this way, cookies are not
+ designed or intended to be used to hold authentication information,
+ such as account names and passwords. Unless such cookies are
+ exchanged over an encrypted path, the account information they
+ contain is highly vulnerable to perusal and theft.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="OTHER, SIMILAR, PROPOSALS">
+<t>
+ Apart from RFC 2109, three other proposals have been made to
+ accomplish similar goals. This specification began as an amalgam of
+ Kristol's State-Info proposal <xref target="DMK95"/> and Netscape's Cookie proposal
+ <xref target="Netscape"/>.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Brian Behlendorf proposed a Session-ID header that would be user-agent-initiated
+ and could be used by an origin server to track
+ "clicktrails". It would not carry any origin-server-defined state,
+ however. Phillip Hallam-Baker has proposed another client-defined
+ session ID mechanism for similar purposes.
+</t>
+<t>
+ While both session IDs and cookies can provide a way to sustain
+ stateful sessions, their intended purpose is different, and,
+ consequently, the privacy requirements for them are different. A
+ user initiates session IDs to allow servers to track progress through
+ them, or to distinguish multiple users on a shared machine. Cookies
+ are server-initiated, so the cookie mechanism described here gives
+ users control over something that would otherwise take place without
+ the users' awareness. Furthermore, cookies convey rich, server-selected
+ information, whereas session IDs comprise user-selected,
+ simple information.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="HISTORICAL">
+
+<section title="Compatibility with Existing Implementations">
+<t>
+ Existing cookie implementations, based on the Netscape specification,
+ use the Set-Cookie (not Set-Cookie2) header. User agents that
+ receive in the same response both a Set-Cookie and Set-Cookie2
+ response header for the same cookie &MUST; discard the Set-Cookie
+ information and use only the Set-Cookie2 information. Furthermore, a
+ user agent &MUST; assume, if it received a Set-Cookie2 response header,
+ that the sending server complies with this document and will
+ understand Cookie request headers that also follow this
+ specification.
+</t>
+<t>
+ New cookies &MUST; replace both equivalent old- and new-style cookies.
+ That is, if a user agent that follows both this specification and
+ Netscape's original specification receives a Set-Cookie2 response
+ header, and the NAME and the Domain and Path attributes match (per
+ the Cookie Management section) a Netscape-style cookie, the
+ Netscape-style cookie &MUST; be discarded, and the user agent &MUST;
+ retain only the cookie adhering to this specification.
+</t>
+<t>
+ Older user agents that do not understand this specification, but that
+ do understand Netscape's original specification, will not recognize
+ the Set-Cookie2 response header and will receive and send cookies
+ according to the older specification.
+</t>
+<t>
+ A user agent that supports both this specification and Netscape-style
+ cookies &SHOULD; send a Cookie request header that follows the older
+ Netscape specification if it received the cookie in a Set-Cookie
+ response header and not in a Set-Cookie2 response header. However,
+ it &SHOULD; send the following request header as well:
+</t>
+<figure><artwork type="example">
+ Cookie2: $Version="1"
+</artwork></figure>
+<t>
+ The Cookie2 header advises the server that the user agent understands
+ new-style cookies. If the server understands new-style cookies, as
+ well, it &SHOULD; continue the stateful session by sending a Set-Cookie2
+ response header, rather than Set-Cookie. A server that does
+ not understand new-style cookies will simply ignore the Cookie2
+ request header.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+<section title="Caching and HTTP/1.0">
+<t>
+ Some caches, such as those conforming to HTTP/1.0, will inevitably
+ cache the Set-Cookie2 and Set-Cookie headers, because there was no
+ mechanism to suppress caching of headers prior to HTTP/1.1. This
+ caching can lead to security problems. Documents transmitted by an
+ origin server along with Set-Cookie2 and Set-Cookie headers usually
+ either will be uncachable, or will be "pre-expired". As long as
+ caches obey instructions not to cache documents (following Expires:
+ <a date in the past> or Pragma: no-cache (HTTP/1.0), or Cache-control: no-cache
+ (HTTP/1.1)) uncachable documents present no
+ problem. However, pre-expired documents may be stored in caches.
+ They require validation (a conditional GET) on each new request, but
+ some cache operators loosen the rules for their caches, and sometimes
+ serve expired documents without first validating them. This
+ combination of factors can lead to cookies meant for one user later
+ being sent to another user. The Set-Cookie2 and Set-Cookie headers
+ are stored in the cache, and, although the document is stale
+ (expired), the cache returns the document in response to later
+ requests, including cached headers.
+</t>
+</section>
+</section>
+
+<section title="ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS">
+<t>
+ This document really represents the collective efforts of the HTTP
+ Working Group of the IETF and, particularly, the following people, in
+ addition to the authors: Roy Fielding, Yaron Goland, Marc Hedlund,
+ Ted Hardie, Koen Holtman, Shel Kaphan, Rohit Khare, Foteos Macrides,
+ David W. Morris.
+</t>
+</section>
+
+</middle>
+<back>
+
+<references>
+
+ <reference anchor="DMK95" target="http://portal.research.bell-labs.com/~dmk/state-info.html">
+ <front>
+ <title>Proposed HTTP State-Info Mechanism</title>
+ <author initials='D. M.' surname='Kristol' fullname='David M. Kristol'>
+ <organization/>
+ </author>
+ <date year="1995" month="September"/>
+ </front>
+ <annotation>available at <http://portal.research.bell-labs.com/~dmk/state-info.html></annotation>
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor="Netscape" target="http://www.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html">
+ <front>
+ <title>Persistent Client State -- HTTP Cookies</title>
+ <author>
+ <organization/>
+ </author>
+ <date/>
+ </front>
+ <annotation>available at <http://www.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html></annotation>
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor='RFC2109'>
+ <front>
+ <title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
+ <author initials='D.M.' surname='Kristol' fullname='David M. Kristol'>
+ <organization>Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies</organization>
+ <address>
+ <postal>
+ <street>600 Mountain Ave. Room 2A-227</street>
+ <street>Murray Hill</street>
+ <street>NJ 07974</street></postal>
+
+ <phone>(908) 582-2250</phone>
+ <facsimile>(908) 582-5809</facsimile>
+ <email>dmk@bell-labs.com</email></address></author>
+ <author initials='L.' surname='Montulli' fullname='Lou Montulli'>
+ <organization>Netscape Communications Corp.</organization>
+ <address>
+ <postal>
+ <street>501 E. Middlefield Rd.</street>
+ <street>Mountain View</street>
+ <street>CA 94043</street></postal>
+
+ <phone>(415) 528-2600</phone>
+ <email>montulli@netscape.com</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <date year='1997' month='February' />
+ </front>
+ <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2109' />
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor="RFC2119">
+ <front>
+ <title abbrev="RFC Key Words">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
+ <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="Scott Bradner">
+ <organization>Harvard University</organization>
+ <address>
+ <email>sob@harvard.edu</email>
+ </address></author>
+ <date month="March" year="1997"/>
+ </front>
+ <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
+ <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor="RFC2279">
+ <front>
+ <title>UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</title>
+ <author initials="F." surname="Yergeau" fullname="F. Yergeau">
+ <organization>Alis Technologies</organization>
+ <address><email>fyergeau@alis.com</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <date month="January" year="1998"/>
+ </front>
+ <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2279"/>
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor="RFC2396">
+ <front>
+ <title abbrev="URI Generic Syntax">Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
+ <author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="Tim Berners-Lee">
+ <organization>World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
+ <address>
+ <email>timbl@w3.org</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="R.T." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding">
+ <organization>Department of Information and Computer Science</organization>
+ <address>
+ <email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="Larry Masinter">
+ <organization>Xerox PARC</organization>
+ <address>
+ <email>masinter@parc.xerox.com</email>
+ </address>
+ </author>
+ <date month="August" year="1998"/>
+ </front>
+ <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2396"/>
+ </reference>
+
+ <reference anchor="RFC2616">
+ <front>
+ <title>Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</title>
+ <author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="R. Fielding">
+ <organization>University of California, Irvine</organization>
+ <address><email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="J." surname="Gettys" fullname="J. Gettys">
+ <organization>W3C</organization>
+ <address><email>jg@w3.org</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="J." surname="Mogul" fullname="J. Mogul">
+ <organization>Compaq Computer Corporation</organization>
+ <address><email>mogul@wrl.dec.com</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="H." surname="Frystyk" fullname="H. Frystyk">
+ <organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
+ <address><email>frystyk@w3.org</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter">
+ <organization>Xerox Corporation</organization>
+ <address><email>masinter@parc.xerox.com</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="P." surname="Leach" fullname="P. Leach">
+ <organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
+ <address><email>paulle@microsoft.com</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="T. Berners-Lee">
+ <organization>W3C</organization>
+ <address><email>timbl@w3.org</email></address>
+ </author>
+ <date month="June" year="1999"/>
+ </front>
+ <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2616"/>
+ </reference>
+ </references>
+
+</back>
+</rfc>
Propchange: labs/webarch/trunk/http/draft-fielding-http/rfc2965.xml
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
svn:eol-style = native
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: commits-unsubscribe@labs.apache.org
For additional commands, e-mail: commits-help@labs.apache.org