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Posted to dev@qpid.apache.org by "Keith Wall (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2016/01/25 11:11:39 UTC

[jira] [Closed] (QPID-6993) [Java Broker] Improve security of SCRAM-* authentication managers by not storing the salted passwords

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/QPID-6993?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Keith Wall closed QPID-6993.
----------------------------

> [Java Broker] Improve security of SCRAM-* authentication managers by not storing the salted passwords
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: QPID-6993
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/QPID-6993
>             Project: Qpid
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: Java Broker
>            Reporter: Rob Godfrey
>            Assignee: Lorenz Quack
>             Fix For: qpid-java-6.0.1, qpid-java-6.1
>
>         Attachments: 0001-QPID-6993-Java-Broker-Refactoring.patch
>
>
> Currently the SCRAM-* authentication managers store the salted hashed password.  If this information is somehow leaked then the possesor of the information could use this value to log in to the broker without knowing the plain test password.
> We can change the storage mechanism to store instead the "storedKey" and "serverKey" which will not allow the possesor of the leaked configuration to authenticate - they will need to know either the plain text password or the hashed slated password - which cannot be recovered from the password file.



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