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Posted to dev@tooling.apache.org by "asf-tooling (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org> on 2026/04/03 18:41:45 UTC
[I] User Identity Data Sent to External GitHub API (tooling-trusted-releases)
asf-tooling opened a new issue, #1098:
URL: https://github.com/apache/tooling-trusted-releases/issues/1098
**ASVS Level(s):** L2
**Description:**
### Summary
The asf_uid (Apache Software Foundation user identifier) is transmitted to GitHub's API as a workflow input parameter for GitHub Actions workflow dispatch events. Once transmitted, the ASF UID is stored on GitHub/Microsoft infrastructure, subject to GitHub's data retention policies (not Apache's), visible to anyone with read access to the apache/tooling-actions repository, potentially logged in GitHub's internal systems, and subject to GitHub's privacy policy and terms of service. This represents data leaving Apache's direct control and entering third-party infrastructure.
### Details
In `atr/tasks/gha.py` at lines 119-155, the asf_uid is sent to GitHub API as a workflow input parameter.
Mitigating factors include: ASF UIDs are already semi-public information visible in commits and mailing lists; apache/tooling-actions is an Apache-controlled repository; GitHub has a formal organizational relationship with ASF; user identity is required for audit traceability of release actions; only ASF committers can trigger workflows; and no additional PII is sent.
### Recommended Remediation
Two options:
**Option 1: Pseudonymization** - Create a pseudonymous dispatch reference using hash of asf_uid:unique_id:workflow, store mapping internally for audit purposes, and send only the pseudonymous reference to GitHub.
**Option 2: Risk Acceptance with Documentation** - Document this as an accepted data sharing arrangement in a Data Privacy Impact Assessment (DPIA), noting that ASF UID is semi-public, GitHub has organizational relationship with ASF, required for audit logs, and limited to authenticated committers.
Option 2 (risk acceptance) is recommended given the mitigating factors and legitimate audit requirements.
### Acceptance Criteria
- [ ] Risk acceptance documented in DPIA OR pseudonymization implemented
- [ ] Data sharing arrangement documented
- [ ] Audit requirements satisfied
- [ ] Unit tests verify implementation
### References
- Source reports: L2:14.2.3.md
- Related findings: None
- ASVS sections: 14.2.3
### Priority
Low
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Re: [I] User Identity Data Sent to External GitHub API (tooling-trusted-releases)
Posted by "andrewmusselman (via GitHub)" <gi...@apache.org>.
andrewmusselman closed issue #1098: User Identity Data Sent to External GitHub API
URL: https://github.com/apache/tooling-trusted-releases/issues/1098
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