You are viewing a plain text version of this content. The canonical link for it is here.
Posted to issues@struts.apache.org by "Lukasz Lenart (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2026/10/04 17:05:00 UTC

[jira] [Resolved] (WW-5756) Reject javascript:/vbscript:/data: schemes in href values

     [ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WW-5756?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Lukasz Lenart resolved WW-5756.
-------------------------------
    Resolution: Won't Fix

> Reject javascript:/vbscript:/data: schemes in <s:a> href values
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: WW-5756
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/WW-5756
>             Project: Struts 2
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: Core
>    Affects Versions: 6.11.0, 7.3.0, 7.4.0
>            Reporter: Gouri Sankar A
>            Priority: Major
>             Fix For: 7.5.0
>
>          Time Spent: 0.5h
>  Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> <s:a> builds its href attribute by neutralizing a literal quote (the href= attribute, via
> ensureAttributeSafelyNotEscaped) or blocking a literal "<script" substring (the value= attribute, via
> DefaultUrlHelper.buildUrl -- a check that appears to date back to S2-002/CVE-2008-6682, WW-2427, based
> on an exact symptom match with that historical ticket). Neither stops the value itself from naming an
> executable scheme: javascript:alert(1) needs no quote or <script substring to run once the link is
> activated.
> Reproduced on main (7.5.0-SNAPSHOT) and confirmed the same vulnerable code is present unchanged in
> 6.11.0, 7.3.0 and 7.4.0. Tested with embedded Tomcat 10.1.34, stock struts-default, one
> @StrutsParameter-bound action property named q, set to javascript:alert(document.cookie), bound through
> the documented tag-attribute pattern. Binding that property to the href attribute renders
> href="javascript:alert(document.cookie)". Binding the same property to the value attribute instead
> renders the same unescaped href="javascript:alert(document.cookie)". Binding it to the anchor attribute
> is safe: the payload lands as a URL fragment and is inert.
> Also confirmed vulnerable before a fix: case variation such as JaVaScRiPt instead of javascript, an
> embedded tab or newline inside the scheme (a browser's own URL parser strips these before reading the
> scheme, per the WHATWG URL spec, so a filter that simply checks whether the value starts with the text
> javascript followed by a colon would miss them), and a leading space or NUL character.
> Proposed fix (patch available): a new allowlist-based check (http, https, mailto, tel), applied before
> the existing quote and script-substring checks, with the same WHATWG-style normalization so the
> tab/newline-split variant is still caught. I have a patch with regression tests ready and will open a PR
> referencing this ticket.



--
This message was sent by Atlassian Jira
(v8.20.10#820010)