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Posted to issues@flink.apache.org by "Gyula Komlossi (Jira)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2026/09/16 14:38:00 UTC
[jira] [Updated] (FLINK-40329) Support Single EKU certificates for server and client TLS authentication
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-40329?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Gyula Komlossi updated FLINK-40329:
-----------------------------------
Description:
h4. *Problem & Background*
Starting in May 2026, major public Certificate Authorities (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, etc.) are sunsetting the {{clientAuth}} Extended Key Usage (EKU) on publicly issued leaf certificates. Public certificates will only carry the {{serverAuth}} EKU going forward.
As a result, a single publicly issued TLS certificate can no longer serve dual-purpose role for both server and client authentication in mutual TLS (mTLS) setups.
For Flink deployments that rely on mTLS (e.g., RPC communication, REST endpoints, or internal cluster connections), renewed public CA certificates will fail the TLS handshake during client certificate validation because the {{clientAuth}} EKU will be missing.
h4. *Proposed Improvement #1*
To support the hybrid model (using public CAs for server identity and private/internal CAs for client identity), Flink needs expanded TLS configuration options.
Specifically, Flink should allow users to configure separate Keystores and Truststores (or distinct certificate pathways) for:
# *Server Authentication:* Presenting public-CA certificates ({{{}serverAuth{}}} EKU only).
# *Client Authentication:* Presenting internal/private-CA certificates ({{{}clientAuth{}}} EKU).
h4. *Proposed Improvement #2 (recommended)*
Another way to support the single EKU certificates, if Flink can handle multiple certificates in one keystroke. This way the {{serverAuth}} EKU certificates, provided by a public CA and an internal one for {{clientAuth}} also delivered in the same keystone, so no change is required in the configuration options.
The only thing that needs to be verified, if the used KeyManagerFactory is able to pick the right certificate when needed. The *NewSunX509* KeyManagerFactory implementation has been available since Java 1.5, which is capable of doing this, unlike the current default SunX509.
The second way requires less code changes and can be 100% backward compatible, if the usage doesn't require the change.
h4. *Reference*
* *ASF Blog:* [The Public CA clientAuth EKU Sunset: What Apache Software Deployers Need to Know|https://news.apache.org/foundation/entry/the-public-ca-clientauth-eku-sunset-what-apache-software-deployers-need-to-know]
was:
h4. *Problem & Background*
Starting in May 2026, major public Certificate Authorities (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, etc.) are sunsetting the {{clientAuth}} Extended Key Usage (EKU) on publicly issued leaf certificates. Public certificates will only carry the {{serverAuth}} EKU going forward.
As a result, a single publicly issued TLS certificate can no longer serve dual-purpose role for both server and client authentication in mutual TLS (mTLS) setups.
For Flink deployments that rely on mTLS (e.g., RPC communication, REST endpoints, or internal cluster connections), renewed public CA certificates will fail the TLS handshake during client certificate validation because the {{clientAuth}} EKU will be missing.
h4. *Proposed Improvement*
To support the hybrid model (using public CAs for server identity and private/internal CAs for client identity), Flink needs expanded TLS configuration options.
Specifically, Flink should allow users to configure separate Keystores and Truststores (or distinct certificate pathways) for:
# *Server Authentication:* Presenting public-CA certificates ({{{}serverAuth{}}} EKU only).
# *Client Authentication:* Presenting internal/private-CA certificates ({{{}clientAuth{}}} EKU).
h4. *Reference*
* *ASF Blog:* [The Public CA clientAuth EKU Sunset: What Apache Software Deployers Need to Know|https://news.apache.org/foundation/entry/the-public-ca-clientauth-eku-sunset-what-apache-software-deployers-need-to-know]
> Support Single EKU certificates for server and client TLS authentication
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: FLINK-40329
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-40329
> Project: Flink
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: Runtime / Configuration
> Reporter: Gyula Komlossi
> Priority: Major
>
> h4. *Problem & Background*
> Starting in May 2026, major public Certificate Authorities (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, etc.) are sunsetting the {{clientAuth}} Extended Key Usage (EKU) on publicly issued leaf certificates. Public certificates will only carry the {{serverAuth}} EKU going forward.
> As a result, a single publicly issued TLS certificate can no longer serve dual-purpose role for both server and client authentication in mutual TLS (mTLS) setups.
> For Flink deployments that rely on mTLS (e.g., RPC communication, REST endpoints, or internal cluster connections), renewed public CA certificates will fail the TLS handshake during client certificate validation because the {{clientAuth}} EKU will be missing.
> h4. *Proposed Improvement #1*
> To support the hybrid model (using public CAs for server identity and private/internal CAs for client identity), Flink needs expanded TLS configuration options.
> Specifically, Flink should allow users to configure separate Keystores and Truststores (or distinct certificate pathways) for:
> # *Server Authentication:* Presenting public-CA certificates ({{{}serverAuth{}}} EKU only).
> # *Client Authentication:* Presenting internal/private-CA certificates ({{{}clientAuth{}}} EKU).
> h4. *Proposed Improvement #2 (recommended)*
> Another way to support the single EKU certificates, if Flink can handle multiple certificates in one keystroke. This way the {{serverAuth}} EKU certificates, provided by a public CA and an internal one for {{clientAuth}} also delivered in the same keystone, so no change is required in the configuration options.
> The only thing that needs to be verified, if the used KeyManagerFactory is able to pick the right certificate when needed. The *NewSunX509* KeyManagerFactory implementation has been available since Java 1.5, which is capable of doing this, unlike the current default SunX509.
> The second way requires less code changes and can be 100% backward compatible, if the usage doesn't require the change.
> h4. *Reference*
> * *ASF Blog:* [The Public CA clientAuth EKU Sunset: What Apache Software Deployers Need to Know|https://news.apache.org/foundation/entry/the-public-ca-clientauth-eku-sunset-what-apache-software-deployers-need-to-know]
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