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Posted to users@tomcat.apache.org by lo...@kreuser.name on 2026/09/16 21:36:40 UTC
Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Hello,
I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
[OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
[OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
We're not getting to depth 0.
In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
What do you think?
Thank you for looking into this.
Peter
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by "logo.kreuser.name via users" <us...@tomcat.apache.org>.
Hi Mark,
I have managed to get main compiled. (not that easy. recreating the magic release stuff to get to the same level of the src package).
Your change works perfectly. Thank You.
tomcat | [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
tomcat | [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
tomcat | [OCSP-DBG] depth=0 result=0 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=Test Client Cert
ssl_verify_OCSP reaches depth 0 without an error on depth 1 :-).
Hoping to see a release soon.
Good night!
Peter
> Am 23.09.2026 um 15:00 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>
> On 22/09/2026 15:49, Peter Kreuser wrote:
>> Perfect, Thank you Mark!
>> Thanks for taking this to dev@. Happy to test a patch against my chain whenever there's something to try.
>
> The latest 2.0.x and 1.3.x Native sources at https://github.com/apache/tomcat-native should have a fix for this.
>
> Mark
>
>
>> Kind regards
>> Peter
>>> Am 22.09.2026 um 13:35 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>>
>>>> On 21/09/2026 12:55, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>>> Hi Mark,
>>>> I've been away for the weekend. So forgive me my late reply.
>>>> Answers below
>>>>>>> Am 17.09.2026 um 16:26 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Mark,
>>>>>> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
>>>>>
>>>>> Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed something.
>>>> JVM Version: 11.0.32+9
>>>> JVM Vendor: Eclipse Adoptium
>>>>>> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>>>>>> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
>>>>>
>>>>> If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a Tomcat issue.
>>>>>
>>>> I have started Tomcat with
>>>> -Dcom.sun.net.ssl.checkRevocation=true -Djava.security.properties=/opt/apache-tomcat.base/conf/java.security.ocsp.add
>>>> with ocsp.enable=true in the properties file.
>>>> Adding -Djava.security.debug=certpath,ocsp gave the following logs:
>>>> certpath: anchor.getTrustedCert().getSubjectX500Principal() =
>>>> CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, OU=logo, O=logo, ST=Hessen, C=DE
>>>> certpath: Executing PKIX certification path validation algorithm.
>>>> certpath: Checking cert1 - Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, OU=logo, ...
>>>> certpath: -Using checker7 ... [RevocationChecker]
>>>> certpath: RevocationChecker.check: checking cert
>>>> SN: 1d4eb2a9 aaae4d7e xxxxxx 2c76fd2b
>>>> Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, ...
>>>> Issuer: CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, ...
>>>> certpath: connecting to OCSP service at: http://ocsp.fritz.box:8889
>>>> certpath: OCSP response status: SUCCESSFUL
>>>> certpath: Status of certificate (with serial number 389xxxx486...) is: GOOD
>>>> certpath: OCSP response is signed by an Authorized Responder
>>>> certpath: -checker7 validation succeeded
>>>> certpath: Cert path validation succeeded. (PKIX validation algorithm)
>>>> There was only this one OCSP request to the leaf.
>>>> Note: the java truststore contains the full chain, otherwise Tomcat can't serve the complete server-cert chain, so removing the intermediate isn't an option here.
>>>
>>> That is the difference. Including the intermediate cert in the trust store means that cert is treated as a trust anchor by JSSE so no OCSP validation is performed.
>>>
>>> The Tomcat Native OCSP checks only terminate for a root CA. That could be changed to terminate for any certificate in the trust store. I'll start a discussion about that on the dev@ list.
>>>
>>> Mark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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>
>
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>.
On 22/09/2026 15:49, Peter Kreuser wrote:
>
> Perfect, Thank you Mark!
>
> Thanks for taking this to dev@. Happy to test a patch against my chain whenever there's something to try.
The latest 2.0.x and 1.3.x Native sources at
https://github.com/apache/tomcat-native should have a fix for this.
Mark
>
> Kind regards
>
> Peter
>
>
>> Am 22.09.2026 um 13:35 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>
>>> On 21/09/2026 12:55, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>> Hi Mark,
>>> I've been away for the weekend. So forgive me my late reply.
>>> Answers below
>>>>>> Am 17.09.2026 um 16:26 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>>>
>>>>> On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>>>> Hi Mark,
>>>>> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
>>>>
>>>> Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed something.
>>> JVM Version: 11.0.32+9
>>> JVM Vendor: Eclipse Adoptium
>>>>> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>>>>> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
>>>>
>>>> If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a Tomcat issue.
>>>>
>>> I have started Tomcat with
>>> -Dcom.sun.net.ssl.checkRevocation=true -Djava.security.properties=/opt/apache-tomcat.base/conf/java.security.ocsp.add
>>> with ocsp.enable=true in the properties file.
>>> Adding -Djava.security.debug=certpath,ocsp gave the following logs:
>>> certpath: anchor.getTrustedCert().getSubjectX500Principal() =
>>> CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, OU=logo, O=logo, ST=Hessen, C=DE
>>> certpath: Executing PKIX certification path validation algorithm.
>>> certpath: Checking cert1 - Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, OU=logo, ...
>>> certpath: -Using checker7 ... [RevocationChecker]
>>> certpath: RevocationChecker.check: checking cert
>>> SN: 1d4eb2a9 aaae4d7e xxxxxx 2c76fd2b
>>> Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, ...
>>> Issuer: CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, ...
>>> certpath: connecting to OCSP service at: http://ocsp.fritz.box:8889
>>> certpath: OCSP response status: SUCCESSFUL
>>> certpath: Status of certificate (with serial number 389xxxx486...) is: GOOD
>>> certpath: OCSP response is signed by an Authorized Responder
>>> certpath: -checker7 validation succeeded
>>> certpath: Cert path validation succeeded. (PKIX validation algorithm)
>>> There was only this one OCSP request to the leaf.
>>> Note: the java truststore contains the full chain, otherwise Tomcat can't serve the complete server-cert chain, so removing the intermediate isn't an option here.
>>
>> That is the difference. Including the intermediate cert in the trust store means that cert is treated as a trust anchor by JSSE so no OCSP validation is performed.
>>
>> The Tomcat Native OCSP checks only terminate for a root CA. That could be changed to terminate for any certificate in the trust store. I'll start a discussion about that on the dev@ list.
>>
>> Mark
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@tomcat.apache.org
>> For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@tomcat.apache.org
>
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Peter Kreuser <lo...@kreuser.name>.
Perfect, Thank you Mark!
Thanks for taking this to dev@. Happy to test a patch against my chain whenever there's something to try.
Kind regards
Peter
> Am 22.09.2026 um 13:35 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>
>> On 21/09/2026 12:55, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>> Hi Mark,
>> I've been away for the weekend. So forgive me my late reply.
>> Answers below
>>>>> Am 17.09.2026 um 16:26 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>>
>>>> On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>>> Hi Mark,
>>>> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
>>>
>>> Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed something.
>> JVM Version: 11.0.32+9
>> JVM Vendor: Eclipse Adoptium
>>>> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>>>> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
>>>
>>> If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a Tomcat issue.
>>>
>> I have started Tomcat with
>> -Dcom.sun.net.ssl.checkRevocation=true -Djava.security.properties=/opt/apache-tomcat.base/conf/java.security.ocsp.add
>> with ocsp.enable=true in the properties file.
>> Adding -Djava.security.debug=certpath,ocsp gave the following logs:
>> certpath: anchor.getTrustedCert().getSubjectX500Principal() =
>> CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, OU=logo, O=logo, ST=Hessen, C=DE
>> certpath: Executing PKIX certification path validation algorithm.
>> certpath: Checking cert1 - Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, OU=logo, ...
>> certpath: -Using checker7 ... [RevocationChecker]
>> certpath: RevocationChecker.check: checking cert
>> SN: 1d4eb2a9 aaae4d7e xxxxxx 2c76fd2b
>> Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, ...
>> Issuer: CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, ...
>> certpath: connecting to OCSP service at: http://ocsp.fritz.box:8889
>> certpath: OCSP response status: SUCCESSFUL
>> certpath: Status of certificate (with serial number 389xxxx486...) is: GOOD
>> certpath: OCSP response is signed by an Authorized Responder
>> certpath: -checker7 validation succeeded
>> certpath: Cert path validation succeeded. (PKIX validation algorithm)
>> There was only this one OCSP request to the leaf.
>> Note: the java truststore contains the full chain, otherwise Tomcat can't serve the complete server-cert chain, so removing the intermediate isn't an option here.
>
> That is the difference. Including the intermediate cert in the trust store means that cert is treated as a trust anchor by JSSE so no OCSP validation is performed.
>
> The Tomcat Native OCSP checks only terminate for a root CA. That could be changed to terminate for any certificate in the trust store. I'll start a discussion about that on the dev@ list.
>
> Mark
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@tomcat.apache.org
> For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@tomcat.apache.org
Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>.
On 21/09/2026 12:55, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
> Hi Mark,
>
> I've been away for the weekend. So forgive me my late reply.
>
> Answers below
>
>> Am 17.09.2026 um 16:26 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>
>> On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>> Hi Mark,
>>> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
>>
>> Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed something.
>
> JVM Version: 11.0.32+9
> JVM Vendor: Eclipse Adoptium
>
>>> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>>> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
>>
>> If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a Tomcat issue.
>>
>
> I have started Tomcat with
>
> -Dcom.sun.net.ssl.checkRevocation=true -Djava.security.properties=/opt/apache-tomcat.base/conf/java.security.ocsp.add
>
> with ocsp.enable=true in the properties file.
>
> Adding -Djava.security.debug=certpath,ocsp gave the following logs:
>
> certpath: anchor.getTrustedCert().getSubjectX500Principal() =
> CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, OU=logo, O=logo, ST=Hessen, C=DE
> certpath: Executing PKIX certification path validation algorithm.
> certpath: Checking cert1 - Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, OU=logo, ...
>
> certpath: -Using checker7 ... [RevocationChecker]
> certpath: RevocationChecker.check: checking cert
> SN: 1d4eb2a9 aaae4d7e xxxxxx 2c76fd2b
> Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, ...
> Issuer: CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, ...
> certpath: connecting to OCSP service at: http://ocsp.fritz.box:8889
> certpath: OCSP response status: SUCCESSFUL
> certpath: Status of certificate (with serial number 389xxxx486...) is: GOOD
> certpath: OCSP response is signed by an Authorized Responder
> certpath: -checker7 validation succeeded
> certpath: Cert path validation succeeded. (PKIX validation algorithm)
>
> There was only this one OCSP request to the leaf.
>
> Note: the java truststore contains the full chain, otherwise Tomcat can't serve the complete server-cert chain, so removing the intermediate isn't an option here.
That is the difference. Including the intermediate cert in the trust
store means that cert is treated as a trust anchor by JSSE so no OCSP
validation is performed.
The Tomcat Native OCSP checks only terminate for a root CA. That could
be changed to terminate for any certificate in the trust store. I'll
start a discussion about that on the dev@ list.
Mark
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by lo...@kreuser.name.
Hi Mark,
I've been away for the weekend. So forgive me my late reply.
Answers below
> Am 17.09.2026 um 16:26 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>
> On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>> Hi Mark,
>> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
>
> Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed something.
JVM Version: 11.0.32+9
JVM Vendor: Eclipse Adoptium
>> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
>
> If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a Tomcat issue.
>
I have started Tomcat with
-Dcom.sun.net.ssl.checkRevocation=true -Djava.security.properties=/opt/apache-tomcat.base/conf/java.security.ocsp.add
with ocsp.enable=true in the properties file.
Adding -Djava.security.debug=certpath,ocsp gave the following logs:
certpath: anchor.getTrustedCert().getSubjectX500Principal() =
CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, OU=logo, O=logo, ST=Hessen, C=DE
certpath: Executing PKIX certification path validation algorithm.
certpath: Checking cert1 - Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, OU=logo, ...
certpath: -Using checker7 ... [RevocationChecker]
certpath: RevocationChecker.check: checking cert
SN: 1d4eb2a9 aaae4d7e xxxxxx 2c76fd2b
Subject: CN=Test Client Cert, ...
Issuer: CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025, ...
certpath: connecting to OCSP service at: http://ocsp.fritz.box:8889
certpath: OCSP response status: SUCCESSFUL
certpath: Status of certificate (with serial number 389xxxx486...) is: GOOD
certpath: OCSP response is signed by an Authorized Responder
certpath: -checker7 validation succeeded
certpath: Cert path validation succeeded. (PKIX validation algorithm)
There was only this one OCSP request to the leaf.
Note: the java truststore contains the full chain, otherwise Tomcat can't serve the complete server-cert chain, so removing the intermediate isn't an option here.
Which brings me to the conclusion that at least java 11 behaves like Apache or nginx with "SSLOCSPEnable leaf" or "ssl_ocsp leaf". I have checked their configs and that's probably the reason why they work with my chain.
Would it be possible to add this as an option "ocspLeafOnly" to native too? The default would stay full-chain (chain), so no behaviour change and CVE-neutral - it would just bring the OpenSSL/native connector in line with what JSSE, Apache and nginx already allow. I have a tested one-line change (gating the OCSP call on errdepth == 0 in SSL_callback_SSL_verify) and would be happy to turn it into a PR if you're open to the scope/naming.
Thank you for your support.
Peter
> I'm prepared to be proved wrong though.
>
> Mark
>
>
>> Peter
>>> Am 17.09.2026 um 11:48 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>>
>>> On 16/09/2026 22:36, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>>> Hello,
>>>> I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
>>>> My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
>>>> I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
>>>> I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
>>>> Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
>>>> My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
>>>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>>>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>>>> When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
>>>> We're not getting to depth 0.
>>>> In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
>>>> I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
>>>> What do you think?
>>>
>>> If you look back at the CVEs for Tomcat Native they are all related to OCSP.
>>>
>>> In the current release round there was a deliberate effort to review the OCSP code across all the Connectors (JSSE, OpenSSL-Native and OpenSSL-FFM). The aim was to close any remaining gaps and to make the behaviour consistent whichever TLS implementation was used.
>>>
>>> The behaviour you describe is how Java implements OCSP.
>>>
>>> Revoking the intermediate cert does not automatically revoke the certs it issued. But it does mean that those certificates should no longer be used. So if you care enough about OCSP not to use soft-fail then you should also be checking the validity of the intermediate certs. Which means they need responder URLs.
>>>
>>> If you are using JSSE, you can set a global OCSP responder that is used *instead* of any URI defined in the certificate via the ocsp.responderURL system property.
>>>
>>> There isn't an OpenSSL equivalent.
>>>
>>> A global responder URI seems rather inflexible but per SSLHostContext looks reasonable. It looks relatively simple to add support for an ocspResponderURL to SSLHostConfig which would override any responder URL provided by the certs. This isn't something I'd have to the time to write any time soon but I should be able to find time to review a PR.
>>>
>>> Mark
>>>
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@tomcat.apache.org
>>> For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@tomcat.apache.org
>>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscribe@tomcat.apache.org
>> For additional commands, e-mail: users-help@tomcat.apache.org
>
>
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>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>.
On 17/09/2026 12:44, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>
> Hi Mark,
>
> before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
Interesting. Which version of Java and which vendor? I looked at the
latest OpenJDK code but I didn't run any tests so I might have missed
something.
> I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
>
> Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
If I am reading the Java code correctly and the information I read
online is accurate (never certain) then yes, I would say this isn;t a
Tomcat issue.
I'm prepared to be proved wrong though.
Mark
>
> Peter
>
>> Am 17.09.2026 um 11:48 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>>
>> On 16/09/2026 22:36, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>> I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
>>> My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
>>> I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
>>> I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
>>> Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
>>> My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
>>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>>> When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
>>> We're not getting to depth 0.
>>> In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
>>> I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
>>> What do you think?
>>
>> If you look back at the CVEs for Tomcat Native they are all related to OCSP.
>>
>> In the current release round there was a deliberate effort to review the OCSP code across all the Connectors (JSSE, OpenSSL-Native and OpenSSL-FFM). The aim was to close any remaining gaps and to make the behaviour consistent whichever TLS implementation was used.
>>
>> The behaviour you describe is how Java implements OCSP.
>>
>> Revoking the intermediate cert does not automatically revoke the certs it issued. But it does mean that those certificates should no longer be used. So if you care enough about OCSP not to use soft-fail then you should also be checking the validity of the intermediate certs. Which means they need responder URLs.
>>
>> If you are using JSSE, you can set a global OCSP responder that is used *instead* of any URI defined in the certificate via the ocsp.responderURL system property.
>>
>> There isn't an OpenSSL equivalent.
>>
>> A global responder URI seems rather inflexible but per SSLHostContext looks reasonable. It looks relatively simple to add support for an ocspResponderURL to SSLHostConfig which would override any responder URL provided by the certs. This isn't something I'd have to the time to write any time soon but I should be able to find time to review a PR.
>>
>> Mark
>>
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by lo...@kreuser.name.
Hi Mark,
before I look into the details I want to note that the existing certificate chain validates with OCSP in JSSE just fine (my other tomcat connector uses JSSE). Is this what you meant with my description? If this is how JSSE works, is there a security issue too?
I agree that it would be best to add revocation info to the intermediate, but this is nothing that can be done in a minute. I doubt that a central OCSP responder will change anything in this case - there is no revocation handling for the intermediate...
Would a change in this be against an existing CVE? The case of missing AIA within the chain is not an issue of tomcat but of the certificate provider (me), right?
Peter
> Am 17.09.2026 um 11:48 schrieb Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>:
>
> On 16/09/2026 22:36, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
>> Hello,
>> I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
>> My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
>> I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
>> I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
>> Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
>> My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>> [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>> When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
>> We're not getting to depth 0.
>> In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
>> I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
>> What do you think?
>
> If you look back at the CVEs for Tomcat Native they are all related to OCSP.
>
> In the current release round there was a deliberate effort to review the OCSP code across all the Connectors (JSSE, OpenSSL-Native and OpenSSL-FFM). The aim was to close any remaining gaps and to make the behaviour consistent whichever TLS implementation was used.
>
> The behaviour you describe is how Java implements OCSP.
>
> Revoking the intermediate cert does not automatically revoke the certs it issued. But it does mean that those certificates should no longer be used. So if you care enough about OCSP not to use soft-fail then you should also be checking the validity of the intermediate certs. Which means they need responder URLs.
>
> If you are using JSSE, you can set a global OCSP responder that is used *instead* of any URI defined in the certificate via the ocsp.responderURL system property.
>
> There isn't an OpenSSL equivalent.
>
> A global responder URI seems rather inflexible but per SSLHostContext looks reasonable. It looks relatively simple to add support for an ocspResponderURL to SSLHostConfig which would override any responder URL provided by the certs. This isn't something I'd have to the time to write any time soon but I should be able to find time to review a PR.
>
> Mark
>
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Mark Thomas <ma...@apache.org>.
On 16/09/2026 22:36, logo@kreuser.name wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
>
> My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
>
> I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
>
> I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
>
> Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
>
> My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
>
> [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
> [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>
> When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
> We're not getting to depth 0.
>
> In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
> I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
>
> What do you think?
If you look back at the CVEs for Tomcat Native they are all related to OCSP.
In the current release round there was a deliberate effort to review the
OCSP code across all the Connectors (JSSE, OpenSSL-Native and
OpenSSL-FFM). The aim was to close any remaining gaps and to make the
behaviour consistent whichever TLS implementation was used.
The behaviour you describe is how Java implements OCSP.
Revoking the intermediate cert does not automatically revoke the certs
it issued. But it does mean that those certificates should no longer be
used. So if you care enough about OCSP not to use soft-fail then you
should also be checking the validity of the intermediate certs. Which
means they need responder URLs.
If you are using JSSE, you can set a global OCSP responder that is used
*instead* of any URI defined in the certificate via the
ocsp.responderURL system property.
There isn't an OpenSSL equivalent.
A global responder URI seems rather inflexible but per SSLHostContext
looks reasonable. It looks relatively simple to add support for an
ocspResponderURL to SSLHostConfig which would override any responder URL
provided by the certs. This isn't something I'd have to the time to
write any time soon but I should be able to find time to review a PR.
Mark
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Re: Problems after OCSP changes in Tomcat Native 2.0.16
Posted by Stefan Mayr <st...@mayr-stefan.de>.
Hi
Am 16.09.2026 um 23:36 schrieb logo@kreuser.name:
> Hello,
>
> I have found some troubles with the new OCSP changes.
>
> My mTLS access to my host fails since 9.0.122 with tomcat native 2.0.16. The same client cert with the ocsp reponder works fine with apache, nginx, haproxy...
>
> I can only make my client cert (signed by my own internal CA) work with ocspSoftFail="true".
>
> I was trying to figure out how I could troubleshoot this. I am compiling tomcat native in a Docker image. So I asked claude.ai for help to get some meaningful debug messages into the code.
>
> Claude asked a couple of questions about the setup of my CA and the symptoms and the changes between 2.0.15 and 2.0.16. Interestingly we figured out that it may have to do with AIA and commit 9c6bb9d (Stricter OCSP handling when soft-fail is disabled - AIA extension is not present or no URLs were found).
>
> My certificate chain contains the intermediate WITHOUT an OCSP URI!
>
> [OCSP-DBG] depth=2 result=2 err=0(ok) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/L=Dreieich/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Root CA/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
> [OCSP-DBG] depth=1 result=2 err=3(unable to get certificate CRL) soft_fail=0 subj=/C=DE/ST=Hessen/O=logo/OU=logo/CN=logo Intermediate CA 2025/emailAddress=logo@kreuser.name
>
> When going through the chain, depth 2 is the root that is apparently not checked/reset. Then the intermediate on depth 1 errors and stops the whole OCSP handling.
> We're not getting to depth 0.
>
> In my opinion this error on depth 1 is too strict. The missing OCSP URI on the intermediate could be ignored as the only (truly) relevant OCSP URl is for depth 0: the real client cert.
> I would think to either validate only "existing" OCSP URIs or validate only depth 0.
I stumbled accross something similar with curl on Windows using schannel
and a middle box issuing non-compliant certificates: the CA did not
include any CRL distribution point in the certificate. With this commit
I googled my way to the current CA/Browser forum baseline requirements.
There we find in
https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#712112-crl-distribution-points:
The CRL Distribution Points extension MUST be present in:
- Subordinate CA Certificates; and
- Subscriber Certificates that 1) do not qualify as “Short-lived
Subscriber Certificates” and 2) do not include an Authority Information
Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod.
The CRL Distribution Points extension SHOULD NOT be present in:
- Root CA Certificates.
The CRL Distribution Points extension is OPTIONAL in:
- Short-lived Subscriber Certificates.
The CRL Distribution Points extension MUST NOT be present in:
- OCSP Responder Certificates.
As mTLS is a dying species with public CAs I guess you use a private CA
(do we call them private PKI? The P is not for "Public" any more). Is it
right to apply the rules for public certificates here? Should we have
feature flags to disable specific rules für private CAs?
I know distinguishing between private and public adds a lot of technical
complexitiy. But with the CA/Browser forum becoming stricter I currently
see a lot of things in enterprise environments falling part even if they
should not be affected. And I have to admit, that the stricter rules
will be assumed best practice in the near future and we can expect the
less restrictive CAs/certificates will be flagged in upcoming security
audits.
Just some thoughts,
- Stefan
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