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Posted to commits@superset.apache.org by jl...@apache.org on 2026/07/01 17:12:08 UTC

(superset) 01/02: Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into claude/subdirectory-helpers-tdd

This is an automated email from the ASF dual-hosted git repository.

sadpandajoe pushed a commit to branch claude/subdirectory-helpers-tdd
in repository https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/superset.git

commit 61f36b019fb0654e5b43074974dc497e5d4ad02e
Merge: 720521e703f 6d2b94ceb80
Author: Joe Li <jo...@preset.io>
AuthorDate: Wed Jul 1 09:43:39 2026 -0700

    Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into claude/subdirectory-helpers-tdd
    
    # Conflicts:
    #       UPDATING.md
    #       superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.test.ts
    #       superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts
    #       superset/translations/ja/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po

 .github/actions/setup-supersetbot/action.yml       |    2 +
 .github/workflows/bump-python-package.yml          |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/generate-FOSSA-report.yml        |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/github-action-validator.yml      |    4 +-
 .github/workflows/license-check.yml                |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/pre-commit.yml                   |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/release.yml                      |    4 +-
 .github/workflows/superset-docs-deploy.yml         |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/superset-helm-lint.yml           |    2 +-
 .github/workflows/superset-helm-release.yml        |    2 +-
 UPDATING.md                                        |   43 +
 .../configuration/configuring-superset.mdx         |   18 +
 docs/package.json                                  |    8 +-
 docs/static/feature-flags.json                     |    6 +
 docs/yarn.lock                                     |  174 +-
 pyproject.toml                                     |    2 +-
 requirements/base.txt                              |    2 +-
 requirements/development.txt                       |    2 +-
 .../translations/check_translation_regression.py   |  229 +-
 superset-embedded-sdk/babel.config.js              |    1 +
 superset-embedded-sdk/package.json                 |    2 +-
 superset-embedded-sdk/tsconfig.json                |    1 +
 superset-frontend/package-lock.json                |   16 +-
 superset-frontend/package.json                     |    2 +-
 .../src/chart/components/StatefulChart.tsx         |    3 +-
 .../src/components/AsyncEsmComponent/index.tsx     |   10 +-
 .../DropdownContainer/DropdownContainer.tsx        |    4 +-
 .../src/components/Icons/AntdEnhanced.tsx          |   13 +-
 .../src/components/ModalTrigger/index.tsx          |   20 +-
 .../src/components/Select/AsyncSelect.tsx          |   74 +-
 .../src/components/Select/Select.tsx               |   62 +-
 .../src/components/Table/VirtualTable.tsx          |    4 +-
 .../Table/utils/InteractiveTableUtils.ts           |    2 +-
 .../src/components/TableCollection/index.tsx       |   18 +-
 .../src/components/TimezoneSelector/index.tsx      |   12 +-
 .../superset-ui-core/src/connection/types.ts       |   12 +-
 .../src/currency-format/CurrencyFormatter.ts       |   38 +-
 .../src/currency-format/currencyLocale.ts          |   52 +
 .../superset-ui-core/src/currency-format/index.ts  |    6 +
 .../src/currency-format/symbolPosition.ts          |   93 +
 .../src/time-comparison/fetchTimeRange.ts          |   10 +-
 .../superset-ui-core/src/utils/lruCache.ts         |    7 +-
 .../test/currency-format/CurrencyFormatter.test.ts |   52 +-
 .../test/currency-format/currencyLocale.test.ts    |   65 +
 .../test/currency-format/symbolPosition.test.ts    |   74 +
 .../packages/superset-ui-core/types/assets.d.ts    |    1 +
 .../src/components/ScatterPlotOverlay.tsx          |    8 +-
 .../test/ScatterPlotOverlay.test.tsx               |   52 +-
 .../src/components/GridTable/index.tsx             |   18 +
 .../EmbeddedModal/EmbeddedModal.test.tsx           |   12 +
 .../dashboard/components/EmbeddedModal/index.tsx   |    2 +-
 .../DetailsPanel/DetailsPanel.test.tsx             |   17 +
 .../dashboard/components/FiltersBadge/Styles.tsx   |   12 +
 .../dashboard/components/Header/Header.test.tsx    |   28 +
 .../src/dashboard/components/Header/index.tsx      |    4 +-
 .../SliceHeaderControls.test.tsx                   |  112 +
 .../components/SliceHeaderControls/index.tsx       |   15 +-
 .../src/setup/setupFormatters.test.ts              |   71 +
 superset-frontend/src/setup/setupFormatters.ts     |    5 +
 .../src/utils/navigationUtils.test.ts              |   54 +
 superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts     |   32 +-
 superset/async_events/async_query_manager.py       |   16 +-
 superset/commands/report/execute.py                |   14 +-
 superset/commands/sql_lab/estimate.py              |   79 +-
 superset/config.py                                 |   67 +-
 superset/daos/base.py                              |   15 +-
 superset/daos/dashboard.py                         |   31 +-
 superset/mcp_service/app.py                        |   14 +-
 superset/mcp_service/dashboard/schemas.py          |  705 +++++-
 superset/mcp_service/dashboard/tool/__init__.py    |    8 +
 .../dashboard/tool/duplicate_dashboard.py          |  427 ++++
 .../dashboard/tool/get_dashboard_datasets.py       |  156 ++
 .../dashboard/tool/manage_native_filters.py        |  513 +++++
 .../dashboard/tool/remove_chart_from_dashboard.py  |  540 +++++
 .../mcp_service/dashboard/tool/update_dashboard.py |  148 +-
 .../mcp_service/docs/tool-search-optimization.md   |    2 +-
 superset/mcp_service/mcp_config.py                 |    1 +
 superset/mcp_service/middleware.py                 |    1 +
 superset/models/core.py                            |   40 +
 superset/models/helpers.py                         |   87 +-
 superset/sql/execution/executor.py                 |   62 +-
 superset/sql/parse.py                              |  275 ++-
 superset/sql_lab.py                                |   35 +-
 superset/translations/ja/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po   | 2309 +++++++++++---------
 tests/integration_tests/email_tests.py             |   12 +-
 .../async_events/async_query_manager_tests.py      |   53 +
 tests/unit_tests/commands/sql_lab/test_estimate.py |   78 +-
 tests/unit_tests/config_test.py                    |  120 +
 tests/unit_tests/daos/test_base_dao_soft_delete.py |   50 +-
 .../dashboard/test_dashboard_schemas.py            |   70 +
 .../dashboard/tool/test_duplicate_dashboard.py     |  645 ++++++
 .../dashboard/tool/test_get_dashboard_datasets.py  |  388 ++++
 .../dashboard/tool/test_manage_native_filters.py   |  818 +++++++
 .../tool/test_remove_chart_from_dashboard.py       |  724 ++++++
 .../dashboard/tool/test_update_dashboard.py        |  198 +-
 tests/unit_tests/models/core_test.py               |   39 +
 tests/unit_tests/models/helpers_test.py            |   55 +
 tests/unit_tests/models/test_soft_delete_mixin.py  |   38 +
 .../check_translation_regression_test.py           |  160 ++
 tests/unit_tests/sql/execution/test_executor.py    |   86 +-
 tests/unit_tests/sql/parse_tests.py                |  562 +++++
 101 files changed, 9766 insertions(+), 1479 deletions(-)

diff --cc UPDATING.md
index ef015443e81,ab5994402bc..8432631c244
--- a/UPDATING.md
+++ b/UPDATING.md
@@@ -24,23 -24,27 +24,45 @@@ assists people when migrating to a new 
  
  ## Next
  
 +- [39925](https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39925): URL prefixing for `SUPERSET_APP_ROOT` subdirectory deployments is now handled automatically by helpers in `src/utils/navigationUtils` (`openInNewTab`, `redirect`, `getShareableUrl`, `<AppLink>`). Direct imports of `ensureAppRoot` / `makeUrl` from `src/utils/pathUtils` are forbidden outside `navigationUtils.ts` (enforced by a static-invariant test); contributors writing new code should use the focused helpers instead. No runtime b [...]
 +
 +- [39925](https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39925): `SupersetClient.getUrl()` now strips a single leading application-root segment from the supplied `endpoint` before building the request URL, so a caller that accidentally pre-prefixes its endpoint (for example by wrapping it with `ensureAppRoot` before passing it to the client) no longer produces a doubled `/superset/superset/...` URL under subdirectory deployment. The strip is **single-pass** — a genuine `/superset/superset/<slu [...]
 +
 +- **Breaking — `Superset` view class route prefix removed.** The `Superset` view in `superset/views/core.py` now declares `route_base = ""`, overriding Flask-AppBuilder's auto-derived `/superset` prefix. Routes that previously lived at `/superset/welcome/`, `/superset/dashboard/<id>/`, `/superset/dashboard/p/<key>/`, `/superset/explore/`, etc. now respond at `/welcome/`, `/dashboard/<id>/`, `/dashboard/p/<key>/`, `/explore/`, etc. Under subdirectory deployment (`SUPERSET_APP_ROOT=/super [...]
 +
 +- **Breaking — Three sibling view classes route prefix removed.** Following the same rationale as the `Superset` class above, `ExplorePermalinkView` (`superset/views/explore.py`), `TagModelView`, and `TaggedObjectsModelView` (`superset/views/tags.py`, `superset/views/all_entities.py`) now mount at the application root rather than a hard-coded `/superset/...`. The user-visible URLs `/superset/explore/p/<key>/`, `/superset/tags/`, and `/superset/all_entities/` are unchanged under subdirec [...]
 +
 +- **Legacy `/superset/*` path support.** A new outermost WSGI middleware `LegacyPrefixRedirectMiddleware` (`superset/middleware/legacy_prefix_redirect.py`) 308-redirects every enumerated legacy `/superset/<canonical>` path to its post-`route_base=""` canonical location (e.g. `/superset/welcome/` → `/welcome/` under root; → `/superset/welcome/` under `SUPERSET_APP_ROOT=/superset`, because the canonical resolves through `AppRootMiddleware`). Bookmarks, email links, and external integratio [...]
 +
 +- **PWA web app manifest served dynamically.** The PWA manifest is now served at `/pwa-manifest.json` (under `APPLICATION_ROOT`) by a new `PwaManifestView` (`superset/views/pwa_manifest.py`) instead of the static file at `/static/assets/pwa-manifest.json`. The legacy static source at `superset-frontend/src/pwa-manifest.json` has been removed (along with its `webpack.config.js` `CopyPlugin` rule). The new endpoint resolves `APPLICATION_ROOT` and `STATIC_ASSETS_PREFIX` at request time so  [...]
 +
 +- **Hard re-bookmark break — `/superset/sql/<database_id>/`.** SQL Lab moved to its own blueprint at `/sqllab/`. The legacy `/superset/sql/<id>/` shape changed to a query-string form (`/sqllab/?dbid=<id>`); no 1:1 path mapping exists, so `LegacyPrefixRedirectMiddleware` does **not** redirect this route — it passes through and surfaces a 404. Users with bookmarks to `/superset/sql/<id>/` must update them to `/sqllab/?dbid=<id>`.
 +
 +- **`SqlaTable.sql_url` query-string format.** `SqlaTable.sql_url` now URL-encodes `table_name` and joins it as a query parameter rather than concatenating a second `?`. Previously, with `Database.sql_url` returning `/sqllab/?dbid=<id>`, the concatenation produced `/sqllab/?dbid=<id>?table_name=<raw>` — a malformed second `?` that broke the query parser. External code that parsed the legacy `<base>?table_name=<raw>` shape now sees properly percent-encoded values (e.g. `/` → `%2F`, ` ` → [...]
 +
 +- **New config flag `EMBEDDED_DISABLE_PERMALINK_ORIGIN_REWRITE` (default `False`).** Share/permalink URLs now substitute `window.location.origin` for the backend-supplied origin so a proxied or subdirectory-deployed Superset never hands the user an unreachable internal hostname. Operators whose reverse proxy correctly forwards `X-Forwarded-Host` *and* who want permalinks to carry the backend's literal origin can opt out by setting `EMBEDDED_DISABLE_PERMALINK_ORIGIN_REWRITE = True` in `s [...]
++
+ ### SQL Lab denies large-object and information_schema access by default
+ 
+ `DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS` and `DISALLOWED_SQL_TABLES` now ship with additional default entries, so SQL Lab and chart-data queries that reference them are rejected where they were previously allowed:
+ 
+ - PostgreSQL large-object routines (`lo_from_bytea`, `lo_export`, `lo_import`, `lo_put`, `lo_create`, `lo_creat`, `lowrite`, `lo_get`, `loread`, `lo_unlink`), which read and write bytes on the database server's filesystem.
+ - The SQL-standard `information_schema` views (`tables`, `columns`, `routines`, `views`, the privilege/grant views, etc.), which expose table, column, privilege, and view-definition metadata across the whole database.
+ 
+ Deployments that legitimately query these (for example tooling that introspects `information_schema`) can restore the previous behavior by overriding `DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS` / `DISALLOWED_SQL_TABLES` in `superset_config.py` to drop the entries they need.
+ 
+ Because the denylist now resolves the effective schema through the query-aware path, PostgreSQL queries that change the `search_path` (e.g. `SET search_path = ...`) are rejected on the SQL Lab execution and cost-estimate paths whenever any `DISALLOWED_SQL_TABLES` entry is configured (the default for PostgreSQL), matching the behavior previously applied only when `RLS_IN_SQLLAB` was enabled.
+ 
+ ### SQL parser input length cap (SQL_MAX_PARSE_LENGTH)
+ 
+ The SQL parser now rejects scripts whose UTF-8 byte length exceeds the new
+ `SQL_MAX_PARSE_LENGTH` config option (default `1_000_000` bytes) before they are
+ handed to sqlglot, which bounds parser memory and CPU usage. A single query
+ larger than the cap (for example a very large `IN (...)` list or a big
+ virtual-dataset SQL) raises a parse error in SQL Lab and dashboard-generated
+ queries. Deployments that legitimately run queries above this size should raise
+ the value, and `SQL_MAX_PARSE_LENGTH = None` disables the check entirely.
+ 
  ### Guest-token RLS rules reject unknown fields
  
  The `rls` rules passed to `POST /api/v1/security/guest_token/` are now validated strictly: a rule may only contain `dataset` and `clause`. Previously unknown fields were silently dropped, so a mistyped or legacy scope key (most commonly `datasource` instead of `dataset`) produced a rule with no `dataset`, which is treated as a *global* rule applied to every dataset the embedded resource can reach. Such a request now returns HTTP 400 identifying the offending field instead of issuing a t [...]
diff --cc superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.test.ts
index 60c1b500ac7,eea2a910843..39f35ee7e8a
--- a/superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.test.ts
+++ b/superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.test.ts
@@@ -16,711 -16,48 +16,765 @@@
   * specific language governing permissions and limitations
   * under the License.
   */
 -jest.mock('./pathUtils', () => ({
 -  ensureAppRoot: (url: string) => url,
 -}));
 -
 -let navigateTo: typeof import('./navigationUtils').navigateTo;
 -let assignMock: jest.Mock;
 -let locationSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 -
 -beforeEach(async () => {
 -  jest.resetModules();
 -  jest.useFakeTimers();
 -  ({ navigateTo } = await import('./navigationUtils'));
 -  assignMock = jest.fn();
 -  locationSpy = jest
 -    .spyOn(window, 'location', 'get')
 -    .mockReturnValue({ ...window.location, assign: assignMock } as Location);
 +import { withApplicationRoot } from 'spec/helpers/withApplicationRoot';
 +
 +// Surface any future hang as a Jest timeout instead of stalling CI.
 +jest.setTimeout(20000);
 +
 +describe('openInNewTab', () => {
 +  let openSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 +
 +  beforeEach(() => {
 +    openSpy = jest.spyOn(window, 'open').mockImplementation(() => null);
 +  });
 +
 +  afterEach(() => {
 +    openSpy.mockRestore();
 +  });
 +
 +  test('passes router-relative path through unchanged when application root is empty', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('/sqllab?new=true');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        '/sqllab?new=true',
 +        '_blank',
 +        'noopener noreferrer',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('prefixes router-relative path with application root under subdirectory deployment', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('/sqllab?new=true');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        '/superset/sqllab?new=true',
 +        '_blank',
 +        'noopener noreferrer',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('prefixes correctly for nested subdirectory roots', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/a/b/c/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('/dashboard/list');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        '/a/b/c/dashboard/list',
 +        '_blank',
 +        'noopener noreferrer',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('passes absolute URLs through unchanged regardless of application root', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('https://external.example.com/docs');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        'https://external.example.com/docs',
 +        '_blank',
 +        'noopener noreferrer',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('passes mailto: URLs through unchanged', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('mailto:owner@example.com');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        'mailto:owner@example.com',
 +        '_blank',
 +        'noopener noreferrer',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('uses noopener noreferrer for security on every call', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      openInNewTab('/sqllab');
 +      expect(openSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 +      const features = openSpy.mock.calls[0][2] as string;
 +      expect(features).toContain('noopener');
 +      expect(features).toContain('noreferrer');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('refuses protocol-relative URLs to block open-redirect via `//evil.com`', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(() => openInNewTab('//evil.example.com/phish')).toThrow(
 +        /refused unsafe URL/,
 +      );
 +      expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Scheme-without-authority bypass. WHATWG
 +  // URL parsers extract the host from `http:evil.com/foo` as `evil.com`,
 +  // so the previous regex `/^https?:/i` mistook a cross-origin URL for a
 +  // safe absolute one. The tightened regex requires `//` after the scheme.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['http:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['https:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['HTTP:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['ftp:evil.example.com/file'],
 +  ])('refuses scheme-without-authority URL %s', async (unsafeUrl: string) => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(() => openInNewTab(unsafeUrl)).toThrow(/refused unsafe URL/);
 +      expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // C0/C1 controls and zero-width / bidi
 +  // formatting marks are stripped by browsers before URL parsing, so a
 +  // string like `\t//evil.com` would survive the leading-slash check and
 +  // navigate cross-origin. Reject them outright.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['\t//evil.example.com'],
 +    ['\n//evil.example.com'],
 +    ['\r//evil.example.com'],
 +    ['‎/foo'],
 +    ['​/foo'],
 +    ['/foo'],
 +  ])(
 +    'refuses URL %j containing control or zero-width chars',
 +    async (unsafeUrl: string) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +        const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        expect(() => openInNewTab(unsafeUrl)).toThrow(/refused unsafe URL/);
 +        expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  // The bidi formatting
 +  // ranges U+202A..U+202E (LRE/RLE/PDF/LRO/RLO) and U+2066..U+2069
 +  // (LRI/RLI/FSI/PDI) were promised by the earlier comment but missing from
 +  // the original regex. Pin them directly so a documentation/regex drift
 +  // can't reintroduce the gap.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['‪/foo', 'U+202A LRE'],
 +    ['‫/foo', 'U+202B RLE'],
 +    ['‬/foo', 'U+202C PDF'],
 +    ['‭/foo', 'U+202D LRO'],
 +    ['‮/foo', 'U+202E RLO'],
 +    ['⁦/foo', 'U+2066 LRI'],
 +    ['⁧/foo', 'U+2067 RLI'],
 +    ['⁨/foo', 'U+2068 FSI'],
 +    ['⁩/foo', 'U+2069 PDI'],
 +  ])(
 +    'refuses URL containing %s bidi formatting mark',
 +    async (unsafeUrl: string, _label: string) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +        const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        expect(() => openInNewTab(unsafeUrl)).toThrow(/refused unsafe URL/);
 +        expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
  });
  
 -afterEach(() => {
 -  locationSpy.mockRestore();
 -  jest.useRealTimers();
 +describe('redirect', () => {
 +  let originalLocation: Location;
 +
 +  beforeEach(() => {
 +    originalLocation = window.location;
 +    delete (window as unknown as { location?: Location }).location;
 +    (window as unknown as { location: { href: string } }).location = {
 +      href: '',
 +    } as Location;
 +  });
 +
 +  afterEach(() => {
 +    (window as unknown as { location: Location }).location = originalLocation;
 +  });
 +
 +  test('sets window.location.href to the unprefixed path under empty root', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      redirect('/');
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('prefixes the path under a subdirectory deployment', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      redirect('/');
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('/superset/');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('passes absolute URLs through unchanged', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      redirect('https://external.example.com/foo');
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('https://external.example.com/foo');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // encodeURI-at-the-sink regression: see the
 +  // matching navigateWithState tests — `%27`/`%20` must survive un-doubled.
 +  test('does not double-encode percent-encoded query strings', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      redirect('/dashboard/list/?filters=(label:%27a%20b%27)');
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe(
 +        '/superset/dashboard/list/?filters=(label:%27a%20b%27)',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Backslash-laden URLs
 +  // were accepted by `SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE` and the sibling guards in
 +  // `ensureAppRoot` / `isAllowedScheme`. Browsers normalise `/\` → `//` in
 +  // the special-scheme authority, so `/\evil.com` became a cross-origin
 +  // navigation. The hardened guard must reject these *before* nav, and
 +  // `redirect` (which routes through `navigateTo`) must fall back to `/`
 +  // with a `console.error` rather than navigating to the unsafe target.
 +
 +  test.each([
 +    ['empty app root', ''],
 +    ['/superset app root', '/superset/'],
 +  ])(
 +    'falls back to "/" + console.error for /\\evil.com under %s',
 +    async (_label, appRoot) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot(appRoot, async () => {
 +        const errorSpy = jest
 +          .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +          .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +        try {
 +          const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +          redirect('/\\evil.com');
 +          // Fall back to ensureAppRoot('/') under the active root.
 +          expect(window.location.href).toBe(
 +            appRoot === '' ? '/' : '/superset/',
 +          );
 +          expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        } finally {
 +          errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +        }
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  test('falls back to "/" + console.error for https://good@evil.com (userinfo)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        redirect('https://good@evil.example.com/path');
 +        expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('falls back to "/" + console.error for //evil.com (already-blocked regression)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        redirect('//evil.example.com');
 +        expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Scheme-without-authority bypass on the full-page-nav path. WHATWG URL
 +  // parsers extract the host from `http:evil.com/foo` as `evil.com`, so the
 +  // external-URL branch's bare `parsed.protocol === 'http:'` check mistook a
 +  // cross-origin URL for a safe absolute one. `openInNewTab` already rejected
 +  // this shape; `redirect` (→ `navigateTo`) must too, falling back to `/`
 +  // with a `console.error` rather than following the cross-origin target.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['http:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['https:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['HTTP:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['ftp:evil.example.com/file'],
 +  ])(
 +    'falls back to "/" + console.error for scheme-without-authority URL %s',
 +    async (unsafeUrl: string) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +        const errorSpy = jest
 +          .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +          .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +        try {
 +          const { redirect } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +          redirect(unsafeUrl);
 +          expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +          expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        } finally {
 +          errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +        }
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
  });
  
 -test('ignores a repeated assign to the same URL within the dedupe window', () => {
 -  navigateTo('/dashboard/new', { assign: true });
 -  navigateTo('/dashboard/new', { assign: true });
 +// `navigateTo` and `navigateWithState` are exported imperative helpers
 +// and are the entry points that these tests cover.
 +describe('navigateTo', () => {
 +  let originalLocation: Location;
 +  let openSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 +
 +  beforeEach(() => {
 +    originalLocation = window.location;
 +    delete (window as unknown as { location?: Location }).location;
 +    (
 +      window as unknown as {
 +        location: { href: string; assign: jest.Mock };
 +      }
 +    ).location = {
 +      href: '',
 +      assign: jest.fn(),
 +    };
 +    openSpy = jest.spyOn(window, 'open').mockImplementation(() => null);
 +  });
 +
 +  afterEach(() => {
 +    (window as unknown as { location: Location }).location = originalLocation;
 +    openSpy.mockRestore();
 +  });
 +
 +  test('falls back to "/" + console.error for /\\evil.com (default href)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        navigateTo('/\\evil.com');
 +        expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('falls back to "/" + console.error for /\\evil.com (newWindow path)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        navigateTo('/\\evil.com', { newWindow: true });
 +        // window.open never called with the unsafe URL; fallback to href='/'
 +        expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +          expect.stringContaining('\\evil.com'),
 +          expect.anything(),
 +          expect.anything(),
 +        );
 +        expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Scheme-without-authority bypass: `new URL('http:evil.com/foo')` resolves
 +  // the host to `evil.com`, so the external-URL branch must require an
 +  // explicit `//` after the scheme (mirroring `SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE`) and
 +  // fall back to `/` rather than navigating cross-origin.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['http:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['https:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['HTTP:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['ftp:evil.example.com/file'],
 +  ])(
 +    'falls back to "/" + console.error for scheme-without-authority URL %s',
 +    async (unsafeUrl: string) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +        const errorSpy = jest
 +          .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +          .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +        try {
 +          const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +          navigateTo(unsafeUrl);
 +          expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +          expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +          expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        } finally {
 +          errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +        }
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  test('refuses scheme-without-authority URL on the newWindow path', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        navigateTo('http:evil.example.com/phish', { newWindow: true });
 +        expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        expect(window.location.href).toBe('/');
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
  
 -  expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 -  expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/dashboard/new');
 +  test('passes legitimate router-relative path through unchanged', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateTo('/dashboard/list/');
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('/superset/dashboard/list/');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('uses window.location.assign (not href) for a router-relative path when { assign: true }', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateTo('/dashboard/list/', { assign: true });
 +      expect(window.location.assign).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        '/superset/dashboard/list/',
 +      );
 +      // The assign branch must not also fall through to the href sink.
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('uses window.location.assign for an external URL when { assign: true }', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateTo('https://external.example.com/docs', { assign: true });
 +      expect(window.location.assign).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        'https://external.example.com/docs',
 +      );
 +      expect(window.location.href).toBe('');
 +    });
 +  });
 +});
 +
 +describe('navigateWithState', () => {
 +  let pushSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 +  let replaceSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 +
 +  beforeEach(() => {
 +    pushSpy = jest
 +      .spyOn(window.history, 'pushState')
 +      .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +    replaceSpy = jest
 +      .spyOn(window.history, 'replaceState')
 +      .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +  });
 +
 +  afterEach(() => {
 +    pushSpy.mockRestore();
 +    replaceSpy.mockRestore();
 +  });
 +
 +  test('no-ops + console.error for /\\evil.com (does NOT trigger full-page nav)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const errorSpy = jest
 +        .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +        .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +      try {
 +        const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        navigateWithState('/\\evil.com', { from: 'test' });
 +        expect(pushSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        expect(replaceSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      } finally {
 +        errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +      }
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Scheme-without-authority bypass on the history-API path: the external-URL
 +  // branch must reject `http:evil.com/foo` (host normalises to `evil.com`)
 +  // and no-op rather than pushing a cross-origin URL into history.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['http:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['https:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['HTTP:evil.example.com/phish'],
 +    ['ftp:evil.example.com/file'],
 +  ])(
 +    'no-ops + console.error for scheme-without-authority URL %s',
 +    async (unsafeUrl: string) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +        const errorSpy = jest
 +          .spyOn(console, 'error')
 +          .mockImplementation(() => {});
 +        try {
 +          const { navigateWithState } =
 +            await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +          navigateWithState(unsafeUrl, { from: 'test' });
 +          expect(pushSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +          expect(replaceSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +          expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
 +        } finally {
 +          errorSpy.mockRestore();
 +        }
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  test('passes legitimate router-relative path through to pushState', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/42/', { from: 'test' });
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        { from: 'test' },
 +        '',
 +        '/superset/dashboard/42/',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('uses replaceState (not pushState) when { replace: true }', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/42/', { from: 'test' }, { replace: true });
 +      expect(replaceSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        { from: 'test' },
 +        '',
 +        '/superset/dashboard/42/',
 +      );
 +      expect(pushSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // encodeURI-at-the-sink regression: the CodeQL
 +  // `js/html-injection` sanitiser escapes `%` itself, so already-percent-
 +  // encoded paths (the URL constructor's output always is) were double-
 +  // encoded — `%20` → `%2520` — corrupting the pushed URL.
 +  test('does not double-encode percent-encoded rison paths (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/list/?filters=(label:%27a%20b%27)', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        {},
 +        '',
 +        '/dashboard/list/?filters=(label:%27a%20b%27)',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('single-encodes raw spaces and unicode path segments (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/百分比 slug/', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 +        {},
 +        '',
 +        '/superset/dashboard/%E7%99%BE%E5%88%86%E6%AF%94%20slug/',
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Restore-regex corner cases (review follow-up on the encodeURI fix):
 +  // pinned so a future "simplification" of DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE (e.g.
 +  // an uppercase-only hex class, or a greedy restore that collapses
 +  // intentional `%25XX`) cannot pass the suite while corrupting URLs.
 +  test('preserves intentionally double-encoded %2520 (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/list/?q=%2520', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({}, '', '/dashboard/list/?q=%2520');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('preserves literal %25 followed by hex (%25AB) (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/list/?q=%25AB', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({}, '', '/dashboard/list/?q=%25AB');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('preserves lowercase hex escapes (%2f) (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/a%2fb/', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({}, '', '/dashboard/a%2fb/');
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('single-encodes an invalid percent sequence (%zz) (pushState)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { navigateWithState } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      navigateWithState('/dashboard/100%zz/', {});
 +      expect(pushSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({}, '', '/dashboard/100%25zz/');
 +    });
 +  });
  });
  
 -test('assigns different URLs in quick succession', () => {
 -  navigateTo('/dashboard/new', { assign: true });
 -  navigateTo('/chart/add', { assign: true });
 +describe('getShareableUrl', () => {
 +  test('returns origin + unprefixed path under empty root', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { getShareableUrl } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(getShareableUrl('/sqllab?id=1')).toBe(
 +        `${window.location.origin}/sqllab?id=1`,
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  test('returns origin + prefixed path under subdirectory deployment', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
 +      const { getShareableUrl } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(getShareableUrl('/sqllab?id=1')).toBe(
 +        `${window.location.origin}/superset/sqllab?id=1`,
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
 +
 +  // Composition pin:
 +  // `assertSafeNavigationUrl` is module-private; route the pin through the
 +  // purest public helper. `getShareableUrl` runs the same composition
 +  // (`assertSafeNavigationUrl(ensureAppRoot(...))`) as `openInNewTab` /
 +  // `AppLink`, side-effect-free. Throwing here proves the guard runs
 +  // post-`ensureAppRoot`, which is the invariant `pathUtils.ts:41` must
 +  // preserve in lockstep.
 +  test.each([
 +    ['empty app root', ''],
 +    ['/superset app root', '/superset/'],
 +  ])(
 +    'throws for /\\evil.com under %s (composition pin)',
 +    async (_label, appRoot) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot(appRoot, async () => {
 +        const { getShareableUrl } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        expect(() => getShareableUrl('/\\evil.com')).toThrow(
 +          /refused unsafe URL/,
 +        );
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  test('throws for //evil.com (already-blocked regression)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { getShareableUrl } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(() => getShareableUrl('//evil.example.com')).toThrow(
 +        /refused unsafe URL/,
 +      );
 +    });
 +  });
  
 -  expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
 +  test('throws for https://good@evil.com (userinfo)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { getShareableUrl } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(() =>
 +        getShareableUrl('https://good@evil.example.com/path'),
 +      ).toThrow(/refused unsafe URL/);
 +    });
 +  });
  });
  
 -test('assigns the same URL again once the dedupe window has elapsed', () => {
 -  navigateTo('/dashboard/new', { assign: true });
 -  jest.advanceTimersByTime(1000);
 -  navigateTo('/dashboard/new', { assign: true });
 +describe('openInNewTab — sibling-site coverage', () => {
 +  let openSpy: jest.SpyInstance;
 +
 +  beforeEach(() => {
 +    openSpy = jest.spyOn(window, 'open').mockImplementation(() => null);
 +  });
 +
 +  afterEach(() => {
 +    openSpy.mockRestore();
 +  });
 +
 +  test.each([
 +    ['empty app root', ''],
 +    ['/superset app root', '/superset/'],
 +  ])(
 +    'throws for /\\evil.com under %s and never calls window.open',
 +    async (_label, appRoot) => {
 +      await withApplicationRoot(appRoot, async () => {
 +        const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +        expect(() => openInNewTab('/\\evil.com')).toThrow(/refused unsafe URL/);
 +        expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +      });
 +    },
 +  );
 +
 +  test('throws for https://good@evil.com (userinfo)', async () => {
 +    await withApplicationRoot('', async () => {
 +      const { openInNewTab } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
 +      expect(() => openInNewTab('https://good@evil.example.com')).toThrow(
 +        /refused unsafe URL/,
 +      );
 +      expect(openSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 +    });
 +  });
 +});
 +
 +// AppLink renders a real React element, so its tests can't use
 +// withApplicationRoot — `jest.resetModules()` corrupts @testing-library/react
 +// when its dist files are re-imported across the reset. Mock applicationRoot
 +// at module scope and vary it per test instead.
 +//
 +// Note: the mock factory is hoisted, so `mockApplicationRoot` must be
 +// `mock`-prefixed to satisfy Jest's out-of-scope-variable check.
++
++// Duplicate-assign suppression (master PR #40833): a double-click that fires
++// two identical `navigateTo(..., { assign: true })` calls within 1s must reach
++// `window.location.assign` only once. The dedupe is keyed on the final,
++// app-root-prefixed sink value. These exercise the real `navigateTo` (not an
++// identity stub) so app-root prefixing and the assign barrier run end to end.
++describe('navigateTo duplicate-assign suppression', () => {
++  let originalLocation: Location;
++  let assignMock: jest.Mock;
++
++  beforeEach(() => {
++    jest.useFakeTimers();
++    originalLocation = window.location;
++    delete (window as unknown as { location?: Location }).location;
++    assignMock = jest.fn();
++    (
++      window as unknown as { location: { href: string; assign: jest.Mock } }
++    ).location = { href: '', assign: assignMock };
++  });
++
++  afterEach(() => {
++    (window as unknown as { location: Location }).location = originalLocation;
++    jest.useRealTimers();
++  });
++
++  test('ignores a repeated assign to the same URL within the dedupe window', async () => {
++    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
++      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
++      navigateTo('/dashboard/new/', { assign: true });
++      navigateTo('/dashboard/new/', { assign: true });
++      expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
++      expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/superset/dashboard/new/');
++    });
++  });
++
++  test('assigns different URLs in quick succession', async () => {
++    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
++      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
++      navigateTo('/dashboard/new/', { assign: true });
++      navigateTo('/chart/add/', { assign: true });
++      expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
++    });
++  });
+ 
 -  expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
++  test('assigns the same URL again once the dedupe window has elapsed', async () => {
++    await withApplicationRoot('/superset/', async () => {
++      const { navigateTo } = await import('src/utils/navigationUtils');
++      navigateTo('/dashboard/new/', { assign: true });
++      jest.advanceTimersByTime(1000);
++      navigateTo('/dashboard/new/', { assign: true });
++      expect(assignMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
++    });
++  });
+ });
diff --cc superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts
index f73507f9106,967de1fc24c..5ee26e12a68
--- a/superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts
+++ b/superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts
@@@ -16,332 -16,41 +16,360 @@@
   * specific language governing permissions and limitations
   * under the License.
   */
 -import { sanitizeUrl } from '@braintree/sanitize-url';
 -import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
 +import {
 +  createElement,
 +  type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
 +  type ReactElement,
 +} from 'react';
 +import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
 +// Note: master PR #40546 added `import { sanitizeUrl } from
 +// '@braintree/sanitize-url';` here as part of its sink-wrapping approach.
 +// Dropped on merge because this file's `assertSafeNavigationUrl` /
 +// inline-barrier scheme is strictly stronger: it rejects `javascript:` /
 +// `data:` (scheme allowlist), backslash-laden authority spoofing,
 +// and userinfo-bearing http(s)/ftp URLs — none of which
 +// `sanitizeUrl` rejects. The library remains a project dep (used in
 +// ListViewCard, SqlAlchemyForm, etc.) and is intentionally unused here.
  
 +// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
 +// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
 +// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
 +// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
 +export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
 +
 +// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
 +// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
 +// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
 +// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
 +// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
 +
 +const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
 +
++// Duplicate-navigation suppression for `assign`-mode navigations (master
++// PR #40833: prevents a double-click on "create dashboard" from firing two
++// identical `window.location.assign` calls and creating duplicate objects).
++// Keyed on the final, already-sanitised sink value so the dedupe decision is
++// made on exactly what would reach `window.location.assign`. This is pure
++// bookkeeping — it never touches the sink, so the inline CodeQL barriers on
++// each `assign` branch below remain intact.
+ const DUPLICATE_NAV_WINDOW_MS = 1000;
+ let lastAssignUrl: string | null = null;
+ let lastAssignAt = 0;
+ 
 -export const navigateTo = (
++function shouldSkipDuplicateAssign(sinkValue: string): boolean {
++  const now = Date.now();
++  if (
++    lastAssignUrl === sinkValue &&
++    now - lastAssignAt < DUPLICATE_NAV_WINDOW_MS
++  ) {
++    return true;
++  }
++  lastAssignUrl = sinkValue;
++  lastAssignAt = now;
++  return false;
++}
++
 +// Constant base for the URL-constructor barrier in the router-relative
 +// branches below. Using a constant (rather than `window.location.origin`)
 +// keeps the parse fully deterministic — test mocks that supply only
 +// `window.location.href` still exercise the same code path, and CodeQL
 +// recognises the literal-string origin equality as a sanitiser.
 +const SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE = 'http://navigation-utils.invalid/';
 +const SAFE_PATH_PARSE_ORIGIN = 'http://navigation-utils.invalid';
 +
 +// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
 +// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
 +// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
 +// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
 +// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
 +//
 +// The leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
 +// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
 +// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
 +// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
 +// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
 +// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
 +// below, since `https://good@evil.com` resolves to the host `evil.com`
 +// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
 +//
 +// The http(s)/ftp branches require an
 +// explicit `//` after the scheme. Without it, `new URL('http:evil.com')`
 +// in modern browsers parses the authority as `evil.com` — a same-origin-
 +// looking absolute URL that resolves cross-origin. Mirroring the
 +// protocol-relative `//host` reject from above.
 +// URL strings containing C0/C1 controls
 +// (`\t`/`\n`/`\r`/etc., DEL, U+0080..U+009F) or Unicode zero-width / bidi
 +// formatting marks (U+200B..U+200F, U+202A..U+202E, U+2066..U+2069,
 +// U+2028, U+2029, U+FEFF) are rejected outright. Browsers strip leading
 +// C0 controls before parsing the leading-slash branch, so `\t//evil.com`
 +// would otherwise leave the leading-slash check unable to see the
 +// protocol-relative `//`. Defence-in-depth — no known active bypass
 +// against the current allow-list, but the regex would otherwise depend
 +// on browser-specific normalisation behaviour.
 +//
 +// The bidi range was
 +// extended to cover the explicit-direction format characters U+202A..E
 +// (LRE/RLE/PDF/LRO/RLO) and U+2066..9 (LRI/RLI/FSI/PDI). WHATWG strips
 +// these before parsing the host, but the earlier comment had promised them
 +// while the regex only covered U+200E/F — closing the documentation
 +// drift the code review surfaced.
 +const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE =
 +  /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:\/\/|ftp:\/\/|mailto:|tel:)/i;
 +const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):\/\//i;
 +// String-literal `\u` escapes (via `new RegExp(...)`) instead of a regex
 +// literal so source-file tooling (Babel parser, prettier, eslint) does
 +// not have to round-trip raw bidi / zero-width / line-separator bytes.
 +const FORBIDDEN_CONTROL_CHARS_RE = new RegExp(
 +  '[\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F-\\x9F' +
 +    '\\u200B-\\u200F' +
 +    '\\u202A-\\u202E' +
 +    '\\u2066-\\u2069' +
 +    '\\u2028\\u2029\\uFEFF]',
 +);
 +
 +// `encodeURI` (kept at the sinks below as CodeQL's recognised
 +// `js/html-injection` sanitiser) escapes `%` itself, so an already-
 +// percent-encoded path — and `parsed.pathname`/`.search`/`.hash` from the
 +// URL constructor always are — would be double-encoded (`%20` → `%2520`)
 +// and the navigation would land on the wrong URL. Mapping `%25XX`
 +// (XX = hex) back to `%XX` after the encodeURI pass restores the
 +// constructor's escape sequences. The pair is NOT a strict no-op: the
 +// WHATWG serialiser emits some characters raw that encodeURI escapes
 +// (`|`, `^`, `[`, `]` in paths; also `{`, `}`, backtick in queries), so
 +// those end up single-encoded — semantically equivalent, since servers
 +// percent-decode them back to the same resource.
 +const DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE = /%25([0-9A-Fa-f]{2})/g;
 +
 +function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
 +  if (FORBIDDEN_CONTROL_CHARS_RE.test(url)) {
 +    throw new Error(
 +      'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: contains a forbidden ' +
 +        'control or zero-width character (would survive the allow-list ' +
 +        'as a browser-normalised navigation primitive).',
 +    );
 +  }
 +  if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
 +    throw new Error(
 +      'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
 +        'http(s)://, ftp://, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
 +    );
 +  }
 +  if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
 +    let parsed: URL;
 +    try {
 +      parsed = new URL(url);
 +    } catch {
 +      throw new Error(
 +        'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
 +      );
 +    }
 +    if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
 +      throw new Error(
 +        'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
 +          'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
 +      );
 +    }
 +  }
 +  return url;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
 + * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
 + * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
 + * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
 + * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
 + *
 + * Each `window.*` sink lives inside an if-block whose guard layers
 + * sanitisers so every CodeQL query family that fires on these sinks sees
 + * one it recognises:
 + *
 + *   1. `target.startsWith('/')` + `!target.startsWith('//')` +
 + *      `!target.includes('\\')` — recognised by `js/client-side-
 + *      unvalidated-url-redirection`; rules out protocol-relative and
 + *      browser-normalised backslash-laden authority spoofing.
 + *   2. `new URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE)` + literal equality on
 + *      `parsed.origin` + literal equality on `parsed.protocol` —
 + *      recognised by `js/xss-through-dom`. The constant base keeps the
 + *      parse deterministic when test mocks supply only `window.location.
 + *      { href, assign }` and not `origin`.
 + *   3. `safePath.startsWith('/')` + `!safePath.startsWith('//')` +
 + *      `!safePath.includes('\\')` — extra defence-in-depth on the value
 + *      actually flowing to the sink.
 + *   4. `encodeURI(safePath)` at the sink itself — `js/html-injection`'s
 + *      default model only recognises specific through-function sanitisers
 + *      (`encodeURI`, `encodeURIComponent`, `DOMPurify.sanitize`, …) and
 + *      does NOT propagate startsWith/equality barriers from `target` or
 + *      `parsed.*` through the URL-property derivation into the assigned
 + *      string. Because `encodeURI` escapes `%` itself (it is NOT
 + *      idempotent on percent-encoded input), each sink restores the
 + *      `%XX` escape sequences afterwards via DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE.
 + *      Characters the WHATWG serialiser emits raw but encodeURI escapes
 + *      (`|^[]{}` and backtick) stay single-encoded — semantically
 + *      equivalent, not byte-identical (see DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE).
 + *
 + * External-URL paths get their own block with `URL.protocol` literal-
 + * equality + userinfo guards on the URL-constructor's normalised `href`.
 + *
 + * @internal
 + */
 +export function navigateTo(
    url: string,
    options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
 -) => {
 -  if (options?.newWindow) {
 -    window.open(
 -      sanitizeUrl(ensureAppRoot(url)),
 -      '_blank',
 -      'noopener noreferrer',
 -    );
 -  } else if (options?.assign) {
 -    const sanitized = sanitizeUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
 -    const now = Date.now();
 +): void {
 +  const target = ensureAppRoot(url);
 +  // Router-relative fast-path: triple-layer barrier so every CodeQL query
 +  // family that fires on `window.location.*` / `window.history.*` sees a
 +  // recognised sanitiser:
 +  //   1. Outer `startsWith('/')` + `!startsWith('//')` + `!includes('\\')`
 +  //      on `target` — recognised by `js/client-side-unvalidated-url-
 +  //      redirection` and rules out protocol-relative + backslash-laden
 +  //      authority-spoofing.
 +  //   2. URL-constructor parse + literal-equality on `parsed.origin` and
 +  //      `parsed.protocol` — recognised by `js/xss-through-dom`. The
 +  //      constant base (`http://navigation-utils.invalid/`) keeps the parse
 +  //      deterministic under test mocks.
 +  //   3. Inline `startsWith('/')` + `!startsWith('//')` + `!includes('\\')`
 +  //      on `safePath` — the value actually fed to the sink. Required for
 +  //      `js/html-injection`, whose default model does NOT propagate
 +  //      sanitisers from `target` through the URL-property derivation
 +  //      (`parsed.pathname` etc.) into the assigned string.
 +  if (
 +    target.startsWith('/') &&
 +    !target.startsWith('//') &&
 +    !target.includes('\\')
 +  ) {
 +    let parsed: URL | null;
 +    try {
 +      parsed = new URL(target, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE);
 +    } catch {
 +      parsed = null;
 +    }
 +    if (
 +      parsed !== null &&
 +      parsed.origin === SAFE_PATH_PARSE_ORIGIN &&
 +      parsed.protocol === 'http:'
 +    ) {
 +      const safePath = `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`;
 +      if (
 +        safePath.startsWith('/') &&
 +        !safePath.startsWith('//') &&
 +        !safePath.includes('\\')
 +      ) {
 +        // `encodeURI` is CodeQL's built-in sanitiser for `js/html-injection`
 +        // on `window.location.*` sinks. The previous startsWith barriers
 +        // satisfy `js/url-redirection` and `js/xss-through-dom`, but
 +        // `js/html-injection`'s default model only recognises specific
 +        // through-function sanitisers (`encodeURI`, `encodeURIComponent`,
 +        // `DOMPurify.sanitize`, …). `encodeURI` escapes `%` itself, which
 +        // would double-encode the constructor-normalised path, so the
 +        // follow-up replace restores the `%XX` escape sequences (see
 +        // DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE) — net effect: a runtime no-op for
 +        // legitimate paths with the sanitiser still visible at the sink.
 +        const sinkValue = encodeURI(safePath).replace(
 +          DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE,
 +          '%$1',
 +        );
 +        if (options?.newWindow) {
 +          window.open(sinkValue, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
 +        } else if (options?.assign) {
-           window.location.assign(sinkValue);
++          if (!shouldSkipDuplicateAssign(sinkValue)) {
++            window.location.assign(sinkValue);
++          }
 +        } else {
 +          window.location.href = sinkValue;
 +        }
 +        return;
 +      }
 +    }
 +  }
 +  // External-URL path: parse the input, verify the scheme is in our
 +  // allowlist via literal equality (CodeQL recognises constant-equality
 +  // barriers on `URL.protocol`), verify no userinfo, then feed the URL
 +  // constructor's normalised `href` to the sink. `parsed.href` is a fresh
 +  // string derived from the verified URL properties, so the data-flow
 +  // chain from `url` (source) to the sink is broken by the parse +
 +  // property-check pair.
 +  // `SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE` requires an explicit `//` after http(s)/ftp,
 +  // mirroring `assertSafeNavigationUrl`. Without it, `new URL('http:evil.com')`
 +  // parses the authority as `evil.com` — a cross-origin URL masquerading as a
 +  // safe absolute one. The protocol-equality check below alone would accept it
 +  // because `parsed.protocol` is still `http:` after normalisation.
 +  let parsed: URL | null;
 +  try {
 +    parsed = new URL(target);
 +  } catch {
 +    parsed = null;
 +  }
 +  if (
 +    parsed !== null &&
 +    SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(target) &&
 +    (parsed.protocol === 'https:' ||
 +      parsed.protocol === 'http:' ||
 +      parsed.protocol === 'ftp:' ||
 +      parsed.protocol === 'mailto:' ||
 +      parsed.protocol === 'tel:') &&
 +    !parsed.username &&
 +    !parsed.password
 +  ) {
 +    const safeExternal = parsed.href;
 +    if (options?.newWindow) {
 +      window.open(safeExternal, '_blank', NEW_TAB_FEATURES);
 +    } else if (options?.assign) {
-       window.location.assign(safeExternal);
++      if (!shouldSkipDuplicateAssign(safeExternal)) {
++        window.location.assign(safeExternal);
++      }
 +    } else {
 +      window.location.href = safeExternal;
 +    }
 +    return;
 +  }
 +  // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in dev.
 +  console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url);
 +  // Fallback to deployment home. Same triple-layer barrier so CodeQL sees
 +  // the sanitiser at this sink too (see `navigateTo` docstring).
 +  const home = ensureAppRoot('/');
 +  if (home.startsWith('/') && !home.startsWith('//') && !home.includes('\\')) {
 +    let homeUrl: URL | null;
 +    try {
 +      homeUrl = new URL(home, SAFE_PATH_PARSE_BASE);
 +    } catch {
 +      homeUrl = null;
 +    }
      if (
 -      lastAssignUrl === sanitized &&
 -      now - lastAssignAt < DUPLICATE_NAV_WINDOW_MS
 +      homeUrl !== null &&
 +      homeUrl.origin === SAFE_PATH_PARSE_ORIGIN &&
 +      homeUrl.protocol === 'http:'
      ) {
 -      return;
 +      const safeHome = `${homeUrl.pathname}${homeUrl.search}${homeUrl.hash}`;
 +      if (
 +        safeHome.startsWith('/') &&
 +        !safeHome.startsWith('//') &&
 +        !safeHome.includes('\\')
 +      ) {
 +        // See router-relative branch above for `encodeURI` rationale.
 +        window.location.href = encodeURI(safeHome).replace(
 +          DOUBLE_ENCODED_ESCAPE_RE,
 +          '%$1',
 +        );
 +      }
      }
 -    lastAssignUrl = sanitized;
 -    lastAssignAt = now;
 -    window.location.assign(sanitized);
 -  } else {
 -    window.location.href = sanitizeUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
    }
 -};
 +}
  
 -export const navigateWithState = (
 +/**
 + * Imperative history-API navigation (no page load). Unsafe URLs become a
 + * silent no-op + `console.error`; we deliberately do NOT fall back to a
 + * full-page nav here because callers (e.g. dashboard-properties save)
 + * already display their own success/failure feedback and a surprise
 + * `window.location.href = '/'` would discard unsaved state.
 + *
 + * Inline barriers mirror `navigateTo` (see its docstring) so CodeQL
 + * recognises the sanitiser at every `window.history.*` sink.
 + *
 + * @internal
 + */
 +export function navigateWithState(
    url: string,
    state: Record<string, unknown>,
    options?: { replace?: boolean },
diff --cc superset/translations/ja/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po
index 42d3353e861,7733777d44e..158d054f523
--- a/superset/translations/ja/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po
+++ b/superset/translations/ja/LC_MESSAGES/messages.po
@@@ -13830,9 -14040,9 +14040,12 @@@ msgstr "
  "この JSON "
  "オブジェクトは、ダッシュボード内のウィジェットの配置を記述します。ダッシュボード表示画面でドラッグ&ドロップによりサイズや位置を調整すると自動生成されます"
  
 +msgid "This link cannot be followed because its address is unsafe."
 +msgstr ""
 +
+ # Machine-translated via backfill_po.py (claude-sonnet-4-6) [refs: de, sr,
+ # sr_Latn]
+ #, fuzzy
  msgid ""
  "This link will take you to an external website. We cannot guarantee the "
  "safety of external destinations."
@@@ -14567,12 -14807,12 +14810,15 @@@ msgstr "固定を解除
  msgid "Unpin from the result panel"
  msgstr "結果パネルにピン留め"
  
+ # Machine-translated via backfill_po.py (claude-sonnet-4-6) [refs: de, sr,
+ # sr_Latn]
+ #, fuzzy
  msgid "Unpin from top"
- msgstr ""
+ msgstr "上部からピン留めを解除"
  
 +msgid "Unsafe link blocked"
 +msgstr ""
 +
  #, python-format
  msgid "Unsafe return type for function %(func)s: %(value_type)s"
  msgstr "関数 %(func)s の戻り値の型「%(value_type)s」は安全ではありません"