You are viewing a plain text version of this content. The canonical link for it is here.
Posted to dev@tapestry.apache.org by "Howard M. Lewis Ship (JIRA)" <ji...@apache.org> on 2008/10/16 18:51:45 UTC
[jira] Updated: (TAP5-111) Protect serialized object blobs from
being tampered by external user
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-111?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]
Howard M. Lewis Ship updated TAP5-111:
--------------------------------------
Issue Type: New Feature (was: Bug)
> Protect serialized object blobs from being tampered by external user
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: TAP5-111
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAP5-111
> Project: Tapestry 5
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Affects Versions: 5.0.15
> Reporter: Martijn Brinkers
>
> Using ClientPersistentFieldStorage (t:state:client parameter) an external user can
> 'inject' arbitary serialiable objects.
> An external user can inject for example a very big byte array consuming a lot of memory.
> One solution would be to add a keyed secure hash (HMAC to be precise) to the binary blob to Tapestry can detect that the blob has been tampered with. It be nice if the packing/unpacking (currently done by Base64ObjectInputStream) would be serviced (that is make it a service) so it would be easy to override this behaviour.
> Same applies to t:formdata although the impact is less because it only accepts objects implementing ComponentAction.
--
This message is automatically generated by JIRA.
-
You can reply to this email to add a comment to the issue online.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscribe@tapestry.apache.org
For additional commands, e-mail: dev-help@tapestry.apache.org