(tooling-agents) branch main updated: ASVS audit: 13.2.3.md (redacted)

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     new 6ac3254  ASVS audit: 13.2.3.md (redacted)
6ac3254 is described below

commit 6ac3254283629f6eb230953801ad7f655556f5c3
Author: ASF Tooling Team <ro...@apache.org>
AuthorDate: Tue May 5 14:03:20 2026 +0200

    ASVS audit: 13.2.3.md (redacted)
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+# Security Audit Report: ASVS 13.2.3
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Repository** | apache/steve/v3 |
+| **Audit Date** | May 05, 2026 |
+| **Auditor** | Tooling Agents (bundled-pass mode) |
+| **ASVS Requirement** | ASVS 13.2.3 |
+| **Files Analyzed** | 7 relevant / 49 total |
+| **Files Skipped** | 12 |
+
+**Requirement description:** Verify that if a credential has to be used for service authentication, the credential being used by the consumer is not a default credential (e.g., root/root or admin/admin).
+
+### Findings Overview
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|-------|
+| 🔴 Critical | 0 |
+| 🟠 High | 0 |
+| 🟡 Medium | 0 |
+| 🟢 Low | 0 |
+
+---
+
+## ASVS-13.2.3: Default Credentials for Service Authentication
+
+### Findings for 13.2.3
+
+No findings detected. After thorough analysis, no default credentials were identified in the codebase:
+
+- The application uses SQLite (file-based database) which doesn't require authentication credentials
+- Authentication is delegated to ASF's external OAuth/LDAP system via `asfquart.auth`
+- Cryptographic material (salts, keys) is generated at runtime using `secrets.token_bytes()`
+- No hardcoded usernames/passwords, API keys, or connection strings with credentials exist in the source
+
+### Security Controls Inventory for 13.2.3
+
+| Control | Location | Coverage |
+|---------|----------|----------|
+| Runtime crypto generation | `v3/steve/crypto.py:gen_salt()` | All salt/key operations |
+| External auth delegation | `v3/server/pages.py` via `asfquart.auth` | All authenticated endpoints |
+| SQLite local file access | `v3/steve/election.py:open_database()` | No credentials needed |
+
+### Positive Patterns for 13.2.3
+
+1. **No embedded credentials**: Database access uses local file path (`DB_FNAME = THIS_DIR / APP.cfg.db`) with no username/password.
+2. **Cryptographic material properly generated**: All salts and keys are generated using `secrets.token_bytes()` at runtime, never hardcoded.
+3. **Authentication delegated**: User authentication is handled externally via `asfquart.auth.require({R.committer})` — no credential storage in application code.
+
+---
+
+
+
+## Cross-cutting Architecture Observations
+
+1. **Authentication without Authorization**: The application has robust authentication (via `asfquart.auth.require`) but authorization is largely unimplemented. Multiple `### check authz` placeholders throughout `pages.py` mean any authenticated committer can manage any election. This impacts the backend communication security posture because it means the application's internal access control doesn't properly protect backend resources.
+
+2. **Local-First Architecture**: The application uses SQLite (local file database) rather than remote services. This significantly reduces the attack surface for ASVS 13.2.x requirements about backend communication, as there are no remote database credentials, API keys, or network connections to external services to protect.
+
+3. **Cryptographic Material Lifecycle**: The application has a well-designed cryptographic lifecycle (salt generation → key derivation → vote encryption) but all material resides in the same SQLite file. There's no separation of privilege between the application accessing election metadata and accessing cryptographic secrets.
+
+4. **Single Process Model**: The application appears to run as a single Quart process, connecting to local SQLite. This means connection configuration (13.2.6) is less critical than in distributed architectures, but still relevant for concurrency handling.
+
+5. **Defense in Depth Gap**: While queries are properly parameterized (SQL injection protection) and sensitive data is filtered at the API layer, the single-layer design means a compromise at the application level exposes all secrets simultaneously.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-cutting Recommendations
+
+### Immediate (Critical/High Priority)
+
+1. **Implement secrets management**: Integrate a key vault (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) to store `opened_key` values separately from the election database. At minimum, enable SQLite encryption (SQLCipher) for the database file.
+
+2. **Restrict `__getattr__` proxy**: Limit the Election class's attribute proxy to only expose a defined set of public operations, preventing unintended access to raw database cursors that return sensitive columns.
+
+### Short-term (Medium Priority)
+
+3. **Document and configure connection behavior**: Add SQLite `PRAGMA busy_timeout`, WAL mode, and explicit connection lifecycle management. Document expected concurrency limits.
+
+4. **Implement file serving allowlist**: Add file extension and name validation to `serve_doc()` to define permitted document types.
+
+5. **Add database encryption at rest**: Use SQLCipher or similar to encrypt the SQLite database, ensuring that file system access alone cannot expose secrets.
+
+### Long-term (Architecture)
+
+6. **Separate secrets storage**: Move cryptographic material (election salts, opened_keys) to a dedicated secrets store with access control, audit logging, and key rotation capabilities.
+
+7. **Implement connection pooling**: Replace ad-hoc `open_database()` calls with an application-level connection pool with documented configuration for timeouts, max connections, and retry behavior.
+
+8. **Add outbound request allowlist**: If the application evolves to include email notifications or external integrations (suggested by `get_voters_for_email()`), implement an allowlist of permitted outbound destinations at the application and network layers.
+        
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