{
  "from_raw": "Jean-Baptiste Onofr\u00e9 <jbonofre@apache.org>",
  "from": "Jean-Baptiste Onofr\u00e9 <jb...@apache.org>",
  "gravatar": "27790393b874159fe05609ca7ed812f9",
  "to": "an...@apache.org,\n de...@polaris.apache.org",
  "subject": "CVE-2026-42810: Apache Polaris: Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it later builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those same characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns and `s3:prefix` conditions.",
  "message-id": "<286256f5-fb1c-43d0-5085-d993de1f6847@apache.org>",
  "mid": "nnht5qo4whzlwcohtwzf1wcoo4kmmoz4",
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    "3466960e75475bcb4ea0c48d32428d74b8fa9f5b32c68378766dfeac@<announce.apache.org>"
  ],
  "dbid": "d3b887f20c6ff6ec1d5ae76687ac4036d5bd37fd113d7a6d09c1321740a3c614",
  "cc": "de...@polaris.apache.org",
  "epoch": 1777737617,
  "list": "<announce.apache.org>",
  "list_raw": "<announce.apache.org>",
  "date": "2026/05/02 16:00:17",
  "private": false,
  "references": "",
  "in-reply-to": "",
  "body": "Severity: important \n\nAffected versions:\n\n- Apache Polaris before 1.4.1\n\nDescription:\n\nApache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nI also confirmed a least-privilege AWS S3 variant in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permission on the victim table and only enough\nPolaris permission to create and use the crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.\n\nReferences:\n\nhttps://polaris.apache.org\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42810\n\n",
  "body_short": "Severity: important \n\nAffected versions:\n\n- Apache Polaris before 1.4.1\n\nDescription:\n\nApache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 acce",
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}